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THE MODERN REVIEW.

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# THE MODERN REVIEW

*A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE.*

"INQUE BREVI SPATIO MUTANTUR SÆCLA ANIMANTUM  
"ET QUASI CURSORES VITAE LAMPADA TRADUNT."

LUCRETIVS.

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# THE MODERN REVIEW.

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JANUARY, 1881.

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## *THE PROPHECIES OF ISAIAH.\**

### I.—THE MINISTRY OF ISAIAH.

STUDENTS of the prophetic writings of the old Testament were glad to welcome, ten years ago, a little volume entitled "The Book of Isaiah Chronologically Arranged." It contained in small compass an admirable summary of the results of recent inquiries into the composition of a book which offers more perplexing problems, perhaps, than even the Pentateuch itself. Moreover, its brief expositions showed a thorough mastery of the literature of Hebrew prophecy, and a happy combination of philological accuracy and sympathy with the prophetic spirit, though traditional interpretations were, for the most part, set aside.

The present volume, in which the author offers the results of ten years' further study, is not laid down upon the lines of its predecessor. The different oracles are not arranged chronologically; the order is that of the Hebrew text and the authorised version. The discussion of literary and critical questions is reserved for separate treatment. The translation is much more independent, and the commentary much fuller. Mr. Cheyne's wealth of

\* *The Prophecies of Isaiah; a new Translation with Commentary and Appendices.* By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne. Vol. I. 1880.

knowledge enables him with easy mastery to present a selection of the best judgments on difficult or disputed passages, and he seeks to maintain a strict impartiality among conflicting views. Many readers might have preferred a little less caution and a little more decision, but students will know how to value the author's self-restraint. Among the new features of the commentary, which at once distinguish it from all other productions of English scholarship, may be reckoned, first of all, the abundance of illustration derived from the recent investigations into Assyrian history, and their application to fix the dates of oracles hitherto uncertain. A second very valuable and interesting element is the frank recognition of the traces of popular religion and mythology occasionally appearing in the prophetic language amid ideas far more exalted. The causes which have led to some change of view with regard to the spirit and scope of prophecy the writer does not set forth, nor is the exact nature of the modifications apparent. But it may, perhaps, be said that this volume exhibits a richer sense of the relation between the human soul and God, enabling it to become the medium of the communication of higher truths to the world. This question affects the treatment of the later rather than the earlier portion of the prophecies gathered under Isaiah's name, and may be more freely discussed when the publication of the second volume shall have put us in complete possession of Mr. Cheyne's views on the significance of the "Servant of Yahveh." We shall, perhaps, best prepare our readers for a consideration of this topic by endeavouring to sketch the conditions under which Isaiah exercised his ministry, and to bring out some of the chief themes of his preaching.

( I. )

The eighth century B.C., to which we owe so many precious monuments of Israel's religion, opened happily for the

country and the people. The division of the monarchy was not, indeed, healed. There were still two States watching each other with mutual jealousy. But first one, and then the other was strong enough to take a decisive lead. On the northern throne sat Jeroboam II., whose energy and skill secured for his kingdom a long period of peace. His father's conquests were confirmed and extended. Judah was still suffering from Amaziah's rash declaration of war against Joash, which soon placed even Jerusalem itself at the mercy of the victor from Samaria. Moab and Ammon were once more subject, and paid their yearly tribute of sheep and wool. The upper districts on the east of the Jordan valley were closely reunited with the western provinces. Damascus, which had so haughtily sent army after army into the uplands of Gilead and the fair valleys of Ephraim, now owned allegiance to the conqueror, who restored the ancient power of his people, and ruled without opposition from the Dead Sea to the distant Hamath under the northern slopes of Lebanon.

The death of Jeroboam, and the murder of his son Zachariah after a brief reign of six months, destroyed whatever hopes might have been formed of permanent prosperity for the northern kingdom. Some of the tributary nations took advantage of the rapid succession of incompetent rulers to revolt, while others sought protection in the south. Under Uzziah, Judah rose to independence and power. He regained possession of the coveted port of Elath, on the Gulf of Akaba, at the head of the Red Sea. He maintained a firm control over the tribes of Edom. One after another of the Philistine cities fell into his hands. Towers arose at exposed points round the capital: the walls, partly destroyed after his father's defeat, were restored and strengthened. The same energy was directed to the development of agriculture. On the highland tracts of sheep pasture he reared towers, and sunk wells for his great herds. Vineyards and

cornfields were spread over land that had fallen out of cultivation. So complete was the security of the kingdom that it seemed as if the ideal future of peace and righteousness must be close at hand. It was in the last year of Uzziah's reign that Isaiah first realised his prophetic call.\* The language in which he afterwards recorded it bears traces of a sense of failure in his mission, or, at least, of a consciousness of difficulties and a foresight of disasters which only forced themselves by degrees upon him. Such, at least, was not the tone of hopefulness awakened by the triumphs of Uzziah. An older contemporary of Isaiah beheld the word of Yahveh speed with swift flight over the land, far as Damascus and Hamath. The Philistine cities, still unsubdued, trembled, while Yahveh camped round about his sanctuary, which none could any more invade or overrun, and bade the city of his choice be glad, for the time of peace was at hand.

Rejoice greatly, daughter Zion, shout, daughter Jerusalem: behold thy king will come to thee, come righteous and victorious, lowly riding upon the ass, and upon the young she-ass's foal; then I exterminate chariots from Ephraim, and horses from Jerusalem; the battle bow is exterminated, and he will speak peace to the nations, ruling from sea to sea and from the River to the borders of the land.†

It was a bold prophecy. The traditional conception of Israel's dominion, to which the people clung, even when the larger part of their nation had disappeared through successive deportations, claimed for their sway the whole of the vast territory between the deserts of Egypt and the Euphrates or "the River." Egypt, Assyria, and Israel, were the three great nations of the world.‡ But "the River" was no longer to be the boundary of the mighty Asiatic power. Even already it had been crossed again and again. A century

\* Is. vi. 1.

† Zech. ix. 9, 10. Ewald's "Prophets of the Old Testament," i., p. 310.

‡ Zech. x. 10, 11; Is. xix. 23—25.

before, Shalmaneser II. had taken tribute from Jehu of Samaria, "bowls and cups and vessels of gold." Not all the glory of Jeroboam II. had availed to keep the armies of Vulnirari out of Syria. Damascus had fallen into his hands. He had marched along the valley of the Orontes, and swept down the Mediterranean shores. He had even, in 797 B.C., led his troops over the heights east of the Jordan as far as the territories of Manasseh. A quarter of a century later, the Assyrian troops again attacked the capital of Arâm. It was clear that the land of Canaan could not hope to escape invasion. Nay, the prophets were ready to find in the distant conquerors the ministers of Yahveh's chastisement, and looked to their advent as the day of Israel's doom.

But the time had not yet come. It was not till the second half of the eighth century that the danger became really pressing. The accession of Tiglath Pileser, in 745 B.C., revived the glories of the Assyrian arms. Ere long he crossed the Euphrates, and in successive campaigns reduced the little kingdoms of Syria. First Arpad fell, then Calno, then Hamath.\* Damascus was as yet unsubdued, but its fate was sealed. The Assyrian supremacy was firmly established, and it was with the folly of madmen rushing on their ruin that the kings of Israel and Damascus chose this crisis for an attack on the southern kingdom of Judah. The only conceivable motive for the invasion must have been the hope of compelling Judah to join the coalition of Israel and Arâm against their common enemy. But the attempt was hopelessly frustrated. The sovereign of Judah was powerless to deal with the difficulties of his time. He was no better than a "wilful boy"; Isaiah saw with grief that the real government lay with the women of the palace.† Their own personal safety was the first thing to be secured. At all hazards the invasion must be checked. So Ahaz threw himself into the arms of the very power from which the

\* 740—738 B.C. Comp. Is. x. 9.

† Is. iii. 12.

invading kings had sought to detach him, and sent an urgent entreaty for help to Tiglath Pileser. The Assyrian monarch was not slow in responding. In 734 he advanced once more into Syria. Rezin, defeated in the field, shut himself up in his capital. "Like a caged bird I enclosed him," says the conqueror, proudly; and while Damascus was invested, the whole southern country lay open to the victor's raids. The city held out for two years, but its fall could not be long delayed, and in 732 Tiglath Pileser entered it in triumph. A splendid court was held, which all the tributary kings were required to attend, and thither Ahaz submissively repaired, to meet the princes of Askelon, and Gaza, and Edom, his hereditary foes, now subject to the same yoke. The city was filled with the retinues of the chiefs, in charge of droves of camels, oxen, and sheep, bred on the upland pastures east of the Jordan. From the mines of Arabia came precious metals; the warehouses of Tyre sent their purple wool; the forests which had escaped the invader's axe gave up their timber; and "birds of the sky," the feathers of whose wings were of "shining violet," were stripped of their plumes for the ladies of the court at Nineveh.\*

The possession of Damascus left the way to Samaria quite clear. Tiglath Pileser did not push his victories further; but after his death a fresh descent was provoked, under Shalmaneser IV., by the rash revolt of King Hoshea. Submission was inevitable; but, with a resolve which no danger could tame, he sought the alliance of Egypt, and boldly withheld the Assyrian tribute. Shalmaneser was engaged in the blockade of Tyre, but he detached some of his troops to seize the rebel prince, and formally surrounded Samaria. The city lay on the summit of an isolated hill, in the midst of a valley sweeping westwards to the sea. Rising

\* See the inscriptions in Smith's "Eponym Canon," p. 150; "Records of the Past," v., p. 48.



above the vineyards which clothed the slopes, its ivory palaces stood out like the chaplet upon the brow of the reveller.\* The possession of the surrounding heights gave the conqueror no advantage in a siege which must be conducted by investment and assault, and the inhabitants kept the enemy at bay through two years. Shalmaneser died; but the troops were not withdrawn; indeed, the accession of a new sovereign, in the person of Sargon, only led to the display of fresh vigour. In the third year the proud city fell; large numbers of the people were deported into the north-eastern provinces of the empire; and the kingdom of Israel was at an end (B.C. 721).

But this was only the beginning of Sargon's victories. The annals of his reign reveal a prodigious energy of conquest. He crosses mighty forests; digs reservoirs in the hot depths of the valleys; "sweeps" through the land of Hamath "like a flood;" "in the anger of his heart" he invades countries "like a raven;" "plunges" on hapless cities "like a storm;" or "bursts" over them "as a cloud." From province to province are sent long trains of captive populations, "pulled from their dwellings;" and spoil of all kinds pours into the royal treasury. In the face of dangers such as these, hereditary enmities were subdued. Philistia and Edom, which had loved to harass Judah in her hours of weakness, now knew that her foes were their own. A combination was formed, in which Ashdod seems to have taken the lead.† But even their united resistance, with the alliance of Egypt, was in vain. The armies of Sargon marched along the lowlands to the Philistine city, and the majesty of the great god Assur overwhelmed its king. The punishment of Ashdod was followed by the invasion of Judah; and though the fragmentary records of the reign of Hezekiah are silent, the great oracle of Isaiah x. 5—xii. 6, is referred by Mr. Cheyne to this event, and confirms the

\* Is. xxviii. 1.

† "Eponym Canon," p. 129.

somewhat broken witness of the Assyrian annals. At any rate, it is plain (from x. 11) that the invader was the captor of Samaria. The conqueror advanced with the proud expectation that Jerusalem and her images must yield, like Samaria, like Damascus, and the long list of vanquished "kingdoms of the not-gods." But the prophet took no heed of the invader's self-imposed function of "guarding the honour of Assur;" he had an eye only for his insolent defiance of Yahveh.

For he hath said, "By the strength of my hand have I done it; and by my wisdom, for I am discerning, and I removed the bounds of peoples, and their treasures I plundered, and brought down like a Mighty One those that sat (on thrones); and my hand reached as a nest the riches of peoples, and as a man gathereth forsaken eggs I have gathered all the earth, and there was none that fluttered a wing nor opened a beak, nor chirped." Is the axe to vaunt itself against him who heweth with it? Or the saw to brag against him who moveth it to and fro?\*

So the "rod of Yahveh's anger" was swung by a higher hand, which turned it back when the blow was most imminent; or, to use another of the prophet's metaphors, the crown of Assyria's foliage was suddenly lopped with a dreadful crash! At any rate, the city, the "Lion of God," escaped.

But the danger was only averted for a time. It revived with greater intensity under Sennacherib. The titles which the court annalists ascribed to him duly represented him as the faithful servant of the will of Heaven. He was "the King of the four regions, the appointed ruler, the worshipper of the Great God, guardian of right, lover of justice, maker of peace, going the right way, preserver of good."† The modern historian brushes away all these claims, and pronounces him "the typical Eastern monarch; all the vices of

\* Is. x. 13—15—transl. Cheyne.

† Smith, "Assyrian Discoveries," p. 296.

pride and arrogance, cruelty and lust of power, so conspicuous in Oriental sovereigns, were developed to excess in him." \* Sennacherib had come into power on the murder of his father, Sargon ; and his first task was to pacify the empire by the reduction of Babylon, where Merodach Baladan had assumed the crown. The faintest symptom of relief of pressure in the West was followed as usual by a renewal of the efforts for independence. The people of Ekron deposed Padi, the Assyrian nominee, and sent him in chains to Jerusalem. Hezekiah was thus committed to the struggle. The danger of revolt became urgent, and in the spring of 701 the armies of Sennacherib crossed the Lebanon and marched along the coast. The Phœnician cities submitted at once. Askelon held out a little while, but could offer no permanent resistance ; Ekron fell, and its rebellious princes and priests were massacred. Sennacherib himself pressed on towards Egypt to Lachish ; and meanwhile sent a body of his troops to invade Judah. Jerusalem was summoned to surrender, and Padi was sent back to his Assyrian supporters. The Assyrian inscriptions claim the capture of forty-six cities, and with their usual imagery, represent Hezekiah as shut up in Jerusalem "like a bird in a cage." It is impossible here to essay any discussion of the serious difficulties which present themselves in a comparison of the Hebrew and Assyrian records of the subsequent events. Mr. Cheyne has collected all the available information ; but not even his carefully guarded conjectures and skilful combinations leave a satisfactory impression of solid reality. There is evidence that Sennacherib was baffled in his attempts on Egypt. A battle was fought, in which he claimed the victory. But it was a victory which permitted no further advance, and was speedily followed by retreat. Meanwhile a portion of his army was yet before Jerusalem. With dauntless confidence Isaiah still defied the invader.

\* Smith, "History of Assyria," p. 126.

Vain were his rage and his recklessness ; the doom of the captive was already prepared for his insolence ; with a hook for his nostrils, and a bridle on his lips, Yahveh would turn him back by the way which he had come. The details of the catastrophe are veiled in Assyrian silence, and hidden under the emblems of Hebrew imagery. Late or soon, it would seem, a pestilence did its deadly work. Unable to reduce Jerusalem, unable to enter Egypt, Sennacherib found the chief objects of his expedition frustrated. The captured cities of Judah had been handed over to the tributary princes of Ashdod, Gaza, and Ekron ; a prodigious quantity of spoil, gold and silver, ivory thrones and buffalo skins, eunuchs and musicians for the harem, had been despatched to Nineveh. Here was material enough for a court historian to prepare a glowing narrative of the great campaign. But its omissions are not less significant than its recorded triumphs. It does not venture to relate a conquest of Jerusalem ; it refrains from the usual enumeration of the prisoners after the victory over the Egyptian forces ; and it hurries its hero-king back to his capital without a reason for so abrupt a change of plan. The discretion of the annalist, it has been shrewdly conjectured, conceals the intimations of disaster, if not of defeat, which the Hebrew tradition preserved. Through the dim memories of siege and despondency, of relief and thankfulness, the eye of faith saw the mystic figure of Yahveh's angel looming with dreadful mien. The Assyrian detachment before Jerusalem swelled into a mighty host, laid low in a night by the touch of death. The war was at an end ; the city was delivered ; there was nothing left for Sennacherib but to break up his camp, and march back to Nineveh. The " multitude of his chariots " passed across the wide plain to the Euphrates in diminished numbers, and for the last time. The great Assyrian invasions were over.

## ( II. )

Such, in rough outline, were the external events of the troubled period of Isaiah's prophetic ministry. The Assyrians could never be far out of his sight. The distant nations who composed their troops, the swiftness of their immense marches, the perfect discipline so that none was weary and there was no stumbler therein, the order which never unloosed the girdle nor allowed the thong of the shoes to be torn, the arrows sharpened and the bows all strung, the horses' hoofs solid as flint, and chariots fleet as the whirlwind,—all these were constantly present to his mind, and grew into a distinct place in his conception of the divine purposes. He beheld them summoned by Yahveh; the signal was lifted, the banner unfurled; and from the end of the earth came the awful response of the booted warriors' noisy tramp, till the fair fields and the gay cities of Israel and Judah were laid low beneath them. They came, then, to execute the chastisements of heaven: Asshur was the rod of Yahveh's anger, the staff with which he smote was no less than Yahveh's indignation. Deep must have been the crimes which merited a penalty so awful; and there is no need to read far into the reports of the prophet's discourses to learn what were the offences which drew down so great a woe.

The ministry of Isaiah fell at a time when the monotheism of Israel was struggling into clear and articulate expression. Another century must pass ere it could be definitely formulated in the language of the Deuteronomist. But its noblest minds had already grasped the idea of the spirituality, the universal presence, and the absolute holiness of Yahveh. The characteristics which appear to us inseparable from the unity of the Deity were not, perhaps, inconsistent in their view with the existence of other gods to whom the charge of alien nations might have been

allotted. These remote possibilities, however, did not affect the abomination of idolatries at home. Whatever might be the method of divine government for the ends of the earth, the sole right of Yahveh to the worship of the house of Israel was beyond dispute. With some of its popular forms the prophet had no quarrel. He tolerated the local sanctuaries; the high places on the summits of the hills, the devotion that had gathered round sacred trees and stones and wells, had to bear no interference from him. There is no evidence to connect him with the reform of the national cultus which Hezekiah began, but was unable permanently to complete. But though the centralisation of the worship of Yahveh, by the restriction of it to the temple at Jerusalem, does not seem to have presented itself to the prophet's mind as a necessary or even a desirable aim, it was indispensable that, wherever it was celebrated, that worship should be kept pure. The ancient Canaanite usages connected with it must be abandoned. The association of the emblems of Baal, of Ashêra (the goddess of fertility), with the altars of Yahveh, must be severed. The stone pillars of Baal, the wooden posts driven into the ground as symbols of Ashêra, the *chammanim* (or "sun images"),—all these could have no place in the true service of the Holy One of Israel. Nor could the costly idols, covered with plates of silver or gold, be tolerated in presence of his "excellent majesty." The intellectual scorn which Isaiah pours on the stupidity of the man who bows before the "not-gods" made for him to adore, and then throws them away in the day of terror, almost rivals his moral indignation with the sinful people who throng the Temple with guilty hands and corrupt hearts, in the hope of atoning by punctuality of sacrifice for wantonness and crime. The same perverseness led them to put a ready faith in any one but Yahveh. The necromancers and wizards had their eager crowds of followers, who proclaimed that nothing was more natural than

that the people should have resort to their Elohim,\* the living consult the dead. In critical seasons, it was with Death that they made their covenant for defence, with the powers of the under-world that they sought alliance.† Ready for every novelty, they caught at strange rites from the East, watched the clouds for omens like their neighbours the Philistines,‡ and Ahaz, after tendering his submission to Tiglath Pileser at Damascus, could not be satisfied without taking the pattern of a new altar for the Temple at Jerusalem.§ The weakness of Ahaz, and his ready response to fresh influences, secured for him the hateful distinction of being the first Hebrew king of whom it is recorded that he practised the horrible Molech worship, and, in the euphemistic language long afterwards current, “made his son to pass over by fire.”|| It was with terrible significance that Isaiah employed the imagery of the dreadful burning-place of the Tophet against Sennacherib. What better fate could be in reserve for him and his army than to perish in its ghastly flames! It was all prepared; it had been made deep and broad; the mighty pile needed only its victims and the touch of fire; and the prophet saw “the breath of Yahveh, like a torrent of brimstone,” ready to “kindle upon it.”¶

The disorganisation of religion had its natural counterpart in the corruption of morals. The arrogant defiance of Yahveh, expressed in the popular idolatries, took the form of haughtiness and self-indulgence within the circle of human relations. Under the young Ahaz, no better than a “wilful child,” ruled by the women of his palace, the exactions of the nobles became more tyrannical than ever. The ambi-

\* Is. viii. 19. I cannot think that Mr. Cheyne has done well in abandoning this interpretation (see “Isaiah Chronologically Arranged,” pp. 29, 33). Surely the parallelism makes it quite plain that the Elohim here are the spirits of the mighty dead, as in 1 Samuel xxviii. 13.

† Is. xxviii. 15.

‡ Is. ii. 6.

§ 2 Kings xvi. 10.

|| 2 Kings xvi. 3.

¶ Is. xxx. 33.

tion of increasing their estates could not be suppressed. Little by little the smaller proprietors were ejected: house was joined to house, field added to field, until the wealthy could look round upon the lands they had secured, and find that they "dwelt alone." As the rich became richer, the poor grew poorer. They could not resist extortion, and lay prostrate beneath open violence and secret bribery. Among the wealthy, luxury ran riot in dress and revelry. The great ladies of Jerusalem excited the prophet's indignation by their fineries; but baldness should fall upon their artificial curls; their delicate scents fade away in rottenness; their splendid state-dresses be exchanged for sackcloth.\* Through all classes ran the degradation of drunkenness. They began early in the morning; they continued far into the night. Not even the sacred orders of religion were exempt from it. That which had been the disgrace of Samaria became the infamy of Zion. Priest and prophet, even, were seen to "reel with strong drink;" they came, perhaps from the merrymakings of the sacrificial feasts, "swallowed up through wine, [staggering with strong drink." Nay, they did not shrink from undertaking in this state their most solemn duties; the seer "reeled in the vision," the priest-judge "tottered" as he gave judgment.† Was it, then, wonderful that the presence of a great danger should reduce the reckless citizens to despair, instead of quickening courage and resolve? When the troops of Sargon appeared beneath the walls, the people crowded to the housetops to see the sight; and the prophet sarcastically inquired what was the meaning of the uproar, the noise of joy. Yahveh called them to weeping, bade them mourn with sackcloth and shaven head; "but behold, joy and gladness, killing oxen and slaughtering sheep, eating flesh and drinking wine, 'Eat and drink, for to-morrow we die!'"‡ So, when the city that had been the home of righteousness was now the

\* Is. iii. 16, *seq.*

† xxviii. 7.

‡ xxii. 12.



lodging only of assassins, when its "law-makers" had become "law-breakers," the prophet summed up his "great arraignment" by hurling at them the bitter epithets, "Sodom judges," "Gomorrah people." \*

What hearing could there be in store for the teacher of divine things amid a nation so corrupt and degraded? His words seemed so strange that they were received with stupefaction, though not this time of wine; men went away from his preaching "staggering, but not with strong drink."† Repetition of his warnings was met with mockery, they were no children, babes but just weaned, whom he addressed: it was always, they complained petulantly, "command upon command, command upon command, rule upon rule, rule upon rule, a little here, a little there."‡ Years after the great moment of his first call, the prophet recorded some of the experiences of his mission, as they moulded and modified his earliest hopes. "Go and say to this people," said the Divine Voice, "Hear ye indeed, but understand not, and see ye indeed, but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat, and its ears heavy, and its eyes besmear, lest it should see with its eyes, and hear with its ears, and its heart should understand, and it should be converted and be healed."§ An awful mission, indeed, that should have this for its purpose!—awful enough that had it for its consequence. To have started with this expectation of failure must have taken all hope away at the outset. But nothing is more remarkable in the prophet's writings than the glow of anticipation which suffuses them. It is no blind trust in the inviolability of the sacred city. It is not only the conviction of Yahveh's care which enables him to face every danger in the certainty of deliverance. It is something more: it is the assurance that in the heart of Israel itself lies a store of true life which will still secure for it a noble future. Its iniquities must meet with their appointed doom:

\* Is. i. 10.

† xxix. 9.

‡ xxviii. 9, 10.

§ vi. 9, 10.

upon its sins must fall the allotted penalty; but these cannot wholly exhaust it: upon the remnant they will work with purifying power, and a new age shall begin. When first the prophet realised the stupefying effect which the resistance to his preaching was producing, he cried out, "How long, O Lord?" "Until the cities be waste without inhabitants, and houses without men, and the ground desolate," was the reply. But some should be left; they might be only a tenth; and this, again, might be exterminated: nevertheless, like the terebinth and the oak, which sent out fresh shoots when the trunk was felled and only the stump remained, there was still a seed of holiness, some faithful souls, from whom would spring forth a fresh growth of strength and beauty. Chastisement and purification, destruction and regeneration, these ideas recur again and again in Isaiah's utterances. Sometimes the one is more prominent, sometimes the other: but they are never far separated, and they are always closely connected with the immediate political anticipations of the time. Upon these are founded even the most brilliant of the delineations of the ideal future, which would be inaugurated with the "Day of Yahveh." The forms of this expectation were by no means always the same; let us attempt very briefly to show their relation to the external events and the internal circumstances of Israel's history during this period.

### ( III. )

That national sin must be followed by national punishment was no discovery of Isaiah's. It was already, perhaps, a common-place of the prophetic schools. It was founded on the essential idea of Israel's religion, the conception that Yahveh was holy, and that his people must be holy too. If they were not, they might be allowed for a season to prosper in their unfaithfulness: but a time would come when the

doom of Heaven would fall upon them. This was "Yahveh's Day." Vainly would a people already suffering for its guilt look to this for relief; "there is no brightness in it," said Amos sternly; as well might a man escaping from a lion fall in with a bear, or flee for refuge into the house, and there be bitten by a snake.\* The incidental manner in which the term is introduced by Amos, for the first time in prophetic literature, proves clearly enough that the expectation which it symbolised was no new one: but it was reserved for Isaiah to give to it a new force and range. It looms before him, now distant and now near; sometimes it seems as though it would dawn for Israel only, sometimes as though it would rise upon all the nations. As it is first dimly discerned, it will be the supreme manifestation of Yahveh's majesty. All that is proud and lofty will be brought low: not even the towers and fortresses so lately built by Uzziah and Jotham, or the stately Tarshish ships, can escape. The idols will be thrown to the moles and the bats, and their worshippers will creep into the rocky caves, hide themselves among the rents of the crags, away from the intolerable terror of his appearing. Nay, even the great forest-trees, which were so often made unhallowed sanctuaries; the mountain summits themselves, with their altars lifted so proudly to the sky, must be brought low. "Yahveh alone shall be exalted in that day; and the not-gods, the whole shall pass away."† But immorality must be punished as well as idolatry. So Yahveh will wash off the filth of the daughters of Zion, and cleanse the blood of Jerusalem from her midst; but it will be by the terrible agency of "a blast of judgment, and a blast of extermination." Some, indeed, shall be left; these shall be called holy, "written down for life." Over the divine abode in Zion shall be the solemn signs of his presence, in cloud by day and fire by night; while the very land shall bring forth

\* Amos vi. 18, 19.

\* Is. 12—21.

more abundantly in "pride and adornment unto the escaped of Israel." \*

It is on these lines—the purification of worship, and the establishment of the supremacy of Yahveh, the reconstitution of society in righteousness, and the miraculous renovation of nature—that the picture of the ideal future, to be ushered in with Yahveh's Day, is drawn. To one prophecy, warning and denunciation give the prevailing tone: to another, comfort and hope. But the eye of the seer never travels far away from the immediate events before him; it might almost seem as if the greater and the more threatening the danger, the more sure was he that the divine judgment was close at hand, the more confident that the age of regeneration would set in at once. He chooses the very names of his children to express his convictions. One son he calls Shear-Yashub, "a remnant shall return"; another, when an Assyrian invasion is imminent, bears the ominous combination, Maher-shalal-hash-baz, "swift spoil, speedy prey." When Rezin and Pekah, at the head of their combined armies, are endeavouring to induce Ahaz by force to join the coalition against Assyria, the prophet declares to the trembling prince that he will be delivered from the two kings he fears before the babe who bears the significant name Immanuel, "God with us,"† has learned

\* Is. iv. 2—6.

† Mr. Cheyne frankly recognises the difficulty of this passage. "There is no explanation," he observes, "which does not require us to make some assumption not directly sanctioned by the text. The only question is which assumption is most in harmony with Isaiah's early prophecies." He decides in favour of the theory, "that the 'young woman' is the mother of the Messiah, whose advent, as Ewald has well pointed out, was expected by Isaiah to synchronise with the Assyrian invasion." It is an obvious objection to this interpretation that nothing is said about Immanuel as a king or deliverer. He serves to mark a period of a few years, and then really disappears, for the use of the name in viii. 8, cf. 10, cannot establish for him a Messianic character. This Mr. Cheyne freely admits; but he suggests that this only adds probability to a suspicion founded on other circumstances that "Chap. vii. consists of an incomplete summary of Isaianic discourses;" or the prophecy is to be regarded "as the first rough sketch of the Messianic

to know right from wrong,—their lands shall be desolate, their peoples captive.\* But he does not stop there. The same power which overwhelms Syria and Ephraim will descend on Judah as well. The unhappy country will become the battle-field between Assyria and Egypt: the land will lapse out of cultivation; the only food will be milk from the few cattle turned out to wander on the mountains, and wild honey gathered from the holes in the cliffs. A little later, and the Assyrian flood is seen afar off, like the overflow of one of the great Mesopotamian rivers; it will come sweeping through the country, “overflowing and passing over,” so that nothing shall escape. The awful day will be nigh. Yahveh will show himself holy, a “rock of stumbling to the houses of Israel, a gin and a snare to the inhabitants of Jerusalem: and many shall stumble at it, and fall, and be broken, and snared, and taken.”† The baffled and bewildered people, unable to find deliverance through the wizards and necromancers, will curse their unavailing gods, and disappear in the darkness from which there is no dawn. But the prophecy does not end in gloom. Through the deep shade there shines a growing light. It breaks over the northern districts of Zebulun and Naphtali, which have been exposed again and again to cruel deportations at the conqueror’s hands. The people, reduced to the scantiest numbers, multiply with a divine power. The symbols of foreign bondage, the yoke, the taskmaster’s rod, are broken for ever. War is at an end, and the warrior’s boot, the blood-stained cloak, are cast into a mighty bonfire.

doctrine, to be filled up on subsequent opportunities.” I cannot say that this appears to me satisfactory. The nature or character of the child is of really no consequence. The whole stress of the prophecy falls on the shortness of the period within which the events are to be compressed. This is not measured numerically, but by the time required for an infant to arrive at years of discretion. When the time has gone by, and the events have come about, the truth of Yahveh’s word will be demonstrated, and the sign embodied in the boy will remain to convict unbelievers.

\* *Is.* vii. 14—16.

† *viii.* 14, 15.

The ideal King is at hand. "For a child is born unto us, a Son is given unto us, and the government resteth upon his back, and his name is called 'Wonder-Counsellor, God-Mighty-One, Everlasting-Father, Prince of Peace;' for the increase of the government, and for peace without end, upon the throne of David, and throughout his kingdom, in establishing and supporting it by justice and by righteousness, from henceforth even for ever." \*

The invasion took place. Damascus fell; Samaria fell; desolation settled over Ephraim; new tribes filled the homes of the old inhabitants; but the land yielded no miraculous increase, the soldier's tramp was heard as before, the yoke was pressed with a heavier burden, the staff was swung with more stinging power. The danger came nearer to Jerusalem as Sargon and his troops laid waste the cities of Judah, and threatened the capital. The prophet's hopes only rose the higher. Here was, in truth, the instrument of the divine chastisement, "the rod of Yahveh's anger."† Not for long should the Assyrian survey the land of Yahveh with his haughty eyes. The Light of Israel would break out in fire and his Holy One in flame; it would spread destruction through the conquering array as through a mighty forest, and a remnant of Israel should be saved and return to their true Lord. This is a "final work and decisive, overflowing with righteousness. For a final work and a decisive doth the Lord, Yahveh Sabaoth, execute within all the land."‡ The deliverance appears here as Yahveh's own doing: no "hero-God" stands forth as the divinely-appointed champion of Israel: the ideal King only comes upon the scene when the way is cleared, and the world is ready for the rule of righteousness. He springs from David's house, and he sits upon David's throne. The new society could be conceived

\* Is. ix. 6, 7. Cheyne's transl. But on the epithet "Everlasting-Father" see Hitzig's note in his recently published "*Vorlesungen ueber Biblische Theologie und Messianische Weissagungen*," ed. Kneucker, 1880, p. 207.

† x. 5.

‡ x. 22, 23 (Cheyne).

only as a kingdom, for it could not subsist without government ; and the sole regulating principle known was a monarchy established under the true religion. So the new monarch will be endowed with the clearness of insight, the courage in action, the reverence for the divine will, which will enable him to reorganise all human relations. Nature will undergo a like transformation. When the remaining guilty have been punished by the new ruler, and harmony is established among men by the extermination of the wicked, and the universal spread of the knowledge of Yahveh among the good, the animals will share the same gentle influence. The tyrant falls smitten, the ungodly perishes, by the mere breath of the monarch's lips ; but the lion and the bear need suffer no penalty, for their ferocity came not from unbelieving hearts : the sympathy pervading all created things suffices to bring them into accord with the general innocence and peace. But the blessings of this sovereignty cannot be confined to Israel's land. Through the wide circle to whose bounds its captive people had been carried, they would be felt with a restoring power. The signal of heaven would be lifted over the holy mountain : thither would the outcast flock from the remotest quarters of the earth : the old jealousies which had divided the nation would be forgotten : and a reunited people would be able to " pounce upon the shoulder of Philistia," " put forth their hand on Edom and Moab," and reduce into subjection all their hereditary foes. Well might Zion prepare herself for the song of triumph, for great within her was Israel's Holy One.\*

Such was the future which Isaiah beheld as city after city laid its submission at the feet of Sargon. But the " dreadful crash " with which the conqueror was to be brought low never came. Sargon retired in safety, and after a few years his successor Sennacherib resumed the western war. The peril of Judah became greater than ever, and still the daunt-

\* *Is. xi., xii.*

less confidence of the prophet promised deliverance. As in the previous invasion, no "Wonder-Counsellor" could avail: when the "Lion of God" was compassed with her enemies, God alone could rescue her. Micah might boldly denounce ruin against the very sanctuary, and turn its courts into a wild forest-thicket;\* but for Isaiah that sanctuary was inviolable. When the citizens of Jerusalem could do no more, the peal of Yahveh's voice would be heard; the staff of doom would be swung from heaven against the invader;† like a mighty bird, Yahveh would hover over the city to cover and save it; nay, he would even descend himself on Zion's hill and fight.‡ Once more, the ideal kingdom will be established; or rather, the existing sovereign and people will realise their opportunity, will know their high calling, and rise to fulfil it. "Righteously the king shall reign, and the princes justly shall they rule."§ All spiritual capacities shall be heightened; even stammering tongues shall speak plainly, and the heart of the hasty shall perceive distinctly. Around the monarch, perhaps around Hezekiah himself, shall gather a beauty wrought by the divine favour and inward purification, to which all eyes shall turn.|| The land will not be less blessed than its rulers. As Yahveh's enemies perish on the mountains they claimed for their own, fertilising streams will break forth; the moon shall grow bright as the sun, and the sun shall yield a sevenfold light; and so nature and man shall move together in a mystic harmony. The expectation of future conquest is subdued; the details of the picture are chastened; but its outlines remain the same as before. The change is at hand, near as Sennacherib's troops and their impending destruction.

Once only does the prophet throw the whole conception forward to an indefinite distance. A prophecy addressed to the women of Jerusalem, inserted among other oracles

\* Mic. iii. 12.      † Is. xxx. 30, 32.      ‡ xxxi. 4, 5.      § xxxii. 1.

|| xxxiii. 17.



referring apparently to the later Assyrian invasion, appears to threaten an actual desolation of the capital itself. Thorns and briars will come up upon the joyous houses of the merry town. "The palace shall be forsaken, the hum of the city deserted, the mound and the watch-tower shall be instead of caves for ever, the joy of wild asses, the pasture of flocks."\* The term "mound," "Ophel," suggests the slope of the Temple hill which bore that name; and this identification converts the prediction from a general announcement of the ruin of whole towns and the captivity of their inhabitants† into a declaration of doom upon Jerusalem itself.‡ Be this as it may, it is noteworthy that a new power of renovation is brought in. The desolation will last "until the Spirit be poured out upon us from on high." The gifts of heaven will not be concentrated on the shoot of Jesse's stock. They will be spread over all. No need here for the hero-King to reorganise society. The great end will be effected spontaneously under the immediate influence of Yahveh's creative might. "Justice shall inhabit the pasture-country, and righteousness shall dwell in the garden-land, and the fruit of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness, quietness, and confidence for ever; and my people shall inhabit a home of peace and dwellings of confidence, and easeful resting-places."§

From an ideal such as this in which spiritual force was the only agency, visions of conquest necessarily faded away. Revenge upon ancient enemies ceased to be desired. One of the oldest prophetic oracles, employed by both Isaiah and Micah, had foretold the elevation of Yahveh's mountain

\* Is. xxxii. 14, 15.

† As in v. 8, 10; vi. 11—13.

‡ It does not, however, appear necessary. Mound and watch-tower are quite indefinite; and Ophel was not restricted to the slope of the Temple hill; it is used of a hill in or near Samaria, 2 Kings, v. 24. And the absence of allusion to the sanctuary seems to me a strong presumption that the Temple-hill was not intended.

§ xxxii. 15—18 (Cheyne).

above all other hills. Thither should the nations go up, to learn the ways of Jacob's God, and walk in his paths.\* With this declaration Isaiah had opened his first prophecies: in its spirit (if we may assign to him, xix. 23—25) he concluded his last.† He had already described the Ethiopians as bringing presents to Yahveh to Zion, "the place of his name," on occasion of the great Assyrian overthrow.‡ But what of Assyria itself, and Israel's other great oppressor, Egypt? With their vast dominions, their immense armies, their wealth, their civilisation, they represented all the known powers of the world, and they had used those powers with crushing force against Yahveh's people. In earlier days the prophet had been content to announce that on the fall of the Assyrian invaders a highway should be opened for the captives across the Euphrates, as in ancient days the Red Sea had parted for their forefathers on the march out of Egypt.§ But when the danger was over, he could not rest in the contemplation of the mighty empire laid low in the dust. The supremacy of Yahveh over the whole earth must secure him universal recognition. The idol countries must be smitten; but the blow would be followed by restoration: "Yahveh shall smite Egypt, smiting and healing; and when they return unto Yahveh, he shall receive their supplications and shall heal them." So, between the two great empires, stretching almost to the opposite ends of the earth, there shall be a highway, uniting all lands in a bond of peace. In the midst lay Israel, whose God they should both serve. "In that day shall Israel be a third to Egypt and to Assyria, even a

\* Is. ii. 2—4.

† With the caution which everywhere restrains Mr. Cheyne from pronouncing too decided judgments, he gives full weight to the arguments for a post-Isaianic or even a Maccabean origin of vv. 18—25. It is no doubt a case in which one is apt to be misled by a "personal estimate." But surely vv. 23—25 must belong to a period before the rivalry between Assyria and Egypt was over.

‡ xviii. 7.

§ x. 15—16.

blessing within the earth, forasmuch as Yahveh Sabaoth hath blessed him, saying, 'Blessed is my people Egypt, and the work of my hands Assyria, and mine inheritance Israel.' " \* A glorious vision, indeed, far nobler than that earlier hope of Israel's vengeance and supremacy. By what means the conversion should be effected, the prophet does not stay to reveal. The hero-King was never charged with the preacher's duty, nor is there as yet any hint of the great missionary function of Yahveh's people to the heathen. It is enough to declare the event; Yahveh will himself provide the means.

The so-called Messianic expectation reached its climax in Isaiah's glowing oracles. But even these varied in tone, in the time set for the great change, in the instrument by which it must be accomplished. Other prophets took up the same theme, but hardly with the same exaltation. With the fall of Jerusalem, the overthrow of the kingdom, and the captivity of the people, the hope of the future could no longer retain the same form. During the sufferings and sorrows of the exile, the seers of Israel beheld for it a new destiny, and the hero-King vanished, and the Servant of Yahveh took his place. What is the relation between these two? Did they both appear to the same eyes? Mr. Cheyne's first volume does not supply his answer to this question. It is connected with the theory of prophecy as well as with literary criticism, and must be reserved for subsequent discussion.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

\* *Is. xix. 24—25* (Cheyne)

## GRÆCIA REDIVIVA.\*

"**T**IS Greece, but living Greece no more," sang Byron at the beginning of this century, when the Mussulman was still in the land. And yet a few years later he discerned at all events enough of the promise of life in that degenerate country to make him willing and able both to live and to die for its freedom.

The very last lines he wrote, on the 22nd of January, 1824, at Mesolongi, presage with a sad serenity his coming end.

Seek out—less often sought than found—  
A soldier's grave, for thee the best ;  
There look around and choose thy ground,  
And take thy rest.

And though the soldier's grave was found where many another's has been, not upon the field of battle but on the bed of sickness, still of him as of another, it might well be said that nothing in his life became him like the leaving of it. His purse, his counsel, and his time were ever at the service

\* 'Εθνικὸν Ἡμερολόγιον τοῦ ἔτους 1871, ἐκδοθὲν ἐπὶ Μαρίνου Π. Βρετοῦ. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus.

Πανελληνίον Ἡμερολόγιον 1880, ἐκδιδόμενον ἐπὶ Σακεράτους Α. Παρασυράκη. London: Williams and Norgate.

Greece and "The Times," by "Pierre Lestoile" in the *Minerva* for October, 1880. Rome: Office of *Minerva*.

Τραγούδια Ῥωμαίικα: Popularia Carmina Græciæ recentioris edidit Arnoldus Passow. Leipzig: Trübner, 1860.

The "Statesman's Year Book" for 1875. London: Macmillan.

Selections from Modern Greek Writers. By C. C. Felton. London: Trübner, 1856.

"Νάθαν ὁ σοφός," Lessing's "Nathan the Wise," translated by Angelos Vlachos. Athens, 1879.

of the Greeks. In the midst of failing health and civil discord, in reply to an invitation to retire to a more salubrious place of abode until his strength should be repaired, he wrote, "I cannot quit Greece while there is a chance of my being of any (even supposed) utility; there is a stake worth millions such as I am, and while I can stand at all I must stand by the cause." To the Provisional Government of the insurgents he writes :—

"You have fought gloriously; act honourably towards your fellow-citizens and the world, and it will then no more be said, as has been repeated for two thousand years, that Philopœmen was the last of the Grecians. Let not calumny itself compare the patriot Greek, when resting from his labours, to the Turkish Pasha, whom his victories have exterminated." In his dying words the names of his daughter and of Greece were the last upon his lips.

These closing scenes in the chequered and by no means spotless, but still in its final outcome not inglorious, career of one whom both as a man and as a poet posterity have begun to recognise as more sinned against than sinning, suggest the pertinent questions—What would Byron have thought could he have been living now? Would he in any measure have seen of the travail of his soul and been satisfied? Was Philopœmen, indeed, the last of the Grecians? Have the Greeks as a nation falsified the hopes that Byron entertained, or have they fulfilled his worst misgivings, and was even the generous commendation he bestowed on their first achievements in the war of independence but fulsome flattery?

To begin with the last inquiry. Most of us are too young to remember the Greek Insurrection of 1821—1829. We have all of us a vague notion that had it not been for the wholly unpremeditated battle of Navarino, the Greeks would never have attained the measure of independence that is theirs. But any one

who has taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the history of the times will see that really to the Greeks alone belongs the credit of their own deliverance. They fought single-handed, without encouragement—nay, in the teeth of positive discouragement on the part of the Great Powers of Europe—until it became evident that they would die sooner than return to slavery ; and then not the Governments, but the peoples of Europe, demanded interference in their favour. As long as there was the least hope of the pacification of Greece there was not a Court or a Cabinet in Europe, from England to Russia, that would not gladly have seen them “ pacified,” that is, crushed into submission. As a sample of their heroism, let a single instance suffice. Perhaps few but the readers of Spyridon Tricupes’ “ History of the Greek Insurrection ” are aware that there was a modern as well as an ancient battle in the Pass of Thermopylæ. In the first year of the insurrection, when the commanders of Eastern Greece heard of the approach of Omer-Pasha-Vrioni and the Vizier Kiuse-Mehmet-Pasha, they took up a position almost identical with that occupied by their illustrious ancestors who withstood to the bitter end the Persian invader Xerxes. One general, Panurgiâs, held the monastery of Mustafa Bey with 600 Salonites, and the venerable Bishop Isaïas, son of Solon ; a second leader, Dyoviniotes, with 400, took possession of the bridge of the Gorgopotamos ; and Diakos, a latter-day Leonidas, occupied the bridge of the Spercheios, and the road that led towards the mountain Pass of Thermopylæ. The combined forces of Omer-Vrioni and Mehmet-Pasha attacked them in three several detachments so as to cut them off from aiding one another. Panurgiâs and his soldiers were routed, and Diakos, seeing the danger of his troops upon the bridge, sent two of his officers, Kalyvas and Bakogiannes, to rally them, accompanied by only two private soldiers. But scarcely had they leapt upon the bridge when their com-

rades were dispersed, and these four intrepid men rushed into an inn opposite the bridge, shut the door, and kept up a fire on the foe in the vain hope of so decimating their forces that they might not have strength enough left to fall upon Diakos in the Pass. Meanwhile, his own followers wavered, and began to think their only safety lay in flight. Only Diakos himself and a few companions remembering how, on this very spot, Leonidas of old had perished, determined to stand their ground. Urged by his adopted son to save himself upon a horse which he held ready for his foster-father to mount, entreating him to think of the service he might hereafter render to his country, he replied like a true Laconian, "Diakos flies not." At this moment he is assailed at close quarters, his brother is slain before him, when with barely ten soldiers he retreats to some rugged rocks close to the Pass, and fights for an hour against fearful odds. At length all his comrades are slain, except his foster-son. He himself is wounded in his right shoulder, his gun falls to the ground, but still he keeps his foes at bay holding his pistol in his left hand, until he is recognised, surrounded, and taken bleeding, yet alive. His four friends inside the inn, seeing nothing more of Diakos or those about him, rush out, sword in hand, into the enemy's midst, and are found dead the following day, close to the spot where Diakos had been taken. At the close of this battle, in which three hundred Greeks had perished and many others had been wounded, Diakos, mounted on a mule, was brought to Zitouni, and examined concerning the insurrection. He fearlessly declared that all the Greeks were resolved to regain their freedom or to die. He himself was offered the choice of servitude or death, and instantly chose the latter, saying, "Greece has many another Diakos." On the following day, the 24th of April, 1821, the order was given that he should be impaled. The executioner placed the stake in his hands and bade him follow him to the place of torment. Indig-

nantly he flung it on the ground, and looking round on the Albanians present, "What!" he cried, "is there not one of you found to kill me? Why do you let the Anatolians torture me? I am no criminal." Then walking to the place of execution and casting his eyes upon the earth now smiling around him in all the freshness of the new-born spring, he repeated the popular couplet—

Γιὰ ἰδὲ καιρὸ πού διαλέξεν ὁ Χάρος τὰ μὲ πάρη·  
Τέρα πᾶνθίζουν τὰ κλαδιά καὶ βγάνῃ γῇ χορτάρι.

Behold! how Charon calls me hence in this his chosen hour,  
What time the grass is sprouting green, and buds are on the bower.

With these words, he went on his way to endure for three hours without a groan the agonies of a cruel and lingering death.

As the sequel showed, Greece had many another Diakos. He was but the type of a thousand, nay, of many a thousand, who, in more than two hundred battles—more than one hundred and fifty of which preceded all foreign intervention—fought for the freedom of Greece, not only of that Greece which finally was freed, but of that which (thanks to European diplomacy!) still remains in servitude.

Well might Byron say, "You have fought gloriously."

Vixere fortes post Philopœmena,

to adapt the Horatian line.

But, since the recovery of their independence, so far as they have recovered it, have the modern Greeks upon the whole justified the hopes and falsified the misgivings, or falsified the hopes and justified the misgivings of Byron? In other words, is modern Greece a success or a failure on the whole? I think I hear some cynic forestall the answer by the veritable "stock" rejoinder:—A State that not only does not pay off any portion of its national debt, but does not even pay the interest on its national debt, can hardly be



called a success, whatever else may be urged in its favour or its defence. The Greeks are an "interesting" people, according to an eminent statesman who shall be nameless, but the more of interest they excite the less of interest do they pay. Such I take to be the allegation. It is certainly somewhat stale, now that the Greeks have made a serious and earnest effort to pay their creditors. But had it any time the justice, to say nothing of the generosity which might be looked for from the great in dealing with the small? To be just before you are generous is a good old English maxim; but Englishmen to Greeks on the subject of finance have been often neither generous nor just. Not being a member of that political party whose "finance is its strong point," I do not pretend to be a financier; but when I was last in Athens, in 1879, I had the curiosity to ask a casual Greek acquaintance how he could excuse the various Governments of Greece for not having paid the interest on their national debt. His answer was very simple, and although not wholly satisfactory nor completely borne out by the facts, displayed considerably less ignorance of the subject than is shown by the vast majority of the glib defamers of Greece. He said, "The loans of 1824 and 1825 were negotiated on the understanding that Greece was to be free from Thessaly and Epirus to Crete. That expectation was falsified. Therefore the Greece that contracted the debt was not the Greece which repudiated it, and from its narrow confines could never hope to repay it, either in principal or interest. The debt of 1833 was contracted by Greece as it is at present (excepting the Ionian Islands), and on that debt the dividend has been regularly paid." It is quite true this is not the whole account of the matter. For the latter dividends have been paid, according to the "Statesman's Year-book," only from reserved funds of the loan itself in the first instance, and since then chiefly from the treasuries of the guaranteeing Powers, who are now therefore heavy

claimants upon the Greek Government. Still, the debt is acknowledged, and within the last year the whole matter has been placed on a more satisfactory footing. But, on the other hand, my Greek informant did not state his side of the case with half the force he might have used. Let Mr. Louis Sergeant, in the "*Panhellenic Annual*," page 175, supplement his defence as follows:—"It must be remembered in justice to the Greek nation that it never owned its liability for a considerable portion of these two unfortunate loans. It was not merely that the money was borrowed by the delegates of provinces whereof only a certain number were subsequently emancipated from the Turks, whilst the remainder were never included in the kingdom of Greece. It was not because the penniless borrowers were charged over 13 per cent. on what they received. The Greeks had other complaints to make. They were in the condition of a minor who borrows at an exorbitant rate on his expectations, and even then has to take a good deal of the 'accommodation' in worthless pictures and undrinkable wines. Much of the money went for ships that would not sail, for machinery that would not work, and for men that would not fight. In the case of a minor, a court of equity steps in and modifies his liability under the usurious bond. Ought not the same principle to apply in the case of the Greek patriotic loans? Mr. Luriottis sounded the first note of the objection which has been consistently made by Greece during more than half a century. 'How much of the moneys you have expended without our authority,' he wrote to Messrs. Ricardo, 'you will be entitled to consider as paid on account of our Government or of ourselves, will be matter for future deliberation and discussion.' Thus we find a protest entered at the very moment when the debt was being incurred. It is anything but just, after this, to talk of Greek repudiation in the sense in which that ugly word is applied to some other foreign States."

But Greek finance is positively imposing when compared with that of Turkey. Whilst Turkish Government paper has fallen to a twelfth of its nominal value, Greek Government paper is circulating freely at about 3 per cent. discount, or on rather better terms than the bank notes of the Italian kingdom; yet no one suggests that Italy, with her vastly greater resources, is "not a success." Then, too, the Turkish officials are months in arrear with their pay, whilst the Greek officials are as regularly paid as Englishmen or Germans. We will dismiss the question of modern Greek finance with the remark that, however great may have been, or may still be, its mismanagement, its resources have never been crippled by the profligacy and luxury of sovereign, courtiers, and great men. Greece is neither blessed nor cursed with an aristocracy, and the rapidity with which, within the last few months, she has been enabled to raise an army of 50,000 men, not counting the reserves, without borrowing a penny from the foreigner, speaks well, at all events, for the credit of the Greeks among themselves, the strength of the national sentiment, and the enthusiasm of the popular will.

"But Greece is infested with brigands," say her detractors. Greece is not infested with brigands, we reply, whatever she may have been. There are brigands in Albania and in Thessaly, who make occasional raids into Grecian territory; and this is one of the principal arguments twice recognised and allowed at Berlin for the annexation of a portion of those provinces to Greece. Italy and, still more, Sicily are infested by brigands, yet no one argues thence that Italy is "not a success." On the other hand, street assassinations are rarer in Greece than in England—far rarer than in Italy; life and property are more secure in Athens than in London or Liverpool, Paris or Cologne. I have been robbed in England, I have been robbed in honest Germany: I have never been robbed in Greece. Surely England might wait till she has

“suppressed” the burglars of the metropolis, the highway-men of Blackheath, the “corner men” of Liverpool, who are ready to kick a fellow-creature to death for the sake of “sixpence for a pot of beer,” the “blundering blunder-busterers” of Clare and Mayo, before she casts in the teeth of Greece the unsuppressed brigandage of the unannexed provinces of Thessaly and Epirus.

One more charge, and I have done with rebutting accusations. Says the *Times* of October 15, 1880: “The Greeks claim Thessaly, Epirus, Crete, Cyprus, and who knows what else? But it cannot be said they have as yet fully vindicated Greece for the Greeks, inasmuch as they have not made the best or the most of that land which, for fifty years, has been indisputably their own;” and in the preceding paragraph: “There are in Asia Minor, in Roumelia, in Constantinople, and throughout Turkey, as well as in Italy, Germany, and even in this country, tens of thousands of Greeks whose love for Greece is purely Platonic, who not only never dream of bringing their household gods, their riches, industry and intelligence to add to the population, and thus to the importance of the little kingdom, but who contribute also very little, if anything, to lighten its burdens, to help it to meet its engagements, to keep up a credit which is every day sinking lower” (?). If the credit of Greece is every day sinking lower, how comes it that within the course of the last year her *chargé d'affaires* in London, Mr. Gennadios, succeeded in coming to an arrangement with the English Council of Foreign Bondholders, after the failure of all previous attempts? As to the “Platonic love” of Greeks for their country, what shall be said of the hundreds and thousands of “Platonic” Germans, Dutchmen, Englishmen, Frenchmen who live in foreign parts and contribute little, if anything, to lighten the burdens of the mother-country? True, England, if not Germany, but scarcely Holland and France, suffer from over-population,

which Greece does not ; but on the other hand, if all the "tens of thousands" of Greeks who are now making their fortunes in various parts of Europe were to transfer themselves *en masse* to "the little kingdom," it would be assuredly too small, if not to hold them, at all events, to give scope for their commercial energies. But the Greeks are not unmindful of their country. The handsome edifices which adorn the modern capital, the school of the brothers Rizáres, the orphanage of Chatzes Kostas, the girls' orphanage, the ophthalmic hospital, the infirmary, the almshouse, the children's asylum, the Arsakeion or high school for girls, and the foreign school (both founded by the Educational Society), a third institution for "mutual improvement," on the Bell and Lancaster principles (due to the initiative of the same society), the model infant school, the National University, whose professors *do* lecture, and lecture well, to several thousand students, the National library, the numismatical museum, the archæological museum of Bernadákis, the Lyceum of Varvákis, the observatory of G. Sinas, the academy, named from the same benefactor, the Polytechnion of Sturnáres, the industrial exhibition hall of Evangéles Zappas, are so many monuments of the munificence and liberality of these "Platonic" Greeks, some of whom sacrificed their entire fortunes for their erection and endowment. A full account of these institutions may be found on pp. 403—441 of the *'Εθνικὸν Ἡμερολόγιον* for 1871. Since then others of the "Platonic" crew have erected stately mansions and warehouses in the streets of Athens, the population of which capital has increased since I knew it first in 1868 from about 40,000 to over 100,000. The same "Platonic" enterprise has converted the few boatmen's and fishermen's huts of the Piræus into a kind of miniature Manchester and Liverpool knocked into one, where some thirty factory chimneys are now sending up their smoke to a sky which renders a better

and clearer account of it than that of Lancashire. The railway connecting the Piræus with the City (alas! the only one in Greece) is said to pay its shareholders from ten to sixteen per cent. Is there another town in Europe which can exhibit the like progress within so short a time? Nay, is there another in the world? And yet modern Greece is not a success.

I have done with rebutting charges and yet I have not done. For although I have disposed of serious allegations, I have yet to remark on a flippant taunt, which, did it not proceed from an American humorist of repute, I should not deign to notice. American humour has this peculiar charm, that it is often impossible to tell whether it is humorous or not, whether it is a clumsy joke or a piece of ridiculous earnest. It is sometimes like the farmer's horse that had only two faults. In the first place, it was very hard to catch, and, in the second, it was no good when it was caught. Mr. Mark Twain, in his "New Pilgrim's Progress,"\* after a glowing and no less beautiful than truthful description of the loveliness of modern Athens beneath a moonlit sky, proceeds to recount how he and his companions made their way back to the Piræus through the vine-trellised olive-groves that lie between town and harbour. The grapes were not sour—very much the reverse; and the "pilgrims" pillaged the vineyards at their own sweet will. For this they were remonstrated with by various "troublesome brigands," as the writer has the calm impudence to call the vineyard-keepers. Mr. Twain's comment on this little transaction surpasses, for arrogant effrontery, anything I have ever read. "This shows what sort of a country modern Attica is—a community of questionable characters. These men were not there to guard their possessions against strangers, but against each other;

\* The New Pilgrim's Progress. By Mark Twain. London: Ward, Lock, and Tyler.

for strangers seldom visit Athens and the Piræus, and when they do they go in daylight, and can buy all the grapes they want for a trifle. The modern inhabitants are confiscators and falsifiers of high repute, if gossip speaks truly concerning them, and I freely believe it does." A man who is so free with his fingers may well be free with his belief. I can only speak of the Greeks as I found them. Mr. Twain speaks of them as *they* found *him*, robbing their vineyards—not a very happy mode of introduction. Had the keepers been familiar with American dialect, they would probably have assured Mr. Twain that it was not against one other, but against just such "strangers" as himself, that they were keeping watch. A very different experience fell to my lot. On my last visit to Greece I had occasion, not to rob a vineyard, but to buy a newspaper in the street (the street of Hermes, by the way, the patron of light-fingered gentry). In pulling out a *dekápa* (ten of which make 8½d.), it seems I also dislodged from my pocket a bank-note, which fell upon the pavement. It was a Greek note, and therefore not to be confounded in the eyes of any Greek, however ignorant, with a worthless piece of paper. A little ragged boy, who had seen it fall, picked it up and brought it to me after my back was turned. I am glad it was he that found it, and not Mr. Twain.

There are, unfortunately, too many waifs and strays abroad in the streets of Athens. Most of them earn an honest, but precarious, livelihood as shoeblacks and newspaper boys. They are chiefly immigrants from the outlying provinces. I was amused at the laconic manner in which one of these shoeblacks, pointing at my boots, all covered with the dust of this most dusty of towns, ejaculated the dissyllabic interrogatory, "*θέλεις*;" a friend informed me that most of these shoeblacks actually came from Laconia. A society has been formed for gathering these waifs and strays in a night-school in the evenings, to which I had

the pleasure of paying a visit, and where I heard a reading lesson given. I was astonished and delighted by the way in which these boys not only read the somewhat high-flown Hellenic of their "primers," but gave equivalent Romaic for the less familiar words. This is just what, *mutatis mutandis*, English children in our Elementary—yes, even in our Board Schools—too often cannot do, too seldom are taught to do. I speak from some experience as a "manager" (ironical term!) of National and British Schools, and as a School Board visitor.

My readers will expect me to say something of the home-life of the Greeks. At many a household I was a welcome guest, and that for no other reason than that I was a stranger. Hospitable without ostentation, courteous without servility, as cordial and polite to one another as to myself, I always found the Greeks delightful company. The poorest student, or Government clerk, or shopkeeper's assistant that I met was as kind and attentive, according to his means, as the wealthy merchant, each and all in conformity with the old Homeric reverence for Zeus Xenios—

*χαρίζομενος παρεόντων,*

if it was only the cup of coffee brewed in my presence over a spirit lamp, or the cigarette that was offered at the corner of the street. One might argue from the crowded state of the restaurants that the Greeks are great "diners-out," and not much given to domestic bliss; but though the meals are often taken at an hotel (a great saving of expense and trouble where dwellings are small and servants few), the majority of loungers at these places are students at the University, soldiers and officers, lawyers without clients, and doctors without patients, and other bachelors who have their home yet to make. It is no uncommon thing for parents and married children, and unmarried children too, to live under the same roof in perfect amity, and nothing can be more delightful than the purity, the comfort, and the harmony of



such home-life. A Greek's house, however, unlike an Englishman's, is not his castle ; or if it is, it is one which is daily and hourly stormed without the slightest ceremony. The casual acquaintance is always dropping in, and his appearance never causes any flurry or fuss. He is usually regaled with coffee, sometimes with wine, almost always with marmalade or rose-jam. In the latter case the foreigner experiences some embarrassment, as I did the first time the lady or daughter of the house, I forget which it was, presented before my astonished eyes on a tray a jar of marmalade, a glass of water, and a small regiment of spoons ; but never a plate, or even an oyster-shell, whereon to deposit the luscious compound. Was I expected to put a lump of it upon my trousers' knee ? Fortunately, the friend who introduced me put me up in a whisper to what was expected from me as a man and a gentleman. I was to take one of the spoons, abstract a spoonful of marmalade, transfer the same to my mouth, and then deposit the spoon upon the tray, which was straightway handed to another guest.

The pride of promptitude, and swelling consciousness of knowing the "manner of the god of the land," with which on innumerable subsequent occasions I licked and put down my spoon, fully compensated me afterwards for that "bad quarter of a minute ;" but the anguish of nervous agitation which I endured when first confronted with that awfully enigmatical tray, that portentous jar of marmalade, that imposing array of spoons, combined with the utter platelessness of the entire situation, no pen of mortal man can ever adequately portray.

A very few words must suffice upon the religion of Greece. All religions are tolerated by the constitution, but proselytism is strictly forbidden. The American Missionary and Bible Society agent, Mr. Kalopothakes, and his associates, are regarded by the Greeks very much in the same light as Mr. Mark Twain and his companions were by the guardians

of the vineyards. "Preach your American theology to as many of your own way of thinking and your adopted country as you like," they say in effect; "but do not poach on our preserves."

There is not in Greece any general feeling for universality in religion. The Catholic maxim, "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*," is not the ground of the Greeks' objection to proselytism. In thorough Hellenic fashion they believe in the Orthodox faith as the great political bond of unity. Politics and religion go hand in hand together. If you want to be a Greek you must belong to the Greek Church, and if you belong to the Greek Church you are a Greek (unless you chance to be a Bulgarian or a Russian). The Christian Albanian is the Greek Albanian, the Mahomedan Albanian is the Turkish Albanian. To introduce new gods is as much a political crime in modern Athens as it was in the days of Socrates and Anaxagoras. We need not be surprised at the committee appointed with the sanction of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs giving a prize for a very excellent translation by Mr. Vlachos of Lessing's "*Nathan the Wise*," which, in spite of the freedom of its thought, distinctly enunciates the principle that it is only natural and right for each man to cling to the form of faith in which he has been brought up. Nothing is commoner than to hear the broadest views upon religious matters uttered by Greeks in conversation, and even an ecclesiastic who had studied in Germany, as hundreds do, was very eloquent in my presence on the distinction between "absolute" and "relative" truth in questions of theology, the latter alone, as he contended, being possible to man. It is plain, from these hints, where lies the future of a free theology in Greece,—within and not without the Orthodox Church. From all I saw and heard, I do not despair of seeing German philosophy and criticism entering gradually and slowly into friendly alliance with the gorgeous ceremonial of Byzantine

Christianity. The leaven in the lump is working. It only requires time.

I have left to the last the question, Has modern Greece a national literature? A very large proportion of what passes under that name is doubtless mere translation, or at least close imitation, either of ancient Greek or of modern European models. But nevertheless, the fact remains that in the popular ballad poetry of modern Greece, in the achievements of its klephts and *pallikaria*, and still more in the mythology, which has survived all the inroads of Christianity, there is abundant material for a really classical, because thoroughly national, literature. It only needs cultivation, and it is being cultivated, just as the language itself needs and receives cultivation. It is an entire mistake to suppose that modern Greek is an artificial creation of pedant grammarians. It is only Romaic purged of its foreign accretions and more obvious corruptions, and naturally adapted to the growing wants of the time. To show how thoroughly Greek the purest and, at the same time, the wholly vernacular Romaic is, and also what can be done with it by the hand of genius, I shall conclude this essay by a poem from an unknown pen, illustrative of that universal "*solar myth*" which meets us in so many countries and under so many forms. I append two versions, one in English and another in German, in the hope that some of the beauties of the original which have been sacrificed in the one may be preserved in the other. Few readers of the *Modern Review* will be offended by a German translation, for which, as for the English, I am responsible. It is needless, perhaps, to observe that *Ἄνθος* is a masculine personification of the neuter *ἄνθος*, a flower, and that *Αἵγλή*, with its diminutive *Αἰγούλα*, signifies the rays, properly of the rising, but here, also, of the setting sun. The "mother" is "mother-earth," and the tears on her face are the dew-drops.

## 'Ο Ἀνθὸς καὶ ἡ Αὐγή.

Ἡ Αἰγούλα πού νᾶναι ;  
Κοιτεῖ τὸ βράδυ  
Καὶ μαύρῳ σκοτάδι  
Πλακώνει τὴν γῆ.  
Παγαίνει κεί πούναι  
Μακρὺ κυπαρίσσι  
Παγαίνει στὴ βρύσι·  
Δὲν εἶ' οὐδὲ κεί.

Στ' ἀλῶνι, στ' ἀμπέλι  
Στὸ δρόμο κυττάζει  
Καὶ τίλος φωνάζει·  
Αἰγούλα μ', Αὐγή.  
Αὐγὴ μου συχνότατα  
Τοῦ βγῆκ' ἀπ' τὰ στήθη  
Κι' Αὐγὴ μ' ἀπεκρίθη  
Μιὰν ἄλλη φωνή.

Πῶς εἶ' τῆς Αἰγούλας,  
'Ο Ἀνθὸς ἐστοχάσθη,  
Καὶ πρόθυμ' ἐβιάσθη  
Νὰ πάῃ νὰ τὴ βρῇ.  
'Εγύρευ' ἀνίσυχος  
'Ὡς ἀν περιστέρι  
Γιὰ νὰ βρῇ τὸ ταίρι  
Καὶ δὲν τοῦ βολεῖ.

Καὶ τρέχει καὶ τρέχει,  
Κι' ὀλοῦθε κυττάζει,  
Καὶ δίχως νὰ κρᾶζη  
Δὲν μένει στειγμή.  
Τὴν εἶδε προβαίνοντας  
Στὴ μέση κίφωναξ·  
'Αἰγούλα μ', ἐτρώμαξ·  
'Ο Ἀνθὸς σου πολὺ."

Ἐοῦτα λαλῶντας  
Κοντὰ τῆς παγαίνει,  
'Η Αἰγούλα σιωπᾷνει  
Καὶ δὲν τοῦ μιλεῖ.  
Προσκέφαλο κόκκινο  
Τῆς κεῖ' ἀπουκᾶτον,  
Κρεββάτι θανάτου  
Στενὸ καὶ πικρὺ.

Oh ! where is Augúla ?  
The shadows are closing,  
Black darkness reposing  
Far and wide o'er the land.  
All vainly he seeks her  
Where the tall cypress  
waveth,  
Where the rivulet laveth  
The desolate strand.

By vineyard and wayside  
And threshing-floor gaz-  
ing,  
At length his voice raising,  
"Augúla !" amain,  
"Auge" times unnum-  
bered  
From his full heart he  
crieth ;  
And "Auge" replieth  
A far voice again.

Like the voice of Augúla  
To Anthos it sounded,  
And onward he bounded  
To find her full fain.  
All restless he sought her,  
As some forlorn dove flies  
To find where his love lies,  
And seeks her in vain.

Still onward he hastens,  
His eager eye straining,  
And ever complaining,  
No respite hath he.  
He descries her before him,  
And loudly entreateth,  
"My heart anxious  
beateth,  
Augúla, for thee."

Thus speaking, he nears  
her,  
But as o'er her he bends  
him,  
No answer she sends him,  
The dear lips are dumb.  
Oh ! hard narrow death-  
bed,  
Where lay the cold limbs  
on  
A cushion of crimson,  
All lifeless and numb.

Wo weilt die Augúla ?  
Auf Hügel und Auen  
Tief lagert das Grauen :  
Es schwindet der Tag  
Er sucht sie vergeblich,  
Wo sonst sie gesessen,  
Bei den schlanken Cypres-  
sen,  
Am rauschenden Bach.

Auf Weinberg und Tenne,  
Durch Strassen und Stege,  
Durch einsame Wege,  
Mit forschendem Blick.  
Laut endlich Augúla  
Er tausendmal stöhnte,  
Und "Augi" ertönte  
Die Antwort zurück.

"Das ist die Augúla"  
Meint Anthos und hastet,  
Und nimmermehr rastet ;  
Er eilet, er fliegt.  
So eilet und suchet  
Sein Liebchen die Taube  
Durch Dickicht und Laube.  
Und findet es nicht.

Immer fort ohne Still-  
stand  
Rechts, links schauend  
lief er,  
Und flehentlich rief er,  
Und nimmermehr schwieg.  
Jetzt erblickt er sie vor  
sich,  
Und ruft mit Schmerzen  
"Bang war mir im Herzen,  
Augúla, um dich !"

So redend er naht ihr  
Und zu ihr sich neiget  
Doch Augi, sie schweiget ;  
Kein Wörtchen sie spricht.  
Es stützt das Haupt ihr  
Ein Kissen ein rothes ;  
Auf dem Lager des Todes  
Eng gebettet sie liegt.

Θανάτου στεφάνι  
Τριγύρου στήν κόμη  
Εἶν, εὐμορφ' ἀκόμη  
Στήν ὄψι πολύ.  
'Ο Ἀγγελος ἰσως  
Ποῦ περνει τὸ μιλημ'  
Τῆς πῆρε μέ φίλημ'  
Γλυκὸ τὴν ψυχή.

A chaplet funereal  
Around her brow presses  
Her beautiful tresses,  
Still lovely in death.  
Peradventure the angel  
That of speech hath bereft  
her,  
Kissed her lips ere he left  
her,  
Sweetly stealing her  
breath.

Ein Todeskranz bindet  
Die lockigen Haare :  
Doch sieh ! auf der Bahre  
Wie schön sie noch ist.  
Mich dünket der Engel  
Der so todstill sie machte,  
Hat die Lippen noch  
sachte  
Beim Scheiden geküsst.

Γιατ' ἔχει χαμόγελο  
Ακόμη στὸ στόμα,  
Ποῦ λές μέσ τὸ χάμα  
Δέν πρέπει νὰ μῆγῃ.  
"Δέν εἶν' πεθαμμένη  
Τὴν ὄψι τηράτε"  
"Κοιμάται, κοιμάται  
"Εἰς ὕπνο βαθύ."

For around the fair mouth  
still  
A smile seems to hover ;  
Oh ! 'twere pity to cover  
Her thus with the ground.  
"Not dead is the maiden :  
"Close watch by her  
keeping,  
"Ye shall find she is  
sleeping  
"A slumber profound."

Denn es spielt noch ein  
Lächeln  
Ihr hold auf den Zügen  
O weh ! wenn sie liegen  
Müsst' unter der Flur.  
"Sie ist nicht gestorben  
"Das Antlitz betrachtet ;  
"Ja wohl auf sie achtet ;  
"Sie schlummert ja nur !"

Τῆς πέρνει μέ χέρι  
'Αργὸ τὸ στεφάνι.  
Τὸ βγάδι, τὸ βάνει  
'Απ' τὴν κεφαλῇ.  
"Ἡ Αὐγούλα κοιμάται,  
"Ἀλήθεια σοῦ λέγω.  
"Μὴν κλαῖς, γιατί κλαίγω,  
"Μαρούλα καὶ σύ.

Now slowly and sadly,  
With hesitant fingers,  
The wreath that yet lin-  
gers  
He takes from her brow.  
"Tis the truth that I tell  
thee ;  
"Augúla is sleeping.  
"For all I am weeping,  
"Mother mine, weep not  
thou.

Den Todeskranz zögernd  
Dem Haupte entband er ;  
Mit bebender Hand er  
Entfernte ihn fein.  
"Augúla, sie schlummert ;  
"Wahr ist's was ich sage ;  
"Klage nicht, weil ich  
klage ;  
"Weine nicht, Mutter  
mein !

"Ἴδου τὸ στεφάνι της.  
"Μὴν γέρρης στήν ἄλλη  
"Μερίᾳ τὸ κεφάλι  
"Τὰ μάτια μὴν κλῆς.  
"Σ' τ' ἀφίνω στὰ γόνατα  
"Κι' ἀκόμ' ἂν ἀργήσῃ  
"Ἡ Αὐγὴ νὰ 'ξυπνήσῃ,  
"Ἐμέ τὸ φορεῖς."

"See, there is her chaplet ;  
"Leave gently reposing  
"Her head, without clos-  
ing  
"The dear drooping eyn.  
"On thy knees take her  
garland ;  
"The moments I number ;  
"Should Auge long slum-  
ber,  
"That wreath must be  
mine."

"Sieh ! da ist ihr Kränz-  
chen ;  
"Lass das Haupt ihr nicht  
rücken ;  
"Lass das Aug ihr nicht  
drücken :  
Das Kränzchen behalt.  
"Auf den Schooss dir da  
leg' ich's.  
"Wozu ? willst du fragen ?  
"Ich selbst muss es tragen,  
"Wacht Augi nicht bald."

E. M. GELDART.

## FINAL CAUSES.\*

THE argument from design, which proved so fascinating a subject to writers on teleology of the last century, has been thought to have received its death-blow from Evolution.† This doctrine, as propounded by Mr. Darwin, has now “come of age,” and nearly coeval with that epoch has appeared probably the most elaborate work on *Final Causes* which has ever issued from the Press. It contains two books. The first treats of the Law of Finality, the second of the First Cause of Finality. This term is defined as follows: “It signifies the end (*finis*) for which one acts, or towards which one tends, and which may consequently be considered as a cause of action or of motion.”‡ Hence, it would seem that a sharp distinction should be drawn between *Finality* and *Causality*; that while every phenomenon demands a *cause* of some sort, it is only a certain number which have an *end*, this notion being “produced with an imperious and irresistible force.” Thus, for example, that a pebble should be round and smooth is a result of friction; but we see no “end” in its roundness or smoothness. The eye-ball is also round and smooth, and we rightly or wrongly *do* infer an end in its spherical form; for we recognise its use for rotation. This “imperiousness,” however, is not argument, and the question may be asked,

\* *Final Causes*. By Paul Janet, Member of the Institute, Professor at the Faculté des Lettres of Paris. Translated from the French by William Affleck, B.D., with Preface, by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh. T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1878.

† Lay Sermons. By T. H. Huxley. P. 390.

‡ P. 1.

How is any supposed end to be distinguished from a mere result?

The reply is, that in every case where an end is recognised, there is a multiplicity of coincidences which have by their mutual interaction brought about that end; while the probability of their occurring at haphazard, or as uncorrelated coincidences, and yet collectively producing such a structure as the eye, is one to infinity that such should be the case. It is on these grounds that the order of the planetary system, as well as the organs of animals and plants, imply ends; but we cannot recognise any end in the way a stream of lava pours down one side of a volcano rather than the other.

We may, however, here ask what degree of complexity is requisite to constitute or illustrate an end? If there is an indubitable end in the human eye, is there not a like end in a pigment cell attached to a nerve? or, if there is an end in the limbs of a vertebrate, is there no end in the shapeless pseudopodia of an *amœba*?

Now, the formation of pseudopodia may be claimed by the Positivists as illustrating the inherent properties of sarcode, and as such they are simply *results* and not *ends*.

Even sex, so obviously an end, as Janet thinks, if traced to elementary forms, is foreshadowed in the accidental fusion of two vegetative zoospores. Hence, although ends may seem very apparent in highly-organised beings, the organs exhibiting these ends may be traced back to states where those "ends," by a gradual process of minimisation, seem to pass into accidental "results," and so one cannot at last draw any sharp line between them.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in tracing conduct from such random motions as are executed by pseudopodia, to the actions of higher animals, which seem to show definite ends, points out how the gradations are complete—say, from the swimming of an infusorium to the habits of a cephalopod,

or from those of an ascidian to an elephant. It is just this which renders the attempts to limit finality with any degree of precision so difficult a task.

This difficulty, if I mistake not, is scarcely brought out with sufficient precision by M. Janet. It may, therefore, indicate a line of objection to finality, as it undoubtedly would be to the old views of teleology.

In his sixth chapter of the first book on "Objections and Difficulties," Janet refers to M. Littré's view that "the property of matter of accommodating itself to ends—of *adjusting itself*, as he says—is one of the properties of organised matter. It is of the essence of this matter to adapt itself to ends, as it is of its essence to contract or expand, to move or to feel."\* Our author takes M. Littré to task for this expression.

There must be, however, an underlying truth in it. Otherwise the very existence of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, as they now are, cannot be accounted for. If Littré meant that animal matter, say, of some reptile, through some inherent properties of adaptation, developed wings instead of forelegs, and so produced a bird, such a description may sound absurd; yet every evidence yet discovered goes to prove it true, though the process may have been a gradual one, and only perfected through very many generations.

In fact, Evolution is based on the principle that protoplasm *has* an infinite potentiality of adaptation; and when our author objects to Littré's expression about organised matter having the power of adapting or adjusting itself, he does not refute it by saying, "Let men but think of it, and they will own that there does not exist a sort of entity called organised matter, endowed, one knows not why or how, with the property of attaining ends; what really exists is a totality of solids, liquids, tissues,

\* P. 221.



canals, hard parts and soft parts—in a word, an incalculable totality of second causes and blind agents, that all unite in a common action, which is life.”\* Now, this is true; but it is not one whit the less true that it is, so to say, a plastic whole; for, although when a creature is once born into the world, and has grown to maturity, it can rarely change its form much after that, any more than the leopard its spots; † yet, by its power of hereditary adaptability, it can impress upon its yet unborn offspring a form and structure different in some degree from itself; and so after several generations can produce new species and genera, abounding in so-called “ends,” which were not to be found in the original ancestral form.

It is, in fact, just this plasticity of organised matter (for want of a better expression), to which is due the marvellous results which, *per se*, have all the appearance of ends. Janet finally asks: “Wherein is it more absurd to admit in matter the property of healing itself than the property of adjusting itself to ends?” Neither one nor the other is absurd, for both are equally true. To the famous argument of the watch, it might be added that, if a watch could heal up an injury to its wheels, it would imply a vastly-increased skill in its artificer. But this is just what the highest kinds of organised matter *can* do, and *are* doing, every day!

Hence, if, on the one hand, a large class of phenomena do not instantly convey to our mind the idea of end, whereas another large class imperatively force it upon us, we must bear in mind that the doctrine of Evolution, without destroying that force as far as it acts *per se*, has proved that, in all instances, we can actually or presumedly pass from the highly-complex organ, or organism, so to say, *crammed*

\* P. 221.

† This expression, as symbolical of fixity, is singularly inappropriate, for the colour of the skin of even one and the same animal is extremely variable, according to circumstances, as is the case with trout, frogs, and, above all, the chameleon.

*with ends*, to a homogeneous lump of jelly, with, seemingly, none at all; and that by development, whether studied historically in palæontology or in embryology, we pass by many gradations from what we *à priori* call "results," to what we *à priori* call "ends." It is this discovery which has (it is supposed) given the death-blow to teleology. For tracking them up from below, who can say where "ends" begin? And we may therefore, and finally, ask, Is it not somewhat arbitrary to assert such or such a structure to be an end and not a result?

Before attempting to reply to this, let us return to our author. He gives, as another basis of finality, *the correlation of the end with the future*, which implies the existence of the future phenomenon as the efficient cause, and adopts the old illustration of the eye being fully developed in the womb, though the use of it is solely for the future.

It seems to me that a line of argument may be followed which will eliminate this dilemma. It is based on the fact that *function precedes structure*, by which I mean that functions, now performed by well-differentiated and specific organs, were undertaken by more generalised structures before these organs existed; just as, for example, the membrane of a sea-anemone performs functions of both digestion and respiration.

Again, when a new function is required by even a highly-organised being, that function is, so to say, undertaken for a time by some existing organ (of totally different function) until such modifications have occurred in successive generations as will ultimately enable the organ (thus metamorphosed into a new form) to execute its new functions exclusively. For example, the tendrils of *Naravelia* are foreshadowed in the sensitive climbing petioles of *Clematis*, and the seed-carrying expanded leaf of *Cycas* is preliminary to the ordinary closed seed-vessel, such as the pod of a pea.

Now, these principles of differentiation and metamorphosis

which run through the organised world, imply a universal *potentiality* of acquiring new functions, which, at the same time, proceeds to modify structure, and so gives rise to new organs.

May we not, then, legitimately pass from a consideration of finality in the actual organ to a finality in this very power and potency inherent in organised matter? Whence it comes is unsearchable and past finding out. All we can say is, that inorganic matter shows no signs of it whatever; whereas organised matter, or its ultimate elements, protoplasm and sarcode, would appear to have it to an infinite degree.

Grant finality in this marvellous power, and the whole question would seem to at once meet with its ultimate solution!

Further illustrations will not be unadvisable.

If one contemplates the eye as it is, without regard to its evolutionary history, the idea of finality, if not design, is very "imperious"; but by tracing that history from a mere pigment cell in contact with a nerve, and then by imagining almost microscopic improvements, so to say, to have taken place, the idea of finality seems frittered away, while the notion of design vanishes altogether.

But it seems to return again under the aspect now considered; for granting the pigment cell and a nerve, beyond which analysis is unable to proceed, and mere sensation as a result, "we maintain that, what occurs first as an *effect* takes thereupon the character of an *end*, by reason of the number and the complexity of the combinations which have rendered it possible;"\* and we may ask, Why should the more complex eye issue at all out of the simpler condition? Finality, as expressed by the inherent potentiality of protoplasm, seems to be the sole answer.

Again our author lays stress upon the sexes, as illus-

\* P. 89.

trating the most remarkable fact of co-ordination ; for it is not merely a case of adaptation of one organ to its function, but of one organ to another. Neither is one the effect of the other. "Those two organs are two distinct and independent effects, and yet they can only be explained the one by the other, which is precisely the relation of finality."\*

"It cannot be said," Janet observes, "that this adaptation has been made in course of time ; for as the species could not subsist without it, it would have perished before it had been formed."†

No doubt, existing species could not exist without their full amount of correlative structures ; but it is just because the sexes have been, as it is believed, differentiated in course of time, that the supposed finality becomes, like that of the eye, attenuated by being prolonged backwards into history ; for by travelling historically backwards we can theoretically, if not always practically, see species getting simpler and simpler, and more and more generalised, till in every organism the sexual process would be represented by a mere accidental fusion of two identically similar protoplasmic masses ; while one stage further brings us to an entire independence of such conjugations, and the being propagates by fission of its vegetative system only.

Instead, however, of thus eliminating by degrees every trace of finality in sexuality till we merge into merely mechanical results, is it not just as logical to say that the sexuality of mammalia and flowering plants was potentially visible in the conjugation of monera and plasmodia ? and that the "sexual idea" has reigned throughout, function ever dominating structure till the latter had conformed to the more complete function by becoming specialised more and more ; or, in the words of Janet, "The agreement of several phenomena, bound together with a future deter-

\* P. 52.

† P. 53.

minate phenomenon, supposes a cause in which that future phenomenon is ideally represented, and the probability of this presumption increases with the complexity of the concordant phenomena, and the number of the relations which unite them to the final phenomenon." \*

M. Janet devotes the second chapter to an elaborate investigation of the structure of the eye, ear, tooth, &c., and sees finality in all, just as the older teleologists saw design, in "that when a complex combination of heterogeneous phenomena is found to agree with the possibility of a future act, which was not contained beforehand in any of these phenomena in particular, this agreement can only be comprehended by the human mind by a kind of pre-existence in an ideal form of the future act itself, which transforms it from a result into an end—that is to say, into a final cause." †

If this be a correct account of finality, then the inter-crossing of flowers would be a most pertinent illustration of it. For the conclusion Mr. Darwin and others have arrived at is, that plants, to be perpetuated, *must* be crossed at least occasionally, that nature "abhors perpetual self-fertilisation," that "self-fertilisation is injurious," &c., such being expressions to be found in Mr. Darwin's writings.‡ We have "a complex combination of phenomena" in the structure of the flower of an *orchis*. This structure is correlated to an insect which *must* convey the pollen-mass from one flower to another, or the seed will not be set. Here, then, is exactly what Janet defines as finality; for the structure is found to agree with the possibility—nay, necessity—of a future act, that performed by the insect, which was certainly not contained beforehand in the structure itself. Such, then, is clearly finality in the

\* P. 55.

† P. 85.

‡ As, for example, repeatedly in his work "Cross and Self-Fertilisation of Plants." I have given reasons elsewhere for dissenting strongly from these expressions.

structure of many flowers as they now exist. *How* their peculiar structures were obtained is another question, which we will not discuss at present.

One of the most patent facts in Darwin's expositions is that almost every detail of structure is presumed to have a use, excepting, of course, "rudimentary organs," whose use is now gone, as it is superseded by that of other organs, notably so in the structure of flowers; and he sets himself the task of discovering such use. This is an *à priori* conclusion which he then proceeds to test by trying to discover the use.\* His language could be very appropriately adopted by a teleologist; but we know he does not believe in direct design. All the minute details of structure which seem so "imperiously" to force finality, if not design, upon the mind, have been acquired, according to Mr. Darwin, by the unintentional acts of natural selection. All the characters by which a specific form is known he compares to chance fragments of stone, broken from a mountain rock, but of which natural selection has picked out and preserved those most suited to render the creature the fittest to survive; just as a man may select stones of different shapes wherewith to build his house, without having previously shaped them himself. These are his words:—"The fragments of stone, though indispensable to the architect, bear to the edifice built by him the same relation which the fluctuating variations of each organic being bear to the varied and admirable structures ultimately acquired by its modified descendants."†

There has always seemed to me to be a strange oblivion underlying this simile. What sort of a house, much less a palace or cathedral, *could* possibly be constructed out of unhewn and unworked stones, if the architect were merely

\* See, for example, his remarks on "*Momordae Ignea*" in "*Fertilisation of Orchids*," p. 249; First Ed.

† "*Animals and Plants under Domestication*," vol. ii., p. 430.

to content himself with the rough fragments with which the weather or accident supplied him ?

The exquisite details of structure of a flower of the field, like to which Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed, is much more comparable to a highly-finished and beautifully-designed architectural pile than to such a rough building as that to which Darwin would have us liken it. If it be necessary to *intentionally* prepare each stone for its future position in the structure, so by analogy it might be reasoned that Nature had intentionally caused each detail to develop with the ultimate end of forming "a complex heterogeneous whole." No doubt Darwin's simile is correctly apposite to *his* theory of unlimited variations, out of which natural selection takes the best ; but, as already stated, naturalists are by no means at one in adopting that view. Another is that variations do not occur until external conditions have incited them to appear ; and that when they do, it is in response to, and they are then consequently correlated with, the environment ; in other words, the organism becomes more and more adapted to the environment, so that natural selection has little or nothing to do.

Mr. Darwin would seem to lay much more stress upon the inherent, spontaneous powers of variation than upon the environment as an inciting cause ; for he expresses himself as inclined "to lay less weight on the direct action of the surrounding conditions than on a tendency to vary, due to causes of which we are quite ignorant." \*

I have always adhered to the opposite view, and regarded the environment as by far the most important "cause" of variation, in that it influences the organism which, by its inherent but latent power to vary, responds to the external stimulus, and then varies accordingly.

This view has lately been very strongly insisted upon by Dr. Aug. Weismann, who thus speaks :—"A species is only

\* "Origin of Species," p. 107 ; Sixth Ed. ; 1878.

caused to change through the influence of changing external conditions of life, this change being in a fixed direction which entirely depends on the physical nature of the varying organism, and is different in different species, or even in the two sexes of the same species. According to my view, transmutation by purely internal causes is not to be entertained. If we could absolutely suspend the changes of the external conditions of life, existing species would remain stationary. The action of external inciting causes in the widest sense of the word is alone able to produce modifications." Mr. Alfred R. Wallace, who quotes the preceding in his review of Dr. Weismann's work, "Studies in the Theory of Descent," says that he "has arrived at almost exactly similar conclusions to these." \*

Whichever theory be adopted, the outcome is, of course, the same—viz., structures which *per se* imperiously suggest finality or design. But since the special creation hypothesis is out of court, and Evolution of some sort only accepted, design may be excluded, and the question stands, Does finality remain? If Janet's definition be accepted, then as "ends" abound everywhere in organism, finality is also *passim*. We are not concerned, be it remembered, at present with the investigation as to *how* the complex correlated structures *do* arise in response to either an external or internal stimulus.

Now, assuming finality to be recognised in Nature, it must be either intentional or not. In the First Book Janet does not concern himself with intentionality. He does not therein raise the question as to how the first cause acts, but whether the second causes, as they are given to us in experience, act for ends or not. Within these limits, then, is the analogy between the industry of man and that of nature legitimate?

Taking as a starting point the consciousness of personal

\* *Nature*, vol. xxii., p. 141.



finality in ourselves, we infer by analogy a similar finality in other men; "from finality in the industrious actions of other men, we pass to finality in the industrious actions of animals, whether these actions present the appearance of some foresight and reflection, or appear to us absolutely automatic. We have now to pass from the external actions of the animal, which are called its *instincts*, to its internal operations, which are called its *functions*. This is the kernel of our whole deduction." \*

In tracking finality thus downwards, the reader will at once perceive that the author considers finality as equally characteristic of the voluntary and the automatic acts of man, as well as the acts of all other animals, whether external and instinctive, or internal and functional.

He notices a "profound difference between functional industry and human—namely, that artificial industry constructs the machines it has need of to perform its operations, while the animal functions are only the operations of machines already constructed. The man makes pumps, but the animal has received from nature a natural pump, the heart. . . . Whatever be the cause that has constructed it . . . is of little consequence; in any case, this cause in constructing this machine has performed a series of operations entirely resembling those of a workman constructing analogous machines." †

The author then pertinently asks, "How could the same machine be considered here as a collection of means and ends, there as a simple coincidence of causes and effects?" Why is a spider's web a mere effect, but a fishing-net an end? "Can we thus assign two absolutely opposite causes to two absolutely identical actions?" And Janet redefines finality under this comparison, observing that "in both cases there is a twofold common character:—1st, the relation of the parts to the whole; 2nd, the relation of the

\* P. 87.

† P. 99.

whole to the external medium. . . . There is no part which has not its reason in the whole. . . . Now, is not that the essential and distinctive character of finality? It is not, then, the more or less of internal activity or of spontaneity that is here in question; it is that *pre-established harmony* of the part and the whole, which, common at once to the works of art and to the works of nature, confers upon them, on the one as on the other, an incontestable character of finality.”\*

The two words I have italicised in this quotation may possibly give rise to a misconception; for whatever “pre-established harmony” may be seemingly present in the correlation of organic structures, Evolution will not permit of any correlated structures having been made in *anticipation* of fulfilling a want. They may be made so now in the development of existing species—say the eye in a foetus—but when originally differentiated, it was in accordance with *immediate* wants, or, as I believe, in response to external stimuli—*e.g.*, light in this case.† But once formed, it becomes hereditary, and *then* ever afterwards will be formed in apparent anticipation.

Finality is certainly not destroyed, whether we believe organs to have been developed by evolution, or to have been created in some analogous manner to the fabrication of a steam-engine by man. For my own part, I still hold to the theory that *uses* cause *adaptations*, on the principle that *function precedes structure*. Thus as a graminivorous animal has its food already (so to say) cut up into slices in grass-blades, it does not require scissors to reduce it to small pieces in order to make a convenient mouthful. But a carnivorous animal has a large lump of flesh in the

\* P. 101.

† If total darkness causes eyes to atrophy, as in fishes, &c., in caves, light is evidently essential to keep the structure of the eye in its normal state. Hence it is legitimately to be inferred that light has “caused” them.

shape of a carcass. It requires to cut it up. The action of biting in order to do this, previous to masticating, has converted its teeth into scissor-like carnassials, and as it can no longer masticate it bolts the pieces whole.

So, too, man would never have thought of making scissors unless he had had something that he wanted to cut up. The object induced the manufacture, "Necessity being the mother of invention." The parallel is complete; only, in the one case it is spontaneously effected by the plasticity and adaptability of living matter; in the other it is artificially produced by the consciousness and skill of man.

Not only, then, do we recognise finality in the functions of the completed organs, but in the very formations of the organs themselves.

But now asks Janet, "Is this analogy between human industry and the industry of nature, though justified by theory, also justified by science?" According to the older methods of interpretation, the form of the organs was supposed to imply their function. But at the present day we have reason to believe the reverse, or, as I have expressed it, that *function precedes structure*. In generalised animals different functions are often executed by one and the same organ; and it is not till later—*i.e.*, higher in the scale of life—that differentiation of a common structure into special organs occurs, each organ now taking on its special function, according to the principle of the division of labour.

The present method of investigation does not limit itself to organs, but presses on to the ultimate analysis, till it reaches the fundamental and physical basis of life, or the protoplasmic cell; and science declares that this analysis leaves no room for ends, but can find nothing but causes and effects. Hence once more do we ultimately arrive at the *Potentiality of Protoplasm*, and all we claim is, that, given certain, nay, almost any, combinations of conditions of the

environment, protoplasm will do such or such a work, the outcome of which is an organ adapted to its environment, and finally an organism which then "imperiously" asserts to us its finality.

We thus arrive at the last question, Whence comes this potentiality of protoplasm? or, How is it that orderly differentiation comes out, and not perpetually changing states of chaos? As a fact, the more differentiation has set in, the more wonderful are the structures produced; so that, casting the eye back through the vista of past ages, from the *Eozoon* to man, we see nothing but ascending series in every direction.

Science knows nothing of "must." All that we can say is, that such or such organs do grow in an embryo, and that collectively they do make an organism, but they may at any time make a monster instead.

Thus normally the tissue of a leaf-bud is formed in a certain way; but a *cynips* punctures it and deposits an egg within. The tissues *now* grow abnormally and produce a gall. The inner layers of this contain nutritive food suitable for the grub, and upon which it lives. If the nourishment were not specially provided by the tree, the grub could not live. This is a case which shows how the gall is apparently nothing but an effect or result of a mechanical injury caused by the puncture. But looking at the gall *per se*, we find it furnishes board and residence for the *cynips*. Hence there are at least two "ends" in the structure; and why may we, then, not regard it as one of those "imperious" cases of finality? Yet the whole structure was simply an outgrowth in "response" to, or a "result" of, a minute injury.

This case would seem to furnish a good illustrative example of many others, of which the only interpretation would seem to be that protoplasm is endowed with the property of producing tissues in response to stimuli, and that when

the organ composed of those tissues is completed, it has all the appearance of having had an end in view during its entire structure. And what is true of single organs is true for their totality or a living being.

I have dwelt upon this potentiality of protoplasm, because, contrary to Janet's opinion, it seems to me that it affords the only true resting-ground upon which to base the doctrine of finality. It is an objective fact which is indisputable. Recognise it as such, and then all forms of finality will flow from it.

Having pretty well exhausted the subject of finality as apparent in organs, Janet observes that as animals and plants cannot live without a suitable environment to furnish them with adequate food, "We are thus brought to the notion of *external* or *relative* finality." "It is strange," he adds, in speaking of external finality, "that it did not strike Kant from this point of view that internal finality is in reality inseparable from external, and cannot be understood without it. The organised being, in fact, is not self-sufficient, and it only exists by means of the medium in which it lives. Nature, then, would have done an absurd thing if, in preparing an organism, it had not, at the same time, prepared besides the means necessary for that organism to subsist."\*

But is he not here inverting the process? Nature did not prepare grass *for* herbivorous cattle, nor did she develop herbivorous cattle *for* the carnivora. Every organism was, of course, independent of all others that came into existence after it, as they entered the world in an ever-ascending scale; though each one is *now* dependent upon some other or others if regarded in the reverse order. Thus the lamb was not made for the wolf, but the wolf's teeth have been secured to it as the best adapted for tearing flesh of some kind. Teeth are an internal finality,

\* P. 157.

but the lamb cannot be regarded as external finality for the teeth.

The oak-gall produced specially by and for the cynips would seem to be a much better case of external finality; or again, the honey of flowers for insects. Organic internal finality is the result of adaptation to the environment, but the environment cannot adapt itself to the organism.

The eleventh chapter is devoted to the consideration of various forms of objections which the author describes with his usual acumen. He shows, for example, that when Descartes objects because, as he says, we cannot find out God's ends, he confounds *absolute* with *relative* ends. The former, he observes, may well be beyond our reach, but the latter are matters for investigation, and come within the region of experience.

The objection of Maupertuis, quoted as follows by Janet, is based upon *the conditions of existence*, and is singularly like Darwinism:—" Might it not be said," he writes, " that in the fortuitous combination of the productions of nature, as it was only those in which certain relations of convenience were found that could exist, it is not wonderful that this convenience is found in all the species that actually exist? Chance, it might be said, had produced an innumerable multitude of individuals; a small number were found constructed so that the parts of the animal could satisfy their wants; in an infinitely greater number there was neither convenience nor order; all these last have perished.

" This hypothesis of a groping of nature, and of a period of disordered parturition, said to have preceded rational productions such as we see them now, is contrary to all that we know of the processes of nature. No trace subsists of this period of chaos, and everything leads to the belief that, if nature had begun by chaos, it would never have come out of it."\*

\* Pp. 205, 206.

His idea appears to have been general in ancient cosmogonies, that as long as a chaotic state of things existed, nothing but monstrous beings could be or were produced. Hence, the strange beings described by Berosus :—" There was a time in which all was darkness and water, and in these were generated monstrous creatures having mixed forms. Men were born with two and some with four wings, bulls were produced having human heads, and dogs with four bodies having fishes' tails. . . and horses with dogs' heads, and other creatures having the shape of all sorts of beasts," &c.\*

But this is only a concrete ideal representation of a fundamental conception, that *order* is incompatible with chaos or chance—*i.e.*, the undesigned and undirected clashing of nature's forces. And although expressed in so quaint a form, it undeniably involves a great truth, which was early grasped by the mind of man.

Darwinism is essentially a similar theory, though in a very different dress. The reader will detect a similar ring in the following tones :—" Of tens and hundreds of thousands of intermediate forms we know nothing by direct observation. They have perished as better fitted forms ousted them in the never-ending conflict." †

The *idea* underlying these words is closely akin to that of Berosus—viz., "intermediate forms unfitted to survive."

The Planetary system furnishes another illustration, and seems ever to have been taken as indicating order. The following is from the fifth tablet of the creation discovered by Mr. G. Smith. In the sixth and seventh lines we read—  
He marked the positions of the wandering stars to shine in their  
courses,  
That they may not do injury and may not trouble any one.

Just as chaos and disorder, or their spiritual representative,

\* Quoted from Max Müller's "Lectures on the Science of Religion," p. 50.

† "Degeneration," by E. Ray Lankester, p. 17.

the great dragon of the sea, are considered as the source of evil, so where *order* reigns no harm follows. Psalm cxxi. 6, 7, has a somewhat similar idea—"The sun shall not smite thee by day, nor the moon by night. The Lord shall preserve thee from all evil : He shall preserve thy soul."

It seems to me that the same problem is offered both by chaos and by Darwinism—namely, How can order and admirable adjustment issue out of either chaos on the one hand, or out of innumerable chance variations on the other? If, however, we recognise in protoplasm (as we must) a power of development in conformity or in adaptation to a changeable environment, *the change in the right direction being set up by the environment*, then the difficulty of the "tens or hundreds of thousands of intermediate forms" vanishes; for they were but the creation of the brain—not of nature.

And we may carry the problem further back, and observe with Janet that "It still remains to explain how a conflict of forces can, at a given moment, have brought about a result so complicated, and requiring so appropriate a mechanism, as life."\* "Everything leads to the belief that if nature had begun by chaos, it would never have come out of it."†

Janet does not seem to be a palæontologist, or probably he would not have misunderstood the expression that "fossils are embryos of actual species," or have said of Aristotle's remark—"the animal is an unfinished man"—"as a metaphorical and hyperbolical expression, this is an admirable thought; as an exact theory, it is very disputable."‡ Every naturalist will recognise the author's difficulty, which leads him into false inferences; for he says: "No doubt the inferior species have imperfect forms in relation to the superior. It is better to have the wings of the bird than the flaps of reptiles; the brain of man than that of the

\* P. 207.

† P. 206.

‡ P. 209.



oyster." Such is, however, *not better if taken alone*. With the conditions of life required by the oyster or the reptile, brains and wings respectively would be utterly useless and superfluous. He is more accurate when he says: "Every being that lives, being even thereby organised to live, be that life humble or powerful, contains relations of finality and design [?]; between this being, however humble, and a purely fortuitous product, a freak of nature, there is already an abyss, and the latter can never have served as a transition to the former. In the polyp I see finality as well as in the vertebrates, and the tentacles by which it siezes its prey are as appropriate to their use as the claws of the tiger or the hand of man." \*

Janet next considers Spinoza's objections. The latter "explains the belief in final causes as he explains the belief in liberty—*i.e.*, by ignorance of causes. When we act without knowing what determines us to act, we think ourselves the masters of our actions, and we say that we act freely. So when we do not know how nature acts, we suppose that it acts voluntarily, and in order to be useful to us." †

No doubt an enormous percentage of our acts are automatic, even though we should know—*if we thought about them*—the cause, in many instances; yet we do these acts spontaneously. But—and this appears to me to lie at the root of so-called free will—we *can make any motive an object of thought*; and so far as we do so, we are *not* ignorant of the cause, as in all cases of deliberate choice. A selection between two acts may be purely automatic, and we may call it unconscious natural selection, and we act purely and simply in obedience to the strongest motive, and we are then automata. But we *can* bring motives to bear upon the question by a determined reflection, and not merely through automatic memory. We then make the selection *an object of deliberate thought*. This is volition, or free will.

\* P. 209.

† P. 211.

Conscious of this, we can, by analogy, infer it in finality.

Spinoza's objection, moreover, would prove too much, for, as Janet observes, "There are thousands of phenomena whose causes are unknown, and which are by no means, therefore, given as examples of finality, such as showers of meteors, volcanoes, &c."

The author next notices M. Littré's objection to finality :—"The property of accommodating itself to ends," \* to which I have already alluded. . . . "In another writing, M. Littré had opposed with eloquent vivacity the *vis medicatrix* of the school of Hippocrates, Wherein is it more absurd to admit in matter the property of healing itself than the property of adjusting itself to ends?" †

As long as we merely investigate the structure of organised matter—say, protoplasm, or sarcode, which certainly "does exist,"—and record our observations upon *what it can do*, apart from all considerations of finality, it is impossible to escape from either the *vis medicatrix*, or some equivalent expression, or from Littré's "property of adjusting;" for we find a seemingly homogeneous mass of jelly capable of secreting the most beautifully symmetrical shells conceivable, as in the case of the *Radiolaria*, *Diatomaceæ*, and others; and when we contemplate a complicated organism, such as one of the Vertebrates, it is simply a highly-differentiated mass of sarcode, every atom of which has furnished its individual quota towards the complex structure of the whole. As the whole is an organism adjusted to its environment in all its organs, so are its organs, and so on, till we have dissected out its ultimate elements of cells and fibres, and come at last to the physical basis of life itself. Nothing is more remarkable in the analogy between nature's organism and man's works, than that whereas the latter cannot spontaneously repair an injury, the former can; hence the final question of Janet seems singularly inappropriate, for it is just the pro-

\* P. 221.

† P. 222.

perty of healing itself residing in a living organism—at least in the animal kingdom—that stands out as so complete a contrast to the powerlessness of human works of art to repair an injury.

Rudimentary organs, so abundant in nature including man himself, difficult as they are to reconcile with any argument of direct design, are discussed by Janet with ability, and are considered by him as affording no objection to finality, rather the reverse; for they were of use formerly, but have become rudimentary through disuse, other uses having superseded them. "Nothing conforms more to the theory of finality than the gradual disappearance of useless complications."

Lastly, the production of monsters calls for some attention as bearing upon finality.

The existence of monsters raises no great problem when we consider the *relatively perfect state* in which every organism finds its existence to be.

Were every environment absolutely and perfectly adapted to a being's welfare, and were every condition for the development of a perfect being secured to the parents, then monsters would be impossible. Since, however, under existing circumstances, such a Utopian idea cannot be realised, monsters and abnormal growths of all kinds, as well as diseases, are simply the outcome of the clash of accidentally conflicting forces. They are "errors of nature," caused, as Janet observes, "by the predominance of the laws of nature in general over the interests of living nature." This was Plato's view, and Aristotle explained evil in the same way. And if men would but clearly distinguish between moral evil (*i.e.*, *conscious* abuse of nature's laws) and physical evil (*i.e.*, the production of effects which man—chiefly—dislikes), there would not have been so many attempts to prove a separate author of "evil" from that of "good" in the world.

In the Second Book the author addresses himself to solve

the question whether there is a first cause of finality. Finality being a law of nature, what is the first cause of that law? The reply has ever been, Intelligence. Is this conclusion legitimate?

The old teleological argument has ever been met by the Epicurean view of chances. Atoms have an eternal motion; their fortuitous concourses must have already exhausted infinite combinations, so that the one which now exists is simply one of them. But this theory requires *infinite time* for its accomplishment, and the most modern views of the period spent in elaborating the universe from nebulous matter still make it finite. But, further, we are told that the existence of such combinations of atoms fortuitously as exist is possible, *because it is*. This is obviously to beg the whole question, for the theory assumes that the universe is possible without an intelligent cause. Janet justly remarks, "This picture is possible, because it is; it has, therefore, had no painter"—is just as logical. Logical possibility and real possibility are confounded.

The whole argument is, however, antiquated, and so may be dismissed. The modern form of the objection is that raised by Kant and other metaphysicians, who point out that the argument of analogy cannot do more than suggest an *architect*, but not a *creator*. It cannot rise beyond suggesting a relatively wise, skilful, or powerful cause, but not an absolute one. This, however, implies, observes Janet, that only the form of things is contingent, and that *matter* is not so. "If matter is not contingent, that means that it is necessary,—it exists of itself, it has in itself the reason of its existence; . . . for the same reason we must suppose the cause that gives the form to be necessary on the same ground as the matter itself, and that it is self-existent. How, in short, can it be admitted that a non-necessary cause would have the power to act on a necessary matter and to give it orders? . . . The *processus in infinitum*

would here avail nothing, for by hypothesis the matter supposed necessary is also a last term; therefore, on the other hand, the cause must likewise be a last term." \*

This argument strikes one as irrefragable, and the conclusion is obvious, that the organising cause of the world is a cause of itself or an absolute cause.

Kant's second objection falls with the first, namely, that "from a contingent world we cannot rise to an absolute cause." "But the first objection," says our author, "by the hypothesis of a pre-existent—that is, necessary—matter, furnishes the material of the absolute idea of which I have need. If the first cause is absolute, it will be so in all its attributes: being by hypothesis intelligent, it will be omniscient; being powerful, it will be omnipotent; being good, it will be perfectly good, and so on." †

These two objections of Kant, however, do not touch the very essence of the argument that order implies intelligence.

Three solutions have been offered to account for the existence of finality: the hypothesis of *subjective* finality, that of *immanent*, and that of *unconscious* finality.

The first is the doctrine of Kant, and Janet fully admits "that there is something subjective in this doctrine, namely, the part that is insusceptible of demonstration and verification, and also the unknown part that goes on always increasing in proportion as we approach the very source of the creative activity. But then, again, the same doctrine is objective where it represents facts; it is real on the same ground as all induction that rises from what is seen to what is not seen." ‡

That finality is *internal* or *immanent* is perfectly admissible, "but this *relative immanence* of natural finality does not imply an *absolute immanence*, and, on the contrary, can only be comprehended by its relation to a transcendent terminus. These two difficulties overcome, we are now face to face with the true problem: Is the supreme cause

\* P. 335.

† P. 336.

‡ Pp. 352-3.

of finality an intelligent cause—a *Mind*? This will be the object of our last inquiries.”\*

Hegel says that finality is not merely immanent, it is *unconscious*. A striking illustration of unconscious finality is seen in the instincts of animals.

An unconscious finality, says Frauenstadt, is no contradiction of terms, just as “the Aristotelian opposition between the efficient and final cause is in no way identical with the opposition between the unconscious and the intelligent cause. For the final cause itself may be unconscious.”†

“To attribute to nature an *instinctive* activity is to say that nature acts like bees and the ant in place of acting like man; it is *zoomorphism* substituted for *anthropomorphism*. We see no advantage in it.

“In fact, the true difficulty, the profound difficulty, in this question is that we can only explain the creative activity of nature by comparing it to something that is in nature itself—that is to say, which is precisely one of the effects of that activity. . . . The true difficulty evidently applies to the hypothesis of a primitive instinct quite as well as to that of a primitive intelligence.”‡

Still we have not reached the primary activity yet: the source, perhaps common, both of instinct in animals and intelligence in man. Janet says that what is called Inspiration perhaps comes nearest to our conception of a creative intelligence, or the inventing at once both the means and the end, by a single thought, in which foresight may be regarded as identical with immediate conception; as, for example, the entire air dominates the very first notes of a musical composition. Janet considers the products of a genius as vastly superior to the unconscious products of instinct. He says, “The soul inspired by sentiment is not a blind activity. It is conscious of itself; it has a vivid and profound intuition of its end; it is quite full of it; and it is precisely this vivid sentiment of the end that evokes in it its

\* P. 375.

† P. 377.

‡ P. 379.

own realisation. Instinct, on the other hand, not only is ignorant of the means, but of the end." \*

Is not our author here adducing what is *accidental* to man as grounds for regarding genius as essentially and *per se* intelligent? I cannot help thinking that Janet does not attribute enough to the wonderful powers of the automatic properties of the brain. "Calculating boys" can give no *rationale* of the marvellous feats performed by their own brains. A half-idiotic person may be an extraordinary musical performer, like the negro, "Blind Tom," who used to play in public some fifteen years ago. Remarkable powers of improvisation are perfectly spontaneous and automatic, often enkindled by artificial means, which specially excite the automatic action of the brain. It would seem very difficult to separate flights of genius from pure instinct, when we put aside the *consciousness* of man and his powers, and the *knowledge* that he can cultivate and improve those powers. It was pure instinct that led Mozart, when four years old, to compose a piece of music far too difficult to be played, but perfectly correct in harmony.†

While, therefore, I should lay less stress on man's genius than Janet does as implying great intelligence, I would see in it the highest concrete manifestation of the infinite genius of the Immanent Worker of Nature, so that whereas different forms and varieties of genius are exhibited in different men, I would regard them collectively as the common characteristics of the *power* which underlies nature itself, and which thus shines through those favoured human beings whom we call geniuses.

Then, what of Intelligence? This is not identical with genius. Perhaps one definition of intelligence is the power to distinguish *means* from *ends*, and thus to prepare the means with the view of accomplishing the ends. Thus,

\* P. 394.

† I quote the story from memory, not remembering where I read it.

intelligence is distinct from *tendencies*. "Hunger, for instance, is a tendency. It is not the same thing as the industry that finds food."\* But both are really equally automatic, and I do not see that our author clears up the difficulty, when he asks finally, "Is there not something that represents what we should call foresight, if the divine act were translated into human language? This is the question."† After discussing the nature of human foresight trammelled by accident, Janet compares it with God's "foresight," which means complete vision of present and future at once, as "The act that perceives the end, and the act that distinguishes the means."

"Thus, the doctrine of the *Noûs*, or of intentional finality, has for us no other meaning than this—that intelligence is the highest and most approximate cause we can conceive of a world of order."‡

"The doctrine of final causes, however, cannot escape, as it would seem, a final problem. If each of the things of the universe, taken separately, has been produced for another, for what, and to what end, have they, taken together, been made?"§ To be brief, the sole explanation is in the doctrine of divine love. "It is by goodness that Plato, as well as Christianity, explains the production of things."|| Knowledge is not the absolute end of the universe; but, as Kant says, the end is found in morality or a Moral Being—*i.e.*, Man. "The end of nature is, therefore, to realise in itself the absolute as far as possible, or, if you will, it is to render possible the realisation of the absolute in the world. This is brought about by morality. . . . Morality is, therefore, at once the accomplishment and the ultimate proof of the law of finality."¶ Man is the *only moral being* upon earth. All others are *non-moral*.

GEORGE HENSLOW.



## THE OBLIGATIONS OF DOCTRINAL SUBSCRIPTION :

### A DISCUSSION.

THE secession of the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke from the Church of England, on the ground that he has ceased to be in doctrinal agreement with it, having arrived at conclusions "equivalent to an assertion of the incredibility of miracle and to a denial of the exclusive authority of the Church or of the Bible," has called very serious and direct attention to the position of what is ordinarily and with sufficient clearness called the "Broad Church" party. Some regard Mr. Brooke's secession not only as an honourable, but a noble act, entitling him to rank among these who "have made a good confession;" others condemn it as the running away from a post at which a prophet would have firmly stood, and almost indignantly ask, "What would not Savonarola or Luther have given to be in your position—to be allowed to remain, to be tolerated, until time and truth, not the Pope or the Inquisition, established or crushed them?"\* A third set of critics admit that Mr. Brooke himself had no moral choice; but, within the limits which he has passed, claim liberty of thought, and protest that the great creeds of the Churches of England and Scotland ought not to "fetter the Christian intellect," even of those who have subscribed them.

It is difficult to state the precise question raised in terms

\* *Vide* Letter of Rev. H. R. Haweis, M.A., to the *Daily News*, Sep. 29, 1880

that do not involve some pre-judgment of the point at issue. If it be asked whether a clergyman, who has subscribed to the authorised standards of his Church, is bound by their provisions, all parties to the controversy will answer in the affirmative. Behind such a question lies the deeper one, whether all the demands Subscription can fairly be supposed to make are not satisfied by adhesion to the general doctrine of a Church, although certain specific articles of its creed may be denied.

In other words, given a Church with articles of faith and creeds as its historic inheritance, what is implied by the act of subscription? Does it involve a definite belief in each doctrine the articles of the Church may logically be held to contain, or may some of those articles be rejected while others are accepted, as individual judgment may dictate?

The Church of England, for example, has thirty-nine Articles of Religion. Does Subscription, as it is practised in that Church, mean that a clergyman may select thirty-eight, or thirty-seven, or thirty-six, or any lesser number of those articles, as the articles of his own faith, and dismiss the others as unworthy of credence? Should this prove to be the case, it must further be asked, Is there any limit to this liberty of denial? and, if so, by what standard can it be determined? Every person licensed to preach the Gospel in the Church of Scotland has to subscribe to a formula, of which the following is a part:—

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do hereby declare that I do sincerely own and believe the whole doctrine contained in the Confession of Faith . . . to be the truths of God; and I do own the same as the Confession of my faith. . . . And I promise that I shall follow no divisive course from the present establishment in this Church; renouncing all doctrines, tenets, and opinions whatsoever, contrary to, or inconsistent with, the said doctrine, worship, discipline, or government of this Church.

Can Subscription to this formula be held to indicate

merely a general adhesion to the Church, or does it carry with it the responsibility of upholding all the specific dogmas elaborated in the Confession of Faith?

If the subscriber may deny any one of the "truths" of the Confession, by what principle is his liberty to be regulated, and to what extent may it be carried?

The discussion, it need scarcely be said, involves no personal element. No one can doubt that those clergymen between whose teachings and the dogmas of Articles and Confessions there seems the widest gulf, are perfectly true to their own conviction as to what Subscription imports, and are actuated by the highest motives in continuing their connection with the Church whose boundaries they so strenuously labour to extend. The Christian Church can number among its ministers none more worthy of respect for the depth of their piety as for the breadth of their thoughts, than the Broad Church divines of the nineteenth century.

A Church which presents a standard of theological belief for the acceptance of its ministers does not exist for the purpose of teaching religious truth *in the abstract*. By the very fact that it demands adhesion to a summary of what has to be taught, it abandons that high position. Contrast the position of a conforming minister and that of a professor of science, and this becomes evident. A professor has signed no statement as to the nature of the Astronomy, or the Chemistry, or the Geology he accepts as the condition of holding his chair. No man, however, can become a clergyman of the Established Church without declaring his assent to certain articles of religion. This declaration is the condition under which he holds his office. Unless he consent to make it, he can receive no appointment. He occupies his post, to the exclusion of some other person, because he accepts certain regulations. On entering office he does not say, "I am prepared to teach what I believe to

be true, subject to such limits as the Church may define," but he makes a personal declaration of his own belief; and because the Church regards this as consistent with its standards, it receives him as its servant. The form submitted is an inquiry into his own individual opinions, and on the ground of those opinions an engagement is made. A claim for liberty on any doctrine not mentioned or vaguely defined in the Articles and Book of Common Prayer, is eminently justified. A bond is a bond, and anything not contained in it cannot be held obligatory; but within its own limits, questions of interpretation are the only ones that can possibly come into court.

What, then, is the bond into which the clergyman of the Church of England enters? It runs as follows, according to the Act 28 and 29 Vict. c. 122:—

I, A. B., do solemnly make the following declaration:—

I assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion and to the Book of Common Prayer; and of the Ordering of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; I believe the doctrine of the United Church of England and Ireland, as therein set forth, to be agreeable to the Word of God; and in Public Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments, I will use the form in the said book prescribed, and none other, except so far as shall be ordered by lawful authority.

When certain articles of agreement—and this declaration is an article of agreement preliminary to an engagement for clerical work—are proposed in a common business transaction, or in the course of a legal dispute, or in a treaty between nation and nation, and the answer given is, "*I assent*," it certainly is not generally understood that the assenting party reserves to himself the right of setting aside any one of the articles, as he may privately choose.

I submit that the ordinary language of life, when carried into ecclesiastical affairs, does not lose its meaning; and that to say, "I assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of

Religion," is not equivalent to saying, "I accept some of them, but not others."

Dean Stanley argues that when the present Declaration was substituted in 1865, on the recommendation of the Royal Commissioners, for the one previously imposed, the word "*doctrine*" rather than "*doctrines*" was deliberately adopted, "in order to make it evident that the candidate no longer professed his belief in any particular opinion set forth, but only in the general doctrine. The particular assent to all the expressions in the formularies was done away with in order that henceforth no one might feel his conscience pledged to any of the numerous and at times contradictory propositions contained in those documents."\*

I fail to see the relief to conscience over which Dean Stanley so naturally exults.

The withholding of assent to all the "*expressions*" in the formularies can hardly lighten the far more grievous burden of "*contradictory propositions*."

"*Doctrine*" must be made up of particular propositions.

It is impossible to receive the general doctrine of the Church apart from belief in particular opinions. When the phrase "*I believe the doctrine*" of the Church of England is used, it must mean the sum-total of the particular opinions that make up "*The doctrine*." What these particular opinions are is indicated with perfect clearness in the first clause of the Declaration itself—they are the opinions to be found in the Thirty-nine Articles and the Book of Common Prayer. In a trial for heresy the Court could only ask what particular statements the accused had controverted; and the Articles and Prayer Book could alone furnish the statements which would have any relevancy in an action at law. The charge of denying one of the doctrines of the Church could hardly be met by the plea that "*the doctrine*" had been upheld.

\* Letter to the *Northern Echo*, Sep. 21, 1880.

Dean Stanley's employment of the second clause of the Declaration as a limitation of the first, does not, I think, accord with its actual significance. The second clause adds a new condition to the first instead of subtracting from its force. Far more is demanded than (to quote Dean Stanley's words) "a brief assent to the doctrine of the Church of England as contained in the Book of Common Prayer and the Articles." Assent is *not* demanded vaguely for "the doctrine," but for the Articles; and *in addition to this*, it is stipulated that the doctrine "as therein set forth," must be believed to be "agreeable to the Word of God."

The phrase "the Word of God" undoubtedly refers to the Bible; and one part of the doctrine of the Church is that "it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's Word written, neither may it expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another." (Art. XX.)

Whoever makes the declaration required by the Church of England ought, therefore, to be solemnly convinced that no part of the doctrine set forth in the Thirty-nine Articles and the Prayer Book is at variance with any portion of the Bible.

In order (writes Mr. Sedley Taylor) that we may give a solemn assent to a particular proposition on the strength of its being agreeable to the statements of a specified book, we must be convinced of two things—that the book contains an assertion of the proposition; and that all the statements of the book which have any bearing on the subject of the proposition are true. Thus in the case before us the subscriber has to satisfy himself of the truth of the following propositions:—(1) The Bible supports the statements of the Articles and Liturgy; (2) Every statement of the Bible which in any way bears on the subject-matter of these statements is true.\*

So far, therefore, from finding that the law of Subscrip-

\* The System of Clerical Subscription in the Church of England. By Sedley Taylor, M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Macmillan and Co. P. 4.

tion has been so effectually altered "as to leave but a hair's-breadth of difference from its entire abolition,"\* we find that it is specific in its demands. The Thirty-nine Articles retain their authority unabridged ; and distinct propositions regarding the Bible are definitely asserted.

If in the English Church the "assent" and belief required of its ministers must be taken as seriously referring to certain specific and specified doctrines, still more is this the case in the Church of Scotland. Those who have declared that they "sincerely own and believe the *whole doctrine* contained in the Confession of Faith" as the "truths of God," and have renounced "all doctrines, tenets, and opinions whatsoever, contrary to, or inconsistent with, the said doctrine," can scarcely be regarded as consistent when they doubt any definite proposition the Westminster Confession contains.

But why be consistent? Admitting the existence of a gulf more or less broad between the statements of the Creeds and the opinions of the clergyman, is not Subscription justifiable?

In an ordinary engagement between man and man, or between an institution and an agent, beyond all question the precise terms agreed upon should be respected. No one would defend the mutilation of a definite arrangement in civil affairs. How can it be defended in matters ecclesiastical?

It is pleaded that a distinction must be drawn between the Law and its administration. The liberal clergy declare (according to one of the most eminent of their number, the Rev. H. R. Haweis) that the limits of their freedom of opinion in doctrine and in practice are defined "not by the Law (which no party in the Church attempts to keep consistently), but by the administration of the Law, to which all alike must conform or retire."

\* *Vide* Essays on Church and State, by Dean Stanley, p. 221.

In this plea the following points appear to me entirely overlooked :—(1.) The fact that no party in the Church attempts to keep the Law may be a strong ground for cherishing a policy of peace among the rival schools existing within its own boundaries ;—civil war, under such circumstances, is a dangerous game to play. It does not touch, however, the position of those who, as citizens of the nation to which the Church belongs, ask that its public engagements should be strictly observed.

(2.) The declaration required of a clergyman is an expression of his own personal opinions. The words are “ *I assent to* ” and “ *I believe.* ” The subscriber does not declare merely that he will submit to the verdict of an administrative body ; he states what his own religious convictions are ; and *because that statement is accepted as satisfactory*, receives his appointment.

(3.) When an office is held under specified conditions, those who administer the Law to which it may be subject, are neither solely nor chiefly responsible for the fulfilment of these conditions. A man’s own conscience must be permitted to give a verdict. An officer of any service is bound to ask himself whether he is discharging the duties for which he was appointed. An “ administration ” may have scant means of detecting the doings of its servants ; and the more confidential those duties are the less will they be capable of being watched. The Church cannot send spies into every place of worship, and is bound largely to trust to the faithfulness of its ministers to their Ordination vows.

In no department of life can the plea that legal measures have never been taken against us, absolve us from our personal responsibilities.

(4.) If in no case a clergyman who cares to teach what he believes to be true religion need leave the Established Church until he is compelled—and this is the avowed result



of the doctrine I am criticising—it follows that men may irreverently assent to articles which in set terms they deny.\*

A disbeliever in the bodily resurrection of Christ may be a devout teacher of religion. According to this view of Subscription he may say, "*I assent*" to the proposition that, "Christ did truly rise again from death and took again his body with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature!" A Unitarian preacher may say, "*I assent*" to the statement in Article II., that Christ is "very God and very man!" A believer in the Lord's tender mercy may say, "*I assent*" to Article XVIII. and pronounce those "accursed" who presume to say, "That every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law and the light of nature!"

What is to become of the Church (it is asked) if men are to be strictly bound down to the Articles of its Creed? Will it not lose its intellectual and its spiritual power? Will not all chance of widening its boundaries be gone?

I object to such appeals as irrelevant to the question at issue. The first point to be decided is one of personal responsibility. For myself, I dare not say, "I assent to the Thirty-nine Articles and the Book of Common Prayer," when many statements they contain seem to me untrue; and I dare not say, "I believe" the doctrine "as therein set forth agreeable to the Word of God," when the propositions involved in this statement appear to me more than doubtful.

Without challenging the motives of any one, and with the profoundest reverence for many of those who do not regard the act of Subscription in the same light as I do, I ask consideration for the position, that when a Church

\* "*But in no case need a clergyman who cares for true religion and who cares to teach what he believes to be true religion, leave the National Church.*" Vide letter of Rev. H. R. Haweis, M.A., to *Daily News*, as above.

has an authorised theological standard, only those who strictly conform to that standard should accept the tests it imposes, and enter into its ministry.

It is no reply to say that if this be done, the Church will suffer. Perchance, it ought to suffer. All the resources of the great Ruler of the world are not confined within its boundaries. Out of the very stones He may raise up children unto Abraham.

Judging from the past, the great epochs of the world's spiritual history have not been determined by conformists to existing institutions. The burden of Subscription will never be removed by those who subscribe, even although they protest against their own act. When men refuse in sufficient numbers to submit to Subscription, then, and not until then, will a non-subscribing Church be established. Whether the present Church of England, or one outside of its pale, will be that Church, is a secondary question.

At the present moment Subscription presents the greatest of all obstacles to the existence of a broad, generous, and comprehensive Church in this country.

It perplexes the consciences of young men and drives many of the ablest away from the ministry. It is a life-long trouble and torment to the most delicately conscientious souls, who, having placed themselves beneath its yoke, can see no way of escape and know not what to do.

It checks the free study of theology, restricting, as it does, the pursuit of that sum of all sciences by conditions which neither astronomer, nor chemist, nor any other student of nature, would for one moment accept.

The spiritual power of Christianity suffers from the frequency and intensity of the dogmatic disputes which the practice of Subscription to articles of faith always generates.

I may be charged with placing too much stress upon this one feature of the constitution of the Church. The Church

is far more to many men, it is said, than the Thirty-nine Articles and the Athanasian Creed. It is the home of their life-long culture.\*

Without doubt, it is so ; but when a specific demand like that for Subscription is made, it must be judged on its own merits.

In olden times idols were to many far more than works of a graver's art. They could not be dissociated from reverent memories and solemn prayers. Not without a pang would many an early Christian decline to offer a libation to his ancient gods.

The Catholic Church in the fierce age of the Reformation was far more to many Protestants than a dispute about Transubstantiation. Through its mystic rites they had sought and found a living communion with the Unknown God.

There were, at least, six formulæ in which the doctrine of the Real Presence could be expressed, offering a large choice to subtle and ingenious minds. Nevertheless, the Reformation was accomplished because men were found who refused to call that Flesh which they knew to be Bread, and that Blood which they knew to be the juice of the Grape.

HENRY W. CROSSKEY.

IN following the Rev. H. W. Crosskey on this interesting subject of Subscription, I feel very much like Balaam when called upon to curse the Israelites. Instead of opposing him, as I might have been expected to do, I feel constrained to endorse nearly every word he has said, and to heap malediction on a system which has proved as futile for its purpose as it is radically iniquitous. Nevertheless, as the question before the world just now is unfortunately

\* *Vide Fraser's Magazine*, November, 1880, p. 760.

not as to how the evil of Subscription may be abolished, but how a particular section of the clergy ought to act under existing circumstances, I see a great deal to be said which has not been stated in the foregoing paper. Mr. Crosskey's view of the principle of Subscription *as it ought to be* is perfectly sound and good, and the warning he gives to would-be candidates for Holy Orders is a righteous one. In fact, many conscientious men in our age have refused to make declarations of assent to propositions which they believed to be false, and consequently the Church has lost some of the best-qualified men who could have served her.

But the main question suggested by the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke's secession, put into plain words, is this: Is it right for clergymen who hold views like his to retain their offices in the Established Church?

And here it is necessary to state that this question is so entirely one for individual consciences to decide, that we have no right to decide it for them. If a man feels that he ought to go, and yet remains, he is to that extent unconscientious, and especially in a minister of religion this is a grave delinquency. But if he feels it to be his duty to stay and do his best, no one should dare to impugn his integrity on the ground of some abstract theory which is upset by actually existing conditions.

It is to the candid examination of these conditions that I desire to invite the reader; for I dispute the alleged parallel between the engagement undertaken by a clergyman and an ordinary contract in secular things.

In the *first* place, it makes a great difference that the formularies to which assent is required are not now propounded for the first time, are not the product of the age in which we live, but are three centuries old, and retain their place to-day only because it is so extremely difficult as to be all but impossible to remove or reform them.

*Secondly*, the formularies when carefully examined are

found to be, in many places and on vital subjects, hopelessly contradictory. Had the fact been otherwise, the existence of at least four parties or schools within the Church would have been impossible. To illustrate this, we find the High Church theory of the Sacraments maintained in the Liturgy but denied in the Articles; the Low Church School cannot reconcile the Articles on which they take their stand with the references in the Liturgy to priestly absolution. That party was not so long ago divided into those who believed and those who openly denied the doctrine of Election and Predestination. In the Articles this dogma is manifest if not predominant, yet, as a rule, neither High nor Low Churchmen have taught it for the last thirty years. The Broad Church School have likewise their justification in the contradictions which abound—*e.g.*, the presence in the Creeds and Articles of both Monotheism and Tritheism. The Church may endeavour to neutralise the one or the other, or both, but she can only do so by statements which, to the human mind, are simply unmeaning and unintelligible. She has distinctly declared Monotheism, and as distinctly condemned Tritheism, and yet has given ground for the Tritheist to insist on his Tritheism, and has done this in propositions from which the human reason cannot fail to draw conclusions at once Monotheistic and Tritheistic. Were space allowed me, I could afford your readers considerable amusement by the juxtaposition of the numerous contradictory propositions in the legal formularies. From all which the inference is obvious that no one clergyman ever did or ever could really assent to all those formularies, or was ever able to make his teaching absolutely in harmony with the whole doctrine of the Church.

*Thirdly*, the nature of the "assent" given in such a case as this must be modified by the *animus imponentis*. Every Bishop who has thought at all on the question knows per-

fectly well that to demand an absolute agreement would be monstrous, because it would be impossible to give it. I myself was ordained Deacon and Priest under the old and exceedingly stringent Subscription in vogue thirty years ago. Thomas Musgrave, then Archbishop of York, was made fully acquainted with my then heretical views, and listened most kindly to my objections to the terms of Subscription. But he wisely and truly affirmed that no man living could make, or could be expected to make, such a declaration without reserve. Accepting me for my character, my earnestness to become a minister, and my readiness to serve the Church without any stipend, he ordained me without any hesitation; and I believe that in doing so, he served God better than many another in the present day whose dogmatism is the more exacting in proportion to the shallowness of his observation.

Many of my contemporaries in Holy Orders no doubt entered the Church under similar conditions to mine, having their scruples silenced by the assurance of their Bishops that, as it was impossible to assent to all that the Church required, the Subscription was to be taken in a non-literal sense.

*Fourthly*, as we are considering the position of the Broad Church School, it will be only fair to point to a very significant fact. They alone are singled out for suspicion and for want of honesty in retaining their offices. Let us suppose that this is because they are more inclined to Theism than the other schools are. Now nothing can be more unfair than this. Contrast them for a moment with the Ritualistic (or Romanising) School. The latter are trying to re-introduce doctrines and practices against which the Thirty-nine Articles were framed as a deliberate and solemn protest. They have denounced the Reformers as "rogues and scoundrels," and Protestantism as a "crime." The Broad Churchmen, on the other hand, have proclivities towards doctrines upon

which the Articles are either altogether silent or have said something at least in their favour.

Taken at their worst, these doctrines were not opposed by the framers of the Articles, because they were not anticipated. Surely, then, the departure of the Broad School from the Church standards is not to be compared with the glaring nonconformity of the Ritualists, who not only go in the very teeth of the Protestant Articles, but openly denounce and abuse them.

Surely there is some justification for the refusal of the Broad Church to depart until at least the Ritualists have set the example.

*Fifthly*, just as we find hopeless contradictions between one part of the legal formularies and another, so do we find another hopeless contradiction between the terms of Subscription and the far more solemn and binding oath taken in the Service of Ordination. The Bishop asks the candidate for Priesthood, "Are you determined, out of the said Scriptures, to instruct the people committed to your charge, and to teach nothing, as required of necessity to eternal salvation, but *that which you shall be persuaded* may be concluded and proved by the Scripture?"

To this the answer is made:

"I am so persuaded, and have so determined by God's grace."

Speaking for myself, I can honestly declare that I have never broken that solemn vow even to this day. What greater liberty could any one desire than that afforded by this large licence—to teach *only* as necessary to salvation what the priest himself is persuaded may be proved by the Scripture? Nay, it is not merely a licence granted to him, but a solemn duty imposed upon him, and which he voluntarily undertakes and promises to perform.

The priest, furthermore, promises "to be ready with all diligence to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange

doctrine contrary to God's Word," and he reads in the Articles that Churches generally, and his own Church, too, may err "not only in their living and ceremonies, but also in matters of faith." As charity begins at home, he is, therefore, justified in banishing and driving away, first of all, erroneous doctrine from his own Church, and should not be subject to pains and penalties for keeping the vows of his Ordination. These vows I regard as the most important, if not the whole, of a clergyman's obligations, while the written assent to the legal formularies amounts to nothing more than a promise not to contradict them.

So long as I retained my benefice, I took good care to keep strictly within legal restraints. I look back with a glow of a little pardonable vanity to the day when Sir John (now Lord Chief Justice) Coleridge admitted before the Privy Council that I "had only affirmed what the Articles do not deny, and had only denied what the Articles do not affirm." And though all this ingenuity is sadly out of place in religious matters, and the necessity for it is most deeply to be deplored, yet when all the history of the past and the conditions of the present of the Church of England are duly considered, we can only come to the conclusion that the *legal* is the measure of the *moral* obligation in the matter of conformity to the standards. On that ground, I may go the length of saying what may sound an absurdity, but is nevertheless hard and invulnerable truth, viz., that if I was deprived of my benefice for preaching a religion which could dispense with the intervention of Jesus Christ [and yet I could and did do so without verbal contradiction of a single line in the legal formularies], then the Archbishop of Canterbury and several other bishops ought, *à fortiori*, to be deprived for heresy, inasmuch as they have gone far beyond me in publicly contravening the Eighth Article, which says that "Athanasius's Creed ought thoroughly to be received and believed." The Bishops referred to said it ought *not*.



Until justice is satisfied by the legal expulsion of these highest functionaries, it seems a stretch of scruple to expect the Broad Church school to expel themselves.

I finish as I began, by denouncing the system of Subscription as iniquitous as well as futile, and shall welcome the day when the clergy of the dear old Church of England (which God preserve!) shall be entirely free from the slightest fetter upon the utterance of their real convictions.

CHARLES VOYSEY.

MR. CROSSKEY and Mr. Voysey take it for granted that any system of Subscription to Creeds or Articles is in itself immoral, "radically iniquitous, and futile." Mr. Crosskey's arguments, however, are almost entirely, and Mr. Voysey's are quite, confined to the consideration of the degree of culpability of subscribers who disbelieve the doctrines to which they have assented. Mr. Crosskey makes the sweeping assertion that "A Church which presents a standard of theological belief for the acceptance of its ministers does not exist for the purpose of teaching religious truth *in the abstract*. By the very fact that it demands adhesion to a summary of what has to be taught, it abandons that high position." But Mr. Crosskey's arguments are directed against the immorality of clergymen who assent to articles which they believe to be untrue. Mr. Voysey apologises for Broad Churchmen on the ground that they are no more insincere than the High and Low. I, although a "Broad Churchman" who wish to see the Subscription to the Articles abolished, cannot submit to Mr. Voysey's apology any more than to Mr. Crosskey's imputation. If three parties, and not merely one as Mr. Crosskey suggests, were immoral in the Subscription, the evil would be intensified threefold. The Church to me would be triply

abominable. I urge that these two gentlemen mistake a general feeling that many of the Articles have ceased to touch what, in the present age, is vital and prominent truth, for a belief that they contain false and pernicious teaching.\* When these discussions crop up, as they must occasionally, one has an uneasy sort of feeling that one may have subscribed in careless youth to something very dreadful. Thirty-nine is an alarming number; but, after reading through the Articles once more before writing this paper, I again feel sure that the assumption is an altogether mistaken one.

The Articles are not a "summary" of our Faith, they are rather directions for our guidance. I could not stand up in public worship day by day, and say, "I believe them," as I can in the Creeds say, "I believe in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Spirit." And the Church does not ask for this from the clergy. She merely asks that at certain important crises in their lives they shall assent to the Articles and express their belief that the doctrine of them is agreeable to the Word of God.

Now, I do not mean to say for a moment, because the act of Subscription may only take place once or twice in a lifetime, that it is any less binding than if it were a daily occurrence; but I do contend that the assent is different *in kind* from the assertion of belief in God and in the great facts whereon our religion is based which we make constantly in worship. In the one we assert our personal belief in vital truth; in the other we accept and assent to certain guiding principles (articles and lines of thought); we express our belief that they are agreeable to God's Word. A glance at the Thirty-nine Articles will show that assent to them must professedly and avowedly be different in kind from the act of moral adhesion and Subscription which is involved in

\* I think Mr. Haweis, in the remarks quoted by Mr. Crosskey, represents very few Broad Church clergymen.

the recital of a creed. These Articles refer us from themselves to certain "standards" and "summaries" (to use the words by which Mr. Crosskey inaccurately describes the Articles)—viz., the Creeds which Article VIII. says "ought thoroughly to be received and believed; for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." The wording of the Articles shows the nature of the assent asked for to them—*e.g.*, compare what I have just said with Article XXXV. It says: "The Second Book of Homilies, the several titles whereof we have joined under this Article, doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for these times . . . and therefore we judge them to be read in churches by the ministers, diligently and distinctly, that they may be understood of the people." So, too, in the next Article the writers say: "We decree." Thus I am not wriggling out of, or minimising, the literal and intended meaning of the Articles, when I say that Subscription to them is merely assent to certain directions and guiding lines laid down for us by others, and is not of the nature of that heartfelt expression of belief which is involved in the recital of Articles prefaced by the assertion "I believe." If this be so, then the alarming demands upon the clergy which Mr. Crosskey sets forth are read into the Articles by him and not made by them. If we were committed by our Subscription to all that Mr. Crosskey, with his pitiless logic, commits us to, I should perfectly agree with him as to the immorality of our position. I should only disagree with him in that charitable paragraph in which he attributes "the highest motives" to any who see the gulf he sees between their teaching and the dogmas to which they have subscribed. I should deprecate "the piety" which could so blind us to our insincerity.

I think I shall best present my refutation of Mr. Crosskey's view of our obligations by stating some popular dogmas to which the clergy are not committed by the

Articles. Mr. Crosskey says "distinct propositions regarding the Bible are definitely asserted." I deny this. The one proposition about the "Holy Scriptures"—the Articles nowhere use that, to modern ears, fallacious expression "The Bible"—is most carefully and guardedly indefinite. It is evidently aimed at those who laid heavy burdens upon Christians—like Tetzels indulgences or other people's assurances—for which there was no warrant in the writings to which reference was universally made. It says, "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation, so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man. . . ." Then the names of the "books" are recorded. "And the other books (as Hierome saith) the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners, but yet doth it not apply them to establish any doctrine;" these are the Apocryphal books. Now, considering how carelessly and loosely most religious people hold the Bible to be a single book dictated word by word from heaven, it is a matter deserving of notice and much thankfulness that the Articles clearly call attention to the variety of authorship and date of the several books, and to the fact that they are writings selected out of many. Article XX., quoted by Mr. Crosskey, has evidently the same purpose, when it says that "it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's Word written." Thus the framers of the Articles seem to have *avoided* these "distinct propositions," which Mr. Crosskey laboriously evolves as "definitely asserted." We should *à priori* have expected that the clergy were pledged to a belief in what is carelessly called "the infallibility of the Bible." But it is not so. "The sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures" is all that they are committed to.

The Church is also forbidden (Article XX.) to "expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another." Mr. Voysey says that had he space he could afford

us "considerable amusement by the juxtaposition of the numerous contradictory propositions in the legal formularies." I wish he had given one instance. I really do not know where to lay my hand on one. I should, however, expect apparent contradictions. The highest truth is often only expressible in two parts of a contradictory couplet, in paradox. Take as a simple and unsectarian instance the two lines of thought illustrated by our Lord in the saying: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things" (the abundant food and beautiful raiment) "shall be added unto you." And "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of heaven." We believe that worldly prosperity is in the long run for the righteous. We also believe that it is enormously difficult for the prosperous, the successful of all kinds, to enter into the realm of divine sympathy with the weak and struggling, the kingdom of God on earth. How are we to express the whole of the Christian teaching on this important subject except in a contradictory couplet? And so I have no doubt that, logically followed out, some of the "propositions" of the Articles are contradictory, and the compilers acted wisely when they enjoined that the Church had no right to expound one part of divine truth so as to be repugnant, antagonistical instead of antithetical, to another.

What I have said above seems to me also to meet Mr. Crosskey's statement that by this Article XX. we are pledged "to be solemnly convinced that no part of the doctrine" of the Prayer Book "is at variance with any portion of the Bible." Here would be a serious difficulty for us if we were pledged to any infallible dictation or verbal inspiration theory of the Bible. But we are not. We do not take the Bible to be an epitome of doctrine which has to be put together like a Chinese puzzle. It contains writings of our venerable saints, not one of which professes to be a complete *résumé* of Divine truth, most of which are on the face of

them casual productions. Yet they are so numerous and discursive that we can gather from them the articles of universal faith in the early Church.

To say that nothing we teach "is at variance with any part of the Bible" would be a statement in itself absurd and carelessly fallacious, for the Bible contains the words of all sorts of people, in conversation and in every style of utterance. What the Article states that the Church has no authority to do is to "expound" or "decree" or "ordain" anything from one place of Scripture contrary to what may be expounded from another place. The man whose genius it is to preach the gospel of faith is not to build up anything that attacks him whose mission it is to declare the gospel of good works. There is room for each party within the Church so long as each declares its portion of Divine truth, and does not attack and seek to destroy antithetical portions. Other popular dogmas which liberal theologians reject are conspicuous by their absence.

The vulgar doctrine of the substitution of Christ—that God's vengeance was satisfied by seeing Christ suffer the torments due to mankind—is not taught in Article II, nor anywhere else.

The doctrine of everlasting punishment finds no place in the Articles. We are left to interpret rationally those words in the Athanasian Creed, which at first sight seem to teach this horrible doctrine. We may not interpret them so as to be repugnant to the doctrine of final universal restitution. Perishing everlastingly and going into eternal fire may be taken, by those who will take them so, to mean perishing to the life of the Eternal, going into the purifying, consuming fire of the Eternal.

Once (and we cannot, as Mr. Voysey well says, shut our ears to the voice of the history of our Church) there was for ten years, commencing in 1552, an article as follows:—"All men shall not be saved at the length."—"They also

are worthy of condemnation, who endeavour at this time to restore the dangerous opinion that all men, be they never so ungodly, shall at length be saved, when they have suffered pains for their sins a certain time appointed by God's justice." It is a noteworthy fact that the Church of England quickly expunged this Article. Again, the commonly received notions as to original sin are not countenanced in the Article on that subject. I confidently repeat, the Articles are not narrowing and enslaving. They are rather a protest against the careless and false theology of the majority of living, professing Christians. The chief reason for wishing them abandoned is that with the new circumstances which three hundred years have brought about, theology has shifted its drift, and these Articles rather beat the air.

But Mr. Crosskey will say, "There are Thirty-nine Articles—are you sure that there is no out-of-the-way opinion expressed by the compilers of them, with which you cannot be said to agree? *E.g.*, Are you sure, with Article XXI., that 'general councils may not be gathered together without the commandment and will of princes'?" Here I must fall back on history. I am quite sure that the Reformers did well to declare that the Pope had not the right to ignore nationalities, and that it was for each nation to consent to councils, and not to be over-ridden by any council the Pope chose to declare a "general" one.

I have tried to show that the assent avowedly asked for to the Articles is not of the *kind* implied in the recital of a creed. Unfortunately for the purposes of discussion on an abstract question, the Church of England has a long history, and is a great and comprehensive society. The Articles are not for the laity, but for students who are supposed to know something of the history of their Church. Is it to go for nothing with these students that the Church has deliberately changed the form of declaration from one of "unfeigned

assent and consent" to simple "assent," and asks for an expression of belief that the general "doctrine," and no longer the separate "doctrines," is agreeable to the Word of God? If the fact that this change has been made is to go for *anything*, it is surely a *formal permission and command* to the clergy to take a broad view of the obligations of subscription, and not to torture their consciences, or abuse their opponents, over details in the Articles.

Moreover, room must be found for what Mr. Voysey calls the *animus imponentis*, which, according to the Church's system, is not so much, as he puts it, to "modify" as to be an indispensable element in the interpretation of the assent which the Church demands of the candidates for ordination. Mr. Crosskey says the subscriber "states what his own religious convictions are, and *because that statement is accepted as satisfactory* receives his appointment." If the Church had not provided that he should have to deal not merely with written formularies, but with a living man, the scruples of the candidate would be multiplied and more often irremovable. But the Church does not say "go to an office and subscribe that document," but "go to your bishop and make your assent intelligible to him." Mr. Voysey's interesting account of the admirable relations between him and his bishop at ordination illustrates not what lax bishops *may* do, but what, on any reasonable theory, bishops exist for the purpose of doing. If we had no administrative institution of living men and representatives of the living Church, Mr. Crosskey's objections to Subscription would be unanswerable.

I fear I have little space for the defence of Subscription *on principle*. Mr. Crosskey's only argument against it is contained in the contrast which he points between the position of a conforming minister and that of a professor of science. But the clergy are not professors of comparative theology. They are ministers to witness on behalf of



Christians, for Christ, to the world. They have to lead the worship and the work of the Christian society. Why does this society cohere? On what is it based? On anything of the nature of fact, on anything beyond the exalted aspirations of those who compose it? If we come together to worship God, if we work in His Name amongst men, it must be because we believe something about Him. It is for purposes of worship and on educational grounds desirable that we should clear ourselves as to what we do believe about Him which binds us together. How is the truth that we do hold essential to be taught to others except through some forms? How are we likely to arrive at higher truth except when we often set before ourselves the truth at which we have arrived? How is the moral power of the truth we hold to brace and sway us, unless in our worship we remind ourselves and one another of it, and bow before the Most High and Holy?

If Christianity, in the broadest conception of the term, contain the supply of man's deepest and most permanent needs, it must be desirable that Christians should be agreed as to the essential elements of it.

Who will deny that it would be a manifest scientific gain if we could formulate that as to which all who profess and call themselves Christians can subscribe? Are we prepared to admit that there is nothing we can lay down as fact on this most absorbing of themes? If people believe anything definite, it must be well both for themselves and for the truth's sake that they should say what it is. It seems to me fairer to assert that creeds force all people to think more or less than that they hamper thought. So much as a defence for some creed, and, therefore, for some Subscription either implied or expressed. It matters little whether a formal declaration is made, or merely implied, when you are arguing as to the sincerity of the adherent.

But how do I defend Subscription to so large an extent as

even the Apostles' Creed (to which, *for the present distress*, I should wish to see compulsory Subscription limited)? It is to me, indeed, a bitter pang that the National Church should lose Mr. Stopford Brooke and others. Still, the interests of the highest truth seem to me to be best served when pressure is put upon Churches to say what they believe. The truth is more likely to be evolved if each set of people who cohere for work and worship formulate what for them is vital universal truth. This will assist arrival at the truth, as it were, by natural selection. The Christian Spirit will more and more lead people to seek for union in worship, and there will be a healthy disposition and tendency in each body to drop what unnecessarily hinders union.

This is not the occasion to defend the items of a creed. And yet the justification of Subscription must chiefly depend on the tendency of the facts asserted in the creed subscribed to. If the dogmas have a tendency to check freedom of thought, and to intensify dogmatic disputes, as Mr. Crosskey assumes they must, then Subscription to them is altogether to be condemned. I maintain that the central doctrines of our Church are essentially and radically qualified to stimulate human thought in all its branches and to inspire universal charity.

God can only be known through the humanity which Jesus Christ has taken and glorified. God in Christ has identified Himself with every human being. If we want to learn of God, we must learn through all men. All ignorance is ignorance of God. "All holy desires, all good counsels, all just works" *in every human being* "proceed from Him," to use the words of one of our daily collects. We can only serve God by serving humanity. In the risen and ascended Christ we see the first-fruits and the predestination of all humanity. Such are some of the beliefs to which we are immediately pledged by our faith in the Incarnation.

When we subscribe to this doctrine we pledge ourselves against all intolerance, all contempt of God's word through whomsoever it may come to us. The much-abused Athanasian Creed, which I, as a radical and freethinker, love, bids us believe that God the Father is "immensus," God the Son "immensus," God the Holy Ghost "immensus," illimitable. Who, believing this, dare limit the range of thought? Who that knows the narrowness of his own heart would not hesitate to reject beliefs so fundamentally reconciling and uniting for humanity? Such Subscription is, indeed, as Mr. Maurice said, "*no bondage*."

I know that we are terribly prone to insincerity, and that subscription gives us one more opportunity of being false to the Most High and to one another. But, on the other hand, it may force the careless to question their own sincerity. I have no doubt many a philosopher could prove that Mr. Crosskey and Mr. Voysey and I would be guilty of insincere compromise and gross pandering to superstition if we knelt down to say the Lord's Prayer together, and stood up to sing the Evening Hymn,—unless first we subscribed to certain Articles agreeing as to what we did mean and what we did not mean by our actions and words.

In conclusion, I ask to be allowed to protest that it is from no feeling of Pharisaic superiority of any kind to my reverend predecessors in this discussion that I cling to some minimum of definite Subscription which I know they must reject. I have, in my narrowness, at least subscribed to that which warns me that their faith in God and Christ may be purer than mine, and that if I would receive the full revelation of God in Christ, I must humbly seek to learn of them. I cling to this ancient symbol of faith, in the hope that, with it or without it, but, at any rate, through the witness it has borne, their children and my children, as members of One Holy Catholic Church, may be drawn into a closer union than our generation has attained to, with one another

and with their forefathers, who, though separated on earth, are now, and always were, one in the Heart of the Most High.

GEORGE SARSON.

THE present writer proposes to limit himself almost wholly, in the few pages at his disposal, to some general discussion of Subscription as a basis of Church fellowship, leaving it to others to deal with the subtle question of the obligations implied in the concrete case of Subscription to the Church of England Articles. He will thus address himself chiefly to a consideration of the last three or four pages of Mr. Sarson's very interesting contribution to this friendly debate.

Mr. Voysey attacks the principle of Subscription, while defending the Broad Churchman in a free interpretation of the obligations thereof. Mr. Sarson, while he will admit no apology for insincere conformity, upholds Subscription to some formulary or other, if only the Apostles' Creed, as the essential condition of a strongly cohering Church. It is here that I fail to follow him.

Mr. Sarson justly observes that in this connection "it matters little whether a formal declaration is made or only implied;" and sees clearly that the repetition of a Creed, and the setting of the hand to a document in "assent" to it, are based on the same principle. So also is the compulsory use of fixed liturgical forms. The principle is that it is desirable to secure and to express unity of intellectual apprehension among those who constitute a Church.

For, asks Mr. Sarson, on what is such a society based? "On anything of the nature of fact? On anything beyond the exalted aspirations of those who compose it?" I reply that it certainly is, or should be, based on something of the nature of fact, and, indeed, should have for its bases—first,

the profoundest fact in the nature of Man; and secondly, the profoundest fact known to us in the nature of God. The first of these two facts is that man craves for intercourse with God; the second, that God enters into communion with man. A true Church exists that such communion may be carried out by men massed together in a fellowship which is found, on man's side, to intensify and vivify that communion by sympathy.

Now we shall all agree that if such be the facts on which true churchmanship is based, the wider the fellowship that can be secured, and the fewer the good men sincerely desiring to worship God that shall find themselves by express condition, or through scruple of their own, excluded from the Church, the more effective that Church must be. Nothing, then, should be done, if it can in any way fairly be avoided, to narrow the communion of worshippers or to cut up into sections the ideal Church of all who desire to worship God. That these will, according to their habits of mind and spirit, divide off into groups often having little mutual sympathy, we must indeed expect; but it is a wanton dereliction from the highest aims of the Church unnecessarily to accelerate that process. But this is precisely what the drawing up of articles, creeds, standards, and even fixed and rigid forms of prayer effects. Mr. Sarson regards this dividing of the Church Universal into sections, each with its formulated Creed, as a kind of "natural selection." On the contrary, this is *artificial* selection. Artificial selection is the interference by man with the natural working of things in order to produce some type which he cannot trust nature (or God) to produce unaided. Creed and Subscription interfere with the natural groupings of churchmanship in order to draw men towards some one standard of doctrine, wide or narrow, wise or foolish, true or false, but in any case, and in Protestant Churches acknowledged to be, *fallible*; whereas the natural groupings of churchmanship are quite as much

round special ideas in the method of worship—for example pomp or Puritanism and other things—as round particular doctrines. Natural selection would leave these groupings to shape themselves according to the tendencies actually existing in men.

Most heartily do I agree with Mr. Sarson when he writes —“It is for purposes of worship, and on educational grounds, desirable that we should clear ourselves as to what we do believe” on religious matters. That is so. Every one of us should strive thus clearly to present to himself from time to time what he believes, what he disbelieves, and what he neither believes nor disbelieves. But the very value of such a habit to you is that you may, with unhampered freedom and undimmed candour, if reason and the Holy Spirit so shall lead you, revise your judgments and shift the boundaries of your belief or disbelief. The deepening, exalting, purifying, and developing of your doctrinal belief is the very aim and end of such mental reviews. But they who recommend to us fixed formularies of faith must either confess that such reviews may very possibly result in a man’s finding himself outside their boundaries, or else beg the question by assuming that such revision will always land him within their terms. “How,” asks Mr. Sarson, “are we likely to arrive at higher truth except when we often set before ourselves the truth at which we have arrived?” How, indeed? But does not this pertinent and momentous question itself imply that we are to go on from reach to reach of truth, or of what shall seem truth to us, and so, even if our minds have started well within the formularies laid down for us by the great and thoughtful dead, run daily risk of finding ourselves transcending them, or at least outside them? If the formularies have any effect whatever on our mental habits, must it not be then to check our eager search for higher truth?

“How,” again asks Mr. Sarson, “is the truth that we do hold essential to be taught to others except through

some forms?" Forms: yes. But the question is, shall those forms be fluid and adaptable to change and development of thought, or shall they be fixed so that all thought must hew itself to their mould? Shall they be clothes which a man may change, or shall they be gyves which he must wear though they cut him to the bone?

It is, thinks Mr. Sarson, desirable that we should be agreed, and that "pressure" should be "put on churches to say what they believe." Agreement, fairly obtained, is good; but will Subscription make men agree? The Apostles' Creed is suggested as a standard of reconciliation, and there are doubtless some who would press into a Church of which this was the only standard, who yet are kept far aloof from the Church of England as it is;—and that is the widest concession which the friends of Subscription have ever proposed. But has Mr. Sarson no wish to join in spiritual communion with such men as his predecessors in this discussion? It is clear from the picture he has drawn near the end of his paper that such communion would be grateful to his wide and Christian sympathies. Yet neither they, I suppose, nor hosts of other good men whose craving for fellowship in prayer, whose natural good churchmanship, are as strong as theirs, believe, for example, that Christ descended into hell or in the resurrection of the body. Subscription to the Apostles' Creed, then, if it be more than a form, must keep them out. But what does the Church, as a religious communion, gain by keeping them out? Would it not rather gain by breaking down barriers and drawing to itself by "natural selection" all such as sympathy and aspiration might win into its cathedrals and parish churches?

The less you make Subscription to mean, the more futile and useless is it; the more you make it to mean, the more injurious is it to the Church itself and to all whom it includes or excludes. The true basis of Church fellowship

is not Creed but common aspiration and spiritual sympathy.

Finally, turning back to Mr. Crosskey's contention with those insincere subscribers whom Mr. Sarson does not defend, but others do, I would earnestly endorse the warning Mr. Crosskey utters. The people of Great Britain are not versed in subtleties of casuistry. Their healthy moral sense refuses to measure moral by legal obligation. They believe that the Established Churches of this country have bound themselves by certain standards clear enough in meaning to all plain men. They see increasing numbers of the clergy of those Churches, touched with the finer spirit of modern liberalism, gathering to theological positions far removed from those held by the men who fixed the standards of the two Establishments. They hold that Mr. Stopford Brooke has done the plain, clear, truthful thing. They cannot see that men who share his theology but hold back from his renunciation, are doing the plain, clear, truthful thing. It is of vital importance, for the sake of the community at large, that these men should either make that renunciation or show clearly that truthfulness does not demand it. It is of vital importance for this reason : that if the action of the teachers confounds the people's moral sense, then the teaching of those teachers must be vain in the people's ears.

A.

This Discussion will be concluded in the April Number of the MODERN REVIEW.—[ED.]



## JOHN MILTON.\*

**T**HE completion of Professor Masson's "Life of John Milton: Narrated in Connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his Time," is an event worthy of grateful recognition by all liberal Englishmen. The first volume of the work was in our hands in December, 1858. The preface to the sixth volume is dated December, 1879. To those who welcomed the first volume the appearances of the others from time to time during a period of twenty-one years have afforded a series of literary pleasures of no common kind. Professor Masson has placed the whole of the events and circumstances of Milton's life before us in one work. The twenty-one years of publication must have been preceded by many years of labour in preparation and collection, in order to account for the large result. But it is such a result as could only be attained by the well-directed labours of a single mind. No "Milton Society" could have wrought a work like this; but the work itself may leave room for the operations of such a society. Although the Professor has reaped the whole field and carried the harvest, yet he may have left many dropped and scattered ears for the gleaners. Before long a Milton Society may perhaps be formed on some basis like that of the various Shakespeare and other societies. At present Milton has scarcely passed out of the sphere of party;—and while

\* The Life of John Milton: Narrated in Connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his Time. By David Masson, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in the University of Edinburgh. 6 vols., 1859—1880. London: Macmillan and Co.

in such a sphere, sections of party will set up their peculiar claims to him. Some of our readers may have a recollection of the unsuccessful attempt some years ago to establish a Milton Club, which failed in consequence of a design to subject the membership to a kind of orthodox test. This experiment is not likely to be repeated. The influence of Milton's name can never be enlisted in favour of any scheme which does not rest upon the broadest grounds of personal liberty of both thought and action; and the time is fast approaching when an unlimited universality will be acknowledged as the only possible area for the exhibition of Milton's genius. As soon as he emerged from the strife of parties and the odium of the Restoration, his poetical genius was acknowledged on all sides, and his name placed second in the roll of English poets.

A century later, when men looked back to the English Commonwealth for the rise of the principles of civil and religious liberty, Milton's political writings attracted the attention they deserved. His collected prose works were first published in 1698, with Toland's *Biography* prefixed. These volumes are folios, and though bearing the name of Amsterdam on their title-pages, were really printed in London. Birch's editions followed in 1738 and 1753; and Dr. Symmons's edition, with a translation of the "*Defensio Secunda*" by Robert Fellowes, M.A., was published in 1806, in seven handsome 8vo volumes, with a life by Dr. Symmons, in many respects, and from a Whig-Revolution point of view, very admirable. A popular edition appeared in 1838 with a fine "Introductory Review," by Robert Fletcher; and now the whole of the prose works, including Bishop Sumner's translation of the "*Treatise on Christian Doctrine*," forms part of Bohn's Standard Library.

It may, therefore, be fairly said that the body of Milton's works—a literature in themselves—is in every library, and is an element in the intellectual life-blood of England.

Still, there is one characteristic feature of Milton's mind which removes him from the admiration and sympathy of a considerable section of the religious world. This is his rigid anti-sacerdotal spirit. Milton is essentially Protestant, and, therefore, repugnant to all ritualists, whether Roman or Anglican. Even our great statesman, whose Homeric studies have won for him a high place in literature, cannot give ungrudging welcome to Milton. Homer and Shakespeare claim universal homage without limitation or reserve. Milton is both a Puritan and a heretic, and draws from his countrymen a less complete, though perhaps an intenser, worship. Shakespeare was happy in filling the imagination of mankind with a flood of light unobscured by a cloud or even a transient vapour from the political and ecclesiastical turmoils of his age. So might it have been with the great poet of the seventeenth century, had he not fallen "on evil days."

In preparing for the work of his life as that of a poet in the highest sense, the purposes of Milton were so pure and so lofty that there can be no doubt he would, but for adverse circumstances, have shone as a luminary in literature without admixture of mundane things. Until his thirty-first year, Milton was only a son of the Muses. His stores of learning and observation, his aspiring genius, his chaste life and his devout spirit were being trained and directed into the sphere of the imagination for the production of works which should win an immortality of fame. It is difficult to conjecture what the results of his genius might have been without the interruptions of political conflict and the modifications of religious controversy. But surely no soaring spirit was ever so clogged and hindered by circumstances as that wandering student, who was drawn by events from the fields of Italy and the mountains of Greece to yoke Pegasus to the task of dragging his country out of the sloughs of despotism and anarchy

before he could be allowed to rise from the earth and traverse the "realms of gold." Thus it happens that there are two Miltons with whom we have to deal, and until both of them shall be completely presented to us we have a difficulty in estimating the whole man. Professor Masson has made this presentation, and in his volumes we have all the materials before us.

The difficulty of the work seems to have pressed itself on the mind of the biographer with especial force as soon as he had completed his first volume. This volume covers the period of Milton's life from his birth in 1608 until his thirty-first year, and is almost purely a narrative biography; and for this reason: that the disturbing influences of the poet's career did not begin until after his return, in the July of 1639, from his visit to the Continent. He would gladly have remained abroad much longer than he did; and, indeed, he intended to pursue his travels into Greece, and he would doubtless have spent more time in the cities and among the societies most congenial to his tastes and his lofty literary aims. When he was enjoying all the delights of foreign travel and society, he had already brought his education to a perfect maturity; and by his writings up to that time he had satisfied the best judges as well as himself of his powers and capacities for poetry. Nothing had been omitted or left incomplete in his work of self-culture and preparation. He had submitted himself to the judgment of the most learned and most noble of his contemporaries in England, France, Switzerland, and Italy, and had won from every quarter approval and encouragement. Grotius, Galileo, and Manso, and many other poets, scholars, and divines, received the young Englishman, and recognised his talent. His English poetry sounded with strains unheard since Shakespeare sang. "*L'Allegro*" and "*Il Penseroso*," "*Comus*" and "*Lycidas*," fell on the ears of his countrymen with a delight which none but the strains of the age of Spenser

could awaken. In Latin verse, and in the complimentary sonnets which he wrote in the Italian tongue, he had approved himself a master in the opinion of foreigners. It might seem that nothing remained but to wait for time to mature his mind for some supreme expression of his imagination which the world would not willingly let die. But the career he longed for and expected was suddenly checked, and it might have been for ever.

It is this change from an even tenor to an interrupted life which has led his biographer to adopt the method of placing the history of the times and the biography of his subject before the reader in such a way as to do full justice to both. The first volume, as we said, was out in December, 1858. The second volume came out in March, 1871; and in his Preface of that date, Professor Masson felt himself called upon to explain the plan of his work—a plan partly adopted in the first volume, but not so necessary to it as to the volumes which were to follow. He says:—

Now, while it is the right of the public to say what they want in the shape of a book, it is equally the right of an author to say what he means to offer; and accordingly I repeat that this work is not a Biography only, but a Biography together with a History. . . . No one can study the life of Milton as it ought to be studied without being obliged to study, extensively and intimately, the contemporary history of England and even, incidentally, of Scotland and Ireland too. Experience has confirmed my previous conviction that it must be so. Again and again in order to understand Milton, his position, his motives, his thoughts by himself, his public words to his countrymen and the probable effects of those words, I have had to stop in the mere Biography and range round largely and windingly in the History of his Time, not only as it is presented in well-known books, but as it had to be rediscovered by express and laborious investigation in original and forgotten records. Thus on the very compulsion, or at least by the suasion, of the Biography, a History grew on my hands.

With the plan of the author thus clearly indicated, we

have no right to complain that Professor Masson's six volumes are both a history and a biography; and when once we have discovered his method, we find it a very useful one. Milton's life and writings were so mixed up with public affairs that any adequate account of him implies what Masson describes as the "incessant connection of the History and the Biography—the History always sending me back more fully informed for the Biography, and the Biography again suggesting new tracks for the History." Nor are the intercalary portions of the work confined to the ordinary history of the period. In the first volume we have a comprehensive survey of British literature, giving a view of it generally at the time when Milton resolved to connect himself with it. And in the sixth volume a chapter of one hundred and thirty-two pages is devoted to a survey of the first seven years of the literature of the Restoration. From the second volume onwards we find every volume divided into "Books," and every book devoted to distinct portions of "History" and "Biography;" while the chapters into which the books are subdivided take the portions of the History and the Biography in the order of convenience; one book being divided into two or three chapters only, and another into as many as eight. Take, for instance, the second volume. The first Book is classified into "History—The Scottish Presbyterian Revolt," and "Biography—Milton Back in England." Chapter I. The Scottish Covenanters and the First Bishops' War. Chapter II. Milton Back in England—Old Friends—Epitaphium Damonis—Lodgings, &c.—Literary Projects, &c. Chapter III. returns to History, and is about Bishop Hall's "Episcopacy," "The Short Parliament and the Second Bishops' War." In the volume in question, one book is devoted to the History of English Presbyterianism and Independency up to 1643—a chapter by itself, but of great importance, and following immediately upon a very careful account of the Westminster Assembly

of Divines. If we regard Vol. II., as we have briefly described it, as a specimen of the whole work, we shall get an idea of the amount of labour bestowed in bringing together such a vast accumulation of materials. In fact, we have a minute biography and an elaborate history so arranged as to afford the advantages of each. We might further distribute the historical portions into civil, ecclesiastical, social, and literary history;—and for everything of interest in all of these departments the work will be consulted by students of each subject. What a well-furnished library could scarcely yield to the most diligent after a laborious search, the reader can now find within the compass of Masson's six volumes. A seventh with an index is promised, and is very much needed; and the more complete the apparatus, the better for future readers. Though we read the volumes as they came out, when we look into them again with the intention of giving some account of them, we cannot but feel dismayed at the extent of the field which lies open before us. It is impossible for us to do more than to invite others into the field, and to try to say a few words about the new interest in a great name which Mr. Masson has awakened.

We have referred to the change which the English Revolution effected in Milton's career; and we will endeavour to carry the thought further and to suppose that he had disregarded the call of duty which came to him while in Italy, and had made literature and especially poetry the sole work of his life. What poem, what "strains of an unknown strength," such as he promises in the "Epitaphium Damonis" if life should be spared him, and which should be read by the dwellers beside the English rivers, could even Milton have produced if his literary ambition had been the sole object of his life? In his "*Defensio Secunda*," he says:—

When I was preparing to pass over into Sicily and Greece, the

melancholy intelligence which I received of the civil commotions in England made me alter my purpose; for I thought it base to be travelling for amusement abroad while my fellow-citizens were fighting for liberty at home. . . . I returned to my native country when Charles was renewing the Episcopal War with the Scots, and the necessity of his affairs obliged him to convene a Parliament. I hired a spacious house in the city for myself and my books; where I again with rapture renewed my literary pursuits, and where I calmly awaited the issue of the contest. . . . I saw that a way was opening for the establishment of real liberty; that the foundation was laying for the deliverance of man from the yoke of slavery and superstition; that the principles of our religion which were the first objects of our care would exert a salutary influence on the manners and constitution of the republic; and as I had from my youth studied the distinctions between religious and civil rights, I perceived that if ever I wished to be of use, I ought at least not to be wanting to my country, to the Church, and to so many of my fellow-Christians, in a crisis of so much danger. I therefore determined to relinquish the other pursuits in which I was engaged and to transfer the whole force of my talents and my industry to this one important object.

To be deaf to this high calling, to be unprepared to respond to it, was not possible to a spirit like that of Milton. He who had from his youth studied "the distinctions between religious and civil rights" was already equipped for the fight in which he determined to engage. A life withdrawn from the public life of his country at such a time, and selfishly devoted to literary aims however high and praiseworthy in themselves, could not have issued in the production of "*Paradise Lost*," could at best but have produced an idle song even out of the legendary stories of Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table, and have added to the many forgotten epics of second-rate poets, whose utterances have no connection with the spirit of their own or any other age. From the beginning of the Long Parliament until the Restoration, Milton's pen was busy with the topics of the day or with the preparation of State papers



and popular vindications of the acts of the great statesmen and soldiers of the Commonwealth. An occasional sonnet, worthy of its origin from the stirred affections or noble admirations of their author, broke now and then from the heart of the poet. The pen was fertile in a series of contributions to the controversies of the time. His earliest publications were concerning reformation, prelatical episcopacy, and ecclesiastical government. It has been objected to many of these writings that they were disfigured by coarse personalities and undignified terms of abuse. But it is not by these portions of them that Milton's pamphlets ought to be judged. They contain passages of the noblest eloquence which must for ever be the comfort and encouragement of those who set pure religion above every attempt to degrade and enslave it. Anti-sacerdotalism is the key-note of Milton's first effort to warn and arm his fellow-citizens against the things that have hindered the cause of reformation in religion. Speaking of the acts of the priest party, he says: "They began to draw down all the divine intercourse betwixt God and the soul—yea, the very shape of God Himself—into an exterior and bodily form, urgently pretending a necessity and obligation of joining the body in a formal reverence, and worship circumscribed; they hallowed it, they fumed it, they sprinkled it, they bedecked it, not in robes of pure innocency, but of pure linen, with other deformed and fantastic dresses, in palls and mitres, gold and gew-gaws fetched from Aaron's old wardrobe or the flamens' vestry; then was the priest set to con his motions and his postures, his liturgies and his luries, till the soul by this means of overbodying herself, given up justly to fleshly delights, bated her wing apace downward; and finding the ease she had from her visible and sensuous colleague the body, in performance of religious duties, her pinions now broken and flagging, shifted off from herself the labour of high soaring any more, forgot her heavenly

flight, and left the dull and droiling carcass to plod on in the old road and drudging trade of conformity."

The Second Book of the "Treatise of Reformation" in England concludes with a passage which is too well known to render it necessary to quote it here. It is the promise of an offering of "high strains in new and lofty measures, to sing and celebrate the reign of Christ when He shall judge the kingdoms of the world, and distribute national honours and rewards to religious and just commonwealths." It is, in fact, a "high strain" of inspired poetry, and with a hundred others abounding in all of Milton's political writings, shows that the poet never wholly put off his singing robes, though the utterances were not clothed in verse, and were but the ornaments and exuberances of a controversial writer earnestly engaged in the pressing questions of the hour. The year 1641 saw the publication of the tracts already referred to, and of two other very important ones—"The Reason of Church Government urged against Prelaty," and "Animadversions upon the Remonstrants' Defence against Smectymnus." The former of these contains Milton's high estimate of the office of the poet, and his "covenant with the knowing reader, by labour and intense study, which I take to be my portion in this life, joined with the strong propensity of nature, to leave something so written to after times as they should not willingly let it die." And if we ask what are the permanent portions of these early prose works which can interest us to-day, and whether anything can be drawn from them which shall suit our purposes in present controversies, we shall have no difficulty in finding such things in abundance. The ritualism of Laud is still active in our religious world; and the quotation made above from the tract on Reformation needs no modification to adapt it to the present time. Take also this passage, selected at random from the "Animadversions":—"It is the calling of God that makes a minister, and his own painful study and

diligence that manures and improves his ministerial gifts. In the primitive times many, before ever they had received ordination from the Apostles, had done the Church noble service. It is but an orderly form of receiving a man already fitted, and committing to him a particular charge; the employment of preaching is as holy and far more excellent; the care also and judgment to be used in the winning of souls is an ability above that which is required in ordination." It is impossible in a brief review to set forth the particular controversies of the years in which these pamphlets appeared, or even to give the names of those who engaged in them. The fight was sometimes a savage one, and the "*Animadversions*" are in some places rough, and even scurrilous, to a degree which would not now be tolerated. Our present object is to show that while engaged in them Milton never forgot the higher purposes of his life and study, and also that, from the earliest period of his public efforts, he laid hold on first principles which could have but one outcome—namely, the attainment of the highest ground, or, as we should say now, the most advanced ground, on which political and ecclesiastical liberty can rest. Consider the extract about ordination, and the essence of the ministerial function. We can add nothing to-day to the force of such a statement. With his thoughts so based on eternal principles, what could the doctrines of the Churches be to Milton, even at the beginning of his career as a public writer? Episcopacy was being weighed in the scales of discussion, and Milton had long ago judged it. When Episcopacy had fallen, came the attempt to put Presbytery in its place. Milton's fourth pamphlet, as Mr. Masson points out, is in favour of Presbyterianism, but rather from the necessity of the argument than from anything else.

At the very outset of his pamphlet Milton declares the question respecting Church Government to be whether it ought to be presbyterial or prelatical; nay, shortly afterwards he has

a sentence which shows that at this time there was little dream either in his mind, or in that of the people around him, of the possibility of any form of Church Government that should not be definable as one or the other of these two (Vol. II., p. 376).

But was there not an element in the question which for the time shut out the possibility of any other form? We mean "uniformity" in religion; and in deliberating on behalf of a national establishment, this element ruled in the minds of nearly all men. How earnestly the religious men who sat in the Long Parliament regarded "uniformity" as essential to national religion, we all know; and how much was expected from the Westminster Assembly of Divines we can learn more readily from Professor Masson's second volume than we could possibly learn elsewhere. If uniformity in religion was necessary, and was to be secured, Presbyterianism seemed the likeliest form it could take. A most interesting list of all the persons who were chosen to sit in the Westminster Assembly will be found on pages 515 to 524 of Masson, Vol. II. In view of Milton's ultimate choice of the principle of Independency, we will pursue this question, with Mr. Masson's assistance, a little more fully.

After describing the falling off or withdrawing of the Bishops and other adherents of Episcopacy from the Assembly, Professor Masson says:—"In respect of theological doctrine, for example, the Assembly, as it was then left, was perfectly unanimous. They were almost to a man Calvinists or Anti-Arminians, pledged by their antecedents to such a revision of the Articles as should make the national creed more distinctly Calvinistic than before. . . . On the question of Church Government the Assembly knew itself from the first to be divided into parties." This division became of the utmost importance, for on the result of the struggle between Presbyterianism and Independency depended the fate of England. Mr. Masson's section, entitled, "Presbyterianism and In-

dependency in July, 1643: their prospects in the Westminster Assembly," throws so much interest on this topic that we make no excuse for transcribing a portion of it:—

I regard the arrival of Roger Williams in London about Midsummer, 1643, as the importation into England of the very quintessence or last distillation of that notion of Church Independency which England had originated, but Holland and America had worked out. Our history of Independency in all its forms on to this quintessence or last distillation of it in the mind of a fervid Welsh New-Englander, who might now be seen, alone or in young Vane's company, hanging about the lobbies of the Houses of Parliament and the Westminster Assembly, has not been without preconceived and deliberate purpose. For, in most of our existing studies and accounts of England's great Revolution in the middle of the seventeenth century, I know not a blunder more fatal, more full of causes of misapprehension and unfair judgment, than that which consists in treating Independency as a sudden new phenomenon of 1643, or thereabouts, when the Westminster Assembly met. Not so, as we have seen. For sixty years before 1643 Independency had been a traditional form of Anti-Prelacy in the English popular mind, competing with the somewhat older Anti-Prelatic theory of Presbyterianism, and though not possessing the same respectability of numbers and of social weight, yet lodged inexpugnably in native depths, and intense with memories of pain and wrong. It did happen, in 1643, when Prelacy was removed from the nation, and the question was what was to be substituted, that this native tradition of Independency found itself dashed against the other tradition of Presbyterianism, in such conditions that Independency seemed the pretender and upstart, while Presbyterianism seemed the rightful heir. This arose partly from the fact that Presbyterianism had mass and respectability in her favour, was at home on the spot, and had her titles ready; whereas Independency had been a wanderer on the Continent and in the Colonies, had contracted an uncouth and sunburnt look, had been preceded by ugly reports of her behaviour in foreign parts, had changed her name several times, and was not at once prepared with her pedigree and vouchers. Partly, however, it arose from the omnipotence at that moment of Scottish example and advice in England. Anyhow, for the moment, Independency was at a disadvantage. She seemed even to doubt

her chance of obtaining a hearing. Nevertheless, she was to be heard, and fully, in the course of time. Not a form of Independency, not a variety in her development that has been described in the preceding narrative, from Brown's original English Separatism, on through Robinson's Congregationalism or Semi-Separatism antagonising Smyth's extreme Separatism and Se-Baptism in Holland, and so to the Consolidated Robinsonian Independency of the New England Church, with its outjets in Mrs. Hutchinson's Antinomianism and Roger Williams's absolute Individualism, but were to have their appearances or equivalents in the coming controversy in England, and to play into the current of English life (Vol. II., pp. 602—3).

This extract is enough for our present purpose, which is to show that very unexpected "developments" besides those suggested in our extract were to come into play. That Milton should break with the Assembly might be expected; but what actually did occur was a personal matter which is the most extraordinary circumstance in the whole of Milton's life. An unhappy marriage was the occasion of Milton's personal conflict with the ecclesiastical leaders of the time. When he became a "Divorcer" the whole weight of the religious indignation of England was against him, and he was driven into Independency by a kind of moral necessity, —a power sufficient for the purpose, even supposing that the progress of his inquiries and the turn of his mind had not been leading him in the same direction. The disturbance in Milton's imaginary career of pure contemplation and literary labour by political affairs is not a greater "interference" in his life than that which his marriage and its consequences produced. The elevated tone—we might almost say super-human or angelic character—of Milton's ideas in regard to the relations of the sexes, and his grand doctrine of "the sublime notion and high mystery" of personal purity—for the vindication whereof he deserves eternal honour—were put to a severe trial in his own unfortunate experience. In his thitry-fifth year, nine years after the production of "Comus," he went into Oxfordshire to visit the Powells, old

friends of his family, but strong Royalists, and he returned to London with a bride of seventeen—the girl Mary Powell, of whom we really know nothing personal as to her character or abilities, but about whom much may be inferred from the conduct of her husband and from unmistakable allusions in his writings. Professor Masson has given us the details with care and delicacy, and has brought out all the references which Milton's writings can be made to yield on the subject whether in prose or verse. Enough to say here, that Milton's ideas of the married state did not find themselves fulfilled in his experience, and that he did find the materials out of which to lay down new claims for personal liberty which found vent in his pamphlets on the subject of divorce. By these publications he broke altogether with the Presbyterian party; and at the same time, and during the publication of the divorce tracts, he defied the Ordinances of Parliament and the principles of the Assembly by the publication of the most magnificent of his prose works, the "*Areopagitica*, or speech for the liberty of unlicensed printing." In six years from the time of his return to England, Milton had placed himself ahead of Assemblies and Parliaments, and of the public opinion of his country. By the close of the year 1645 he had fought the battles of liberty in religion, in domestic life, and in public speaking and printing, and had gained a victory in every field as complete as that which Cromwell gained in the same year at Naseby over Episcopacy and absolute Monarchy. As Cromwell stood first in the rising Republic as the representative of statesmanship and military glory, Milton stood by his side as the representative of civil, social, and religious liberty. The effects of the publication of the "*Areopagitica*" are described by Masson in his third volume, and we borrow from it a passage which sums up Milton's position at the time of which we have just been speaking:—

On the whole, then, Milton's position among his countrymen

from the beginning of 1645 onwards may be defined most accurately by conceiving him to have been, in the special field of letters, or pamphleteering, very much what Cromwell was in the broader and harder field of Army action, and what the younger Vane was, in Cromwell's absence, in the House of Commons. While Cromwell was away in the army, or occasionally when he appeared in the House, and his presence was felt there in some new Independent motion, or some arrest of a Presbyterian motion, there was no man, outside of Parliament, who observed him more sympathetically than Milton, or would have been more ready to second him with tongue or with pen. Both were ranked among the Independents, as Vane also was, but this was less because they were partisans of any particular form of Church Government, than because they were agreed that, whatever form of Church Government should be established, there must be the largest possible liberty under it for nonconforming consciences. If this was Independency, it was a kind of large lay Independency; and of Independency in this sense Milton was, undoubtedly, the literary chief. Only when he was thought of by the Independents as one of their champions, it was always with a recollection that his championship of the common cause was qualified by a peculiar private crotchet. He figured in the list of the chiefs of Independency, if I may so express it, with an asterisk prefixed to his name. That asterisk was his Divorce Doctrine. He was an Independent, with the added peculiarity of being the head of the Sect of Miltonists or Divorcers (Vol. III., p. 434).

After Naseby there was a lull in the strife; and this seems to have been accompanied by a revival of interest in general literature. Milton took occasion of this to put before the world those higher claims to distinction which were never absent from his mind, and to show his countrymen that he was something more than a writer of pamphlets and a controversialist. Mr. Masson gives a very interesting account of Humphrey Moseley, the bookseller, whose judgment and taste in pure literature seem to have been of an unusual kind. Moseley looked out for the best poetry that could be found, and after publishing an edition of Waller's poems, considered perhaps as the best lyrical verses



of the time, he applied to Milton for his unpublished verses to be included in a volume with "*Comus*," which had been published by Lawes in 1637, and "*Lycidas*," which had appeared with other poetical pieces in a memorial volume printed at Cambridge in 1637—8. The result of this application was the appearance in 1645 of "*The Poems of Mr. John Milton, both English and Latin, compos'd at several times.*" Mr. Masson's remarks on this volume, which had the following Latin motto on the title-page—

Baccare frontem  
Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro  
(*VIRGIL, Eclog. vii.*),

will give our readers great pleasure :—

Has the reader noticed the motto on the title-page from Virgil's seventh Eclogue? It is peculiarly significant of the mood in which the volume was published. Milton, who has called himself *Thyrsis* in the *Epitaphium Damonis*, here adopts in the happiest manner the words of the young poet-shepherd *Thyrsis* in Virgil's pastoral. *Thyrsis* there, contending with *Corydon* for the prize in poetry, begs from his brother shepherds, if not the ivy of perfectly approved excellence, at least

Some green thing round the brow,  
Lest ill tongues hurt the poet yet to be.

Could anything more gracefully express Milton's intention in the volume? This collection of his Poems, written between his sixteenth year and his thirty-eighth, was a smaller collection by much, he seems to own, than he had once hoped to have ready by that point in his manhood; but it might at least correct the impression of him common among those who knew him only as a prose pamphleteer. Something green round his brow for the present, were it only the sweet field spikenard, would attest that he had given his youth to Poesy, and would reannounce, amid the clamour of evil tongues which his polemical writings had raised, that he meant to return to Poesy before all was done, and to die, when he did die, a great Poet of England (*Vol. III., p. 453*).

The story of the portrait of Milton engraved for this edition of his poems by William Marshall, and of the trick

played upon the engraver by Milton in revenge for the badness of the likeness, is a very amusing one, and is pleasantly told in pp. 456—9 of Vol. III. It is curious to find the author of "*Il Penseroso*" engaged in a "practical joke."

The interval of "pure literature" was not a long one. A mightier wave of the Great Rebellion was rising with the conflicts between the Presbyterians and the Independents, and between the Parliament and the Army, which was to end in sweeping away the Monarch and the Monarchy, and to lay them in the dust with the Bishops and the Church. The history of the last two years and a-half of the reign of Charles I. occupies the fourth book of Vol. III. of Masson's History, and extends over nearly two hundred and forty pages. There are many things in this period which we should like particularly to notice; but one of the points most interesting to us is the Ordinance of Parliament of the 2nd of May, 1648, "For the preventing of the growth and spreading of Heresy and Blasphemy." This ordinance was directed against the Independents by the efforts of "a sudden influx of Presbyterians." It denounces death for heresies of doctrine concerning the Persons in the Godhead, or the canon of Scripture; and imprisonment for minor errors, such as "that man is bound to believe no more than by his reason he can comprehend," "that the baptizing of infants is unlawful," &c. "Imagine," says Professor Masson, "*that* going forth just as the second civil war had begun, as the will and ordinance of Parliament! One wonders that the concordat between the Parliament and the Army, arranged by Cromwell and the other army chiefs in the preceding November, was not snapped on the instant. One wonders that the Army did not wheel in mass round Westminster, haul the legislating idiots from their seats, and then undertake in their own name both the war and the general business of the nation. The

behaviour of the Army, however, was more patient and wise" (Vol. III., p. 601).

The ordinance might have been directed against Milton himself from what we know of his opinions subsequently published; and it shows in its impotent rage and intolerance that the Independents were already associated with heresy and free opinions by their opponents, who, on their part, must have begun to feel the breaking down of orthodox authority. Milton, at all events, was not afraid of the imputation of heresy, and was probably making an approach to those principles of toleration which he published twenty-five years later in his tract "Of true religion, heresy, &c." Indeed, both along the religious and along the political track, he was advancing with the times to an apprehension of the requirements and conditions of true liberty.

Milton's supreme political utterance is "The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates;" and its importance, so far as we know, has not hitherto been fully recognised. Professor Masson says of it:—

Milton was the first Englishman of mark, out of Parliament, that signified his unqualified adhesion to the Republic. This he did on the 13th of February, 1648—9, by publishing that pamphlet on which we saw him engaged in his house in High Holborn during the King's trial. . . . The new pamphlet, like most of its predecessors, was unlicensed. It was published exactly a fortnight after the King's death, and exactly a week after the Republic had been declared. The "Eikon Basilike," the supreme publication on the other side, had preceded it by four days. "The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates" is not equal in richness of literary interest to the best of Milton's previous pamphlets. It is, however, a strong, thoroughly Miltonic performance, falling with hammer-like force on the question discussed; and it must have been welcomed by the founders of the Commonwealth in their first hour of difficulty (Vol. IV., p. 64).

May we not call Milton the Prophet of the Nation at this critical hour, as he had been when Prelaty was under judg-

ment, and was to be, though fruitlessly, on the eve of the Restoration? As from the mouths of Hebrew Prophets, so from Milton's, some axioms of truth or deep moral principles break forth every now and then in the midst of argument and rebuke. Among the opening words of "The Tenure," he says, finely, "Indeed, none can love freedom heartily but good men;" and, near its close, he turns upon the Presbyterians and rebukes the Assembly with the words, "Let them be sorry that, being called to assemble about reforming the Church, they fell to propping and soliciting the Parliament, though they had renounced the name of Priests, for a new settling of their tithes and oblations." He saw wherein the failure of the ecclesiastical bigots and "forcers of conscience" lay, and he trusted in the righteousness which, as he believed, inspired the leaders who had ventured "to depose and put to death a tyrant or wicked king." We are not now entering on the argument of the right or the policy of the deposition and execution of Charles. It concerns us only to get, if possible, a glimpse of Milton's part in it as the courageous advocate of the most daring political act in modern history. He placed himself in the front on this occasion, and what he did now in February, 1648—9, together with what he had yet to do in his "Eikonoclastes" and his two Defences, must be accepted as his especial work in vindicating the act in question for his own countrymen, to all Europe, for his own time, and for all after ages. Without Milton's utterances, the "good cause," to be ever associated by all lovers of liberty with the Commonwealth of England, might not have been fully and honourably recognised as it ever has been; and the daring act of January, 1648—9, might have been regarded only as the Royalists regarded it—as the final deed of a wicked, though great, rebellion. Mr. Masson, in his sixth volume, gives some very interesting information about Milton's escape from being classed among the Regicides in consequence of the Com-

mittees having overlooked "The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates." He gives the Royal Proclamation for the seizing and burning "by the hand of the common hang-man" certain books by John Milton and John Goodwin, and points out that, while the "Defensio" and the "Eikonoclastes" are mentioned, no mention is made of the "Tenure" (Vol. VI., p. 181). "Had a few passages from that book been read [in the Commons], or even only its full title, with recollection of the date of publication, the end might have been that Milton, as well as Peters, would have been flung among the totally excepted Regicides" (p. 178).

The whole of Masson's narrative concerning the doings of the Committees and of both Houses in the matter of the Indemnity Bill, including Prynne's malicious efforts to effect Milton's destruction, has quite a breathless interest. We can do no more than refer to it, and commend it to our readers as a narrative of a critical episode hitherto but imperfectly known in connection with Milton's personal history. Had Milton been only a regicide, he might have shared the fate of Peters—contempt and infamy—whether deservedly or not. Powerful interest in his favour was made, no doubt, and the Poet, fortunately for the glory of England and her literature, survived the Pamphleteer.

The fourth and fifth volumes of "Masson" cover the history from the death of Charles I. to the restoration of Charles II., and include Milton's principal public writings—the "Eikonoclastes" and the two Defences, with particulars of his employments in the service of the State. The subject of the "Eikon Basilike" has recently been ably discussed in this REVIEW,\* and we shall therefore not refer to it here. Nor will space permit us to go into any of the details of the "Commonwealth." We have seen Milton preparing to take his part in the reforms of the Church and

\* The Authorship of the "Eikon Basilike." MODERN REVIEW, July, 1880. By W. Blake Odgers, LL.D.

the State, and ultimately becoming the voice of England in her religious freedom and her Republican government. That the conflict between the Parliament and the Army resulted almost as a matter of necessity in a military tyranny which ultimately broke down, and the Parliamentary element along with it, as soon as the controlling power of the great Protector ceased with his death—we all know. In fact, there was no political power able to withstand the reaction which set in under Richard Cromwell's feeble Protectorate; and the army, although filled with patriotic and God-fearing soldiers such as no other State ever had the power to enlist in its service, had no choice but to hand over the country to the restored monarch and the enthusiastic Royalists who were to keep down the honour of England and all her liberties until the revival of the good cause in the Revolution of 1688.

During the reaction to which we have alluded, Milton lost no opportunity of attempting to recall his countrymen to the principles they were so soon to abandon. In 1651, in his First Defence, he had, as Professor Masson finely says, addressed the continental nations "as from the battlements of the British Island;" and in 1654 and 1655 his Second Defence and his Self-Defence rang in the ears of all the learned men of Europe. In 1659 and 1660 a few English pamphlets, ecclesiastical and political, were the last of his utterances on behalf of his countrymen. If the animosity of Prynne had been as powerful as it was malicious during the debates on the Indemnity Bill, Milton's biography would have ended with a grim paragraph of "hanging and quartering" at Charing Cross or Tyburn. The imagination shudders at the thought. But even if Milton's greater glory had never been manifested, his name would not have altogether perished. He had friends amongst the lovers of learning and poetry of all parties. The exquisite tenderness of the Elegist of King and Diodati would not have been forgotten, though the glory

of the Epic Poet had been quenched in blood. The author of "The Nymph's Complaint for her Fawn," and the "Drop of Dew" would have mourned the loss of his friend in verses only less sweet than Milton's own, instead of having the privilege a few years later of addressing "the poet blind yet bold" on the subject of "Paradise Lost." Perhaps Marvell did more than any other man to rescue his friend from the fate of the regicides. There is every reason to believe that he and other "lovers of the Muses," as well as some men high in favour with the new Government, interposed successfully to open the way for Milton's return to the great object and work of his life. How gratefully may all English-speaking peoples welcome his deliverance and his ascension to the realms of song !

At the age of fifty-two, with fourteen years of life yet before him, tried by experience, purified by trial, "troubled on every side, yet not distressed, persecuted but not forsaken, cast down but not destroyed," Milton found the work to do for which he had "covenanted with the knowing reader," and which he had ever regarded as his "portion in this life." He was always strong and vigorous, inspired with a divine fulness of life. Even his blindness, if properly regarded, cannot make him an object of pity. He could not but feel the loss of sight and deplore it ; but his complaints of that loss, for the most part expressed in the dramatic or poetic form, are not the wailings of misery, but the expression of his sense of the glory of sight, sometimes mingled with abounding gratitude for the "inner light" which was bestowed upon him in such large measure. His outward circumstances were adequate to the purposes of his life. If tried in temper, he was not tried in spirit by the cares and annoyances inseparable from his condition. He enjoyed the tender care of his wife, Elizabeth Minshall, and he delighted in the honour and reverence of many admiring friends. He laboured ever "as

under his great Taskmaster's eye," and devoted himself to his unceasing studies, or waited for the seasons of the influx of poetical inspiration, ever "content though blind."

We have no intention of describing the great Poems which make the name of Milton immortal. The Reformer and the Liberator appear in them also. It is the spirit of liberty that has made "*Paradise Lost*," "*Paradise Regained*," and "*Samson Agonistes*" dear to the English heart; though their popularity has been subject to variations. Hallam remarked in his "*Literary History*" "that the discovery of Milton's Arianism in this rigid generation has already impaired the sale of '*Paradise Lost*.'" Shelley, in his "*Defence of Poetry*," urged such claims for the moral superiority of Milton's Satan over God himself, as are more shocking to ordinary readers than the discovery of Arianism. The variations of popular acceptance are, however, but temporary. The time has come when the charge of Arianism against Milton ceases to carry the weight attributed to it by Hallam. Arianism and Socinianism are phases of Christian opinion, unlikely to be revived in any of their historical forms, though the first, as a general term, may be employed to represent a phase of transition from orthodoxy to free Christianity. And this leads us to bring this essay to a close with a few words about Milton's final theological position.

We have seen how his opinions widened with his sympathies in favour of the Independents and Sectaries. In 1673 he put forth his tract "*Of true religion, heresy, schism, toleration*," &c. In it he says of Socinians and Arminians that they may have some errors, but are no heretics. And again: "The Arian and Socinian are charged to dispute against the Trinity; they affirm to believe the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost according to the Scripture and the Apostolic creed: as for terms of Trinity, &c., they reject them as scholastic notions not to be found



in Scripture." These passages may prepare us for the theology of "Paradise Lost" and the "Treatise on Christian Doctrine." It is, however, of the latter only that we have left ourselves room to speak, and this very briefly; or we should have been glad to transfer to these pages some portions of Professor Masson's analysis of the work as well as some part of the entertaining story of the fate of the manuscript.

The "Treatise on Christian Doctrine" is a very important and very curious book. Had it been published while Milton was alive or shortly after his death, it would certainly have become notorious, and would probably have exerted very considerable influence on the course of English theological thought through the last two centuries as well as on the traditional reputation of Milton himself. As it is, though it has been fifty years before the world, it seems to have found few real readers (Vol. VI., p. 817).

The treatise is based wholly upon Scripture, and its tone, like its introductory greeting "to all everywhere on earth professing the Christian Faith," is apostolical. No doubt Milton regarded the work as a message to the Churches, setting forth, but not imposing on others, his final views of the Christian religion. We cannot help speculating about the effect the treatise might have had on the English Presbyterian and Arian communities—whether it might not have hastened and protracted the period of the prevalence of Arian doctrine in their Churches. But the speculation is idle. The work that might have founded a sect is awakened from its sleep of a hundred and fifty years in the State Paper Office, to be translated by a Bishop and regarded as a curiosity of literature! The progress of human thought with the march of time depends as much upon the living as the dead, and what Milton's Epistle was fated not to do was yet done by the influence of his mind in other ways. In brief, the Treatise shows that Milton's views of the nature of Christ were expressly and emphatically those of

high Arianism ; and that he held opinions about adult baptism which ally him with the General Baptists, and ideas of an inner light approaching to those of the Friends. But he held the lawfulness of war, freedom of divorce, and the lawfulness of polygamy. Moreover, he was a strong anti-Sabbatarian. He regarded with favour the gaities and ornaments of life, and the innocent refinements and elegancies of conversation. And yet, to close these remarks with the closing words of Professor Masson's noble Biography : " It would be a mistake to say of Milton, on any of these accounts, that he did not belong to the great Puritan body of his countrymen. . . . Only an unscholarly misconception of Puritanism, a total ignorance of the actual facts of its history, will ever seek, now or henceforward, to rob English Puritanism of Milton, or Milton of his title to be remembered as the genius of Puritan England " (Vol. VI., p. 840).

HERBERT NEW.

## WHAT WOULD THE ATHEIST HAVE?

WE ask this question with reference to what, by very many, is still felt to be a serious difficulty in the way of believing in God as One who is perfectly just and good and wise, or as One who is able to achieve what perfect justice and goodness and wisdom would desire. We wish to treat that difficulty, where it is seriously felt, with something more than respect. It may do for prosperous poets and happy preachers to sing of nothing but the joy of life and the goodness of God; but contact with the stern realities of life shows us the other side. An old English poet—poet, too, not of sorrow and shadows, but of gladness and sunshine—calls this the “isle of dreams,” and says,—

In this world, the isle of dreams,  
While we sit by sorrow's streams,  
Tears and terrors are our themes.

And, to a large extent, they are our themes, unless we are heartless and unobservant. Shakspeare, in his profoundest and sorrowfullest tragedies, adroitly introduces intervals of near-lying humour, little snatches of song, bright gleams of sunny-hearted delight, or pure unconsciousness of evil. And that is a picture of real life. The great tragedy is being enacted;—the sick are pining, the vicious are sinning, the lonely are mourning, the helpless are perishing, the young are drifting into their life of grinding toil, the old are drifting out by the way of a pauper's grave; and we hold our little merry-makings, enjoy our music, laugh or

sigh over our mimic mirth or pain, or jog on in the even tenor of our way, and only a thin partition or narrow street separates the bounding from the breaking heart, the wedding party from the funeral, the happy mother, with her new-found treasure, from the mother with the empty place in house if not in heart. In truth, the sins and sorrows of a great town would haunt us like a weird spectre, in bed or at board, at church or at business, if there were not so many things lying nearer to us to fill our eyes and engross our thoughts ; and though these engrossing things be trivial, and some of them but little selfish things, they serve, like tiny fingers on our eyes, to blot out the tremendous spectacle.

Religious people are apt to say that it is the rebellious spirit which finds occasion for unbelief in these sorrowful sides of human life ; but it is not so. It is too often the frivolous, the thoughtless, the selfish, who have the least doubt about God and His perfect goodness, and over whose contented spirits the wave of doubt, produced by the throb of sympathy, never passes. Happy themselves, and never troubling their heads about the miserable, except in some small way of "charity" ; full themselves, and never hearing the cry of the hungry, they find it easy to cry "infidel" when some tender, receptive, sensitive soul, appalled at the extent of the world's sorrow, falters on what Tennyson calls—

The great world's altar-stairs  
That slope through darkness up to God.

For it is, as a rule, such a soul, grieved at the sight of so much evil, perplexed at the spectacle of the apparently savage and merciless side of Nature, that falters ; or, in some moment of sharp agony, denies.

And yet, while allowing all this, admitting that there is around us enough of squalor, dirt, deformity, hunger, disease, and sin, to make us all wretched if we were nearer

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to it, and less engrossed with our own affairs; admitting, too, that they are not necessarily the most religious souls who most readily glorify God as good to all; still, there are some sober, practical considerations which lie on the threshold that go very far to mitigate the seeming severity of the evils of life, and that even suggest the curious and instructive conclusion that, after all, the happiest half of the world is not perhaps the half where the money and the machinery for producing happiness are found.

It is certainly a fact that misery exists only in reference to habits of body and states of mind; that what is misery to one would be tolerable to another, or even luxury to a third; and that, therefore, an enormous proportion of the apparent misery of the world is either not misery at all, or is misery of a very different kind from that which we take it to be. John Stuart Mill's painful picture of life's misery is here a very instructive one. He himself supplies us with an illustration of the fact we noted above—that it is the character the very reverse of frivolous, selfish, or rebellious that is most deeply touched by the spectacle of the misery of the world, or that finds in it a reason for doubt or unbelief. It was his very goodness, his sympathy with his kind; in fact, his natural piety, that led him to his state of mind. But, on the other hand, it was this very sensitiveness that made him see more than there was to see. His tender heart, for once, prevailed against his keen insight and clear head. He said that Nature did every day nearly all the things that men are imprisoned or hung for doing; and that she did these things "with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and justice." He got, by an opposite road, to the old Puritanical conclusion—that this world is "a waste, howling wilderness." But the exaggeration is manifest. The earth is not the scene of misery he pictures. As to the lower animals, it should be obvious that pain to them cannot be, in many cases, what pain is to us:

pain is relative to consciousness and thought ; but, whatever the nature of their sensations may be, we are perfectly safe in saying that the happiness, whether as to amount or intensity, must far outweigh the misery.

Then, in relation to the misery of human beings, we must begin, as we just now indicated, by taking off an enormous percentage, which is due purely to the state of mind of the observer. It is here that "things are not what they seem." A refined woman, if unaccustomed to the sight, might look with horror on any one of a hundred streets or lanes in a great town, and might be frightened to see how much earth could be made like hell. And, truly, it is pitiable enough ; but, as regards misery, she would utterly miscalculate. Those dirty, dingy little houses are havens of refuge to hundreds ; the food they eat is what they are used to, and like best—when they can get enough of it ; the smells are not noticeable, except by a few ; and as for that reeking den, called a public-house, it probably gives as much enjoyment as her husband's club. It is sad enough, even so ; but, as regards misery, her impression needs an enormous rectification. She might go home, with tears in her eyes, and a thrill of thankfulness in her heart, to look on her children there. But her sum would be all wrong ; her multiplication and subtraction alike inaccurate. The terrace-children seem to have all the multiplication, and the poor little gutter-children all the subtraction ; but, so far as mere conscious pleasure goes, it may be rather the other way ; for, after all, still confining our attention to mere animal enjoyment, it is very doubtful whether the nurseries of the world have given more pleasure than the streets. Nature—shall we say God?—is very good to her gutter-children. She teaches them to get out of the way of horses, where ours would infallibly be run over ; she gives them, by instinct, to know the way home, so that they may have the joy of following the band a mile, where our children can

hardly be trusted to leave the gate. She helps them to get for themselves strange joys out of a bit of string, a few chips, and some shells; while, with endless story-books and costly contrivances for giving delight, we often fail to keep ours "good." She makes them thrive on thick pieces of bread, when they can get it, while ours need the doctor on four meals a-day. So with the men and women who are fathers and mothers of these children. Troubles enough they have, it is true, but not in the way we imagine. True, they live in dreary lanes, with polluted air and narrow rooms and endless noises; many of them have no Sunday clothes, and they live from hand to mouth, and lay by nothing for an evil day. But all this is commonplace to them. "Familiarity" breeds more than "contempt." They get many pleasures, too, in their way,—cheap enough, and not ideally admirable, but producing in them the same thrills, and ministering to the same feelings, as those known in "higher circles." The little humble merrymakings of the poor, or the red-letter days of the squalid, give amazing delight; and not a few homely pleasures come along the dingy "tenor of their way."

Another consideration carries us to a deeper and entirely different view of life, in relation to the real sorrow that remains when all allowances are made. The mystery is not explained, indeed, but light is thrown upon it by the very suggestive fact that out of sorrow have sprung some of the most precious elements of human life, and some of the most lovely traits of human character. Sympathy itself seems conditioned by sorrow, and pathos could hardly exist without pain; and the best half of life's emotions, and the vast varieties of moods and feelings, with all the lights and shadows of hope and fear, and love and hate, and expectation and surprise, can hardly be imagined except in a world where something answering to sorrow is possible. The noblest things in human life, the sublimest creations of

literature and art, the grandest developments and manifestations of character, seem somehow vitally related to this mysterious creative agent. There could have been no heroes, if there had been nothing to dare and nothing to endure ; no poets, if life had all been an easy gliding with an endless placid tide ; no self-sacrifice, if there had been nothing to surrender and nothing to bear ; no Jesus, if there had been no cross ; no Shakspeare, if there had been no possible Ophelia, Cordelia, Hamlet, Lear.

Life, in other ways, is full of singular indications of the fact that pain and difficulty and failure are actually necessary factors in education and enjoyment. Pain, in a variety of forms, is the guardian angel which warns us of error and danger, or the sentinel which peremptorily orders us off ; and that, though disagreeable for a time, is truest mercy. Besides, how often is failure the very key of success—the most direct road to the surest kind of possession ! How frequently does loss teach us how to gain ! How continually does endurance train to hardy manhood ! What we call misfortune or defeat is often our best schoolmaster, to call out our dormant powers, to vitally educate us, to make victory really our own. In the class-room, it is the blunder that is pilloried by a laugh which covers with confusion that comes to a speedy and utter end ; and, in the workshop, it is by cutting himself and spoiling his material that the young workman soonest and most surely finds out how to handle his tools. It is so that men learn all they deeply know, and gain all they securely win.

In the life of a nation we may see the same thing—that nothing has been solidly won without previous defeat ; that failure brought experience ; that even the “ hope deferred ” which “ maketh the heart sick ” had its far-reaching uses ; that trial knit men’s hearts together ; and that, as a rule, the gravity or variety of its trials measured the extent of its freedom, its security, and its solidarity. Where the laws



are the most human and the best administered; where institutions do not quickly change, but go on their steady way, unhasting but unresting, never going backward, but always onward to the perfect day; where the liberties of a people are based on the surest foundations and secured by the safest guarantees; where the rights of man are most respected, and the governing or administering classes touch most nearly the "working" classes, with the fewest contentions and the soberest freedom for all, we find that the mighty structure has been reared through long, laborious centuries, and inch by inch; and that not without bitter sorrow and suffering has freedom broadened "slowly down, from precedent to precedent." All the great political reforms of our own day, for the removal of abuses and the correction of mistakes that had rooted themselves in the public policy of the English people, were won only after sore struggle; and we cannot reverse these reforms, simply because they *were* so won. We cannot go back to the political system of fifty years ago; we cannot return to the discarded ideas and policy of Protection; we cannot re-establish the old selfish monopolies; we cannot restore the corrupt pocket boroughs; we cannot re-impose the tax upon literature,—and all this, not only because the decisions come to on these matters were sound, but because these decisions came after failure and suffering and hard work which always drive away the chaff from the wheat, and then root the good seed in men's living hearts, tread it down, and make it bring forth fruit which all learn to value.

The triumphs of Science furnish another illustration of the same fact. How they are won, we know; and what mistakes and sorrows pave the way for nearly all great achievements. The old astrologers and the alchemists of a bygone day were not mere babblers and quacks. What grand feelers after the truth were they! The dream of astrology has become the reality of astronomy; and the

fevered fancies of the alchemist have become the sublime discoveries of the chemist. Herschel was a lineal descendant of the feared or despised men who listened for "the music of the spheres" or felt after the subtle laws that bind worlds and systems in one mysterious mighty whole; and Faraday was related by every intellectual tie to him who first sought in his crucible and his ashes for the philosopher's stone. In other fields of experiment and achievement the same thing is true. The early engines burst or break down; the experimental ships are clumsy, and waste precious time or go to the bottom; and then men see at once what is wanted. Every failure leads to better ideas or better work, till at last all falsities and ignorances are eliminated, and the stern schoolmaster, suffering, gets the truth comprehended and obeyed. He, then, who complains of suffering, complains of his best discoverer, his best inventor, his best practical engineer, his stern but unerring guide.

We do not say that these considerations explain everything connected with the mystery of suffering; still less do we say that suffering has been palpably "ordained" for the sake of the results we have indicated, or that it is obviously a good and right thing that some people should be miserable in order that others should be made sympathetic, self-denying, successful, or heroic; but we do say that these considerations go a very long way towards relieving the Atheist's otherwise gloomy and miserable picture, and that they do connect struggle and sorrow in a very curious and impressive way with the best results of triumph and the noblest forms of joy.

It may be here objected that the "difficulty" nevertheless remains, because a good, wise, and powerful God could and would have called into being a race that would have had no need to go through all these dark and sorrowful stages on the road of life ere it could reach the goal.

Perhaps so, but that is not clear ; it is, indeed, scarcely conceivable. A race of animated chronometers, curiously constructed to go right from first to last, is hardly the same thing as a race of hoping, fearing, loving, hating, struggling, self-centred, educated, aspiring men and women ; and such a race of men and women could hardly have been called into existence, even by infinite power, without some such process as that we have been considering. We do not say that this is perfectly plain, or that we are warranted in affirming that this is palpably the best conceivable world for the growth and development of human beings ; but we may assuredly conclude that this is evidently the best *kind* of world for the growth and development of such beings. Another kind of world might have grown angels or automatons, but angels or automatons are not under discussion just now.

It may here be useful to take note of the fact that the doctrines and suggestions associated with the phrases "law of selection" and "survival of the fittest," have thus far not tended to lessen the difficulty felt by those who are sensitively alive to the pain and sorrow endured by living beings, even on the upward march. But we have yet much to learn here. In a state of society to which the name of "savage" would be given, the law of "the survival of the fittest" works itself out unchecked by few if any of the gracious moral rectifications and spiritual adjustments that come with the higher stages. There, as in the case of some of the lower animals, a maimed, old, or useless member of the group is frequently pitilessly destroyed. "Every one for himself" is the law of life in those low social latitudes. But, as civilisation advances, all kinds of subtle checks come in to modify or to positively reverse these first rough developments of the law of "the survival of the fittest ;" and the deeper fountains of the spirit are reached. It is found that muscle is not everything, that being an able fighter or hunter is not the highest qualification for a ruler,

that there is something, too, in poetry, in graciousness, in the laughter of little children, in the pathos of age, in the struggles of the weak and the sorrows of the unfortunate. It is perceived that weakness, and old age, and misfortune, and deformity, and ignorance, and lunacy, and crime, are not just things to sweep out of the way as hindrances, but things to take account of, to spend thought and pity and love upon ; and so the law of " the survival of the fittest " comes to have an entirely new meaning, in the survival of the fittest to think, and forecast, and plan, and pity, and love ; nay, possibly, the fittest to be thought about, to be provided for, to be pitied, and to be loved.

Can we not see here at least the dawn of light upon one of the darkest problems connected with the painful education of the race ? At the very worst, we see the unadapted giving place to the adapted, the incapable perishing before the capable. It is, perhaps, nothing higher or more merciful than the " competitive system ; " but there is nothing malignant in that. It is, at all events, a grand effort to find out the best, that it may be advanced and perpetuated. And surely, if we ponder that, we shall see that Nature is neither blind nor cruel ; nay, but the more we think about it, the more shall we hear the gentle voice behind the cloud, the more shall we feel the beating heart beyond the iron hand.

It is with man as it has been with the earth on which he lives his little day. That has been shaped into beauty and fashioned into grace by the multitudinous processes of myriads of ages. Like a submissive child, it lay in the hands of the great mother, and so grew " to the measure of the stature " of this glorious earth. And not always by tender processes : but by fire and water, by all-consuming heat and all-binding cold, by fierce convulsions and gentle erosions, by ice masses and lava streams, yet all orderly, gradual, progressive, beneficent, the earth has been fashioned into hill and dale, mountain and meadow, with rich minerals

in the cells beneath, and balanced clouds for use and beauty in the heavens above, and river channel and ocean bed for the traffic of the world.

It is the same with the hardier growths that spring from her fruitful surface. The tree is beaten by every wind that blows, but takes a faster grip of the soil beneath, for all that it endures above. It is drenched by spring rains, thundered at by winter storms, and burned with summer suns ; but the one roots it in the earth, the other wins it to spread its beauty to the heavens. But these are poor patient things that have no choice, that cannot help yielding to the divine musician, the glorious architect, the mighty builder of the universe. But man, tempest-tossed, weary, struggling man, has the fatal gift of will. He can rebel, he can hate, he can repine, he can make the worst of everything, he can make the light hurt him, he can make all things "work together for" harm. On the other hand, this very gift of will, which distinguishes him from the earth or the tree, endows him with power to rise far above the conditions that limit the growth and development of these. "Creature of circumstances" he may be, but he has the wondrous power of himself becoming the supreme, the dominant circumstance. The poor tree must always submit to its fate, but man seems to have a practically inexhaustible energy which only needs to be drawn upon by the will. Let the storm only blow hard enough, and the tree must yield ; but if a man will only will it, he can bend his head to every blast and be unconquered, and make all things "work together for good."

We have said that we desire to treat with more than respect the difficulty felt by many tender souls ; but that desire is occasionally somewhat tried by a class of objectors, with reference to whose demonstrative complaints we have been more particularly led to ask the question, "What would the Atheist have?" A case in point will be most useful here. Some time ago, there appeared in Mr. Bradlaugh's

Paper two articles written in a missionary, not to say a militant, spirit, whose writers seemed as anxious as any revivalist to convert us to their views, and to save us from our own. Their utterances, to persons not accustomed to literature of the kind, may appear extreme and unusual ; but they are by no means uncommon, and, in milder forms, are, in a sense, very prevalent. It is good, however, to have the "difficulty" in an outright form. These writers, in common with all who take their view, fall into a singular unfairness. They confine their attention to, or only take account of, that side of nature and life which looks dark and sorrowful ; and they exaggerate even here. They become a sort of "devil's advocate" even against the "Nature" they desire to set in the supreme place.

One of these writers goes so far as to affirm that the belief in God is itself "a fruitful source of misery." He not only concludes that because there is misery there can be no God, but he seems to attribute not a little of that misery to belief in Him. In any case, this is mournfully one-sided, leaving out of the reckoning as it does the mighty consolation the belief in God has been to millions of even the most miserable. We do not say that belief in God is proved to be well founded because it gives consolation ; but the Atheist has at most only as much or as little right to say that that belief is false because it has led to superstition, bigotry, and persecution. But the question, at this point, is, not whether belief in God is well or ill founded, but whether it makes the world miserable ; and what we note here is the ignoring of the undoubted fact that belief in God gives an enormous amount of the profoundest kind of happiness to the world. When a man who appears to be estimating the value of things says broadly, that "the belief in God has been a fruitful source of misery," and adds not a word about it as an infinitely more fruitful source of consolation, hope, and joy, he uses false weights and measures, and will only escape

the charge of suppressing the truth by pleading that, for the time being, he lost sight of it—in other words, that his animus was stronger than his attention.

This same writer affirms also that “the ‘God-idea’ has inspired few to noble action,” and that “it is a stumbling-block to progress;” a statement which, in one form or another, is frequently made by militant Atheists, but which will hardly pass unchallenged by unprejudiced students of history. “The God-idea” has not only consoled the mourner, helped the miserable, made years of sickness bearable if not blessed, kept poor men and women from being soured by their struggles and crushed by their burdens, and lit the path of the dying in the last gropings for dear life; but it has been the very life and soul of the noblest workers for humanity. “The Atheist,” says this writer, “is the pioneer of a coming and a better time: he pleads for the poor, he seeks a nobler estimate of man.” God help him! What have Theists and Christians been doing all this while? What lies, to this very hour, at the very heart of our charitable institutions for healing the sick, for housing the orphan, for educating the ignorant? What, but the love of man that has been cherished and fed by love of God? Who, until now, have been the first to plead for the poor? and by what accident has it happened that the emancipators of the slave and the pleaders for the poor have, as a rule, been those who declared that to believe in God was the very breath of their mental and moral being?

“A nobler estimate of man,” too, is promised by the new evangelist. Will it, then, be “a nobler estimate of man” to say that instead of being a glorious creature destined to an eternity of progress, his life and his education are alike limited to the present narrow, and, on his own showing, miserable scene? Will it be “a nobler estimate of man” to reduce him to the level of a superior beast of burden, who is only more knowing that he may be more wretched, and

who is only more capable that he may be more baffled and broken? Will it be "a nobler estimate of man" to tell him that he can love only to lose, that he can labour only to be worn out, that he can hope only to be disappointed, that he can aspire only to be blotted out, and that however much he may lift himself above the tyranny of circumstances, and educate, cultivate, and elevate himself, he is only decking himself for a funeral, and growing a glorious manhood for the grave? Right or wrong, it is overwhelmingly plain that the Theist or the Christian has, at all events, the noblest estimate of man; and it is sheer mockery to talk of Atheism improving upon it, by destroying every portion of the estimate that gave man hope of advancement beyond the accidents of life, beyond the incident called death.

"The Atheist," says this writer, "is in front of all great movements for political, social, and moral advancement." But that remains to be seen; for, assuredly, up to this moment, "all great movements" of every kind have been mainly in the hands of Theists or Christians; and it has yet to be shown what political, social, or moral improvements can be wrought by getting rid of faith in God. To say the least of it, the experiment has yet to be tried: to say the truth about it, the experiment has nothing winning about it, to make us wish to try it.

Assuredly, if there is no God, and if we are to know it; if the splendid conception of life and progress beyond the grave is only a vain imagination, we are not better off than we thought we were, but unspeakably worse. Surely that is something to sorrow over with grief unutterable; and surely an element in life has then disappeared which has done incalculable service to humanity in its hours of bitterest need. The Atheist offers us "emancipation," but, assuredly, if we have to embark upon the effort to live "without hope and without God in the world," with only Atheism at the helm, it will become us to do so with a



"*sad, wise valour,*" as men who go to try a great and doubtful experiment, the like of which has never been tried, and the end of which no man can foresee.

The second of the two writers named well represents a class to whom we have already referred, a class by no means as limited as many imagine. He dwells exclusively upon what we have already admitted is, on the face of it, a formidable argument against the existence of a good, wise, and all-powerful God. But this writer is not merely sensitive to the difficulty we have already discussed; he revels in it, he presses it upon us in what we have called a missionary or militant spirit, and founds upon it a vehement argument against the existence of God. He says that if he were the maker and the governor of the world he should be ashamed of his handiwork. He bids us think of the deaths by fire, wars, epidemics, explosions, shipwrecks, and the like; and asks how the occurrence of these can be reconciled with the idea of the existence of a good, wise, and powerful God. In return, we ask him what he would have. As an outright Atheist he would be the first to scoff at miracle, and to pour contempt on the suggestion of any supernatural interference with "the laws of nature." He probably prefers science to prayer; but what science could there be in the absence of the catastrophes he deprecates? Perhaps he would like a world in which fire knew what to burn and what to let alone; in which gunpowder could be trusted to explode only on suitable occasions, and in which bad work did not tell in a bridge. If not, what would he have? Either "the laws of nature" must be repealed, or God must interfere to prevent mistakes or to avert the consequences of them. The Atheist covers with derision the old-fashioned preachers who see in a great disaster the interference of God, for judgment or warning; but how much better is he when he makes the non-interference of

God a reason for not believing in Him? Mr. Holyoake was wiser when he taught us that "Science is the Providence of life," and asserted the truth that "scientific pursuits once authorised, scientific habits come to be cultivated, facts assume a guiding importance. The thinker acquires confidence and courage in the resources of science; he perceives the predominance of reason, and he learns to trust it throughout." What is this but to "justify the ways of God to man," in permitting the sublime order to revolve, crush what it may? It is the child who wants to be saved at every moment from the consequences of its errors, or who expects to be safeguarded against all accidents. But Atheism professes to be exceptionally vigorous, courageous, independent, and manly. This world, then, is the very kind of world that Atheists ought to like, and God the very kind of God they ought to be glad to admire. He is as impartial as a scientific force, as veracious as a mathematical quantity. He never surprises us with trick or variability, and is not moved from the rock of law even by cries and tears,—wonderful, unchangeable, just.

But something else is true. If we admit that evil broods about us, like some hungry beast, seeking whom it may devour, it is also true that the good, working, throbbing, shining at the heart of all things, is never absent, is never conquered, is always conquering. The good is not only here, but it persists, it is master, it seems destined to finally prevail. The problem of the co-existence of these two forces may be surely postponed in presence of this hopeful fact: and, all the more because the struggling soul feels that evil is somehow a usurper, or only a stepping-stone, at best, to the good; all the more because it feels that the good is its rightful king, it beats against the bars of the fleshly cage, and longs for the beauty, the harmony, the sunlight,

and the love, of which it dreams, or which it sees or hears or feels.

One very suggestive fact may be helpful here—that the effect of misery upon the miserable is, as a rule, not that which the Atheist would lead us to look for. Atheism, as we have seen, justifies itself by pointing to the world's sorrow; but Theism has expressed itself most touchingly and tenderly when that sorrow has had to be endured. It may be a paradox, but it is a fact, that it is not the miserable who “curse God and die,” but the prosperous who do that for them. Sorrow has drawn out the soul to God in profoundest trusts and sweetest confidences and most unshaken love. It is as though the baffled soul never reasoned about it; as though, in the failing of flesh and heart, nothing was remembered but the need of an abiding refuge and an undying friend. Logic may say:—If God is almighty, He is responsible for your grief; or if He were good He would help you out of it; curse Him and die: but the heart persists in its yearning, and cries “My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God: when shall I come and appear before God? My tears have been my meat day and night, while they continually say unto me, Where is thy God? . . . But I shall yet praise Him, who is the health of my countenance, and my God.”

As a matter of fact, then, it is not the sorrowful who become Atheists: they take refuge from creation in the Creator; they treat the world as a desert through which they pass to the Father's house beyond; they “rest in the Lord, and wait patiently for Him.” There might, indeed, be compiled a literature of the trust of sorrowful souls; and how rich would be the prayers, how sweet the hymns, how pathetic the entreaty, how sublime the confidence, how exultant the praise! No! it is not sorrow that will kill faith in God; but if ever the evil day should come when the child-heart shall die out of the world, and the love of God be

dismissed as a detected dream, it will only be when life gets all the heroism and poetry taken out of it, when nature is regarded only as a provider of marketable commodities, when physical pleasures alone are included in the category of human delights, and when hard cynicism, or weary satiety, or insipid common-place, or animal selfishness takes the place of aspiration ; and when, having ceased to strive or dream, men cease to love or hope. But that day will never come. Science and civilisation will only make God a greater necessity than ever ; and, in a universe vaster than our fathers knew, we and those who come after us will find ever more and more to lead the soul to aspire, to wonder, and adore.

We are thus led to one thought more, with which we may fitly conclude, and which, indeed, is necessary to our argument, though it will carry us far beyond the Atheist and his difficulties or his refutations. There is a growing feeling that the converging lines which, in relation to so many subjects, all tend to the great central facts of development through struggle, and progress through suffering, tend also, and more and more luminously and manifestly, to the sublime thought that the end is not here and now,—that the development and progress of man do not end with this little scene, that life's account must be left open, and that we cannot yet strike the balance of life's profit or loss. Presently the arms of the great silent mother will open to receive the worn-out form : but what then ? Will the mighty process which has been going on at every step end just when it seems to be well begun ? Are the accumulations of a life to go for nothing ? and is Nature such a spendthrift of her productions that she can afford to fling her choicest fruits away just when they begin to ripen ? What does reason say to that ? What does conscience say to that ? What does the voiceful spirit say to that ? That way victory lies, and not defeat ; life, and not death.

There will come, indeed, a little hurried winter, a moment's tremor in the mysterious cold, a closing of the poor, worn eyes, a few kind drops on a new-made grave; but—

Though I stoop  
Into a tremendous sea of cloud,  
It is but for a time. I press God's lamp  
Close to my breast: its splendour, soon or late,  
Will pierce the gloom. I shall emerge somewhere.

J. PAGE HOPPS.

## FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT FAUST.

### II.—THE LEGEND AND THE STAGE.

**B**IOGRAPHY, basing itself mainly upon tradition, and largely impregnated by fable, records the existence, in the second half of the fifteenth, and in the early years of the sixteenth century, of a Doctor Johann Faust, philosopher, scholar, magician, conjuror. This Doctor Faust was born, it is supposed, in Kundlingen, now called Knittlingen, in Würtemberg; left ordinary studies for that of the black science, which he mastered in Krakau, and there instructed in unlawful arts his *Famulus* (or servitor) and disciple, Wagner. Faust is said to have exercised his power of summoning to his aid the Evil One, and to have made a compact with the devil, in virtue of which the soul of the magician should become the property of the fiend in consideration of a period of twenty-four years of enjoyment of all desires, and of all the pleasures that the senses, that the lust of the eye and the pride of life, can yield. Faust was to have, for the fulfilment of his purposes, a certain devil (Mephistopheles by name) attached to his person and service, and always at his command. The Doctor travelled far and wide in Germany, with his attendant fiend; enjoyed himself to the uttermost, and set the world wondering at the feats that he could perform. At the end of the covenanted time, the inexorable Evil One claimed his bargain, and the unhappy Doctor was robbed of life, under circumstances of gross cruelty, at the village of Rimlich, between the hours (these are very precisely given) of twelve at night and one in

the morning. Meantime his fame for wonder-working and for the diabolic art had become great, and widely spread throughout all Germany, and even in other countries of Europe.

The priests were glad of so pregnant an example of the danger of meddling with those unholy arts which, though forbidden, were yet then generally believed in; the vulgar love of the wonderful and the horrible was deeply excited by the life, death, and adventures of this potent magician; and hence it came to pass that Doctor Faust became the property of popular credulity and awe; and that, within some few years after his terrible death, his name and fame were bruited through all the land. Narrative and drama, the book and the stage, laid hold of the dark Doctor; and such reputations speedily became the subjects of exaggeration. The life of Faust penetrated into the life of the people, and from many sides was found to be attractive, awful, and suggestive. The flames of Hell light up a huge fire upon earth. The sense of that dim unholy power which can command the services of demons, and which can, by such aid, enjoy years of the enjoyment of every earthly lust, lays hold of superstitious fancy, and the tragic end of such a man has an appalling grandeur which impresses and stirs the popular imagination. Poems, pantomimes, puppet plays, tragedies, upon the subject of the great conjuror, appeared in numbers. In 1599, Wiedemann published, in Hamburg, his *Wahrhaftige Historien von denen greulichen Sünden Dr. Joh. Faustens*. Printed at once in Cologne and in Nürnberg, but without date on the title-page, comes next *Des durch die ganze Welt verrufenen Erzscharz Künstler's und Zauberer's Dr. Faust mit dem Teufel aufgerichtetes Bündniss, abenteuerlicher Lebenswandel, und schreckliches Ende*.

Nay, the legend of Dr. Faust spread beyond Germany to other countries of Europe, and, before the end of the sixteenth century, Marlowe had produced in England his *Tragicall Historie of Dr. Faustus*. It would be impossible to enumerate here all the shapes which this most popular,

though intensely German legend, has taken in literature and in the drama. A direct product of its time, the tradition is yet full of vital, of perennial essence, whether of wonder only, or of wonder blent with superstitious fear. We no longer believe in the gods of Greece, but we still love the beauty of the myths that they represent, and the sculpturesque glory of the forms in which they were incarnated by human imagination, and in which they still exist in the ideality of the pure marble. Goethe found a most moving and picturesque tradition, a story known, at least, to every German, and susceptible, as he soon saw, of great art-treatment as the vehicle of the very deepest meanings. It attracted him in his poet youth; unhesitating, but unrelenting, he worked out of it gradually during the long years of manhood his own dramatic version, and the completed work crowned his sovereign age with its brightest glory. Seldom, in the history of literature, has a great poet so wisely or so happily selected a subject which would exert his powers to the very top of their bent. The idea of *Faust* is now inseparably and distinctively associated with the name of Goethe; and he has made the old, old story immortal by enclosing its rude outline and essence in all the higher meanings, in all the deeper beauty, that he could add to it. Goethe, himself a magician in the divine sort, found noble material for his art in the mediæval legend of the black wizard, Faust.

The first part of Goethe's *Faust* was begun, probably, in or even before 1774. The execution of the poem spread itself slowly over some thirty years. It was worked upon gradually, in the intervals of much other work, at many times and in many places—one scene was written in the Borghese Gardens in Rome—and was first printed, in its complete form, in 1806; a perilous and distracted time, in which the French victory of Jena exposed Weimar to occupation by French troops, and caused the destruction of many German manuscripts—as, for instance, Herder's



posthumous manuscripts and Meyer's works. Goethe's own house was filled with soldiers, and, inspired by a dread of the possible destruction of the completed manuscript of his masterpiece, he at once sheltered it in the security of print.

This first part of *Faust* was first produced upon the stage on 19th January, 1829. The theatre to which this honour belongs is the *Hoftheater*, of Brunswick; and Herr Eduard Devrient, in his *Geschichte der Deutschen Schauspielkunst*, tells the story of the original adaptation of Goethe's infinite, but dramatic poem, for acting; and of its first presentation on the boards of a German theatre.

August Klingemann had long been the successful Director of the *National-Theater* in Brunswick; but when, in 1826, the young Duke Karl (he was then eighteen years of age) came to the Ducal throne, he evinced a lively interest in the drama. The æsthetic Duke's interference was not of unmixed advantage to the theatre. He paralysed the beneficial working of Klingemann, and he then appointed his Master of the Horse, Herr von Oeynhausen, to be *Intendant* of the theatre. Klingemann was not dismissed, but his excellent theatrical discipline was destroyed, and his efforts in the cause of true dramatic art were seriously let and hindered. The young Prince interfered personally with the management of the theatre; he attended rehearsals; he set aside Klingemann's excellent rules, and thwarted Klingemann's strenuous aims and objects. The result of princely interference was not productive of good. Many of the best actors left the theatre; and those who remained were demoralised by a system of capricious favouritism. Young princes who meddle with the management of theatres have a tendency to take an almost disproportionate interest in the representatives of female characters, and Duke Karl's theatrical activity was, in this, as in other respects, very injurious to the Brunswick *Hoftheater*.

One caprice, however, of the young Duke led to a most important result—to the production on the Brunswick

stage of Goethe's *Faust*. Klingemann was himself the author of a dramatic version of the old *Faust* legend; and this version, which seems to have had, in its day, a moderate stage success, Klingemann was fond of producing in the theatre which he so ably managed.

On some occasion on which Klingemann's *Faust* was presented, Duke Karl, who loved to tease and to thwart the great manager, asked Klingemann why he did not produce the *Faust* of Goethe; and the Duke intimated that Klingemann dreaded the rivalry of Goethe. Klingemann replied that he would not venture to compare his play with that of Goethe; but that Goethe had not written his poem for the stage, and that it might be difficult to adapt it for representation. This was surely a not unnatural idea, as things then stood, or were held to stand, on the part of the Director. The Duke persisted; he had, he said, looked through Goethe's play, and found it intrinsically dramatic and very possible for acting. The Duke, naturally enough, carried his point; Klingemann himself adapted, for the first time, Goethe's poem for actual representation; and the piece was performed, with enormous success, on 19th January, 1829.\*

\* The following is a copy of the playbill of the first performance, on any public stage, of Goethe's *Faust*:—

BRAUNSCHWEIG-HOF THEATER.

Montag, den 19 Januar, 1829.

Zum Erstenmal:

FAUST,

Tragödie in sechs Abtheilungen von Goethe, für die Bühne redigirt.

PERSONEN.

Faust . . . . .	Hr. Schütz.	Erster	} Handwerks- bursche .	{ Hr. Feuerlacke. Hr. Küster. Hr. Fischer.
Warner, sein Famulus . . .	Hr. Senk.	Zweiter		
Mephistopheles . . . .	Hr. Marr.	Dritter		
Der Erdgeist . . . . .	Hr. Dessoir.	Erster	} Schüler . .	{ Hr. Berger. Hr. Fitzenhagen.
Büser Geist . . . . .	Hr. Goesmann.	Zweiter		
Ein Schüler . . . . .	Hr. Hübsch.	Erstes	} Dienstmäd- chen . .	{ Dem. Solbrig. Elise Hambath.
Frosch . . . . .	Hr. Eggers.	Zweites		
Brander . . . . .	Hr. Gunther.	Erstes	} Bürgermäd- chen . .	{ Mad. Grösser. Dem. Hüpfner.
Siebel . . . . .	Hr. Moller.	Zweites		
Altmayer . . . . .	Hr. Scholz.	Erster	} Bürger . .	{ Hr. Gerard. Hr. Clarpus. Hr. Haars.
Eine Hexe . . . . .	Mad. Lay.	Zweiter		
Margarethe, ein Bür- germädchen . . . . .	Mad. Berger.	Dritter		
Valentin, ihr Bruder, Soldat . . . . .	Hr. Kettel.	Eine alte Wahrsagerin	} Mad. Heeser. Soldaten, Volk, Erscheinungen und Geister.	
Frau Marthe, ihre Nachbarin . . . . .	Mad. Klingemann.			

Der Anfang ist um 6 Uhr, und das Ende nach halb 10 Uhr.  
Die Casse wird um 5 Uhr geöffnet.

Klingemann, to whom the credit of the first dramatic production of *Faust* is to be ascribed, died in 1831.

The next appearance of Goethe's *Faust* on the German stage occurred on 27th August, 1829, at Dresden. The Dresden Theatre was then under the brilliant and intellectual management of Ludwig Tieck, who naturally desired to add the German masterpiece to his long and glorious *répertoire*. Tieck hesitated, at first, from some fear that Goethe's wonderful poem would suffer when brought into contact with the realism of the scene; but the Dresden public demanded its production, and Tieck was not willing to remain behind when Klingemann had shown the way. It seems tolerably clear that the version then played at Dresden was arranged by Tieck himself. Indeed, it is highly probable that at least slight differences exist even yet between the various versions of *Faust* played in the different leading theatres of Germany. Each director takes his own view; and has power, within his own province, to translate his view into action. Each leading theatre in Germany possesses certainly its own acting copy of Goethe's *Faust*; though some slight modification may possibly be allowed when a great star—as Seydelmann or Emil Devrient—travels about with his *Gastrollen*, and plays Mephistopheles or Faust with the arrangement which, as the actor thinks, best suits his own style, or his own means of producing effect in the play. The star-actor is, in Germany, as great and as dogmatic a potentate as he is elsewhere in Europe. The actor is the despot of the stage.

Of all parts in the drama, Goethe's Mephistopheles would seem to be almost the most difficult character that an actor could undertake; difficult to conceive; almost more difficult to execute: for Goethe's fiend is an unearthly being. At times we shudder at, and shrink from, this mystic being, who is not of our order, who cannot be touched with a sympathy with our feelings or with our infirmities. It will

be of interest to us to consider the actor—Seydelmann—who is renowned in Germany as the most notable Mephistopheles, and to analyse a little his conception and his rendering of the great part : but it should be borne in mind that, apart from the character to be represented, apart from the due relations of that character to the play, apart even from the reverence due to the poet's conception, there is a great art of abstract acting ; an art which, by tones, looks, gestures, by living dramatically a powerful situation, by embodying moving passion, may be most highly effective, as acting ; and which may yet be wanting in consideration for the dramatist's intentions. This abstract art of acting may produce a vital effect out of a poor play ; or may find its opportunity of displaying itself without a scrupulous regard to the ideas of the author of the drama.

Mephistopheles is mainly modern in conception ; nay, it may be said that Goethe's fiend could only exist in a world which had known Voltaire. Goethe tells Eckermann of the great influence which Voltaire exercised upon his youthful thinkings ; and, long after any teaching of Voltaire had ceased to impel Goethe, this influence survived into his age in the form of his knowledge of the tone of thought which he attributes to Mephisto. In taking human form, in mingling with human action, the fiend loses much of the grandiose mystery with which the pious abhorrence of earlier and of simpler ages had surrounded him. Goethe evidently does not believe—at least, in the ruder and more objective sense—in the fiend ; nor does he tremble before Lucifer. If he had believed, he would have had more reverence for Satan ; but Goethe shows *persiflage* in his very treatment of the mocking spirit. The sneer of Mephistopheles is as the sneer of Voltaire ; as bitter and as barren : for Voltaire's withering mockery was rendered intense by his close contact with *L'Infâme* ; and Mephistopheles, in his futile activity, in his negative knowledge, and in his frustrated malignity,

suggests to us a spirit which has outlived the times in which men believed in him. The dramatic usefulness of Mephisto as the symbol of a spirit of evil is, nevertheless, as great, or, perhaps, greater, than it would have been in days of infernal faith. That earnestness of ideal belief in a personal Evil Spirit which inspires Milton's vision of Satan was wanting in a day which still tingled with cold laughter at the irony of Voltaire, and at the scepticism of the eighteenth century. Goethe was too unconsciously genuine to depict a demon of much more ideal elevation than one who should combine the costume of the Middle Ages with the tone of the modern master of mockery.

Shakspeare does not genuinely believe in the supernatural. His intellect denies that in which his imagination revels. Note the immense difference between his real awe of death and his half-assumed awe of the supernatural. He uses the supernatural—or men's belief in it—with the grandest art; but his day was so much nobler than the eighteenth century, that no man of Elizabeth's spacious times would have embodied the arch-fiend in a spurious human shape of mocking, and mocked at, irony. In the very play in which Shakspeare introduces a ghost, he speaks of death as a bourne from which no traveller returns. His ghost is forbidden to reveal to Hamlet the secrets of a purgatorial prison-house; the apparition of the dead king appears chiefly to impel human action in a tragic tangle of murder and of incest. The spirit of dead Cæsar appears to warn Brutus at Philippi; the ghosts of Richard's victims cheer Richmond, and sit heavy on the soul of Richard. The witches, dæmonic agents of Hecate, translate Macbeth's ambitious imaginings into the fulfilment of fatal prophecy; and a popular, superstitious belief in these debased agents of the Evil One is used for high and subtle art purposes, as a lure to tempt the Thane of Glamis to those crimes which lead him to his ruin. The difference of the ages in which

they lived is as great as the difference between the men themselves; and this truth appears clearly when we consider and compare the uses which Shakspeare and which Goethe make of the supernatural in art.

It is a point of some difficulty for the actor playing Mephistopheles to determine how far he shall hide, or seem to hide, from the other persons of the drama, the fact that he is really embodying the devil. It is clear that the author did not intend Mephisto to be recognised for what he is by other characters. Gretchen, it is true, instinctively, dislikes and distrusts him; his countenance is repellent to her—and then he takes no joy in anything—but, on the other hand, Marthe is willing to marry him; and the revellers of Auerbach's Keller, though exasperated by his mocking *persiflage*, do not know that it is the devil himself who has them by the collar. Gretchen herself dislikes him only as a hateful man. The poet could not allow a recognised fiend to mix visibly with human beings in the tragic, or the common-place, affairs of mortal life. For the actor who "plays the devil" ostensibly, it may be urged that the audience know well who Mephisto is; and they also know that the other persons of the drama must not know. The audience are not careful to see the other characters well deceived in this particular. Seydelmann cared much more for his audience than he did for his poet, or for the other characters. He wanted to display Seydelmann through Mephisto, and to get the utmost possible amount of effect out of so doing. The genius of the stern and spectral North—differing therein widely from Greek feeling—has always represented the fiend through an objective form of grotesque, repulsive horror. The vulgar idea of horns and tail expresses this tone of sentiment vulgarly. That art which is Representation has evolved out of itself a law, in virtue of which the fiend cannot be embodied in a beautiful human form. Goethe developed the traditions of the Middle

Ages, and employed, with a happy result, the red doublet and hose, the short red cloak, the long rapier, and the single cock's feather in the cap, when he depicted his Evil Spirit in human shape. Milton stood in no relation to the mediæval spirit ; his high and shaping imagination distended his conception of Satan to the vague vastness of a colossal ideal.

Karl Seydelmann, born in 1793, was the son of a grocer and coffee-house keeper, in Glatz. His father's business included a billiard-room, which was much resorted to by the officers of the garrison. These officers were in the habit of getting up amateur theatrical performances, and young Karl Seydelmann, who evinced an early and decided talent for acting, made his *début* at the amateur representations of the officers at Glatz. In 1810, the young Seydelmann elected the profession of arms. Helped, probably, by officers whom he had met in his father's billiard-room, he entered the Prussian artillery ; but he soon acquired a disgust for soldiering, and in 1811 he deserted, escaping by means of a forged passport, authenticated by a well-imitated signature of his major. The army succeeded in reclaiming Seydelmann's services ; but, on account of his beautiful handwriting, he was exclusively employed in office work. He knew, indeed, so little of his military duties that, as he himself relates with great amusement, he once, on the occasion of an inspection, was wholly unable to fire off a cannon. In 1815 (the year of Waterloo) we find him playing at Count Herberstein's theatre in Grafenort. From Grafenort he transferred his services to the Breslau Theatre, from which he drew a salary of ten dollars a week.

In Breslau he replaced an actor named Kettel, and had there to perform the young-lover parts. For such characters Seydelmann was but little fitted. He was of middle height, and had bow legs. His features were neither striking nor pleasing ; his hair was red. The glance of his blue eyes was

full of fire, and yet was cold in expression. But his most serious drawback lay in his speech. His tongue was thick, and was long; and his enunciation was, in consequence, indistinct, awkward, and hissing in tone. His voice was rough and thick, had but a limited compass, and was incapable of tenderness or of modulation. In passionate passages it acquired a tone which suggested the growling of wild animals.

Furnished thus slenderly by Nature with the graces or the powers of an actor, Seydelmann's singular determination, and fierce, strong will managed at length to conquer the defects which hindered the display of his undoubted genius. Director Professor Rhode urged him to abandon the stage; but no discouragement could repress Seydelmann, who, strong in his conviction of his own powers, announced, through tears of disappointment, but with passionate gnashing of teeth and stampings of foot, "You shall see; I will be an actor yet!"

Where genuine power exists, such strong, unconquerable resolution always leads in time to success.

Seydelmann set to work to subdue his tongue to become the organ of his purpose. With incredible assiduity, he practised declamation with a flat stone in his mouth. "What Demosthenes—who was only a man—was able to do, I must also be able to do," said Seydelmann, characteristically and defiantly. His proud determination was successful, and he made his intractable voice his slave.

In 1819 he got his first real opening, in the theatre at Grätz, in Steiermark. His artistic insight, his burning zeal, his boundless ambition, his desire to surpass others, were assisted by an acquired skill in dealing with men; and at Grätz he rose rapidly in the profession of his choice. He played all sorts of things; even comic characters, for which, indeed, he had no aptitude; though he endeavoured to supply the want of comic power by a close study and artistic imitation of nature.



The theatre at Grätz fell under the direction of a cab-master, and the haughty Seydelmann at once quitted the company. He strolled about for some time from place to place, and learned thoroughly, in poverty and distress, the miseries of the literally poor player's life. The proud, hard man deduced from his time of sore struggle the bitter lesson that the actor must place his chief dependence upon egotism and self-assertion. Sorrows had hardened, and not softened, his harsh, domineering, and arrogant character.

At the Court Theatre, in Cassel, Seydelmann first obtained the undisputed possession of "leading business," and could play the great parts in which his artistic ambition really revelled.

Like a torch, which burns itself away while giving light, Seydelmann consumed his own health in a fiery attempt to attain to the utmost possible amount of *effect* in his performances. Away from the stage he did not drink, but, when acting, he used spirits freely with a view to stimulate his nervous system to its very highest pitch and strain of effort. This practice told, in the long run, very seriously upon Seydelmann's health. Cooke and Edmund Kean both drank spirits freely as stimulants to acting; but then they also drank them when they were not exerting themselves professionally.

Seydelmann must be ranked as a realistic tragedian. He did not belong to the declamatory and ideal school of Quin, or of the Kembles. Garrick, probably the actor who restored most nearly the school of the contemporaries of Shakspeare, the school of Taylor and of Burbage, included in his style both realism and ideality. He remained firmly based upon the truth of Nature, and yet presented ideal characters ideally. Macready, again, belonged to this mixed school, which presents forcibly and naturally profound passion and pathos, and yet maintains a lofty ideal art aim.

Seydelmann aimed at producing strength of effect. He

preferred the terrible, the striking, the sensational, the surprising. He loved villainous rather than noble characters. He loved Richard III. better than King Lear. He did not care for the *ensemble* of a performance, and never showed a loyal consideration for the author. He was selfish as an actor, and sought chiefly to unfold and to display his own great powers. He was inconsiderate and unfair towards his brother artists. He himself has said that "the stage is a field of battle on which one must conquer or must die. Whoever stands in the way of my success is an enemy that I will strike down." He admits that his object is to produce out of every character the greatest possible amount of effect. He made of every part a subjective property, and developed through it the energy of his own personality. One curious habit in studying he early adopted and always adhered to: he copied out, in his own beautiful handwriting every part that he played. He could not learn a part from the handwriting of other men. Nothing in life came easily to Seydelmann, and he was always slow of study. He noted on the margin of his copy the details of his "business." With inventive insight, he easily detected those great moments in a character out of which he could produce his most splendid effects; and to effect he always looked. His art aims were complected with his personal objects. He burned to surpass all his comrades, and to make of his acting a victory and a glory. The triumph of his own acting—not that of the thing acted—was the result for which he strove. He cared for truth to Nature in her strength rather than for adherence to her modesty. The Weimar school of acting, under the direction of Goethe and of Schiller, had somewhat resembled that of our Kembles: Seydelmann was the fiery Kean who despised art when it hampered the success of strong and working effect.

Fanny Kemble says:—"Kean is a man of decided genius, no matter how he abuses Nature's good gift. He has it.

He has the first element of all genius—Power. . . . Let his deficiencies be what they may, his faults however obvious, his conceptions however erroneous, and his characters, each considered as a whole, however imperfect, he has the one atoning faculty that compensates for everything else—that seizes, rivets, electrifies all who see and hear him, and stirs, down to their very springs, the passionate elements of our nature. Genius alone can do this. Kean may not be an actor, he may not be an artist, but he is a man of genius, and instinctively, with a word, a look, a gesture, tears away the veil from the heart of our common humanity, lays it bare as it beats in every human heart and as it throbs in his own. Kean speaks with his whole living frame to us, and every fibre of ours answers to his appeal. I do not know that I ever saw him in any character which impressed me as a *whole work of art*; he never seems to me to intend to be any one of his parts, but I think he intends that all his parts should be *him*. So it is not Othello, Shylock, Sir Giles; it is Kean, and in every one of his characters there is an intense personality of *his own* that, while one is under its influence, defies all criticism—moments of such overpowering passion, accents of such tremendous power, looks and gestures of such thrilling, piercing meaning, that the excellence of those parts of his performance more than atones for his want of greater unity in conception and smoothness in the entire execution of them.”

Mrs. Kemble’s fine criticism on Kean would apply, to a very great extent, to Seydelmann also. They were players whose powers were not dissimilar, and whose aims in acting were based upon the same force of personality and fervour of genius.

Seydelmann took but little interest in the abstract drama. He desired eagerly to startle an audience and to surpass all competitors; and he early saw that “he who will rule the

world must not try to better it." He accepted everything that he found existing in any theatre, and strove only to find fit opportunities for the display of Seydelmann himself.

I may, perhaps, be permitted to reproduce here a short extract from a previous essay,\* in which I said of Seydelmann :—

*Vis-à-vis* poet and public, Seydelmann thought chiefly of himself—of the effect which he could produce, of the applause he could obtain. He is accused of having often sacrificed his part and his author to some startling reading, to some surprising point. On the other hand he was wholly original; he followed no other actor; he was full of fire and of force, and his own strong, clear will shone through all his performances. When he is compared, as he often is, with his great rival Ludwig Devrient, you always find that Devrient's performance is spoken of as a whole, while Seydelmann is remembered for his points. Devrient sank his personality in modest devotion to his art; Seydelmann asserted himself through and above his art; he was an intense and most moving actor, of strong points and of electric effects. He always excited his audiences to enthusiasm; and he attracted more, perhaps, than any other German actor has done before or since. He disliked playing with great or even good actors; and he would conceal his most startling points at rehearsal in order to prevent his fellow-artists from divining the effects he intended. He was a great, a powerful, a moving, an original, actor; but was self-seeking and vain. He was the first and the greatest of the matadors, or star-actors in Germany.

Seydelmann died in 1843. Herr Eduard Devrient cites many instances of Seydelmann's violations of the poet's text; violations introduced solely with a view to producing new and startling effects as an actor; and Herr Devrient refers particularly for instances of this vice in conception to Seydelmann's Shylock, Marinelli (Emilia Galotti), Alba (in Egmont), Don Carlos (Clavigo), Antonio (Tasso), Ossip (Isidor and Olga), Brandon (Eugene Aram), and Mephistopheles. Thus, Seydelmann's Shylock was not the despised and humble Jew of Venice, but was a raging fury, who

\* "A Glance at the German Stage."

appeared as a despot, who dominated Doge and Senate, and stood above all other persons. He distorted the relation of Shylock to the drama, and to the other characters; his denunciation of Antonio was so violent that spectators expected to see Shylock assault the merchant, and cut the throat of Antonio. As Alba he received Egmont with such indicated meaning of fell intention, that the *insouciance* of Egmont, as that is depicted by Goethe, seemed the merest folly. He was fond, for the purposes of strong effect, of splitting up a speech into "asides," which were never contemplated by the author. When, in the fourth act, Clavigo confesses his intention to marry, Don Carlos has to exclaim—"Hell, death, and the devil! and thou wilt marry her?" Seydelmann said the first part of the sentence as an aside, and then said, coldly and scornfully, to Clavigo, "And thou wilt marry her?" Into the part of Antonio, in Tasso, he imported a suggestion of suspicious relations with the Countess Sanvitale. But Seydelmann has for us most interest in connection with Mephistopheles.

In Germany, generally, Seydelmann ranks as the great Mephisto. Old playgoers, who accompany you to see some other representative of the arch-fiend of the drama, say, sorrowfully, "Ah, if you could only have seen Seydelmann in the character!" His biographer, Rötcher, speaks with boundless, if with indiscriminating, enthusiasm, of this unquestionably powerful performance, while Eduard Devrient, on the other hand, speaks of it with discrimination, but with a tempered enthusiasm. The part requires the utmost intensity of meaning, but cannot bear the merest suggestion of passion, of warmth of feeling, or of human, earthly force.

Seydelmann maintained that he depicted the devil of the old Faust legend, and that Goethe would have been astonished if he could have seen the terrible attributes and the force that could be thrown by an actor into this fiend

that the poet had raised, but had only sketched in words. Seydelmann said—"He who draws the devil on the wall must not faint with fear if the original should grin at him through the sketch." Apart from the broad, general consentience of popular admiration, that most powerful, that most awful presentation of Seydelmann in Mephisto is a standing subject of critical controversy in Germany. Seydelmann indulged his realistic tendencies to the top of their bent in Mephistopheles. He was always the fiend as he appears on the Blocksberg, where he is recognised as the devil. Seydelmann destroyed the position of Mephisto *vis-à-vis* the other characters and the drama itself. His "make up" was dreadfully impressive. He was fierce, coarse, repulsive, dreadful; he excited wild laughter; though that laughter of spectators was, as I imagine, that relief to overstrained feeling which echoes hollowly through the morbid merriment which greets Iago's murder of Roderigo. Seydelmann would not descend, in irony, to the travelling cavalier, to the possible comrade of humanity. "Where," asks Immermann, "where is the Marinelli of hell that Goethe intended?" But, whatever injury Seydelmann may have done to the meaning of the poet, his Mephistopheles, *i.e.*, himself in Mephistopheles, was most terribly real, was most awfully powerful; the nerves, as the imaginations, of spectators were wholly subdued and dominated, and full theatres emptied themselves, after the performance, of excited, deeply moved men and women, upon whose lives was stamped a permanent image of great horror, who had been in dramatic contact with an inhuman being, and who (as I have learned by experience of them) would never wholly forget the impression made upon them by Seydelmann's weird Mephistopheles. The effect that he then produced resembled that which Kean, Macready, Rachel, have also made on the feelings and on the imaginations of men. It is the effect produced by

mighty abstract acting; and may exist in some cases apart from the design or the creation of the poet whose work has been presented on the stage. The stage itself, as an entity, has something dæmonic in its abstract essence and working.

Kühne of Darmstadt is the best Mephistopheles that I have seen. At proper times he raised a shudder in the spectator at imaginary contact with an evil spirit; and he always suggested, subtly, the infra-natural, while his relations with mortals were sufficiently probable. He could express the cold, cynical, inhuman fiend. Döring was too human, too full of *bonhomie*. You could not enough realise the devil. Dawson is held to have been too forcible and fierce. I think that Macready would have been as fine and subtle a fiend as the stage could wish for; his intellect would have added to the human devilry of Iago the unearthly devilry of the very fiend himself. He who could so well play Shakspeare would also have interpreted Goethe.

Through Seydelmann the poet had raised a devil that he could not control; the actor played, literally, the very devil. His Mephisto must have been recognised as the fiend by the other characters, and such recognition would have been fatal to Mephisto's plans; but, while acting the part, Seydelmann paralysed criticism. Men do not laugh when they are under water; they do not criticise while their judgments are submerged by the genius of abstract acting. In Mephistopheles there is nothing human but the assumption of humanity; but that assumption should be sufficiently depicted. The incarnate Evil Spirit is seen to act visibly, as he does act occultly, in his attempts to lead men to their harm; but to one man only in the play is the fiend really known. Seydelmann forgot, perhaps, too much the modesty of his art in his lust for her power.

Frau Niemann-Seebach is the best Gretchen that I have seen; indeed, it would be impossible to conceive, or to desire, a better representative of the part; nor could a more

perfect Marthe than Frau Frieb-Blumauer be imagined. Emil Devrient was a great Faust ; though he failed, before the magic change to youth came, to depict clearly enough the bowed, worn, prematurely-aged student. After the change, he was an ideal cavalier. Hendrichs, as Faust, was too declamatory, robust, loud ; he opened the play with a voice of rolling thunder. He began in virile middle age, and did not grow younger after drinking the witch's draught.

Faust is held, by German actors, to be what players call a "thankless part." They consider that the character, in stage representation, is overshadowed, is obscured, by that of Mephistopheles. German star-actors prefer the fiend to the philosopher ; nor is it to be wondered at that the greater effect should be produced in the most unique part in the drama ;—in a part which embodies a transcendental apparition seen through the mask of a human form. Faust strives, strains, inquires, acts, wrongs—suffers ; Mephisto is the embodiment of denial, of blindness to goodness, truth, nobleness, beauty ; he represents, through the terribly grotesque, irony, sneering, scorn, filth, evil, mockery. His very appearance on the stage, among human actors, is a sensation, a terror, a wonder, a portent of incarnate *diablerie*. Intrinsically, Mephistopheles is more a puppet than is Faust ; but, on the stage, this does not seem to be so. This wonderful and terrible drama of two souls apparently hopelessly enmeshed by the devil, places Mephisto, to all appearance, in the position of motor, ruler ; but he is so to appearance only, since his fruitless activity in reality only subserves the high, inscrutable designs of omnipotent wisdom. The devil, according to Goethe's views and showing, is the mere puppet and factor of the Deity. Faust is certainly one of the most exhausting parts for an actor. It is very long, and is always to be played throughout at a high pitch of passion. There is, in the first part, the tragedy of thought, and of the soul ; there is, in



the later parts of the play, the tragedy of passion, love, conscience, remorse. In the early parts, Faust's impatient, defiant soul, weighted with cares about its relation to the Unseen, feeling (as Goethe himself had felt) the vanity of knowledge, is driven, in haughty desperation, to the black art, and to the eager fiend; and this part requires, from the actor, most difficult and passionate art. Later, after the magic transformation, after the return to youth, the part culminates in passion, though it is passion of a more human sort. Indeed, it has been suggested (*Werel's Goethe's Faust, in Bezug auf Scenerie und Bühnendarstellung*) that the part of Faust should be played by two actors, one sustaining it up to the scene in the witch's kitchen, the other assuming it at that point, and continuing it to the end. German actors, in my opinion, fail to render in the earlier scenes the comparative age of the over-worn student; they make the Faust of the opening too vigorous and robust; there is not contrast enough between the sage and the cavalier. They trust too much to the philosopher's long beard. Both Emil Devrient and Hendrichs seem to me to have failed in this respect. German actresses, on the other hand, often make Marthe too ugly and too old. A very eminent Mephistopheles said, "The play is called Faust, not Mephisto; and the greatest difficulty in the latter part is, perhaps, to avoid putting it too strongly forward at the expense of the title-part. My rendering of Mephisto will never be properly appreciated from all sides until I play it with a Faust who can play me down."

In Shakspeare's treatment of historical characters, history is enclosed and included in a thing more glorious than itself: he did not merely teach the letter of history, but he exalted it to an imaginative ideal, and raised it to the measure of his art. He did not violate, but he did elevate truth. Rapt up to the heaven of imagination in a chariot of the fire of his own genius, he saw the characters of

history in larger relations, and he depicted them as abstract poetical conceptions. Take Queen Katharine, Henry V., Richard II., as illustrations;—he did not falsify, but he overrode history, and used it as a basis upon which his insight and his imaginatively creative power could raise types of a wider and more glorious truth than was comprised in the actual, limited fact. Goethe dealt with the Faust of the old miracle-play in something of the same spirit. No popular legend could present a human soul so complex, so many-sided, so tried and tempted, as that which Goethe evolved out of the rough lumber of legend and tradition.

To deal with the old Faust legend according to the highest modern ideas; to use the *naïveté* of the still vital old popular story as a vehicle for the highest abstract thought and as an enclosure for the most moving tragedy—this was a problem for distinctive genius; this is the problem which has been solved to a marvel by Goethe. The idea that the Evil One should directly bargain with man for man's soul, should satisfy all the desires of the heart, the desire for pomp, pleasure, power, at the price of the soul of the bargainer, is a direct product of the objectivity of conception, of the *naïveté*, of the superstition, of the very piety itself, of the Middle Ages. The story is essentially German; it is full of the *diablerie* which is inherent in German imagination. No other country could have so well evolved from its moral consciousness the legend of Faust. No other country could so well have developed the poet who could subordinate the olden story to the highest purposes of thoughtful and imaginative art. The fancy, the half-divine mythus of devil and angel contending for man's soul, is a more direct objective conception; the bargain between man and demon is the distinctive essence of the Faust story.

The peculiar characteristic of Faust as the subject of a drama is the circumstance that the Spirit of Evil must

appear embodied and incarnate among the merely human characters. The incarnate dæmonic mingles visibly and tangibly with the human action. The infra-human influence is to be watched and traced in its working, and in the result of that working. Take the simple human story of Faust—without visible dæmonic interference—and it resolves itself into a very ordinary drama of seduction, of murder, of sorrow, and of most tragic issue. Place the Evil One ostensibly in action among the mortals, and the drama acquires a weird and deeper meaning—a strange, supernatural influence. How shall the poet conceive and depict this mysterious, this terrible Spirit of Evil? That which the poet's imagination can body forth must be received through the imagination of reader or of spectator. It is difficult to conceive a more difficult imaginative task than that of placing Satan on the stage. How shall the dramatist make such a being speak?—how shall he depict the dark Spirit of Evil, the antagonist of goodness and of God, assuming human conditions and mortal limits? Were not this high problem so nobly solved by Goethe, we should be inclined to hold it to be impossible. In Goethe's *Faust* the fiend does not appear, as he does in Marlowe's *Faustus*, as a mere conjuror, a slave of the ring, who can be called upon at any moment to perform wonderful, if sometimes childish, tasks. No; the Mephistopheles creation of great Goethe is touched to finer issues, and appears for quite other purposes. The mystery of the great—the perhaps apparent only, but yet immortal—conflict between Good and Evil has to be indicated, not dogmatically or doctrinally, but imaginatively, and as it can be conceived by the free and holy spirit of man. In that fine air of spiritual thought which outsoars all the churches and extends above all the steeples must the poet work who will deal adequately and nobly with the Faust legend. There was but one poet who, qualified by very many con-

current circumstances, could discharge the high task ; and that poet was Goethe.

Small wonder that the completion of a drama on this infinite subject should spread over years, long as well as very many, of the great poet's life. He was not in any hurry to complete a work which even he could scarcely exhaust.

A little careful analysis will show how wonderfully Goethe has managed the apparently insuperable difficulty of making Mephistopheles fitly talk. The poet must indicate that the unearthly talker knows more than man can know of the deepest secrets of the universe ; and yet Mephistopheles does not need, or wish, to tell all that he knows ; he unfolds only so much as is necessary to lead and to mislead Faust and the other characters ; though, at times, the fiend speaks as if half thinking his own thought aloud ; while on other occasions—as, for instance, with Marthe and with the student—he speaks in order to indulge his irrepressible, grim, hellish, gross, cynical, bitter humour. Goethe had, of necessity, to make his Devil very like a man. If the fiend were absent from the drama, the action would have the same issue ; but with the very fiend upon the scene, the spectator is subjected to the weird fascination of seeing the process by means of which the end is to be brought about. Goethe believed in “the shows of evil ;” he conceived that the good, that the Deity, was omnipotent and supreme ; and that evil, instead of being a rival power, was only an influence tolerated and used by divinity, to work out divine ends. Hence, he draws Mephisto as a *Geist der stets verneint* ; as a spirit working vainly, always labouring for evil, and yet controlled by a higher power, and always involuntarily working for good—a conception which may be theologically wrong, but is yet possibly divinely true.

Goethe's *Faust*, as he wrote it, is more than a drama ;

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not less than a drama; it is never undramatic. The dramatic poem, which deals with such great argument, includes a drama within its larger limit. No great Regisseur—no Tieck or Klingemann—would find any difficulty in compressing action, poetry, and event into the practical stage scope of an acting drama. A work purely, or merely, a dramatic poem is not necessarily a drama. It may contain no moral conflict, no tragic collision with Fate, no action, and no event which springs from dramatic attrition; but Goethe's *Faust* contains all dramatic elements, and, as a tragedy half supernatural, half human, it remains "sad, high, and working."

H. SCHÜTZ WILSON.

*THE ECLECTIC USE OF THE GOSPEL  
NARRATIVES.*

THOSE whose lot it has been to pass through a gradual course of emancipation from the yoke of bibliolatry must all remember the kind persistency with which anxious friends at one time sought to impale them on one or other horn of a dilemma. "Either," it was said, "you must submit to the authority of the Bible in those parts of it which you do not like, or else you can have no authority at all for those parts which you do like." And so long as such inquirers were looking for a positive as distinguished from a natural authority, that is, for an authority imposed from outside the order of nature instead of that which this order resistlessly carries with it, the dilemma was not without its terrors. But so soon as the need for a positive authority ceased to be felt, it was discovered that one of the horns of the dilemma was made of spiritual india-rubber, and, instead of impaling the soul, did not inflict even a prick on the conscience. The Bible was simply taken at its natural value as an embodiment of human experiences within the order of nature. Some of these experiences were felt to have depended on a false interpretation of the external world and of man's relation to it. Others were felt as growing out of universal and fundamental elements in humanity. All practical and moral difficulties then vanished, whatever critical difficulties might remain. Our inquiring souls continued to read their Bibles, not because any positive authority said, "Search the Scriptures," but

because every now and then they came across something that did them good, and such good as—no matter why—they did not get anywhere else. There were a great many sayings in the book, and not a few stories of human experience which, in Coleridge's pregnant sense of the word, "found" them, went right through all the conventional encasement of their souls into the secret sources of action, and there made a stir that sent a thrill through all their energies. They felt it absurd to be told that because they had given up infallibility there was no authority for them in such parts of the Bible. As well might heathen priests tell the doubters of their mythology that if they cease to worship the sun there is no justification for their feeling the warmth of his beams or the joy of revival in spring-time.

It is obvious, however, that this practical discrimination of spiritual value in the Bible has nothing to do with historical or textual criticism. Yet there is one point where it shows a disposition to intrude. In the Old Testament the question does not arise. For when, for instance, the Psalmist says of his enemies, "Let them make a noise like a dog and go round about the city; let them wander up and down for meat and grudge if they be not satisfied," our rationalised Christians do not feel in the least inclined to make their repugnance to this sentiment a test of its Davidic authorship. They only observe that if David uttered this, he must have been in a very objectionable temper at the time, and they enjoy the 23rd Psalm as much as ever.

But in regard to the Gospels their feelings are different. There they have always been affected not so much by principles or doctrines as by the glory of a life. Fragmentary as the memorials of that life are, yet they are so singularly pregnant and suggestive that, when taken in connection with the Jewish past and the Christian future lying on either side of them, they grow into a perfect whole, as fragments

of an antique statue do if viewed by imagination inspired with knowledge and sympathy. But our spiritual pilgrims from the Egypt of orthodoxy are never allowed to proceed very far on their journey before they find themselves somewhat rudely challenged on this subject. They are asked how they have put their image together ; and, when they indicate the source of their materials, they are asked how it comes to pass that they refuse other elements which would make the complete figure much more discordant and less agreeable to themselves than it is at present. In fact, they are confronted once more with the objection made by earlier friends on quite other grounds. "I wish to know," says Mr. Voysey, speaking of Mr. Clodd's view of the person and character of Jesus, "on what principle of reason or with what consistency such a conclusion can be arrived at after a candid perusal of the four Gospels? Mr. Clodd, so far as I read aright, starts with the assertion that these records are not trustworthy and not strictly historical ; are encumbered with myths ; and that neither the writers of these narratives, nor the followers of Jesus, rightly understood him." \* And again, "We ask by what possible means can we rightly determine which of the records are true and which false ; or which of the speeches are correct reports and which are not? The usual method with a certain school, of which Mr. Clodd so far as Christ is concerned is a type, is to start with the assumption that, because some good deeds and sayings are reported of Jesus, therefore all the good deeds and sayings must be true, and accurately reported, while all the wrong deeds and false sayings are not to be attributed to Jesus, but to the misunderstanding and inaccuracy of his biographers. This method of dealing with professedly historical documents is precisely as reasonable and legitimate as it would be for any school to accept as true all the

\* This and other quotations are from a published sermon delivered by Mr. Voysey at Christmas, 1879.



bad deeds and wrong sayings of Jesus, and to reject as spurious and false all the records of his good deeds and good sayings."

Thus we are confronted with the old dilemma in a much more formidable shape; more formidable, because there is nothing merely fictitious or conventional in either alternative. It is a question of historical testimony. If you are asked why you believe Jesus to have given a pre-eminently spiritual interpretation to religion, you appeal to the Gospels. But when other people point to the evidence these same Gospels give of apocalyptic sensationalism, you say, "Oh, we make no account of that; that results from '*Aberglaube* intruding' into the vulgar minds of the Evangelists." According to this method of treating historical documents, they may be made the mere reflex of personal inclinations.

Still there is something to be said on the other side; otherwise what is called the "higher criticism" would have no place at all. What I suppose to be meant by the higher criticism is, amongst other things, the discernment of congruities or incongruities with character, time, and place, such as distinguish original elements from accretions in a document or tradition under consideration. Of course, the results of such discernment are often characterised by mere probability of various shades, though sometimes they are tolerably certain. But the question is here of legitimacy, not of the degree of probability. Our spiritual pilgrims, being relieved of the fear of damnation for making a mistake, can afford to be satisfied with a very remote approximation to certainty. The congruities of character are more subtle than the regularity of material action in nature. Yet the long experience of humanity has given us some confidence in insisting upon them. The constable who helped Sheridan out of the gutter was probably not deceived when the drunken M.P. gave the name of Wilberforce. And in the notorious Tichborne case the assent of the more intelligent

public to the verdict depended on their sense of incongruity in character, rather than on any attempt to master the perplexities of evidence.

With regard to the subject before us, the relevancy and force of such an argument is, indeed, not denied. For Mr. Voysey, in the sermon already quoted, allows, on very similar grounds, the necessity of distinguishing between the values of different elements in the Gospels. "They profess," he says, "to give us a portion of the biography of a remarkable man. Some of this is, in all probability, true, and some of it false. Some of the speeches are not unlikely to be reported with sufficient accuracy to make them rank as substantially correct. Others of the speeches, especially those in the fourth Gospel, carry suspicion on the very surface, seeing that they are out of character with the prevailing speeches elsewhere." In other words—for so I interpret this judgment—the same man cannot have delivered both sets of speeches. But why is special suspicion thrown on the discourses of the fourth Gospel, rather than on the Sermon on the Mount? Surely, because, on various grounds, the Sermon on the Mount is thought to accord better with the historical character of Jesus as a teacher than the speeches of the fourth Gospel. I contend, then, that in making this distinction, and in hinting at its grounds, Mr. Voysey has supplied at least the germ of an answer to his own question which he puts with much force in the very next paragraph. "By what possible means," he asks, "can we rightly determine which of the records are true, and which are false; which of the speeches are correct reports, and which are not?"

Of course, any complete reply to this question would require an examination of all the materials to be dealt with, and a discussion of canons for their use. But our object at present is much more limited. We are concerned only with the partial answer suggested by Mr. Voysey himself when

he says that some of the speeches in the Gospels "*carry suspicion on the very surface, seeing that they are out of character with the prevailing speeches elsewhere.*" Of course, it is understood that such a mode of discrimination is applicable only after external criticism, that is, judgment by manuscripts, quotations, references, and historical testimony, has done its work. We assume that the results of this external criticism are before us. It gives us an approximately accurate text of the Gospels as they existed some time in the second century, together with certain ecclesiastical surroundings and reminiscences, apart from which they cannot be understood. There is no dispute that a further criticism is permissible, or even necessary. Mr. Voysey, as we have seen, allows it in references to speeches that "*carry suspicion on the very surface.*" And our liberal Christians—or shall we say our neo-Christians?—maintain that the figure of Christ is a bizarre impossibility without it. The only question, then, is as to the principles of application, and for the purposes of the present discussion we shall deal with these best by taking one or two examples.

In Luke xvii. 20, &c., it is said that the Pharisees demanded "*when the kingdom of God should come.*" Like their modern representatives, they were apparently looking for a sort of proclamation by trumpeters, to be followed by a transformation scene, in which they were to play a conspicuous part themselves. The answer they received was remarkable. "*The kingdom of God cometh not with expectation,*" is not a thing that can be waited for like a royal procession; "*neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you.*" The mode of expression is peculiar—*μετὰ παρατηρήσεως* is, indeed, a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* in the New Testament. But the idea pervades the reminiscences of Christ's doctrine, *e.g.*, "*So is the kingdom of God, as though a man should cast seed on the earth, and should sleep and rise night and day,*

and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth of herself"—*αὐτομάτη*, naturally, as we should say, "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear" (Mark iv. 26—28). The same un-Jewish principle is inculcated by the parables of the sower, of the leaven, of the mustard-seed. All suggest that the progress of the kingdom is to be like the processes of life, gradual, governed by law, slowly and even imperceptibly arriving at perfection.

Nor are such parables the only testimony to a peculiarly spiritual and inward conception of the heavenly kingdom in the mind of Christ. It is even oftener implied than directly expressed. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled." "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness." "Lay not up for yourselves treasure on earth,"—in other words, set not your desires on outward things. It may be said that even the most spiritual parables, as, for instance, the first quoted, hint at a harvest suggestive of a world-convulsion in which angels and devils are to play their part. But Christ's notion of a harvest is suggested in the touching incident of the Gospels when "he saw the multitude, and was moved with compassion on them because they were weary and scattered as sheep having no shepherd." Then, said he, "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few; pray ye, therefore, the Lord of the harvest that he will send forth more labourers into his harvest."

The impression made on our minds by these elements in the Gospel is that the great Teacher cherished in his soul a wonderfully pure, spiritual, and exalted interpretation of the traditional ideal of his countrymen, a divine kingdom on earth. That such a conception was not inconsistent with a

hazy acquiescence in the claims of pre-existing apocalyptic visions to the reverence generally accorded them in those times is probably enough. But we gather that the bent of the Master's genius was not in that direction. Nay, he was so taken up with the moral character, and consequent gradual development of the kingdom, that he did not stop to inquire whether his teaching was consistent with the apocalypses then in vogue or not. At any rate, he clearly taught that the kingdom was inward,—the rule of God in the hearts of men,—that its growth was so gradual as to be imperceptible,—that its advent should have no local and conspicuous sign, but should only be felt as a universally diffused light.

But now our neo-Christians are confronted with the apocalyptic visions of the Gospels themselves. The orthodox and the non-Christian, with equal triumph over our simplicity, flaunt before us the flaming pages at the end of St. Matthew. "Look here," they say: "'Immediately after the tribulation of those days shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken; and then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man in heaven, and then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven, with power and great glory.' What do you make of this?" cry both orthodox and non-Christians in concert. "Do you not see that you are worshipping an idol, the work of your own brains?" But the neo-Christians are not confounded. They also, upon occasion, can speak in parables, and sometimes they have put the matter thus. The fragmentary records of the Gospel, like the fragments of shattered statuary at Olympia, need sympathetic imagination and a feeling of congruity to complete the pictures they suggest. If, for instance, we found the head and torso of an Apollo with the leg of a satyr cemented to it, we

should say this is either a blunder, or a whim, of some post-classical gropers in the ruins. And it is to us just as impossible to believe that the teacher who told men no sign of the kingdom of heaven was possible, that, in fact, the kingdom was not outward but inward, and its progress gradual and imperceptible, should also have told them that at its advent, and within the lifetime of the generation then living, the stars should fall from heaven, the Son of Man appear in the sky, and all mankind tremble in terrified subjection. *Credat Judæus*. This apocalypse is thoroughly Jewish ; but it is absurdly incongruous with the un-Jewish principle attributed elsewhere to Christ.

To this answer it is not a sufficient rejoinder to say that our neo-Christians are here allowing their sense of spiritual value to intrude into questions of historical or textual criticism. It is true they do so ; on the principle that the same fountain does not usually send forth sweet waters and bitter. But on further reflection they find themselves confirmed by other considerations. For the character of Christ is not the only personal element in the problem of the Gospels. Contemporary thought and feeling, as influenced by rabbinical culture, have to be considered. The transmitters of the Gospel tradition and its final writers have to be weighed in the balances. Now, there are many tokens that the medium of transmission was thoroughly Jewish. If, then, we find one element in the gospels un-Jewish—except in a very profound sense—while another is instinct with contemporary rabbinism—and if one is incongruous with the other—it is obvious that the rabbinical element may be accounted for by the medium of conveyance, while the other cannot.

But again, not only in feeling but in actual words, the apocalyptic denunciations of the Gospels are a copy, and almost, one may say, a slavish copy of previous, and at that time, popular apocalypses. I need not go into detail

here. It is known to every one. The darkened sun and moon, the falling stars, the sign of the Son of Man, the sounding trumpet, the gathering of the elect, are all directly borrowed from books such as Daniel, and Enoch, and 2nd Esdras. Now, if there is anything beyond their elevation and purity pre-eminently characteristic of the words of Jesus on other than apocalyptic subjects, it is that sort of originality, so easy in appearance, so unapproachable by imitation, which takes every heart with the sweet surprise of an unsuspected simplicity. There is no evidence in the general parables and discourses that Jesus cared much for books. His reading lay in nature and in the human heart. If analogies to his moral sayings are found in the Talmud, they are related to the Gospel as the scattered grains of gold in the quartz reef to the cluster of nuggets near at hand, where the same primeval forces that produced the grains have concentrated their final energy. The speaker of the Beatitudes could never have learned them in a rabbinical school. The truths they express glittered upon him, he knew not how, out of the mysterious background of existence, as stars shine on ordinary mortals out of dark, fathomless space. And can we conceive that a being such as this, when confronted with the problem of the future, should take to gabbling a cento of plagiarisms from the Zadkiels of his race? No; if the supremacy of law over all our thoughts compel us to eliminate preternatural deeds from the history of the time, we do protest that a sense of the congruity never wanting to human character constrains us also to eliminate second-hand apocalyptic common-places from the discourses attributed to Jesus.

Having dealt at so great a length with one illustration, I shall only mention another, which fortunately may be dismissed in a few words. Mr. Voysey tells us very truly that the words, "the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost" are irreconcilable with other sayings

attributed to Jesus, as *e.g.*, "therefore speak I unto them in parables, that seeing they may see and not perceive . . . lest they should be converted, and I should heal them." Now, a preacher who, at the present day, should at one moment declare his anxiety to save the souls of his hearers, and at another should announce his purpose of securing their damnation by propounding insoluble riddles, would give plain tokens of lunacy. And the laws of human nature, as well as of physical nature, were much the same in Gospel days as they are now. Fortunately, in this case, the contradiction to the general tenor of Christ's teaching is plainly traceable to the hazy-mindedness of the Evangelists in regard to the meaning and bearing of a particular passage from Isaiah, quoted by their Master, to show the necessity for his method of teaching by parable. Isaiah, despairing of the inappreciative people whom he addressed in vain, saw in a vision the terror of the Lord, and heard a voice asking for a divine messenger. He cried out, "Here am I, send me." Then he was told that his errand would be a failure, and that its only effect would be to make men worse than they were before. "Go, and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes . . . and convert, and be healed." \* Now, when Jesus was asked why he used so many parables, he said, in effect, that it was his only chance; for the people were very much in the condition described by Isaiah, when plain speaking only made them worse. To such a case the words of the prophet in the original passage were very applicable; but the confusion of the Evangelists is shown by the varied forms in which they give it. Matthew (xiii. 10) is most correct, though not exact. According to him the difficulty lies wholly in the obstinacy of the hearers. Mark (iv. 11)

\* Is. vi. 9, *et seq.*



gives quite a different twist to it, saying, in so many words, that the parables were used for the express purpose of mystifying the vulgar herd, and securing special privileges to the initiated. "Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God: but unto them that are without, all these things are done in parables: *that seeing they may see and not understand,*" &c. Luke almost entirely drops the quotation; and in cold-blooded prose ascribes to the Teacher the design of misleading his hearers. "Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God: but to others in parables; that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand" (Luke viii. 10). The fourth evangelist again (xii. 39) takes a new departure, and if I understand him rightly, refers the blinding and hardening process to the devil. "Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts," &c. It must be obvious that the tradition is here involved in perplexity and confusion. The Master by his use of Isaiah's highly-wrought language had unwittingly suggested the pharisaic notion that unbelief was a mysterious predestined doom, and the Evangelists were eager to contrast this with the privileges of the elect. Hence their discordant torturing both of Isaiah's words and of the use originally made of them.

This case I believe to be typical; and it helps to establish a reasonable canon of judgment. The same respect for human experience which casts suspicion on miracles, also makes it difficult to suppose that the Founder of Christianity was an impersonation of violent incongruities. And where obvious and irreducible inconsistencies arise, that hypothesis is most probable which best accords with the general tradition.

Mr. Voysey says, "On the hypothesis that the writers of the Gospels were friends of Jesus, and wished to exhibit his

moral excellence, it actually became more probable that the faults and errors recorded of him were true than that the virtues and excellences were not exaggerated." Yes; but to apply this rule, you must take into consideration the nature of the ideal of moral excellence which probably dominated those Jews who, about the time of the Christian era, were waiting for the salvation of Israel. I venture to think that this ideal was in some respects very different from Mr. Voysey's, and that writers influenced by it were much more likely to invent traits of character discordant with his high standard than those he is compelled to admire. For instance, devoted admirers of the stern eccentricities of ancient prophets were much more likely to exaggerate the curtness with which their Master dismissed waverers—"let the dead bury their dead"—than they were to invent his blessing on little children, or his courageous sympathy for a notoriously sinful woman.

In conclusion, I look at the whole matter thus. We know, from both Christian and pre-Christian sources, what Jewish ideals and Jewish expectations were. We find that through some influences not here discussed those ideals and expectations were, by a few Jewish sectaries, identified with the life and destiny of a certain Jesus of Nazareth, while the vast majority of his countrymen altogether repudiated such a notion, as a forced and monstrous perversion of ancient tradition. On looking into the reminiscences of these sectaries, we find they relate a good many things concerning Jesus that suggest an enlarged conception of the divine life, and an insight into the power of self-sacrifice wholly discordant with the main ideas of the nation. But at the same time we find other elements in the anecdotes of Jesus that are merely second-hand reproductions of well-known apocalyptic visions, and common-places of Jewish prejudice. That there is an incongruity is undeniable. And in feeling our way towards a solution we should hold most firmly by

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the original elements, not by the second-hand. We should insist on what is un-Jewish and difficult of invention in that age, rather than on what was rational and easy. We should seek at the supreme personal source, not so much an explanation (where none is needed) for the Jewish and heathen corruptions that have degraded the Church, but rather a *vera causa* for the power of moral regeneration that arose in Nazareth and has overspread the world.

J. ALLANSON PICTON.

*AN EPILOGUE.\**

**A**ND so the play is over, and we doff  
The actor's mask for one more subtle, worn  
By those who hide therein from the world's scorn,  
Smiling for all to see, when some forlorn  
Hope dies, and afar off  
They see their doom ; or frowning hard perchance  
Above joy's secret fires,  
When their fulfilled desires  
On fluttering wings advance  
And round them dance.

The play is over, and 'twas but a play  
Within a play ; the wider stage still holds  
Its living tragedy, and comic interludes, replete  
With godlike pain and laughter, sweet  
Singing, low moans,  
And strife that moulds  
Our clumsy clay to that complete  
Manhood which inly groans  
Toward Godhood, fain would meet  
Once more the vital breath  
That made men living souls, and is more than Death,  
Life, Love.  
Often above  
The murmur of the actors on this stage,  
Prattle of youth, and prattle of old age,

\* Written to be recited after a performance of the *Alcestis*, in a country-house.—[Ed.]

Eager discussion of the moment's need  
And foolish greed  
Of coming morrows, will be heard  
Like music half articulate with passion,  
The meaning of it all, that makes the play  
Worth playing, and has stirred  
Even the pastime of an Easter day  
To sudden grandeur, though the passing fashion  
Of the mere show has vanished soon away  
And only left the meaning. Who shall say  
What it does mean?—  
The power of Love?—  
Joy of Self-sacrifice?  
All that has been  
The soul of the world to keep it from its grave?—

Not always as in this play can Love save  
The life of the beloved. Some have poured  
Their lives like water out upon the ground,  
Yet scarce availed  
To make the road less rough, or the hot dust  
Less wearying; these nor quailed  
Nor doubted, but with one accord  
Joy'd in the sacrifice; and some have stood  
Keeping their trust  
With noble hardihood  
In the thick of the battle for an enemy's sake,  
Or for the one they loved who still returned  
Their love with hate: yet might not their heart break  
Until the fight was over, and they learned  
That other life was safe. And a few wait  
With patient hands and feet till the God say,  
"The sacrificial strife  
Is over; thou shalt die:"—Ah! they,  
Set free at last from the life

That was a costlier offering than death,  
Shall with their ebbing breath  
Find then a strange release,  
Shall know at last  
In the joy of that moment all the pain of the past,  
And in the sudden peace  
Shall feel what the storm has been.  
Some in their hand  
Have taken a cup all made of a red flame  
And full of anguish : at Divine command  
They have drained it, with their pale  
Lips set to the deed, lest they should shame  
The power that ruled them ; and with deep amaze  
Have seen the cup transmuted, till, with rapturous gaze,  
They have beheld at last the Holy Grail.

ANNIE MATHESON.

## NOTES AND NOTICES.

### ROBERTSON'S SERMONS.

A NEW volume of sermons by Robertson, of Brighton,\* will commend itself to many besides ordinary sermon readers. It is true this "last fruit from an old tree" will neither add anything to Robertson's fame, nor attract the public attention which twenty years ago made his sermons as popular and well-thumbed as the last new work by Thackeray. So much of what Robertson taught has since become the common property of the whole Christian pulpit, that any young student making his first acquaintance with the author by this volume would scarcely understand the secret of his marvellous popularity. The old lady who in first reading Shakespeare remarked, "Shakespeare would be very wonderful if he were not so full of quotations!" is not an unfair representative of the feeling of the young generation as it takes up the works of the preacher whose fame was and is so great. But those who can look back and remember how they found in his sermons not only a fascinating originality of idea and treatment, but a moral, intellectual, and spiritual suggestiveness which was like food to the hungry, will give a glad welcome to one more sheaf of gleanings from the fruitful field of Robertson's ministry. The selection does not appear in every case to have been judiciously made, a few of the sermons being only skeletons whose gaunt nakedness it is quite certain Robertson himself would never have exposed to public view. Nevertheless, the book gives us the strongly-marked individuality of the man, his fearless thinking, his penetrating glance into all shams and unrealities, his deep, reverent, passionate devotion to the highest ideals of religion, his fine lucidity of style. The intense eagerness with which he was once read may have passed away, but none who ever delighted in him can fail to find their delight renewed as they turn over the pages of the present volume.

It is said that the heresies of one generation are the commonplaces of the next. Nothing will be a greater surprise to our children than that Robertson was ever hounded for his want of orthodoxy. The whole field of theological speculation has assumed another aspect since Brighton

\* *The Human Race*, and other Sermons, preached at Cheltenham, Oxford, and Brighton. By the late Rev. F. W. Robertson. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

listened to its great prophet, and Brighton's vicar harried him into an early grave. The points on which Robertson was considered unsound are small indeed compared with the questions now at stake, and whereas in his life-time High Churchmen and Low Churchmen were united in attacking him, they now turn to his sermons for a defence of the faith. In spite of the *Record*, the younger Evangelicals are all tinged with "Robertsonianism," and use his books as a happy hunting-ground for ideas, much as their fathers used "Henry" and "Scott." No doubt, the tendency of Robertson's method and teaching was in the direction of a reverent rationalism, and this tendency was a powerful ally of liberal theology. The bold, earnest spirit with which he faced all difficulties, his constant appeal to the court of reason, as against the rulings of tradition and the dicta of authority, his scorn of any cowardly attempt to hush up disquieting questions, his manly outspokenness, showing that he at least had very little faith in the fashionable doctrine of pulpit reserve, all did much to influence the *set* of men's minds towards a still wider faith. It can hardly be said that he made any valuable contribution to the theological thought of his day, but the spirit in which he worked was of immense importance to the new movement. That spirit may be seen in a few striking sentences from a sermon on "Guilt of Judging" :—

We boast of our Protestant freedom ; we say that Romanists shut up the Bible, but that we give it without note or comment and bid men judge for themselves. Now think, do we not really say : "Here is the Bible, read it for yourself ; but these doctrines and no other you must find in it ; inquire freely, but at your peril arrive at any other conclusion than this ; here is the truth, and here is the Bible to prove it by" ? Is it not manifest that this is a bitter mockery, and that it only gives the name of liberty ! Hence it comes to pass that men will not bear to hear the truth. They think that they have it already in the small compass of a single mind, and they come to church to hear it repeated to them in a sermon ; not to get fresh gleams of infinite truth, but, holding all the infinite in their minds, to criticise any departure from it. The multitude dare not think, and they who think dare not speak. And this we call free inquiry ! This is the present case of Christian society, to my mind an awful and appalling one. What is there to prevent the spirit of the old times being applied to us ?—"The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so ; and what will be the end thereof ? "

No one could listen to teaching like this and be content to hear submissively the voice of wonted authority. He who breaks up sloth and stagnation of mind, who makes men alive to the dread mysteries of Whence and Whither, who finds in human nature all necessary faculties for arriving at truth, such a one may be orthodox to the back-bone, and yet he is helping on that New Reformation which some are waiting to welcome as the dawn of God's own day on earth.

But Robertson's great work lay in other directions. More than any other man of his age he revolutionised the style and method of preaching. Discarding the conventional jargon of the pulpit and that ponderous three-decker, the model of all sermons, he spoke out in strong, nervous English, perfectly intelligible to every sensible hearer, and without con-



descending to any meanness of device for entrapping the attention of a reluctant audience, made a sermon as direct and interesting, and as much in contact with the living life of the hour, as a speech by John Bright on practical politics. Men were delighted to listen to a man who could be deeply in earnest without extravagance, thoughtful without tediousness, devout without cant. It was a surprise both pleasurable and profitable to hear every topic of the day, where it touched on morals, and every question of social casuistry, frankly discussed in the pulpit, and in the light of a sanctified common-sense. For a generation preachers have learned from Robertson how to preach.

But, more than anything else, Robertson was a great religious influence. Every sentence burns with fire, caught from a spirit intent on calling men off from the idle rout of frets and cares, worldly thoughts and social follies, to the sanctities of love and duty, and the spiritual elevation of a heart loyal to its highest thoughts of life and the eternal. To thousands his words were the most wise, quickening, and inspiring form of religious teaching which the age had to give. Concerned little with the technicalities of theology, he made religion the most living and urgent of all realities, and, rousing men from the sleepy conservatism of habit, moved them now to a wholesome shame and now to "the noble discontent" which makes a better life possible. It is for its directly religious power that this supplemental volume is to be chiefly valued. In such sermons as "The Peace of God" and "The Human Race typified by the Man of Sorrows," we have Robertson at his best, teaching a goodness that is large, balanced, steadfast, and intelligent; revealing a knowledge of the human heart such as only arises from the profoundest sympathy with its needs and aspirations, and which, wherever found, is able to refresh the outworn, reinspire the faint, rekindle the drooping eye, and

Strengthen the wavering line,  
On to the bound of the waste,  
On to the city of God.

JOSEPH WOOD.

IT is not easy to think of Mr. Tennyson as an old man, and his latest ballads\* will certainly not help us to realise the fact that he has passed his seventy-first birthday, and that his poetical career has extended over a good half-century. Wordsworth's *Lyrical Ballads* were published in 1798, and his last volume is dated 1842, giving him six years less than our living poet, who still, let us hope, has many fresh gifts in store for us, with renewed proof that the true poet is always young. Now and then, it is true, we may have begun to be a little alarmed at symptoms shown in some curious utterance, which we may have said, in an irreverent critical humour, we could make neither head nor tail of. But if we found "Out of the Depths" beyond our comprehension, had we not lately read

\* *Ballads and other Poems*. By Alfred Tennyson, Poet-Laureate. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

with delight in some magazine the stirring ballads of "The Fight of the Revenge" and "The Defence of Lucknow"? And now, if we could have thought that the poetic fire was fading, or that any of the artist's cunning was lost, our doubts are confuted at once by the overwhelming pathos and passion of "Rizpah," the tender pitifulness of "In the Children's Hospital," or the intensely original and characteristic humour of "The Northern Cobbler." No, there are no symptoms of decline; we recognise all the freshness, strength, and vitality of a heart and intellect that can never grow old.

There is nothing in the new volume that can be said to add to the great variety of styles and subjects in which Mr. Tennyson had already shown a versatility of genius which was sometimes a surprise even to his most ardent admirers. The sentimental and dilettante air of his earliest productions has long since vanished quite away. His Claribels and faintly smiling Adelines and airy, fairy Lilians, if they have not already passed into the limbo of masks and shadows, will assuredly be remembered only as pretty, unreal fancies, a foil to the artistic completeness and poetical strength of all his mature work. It is curious and instructive to read, at this distance of time, a criticism like that in which the redoubtable Christopher North, in his merciless, slashing way, dissected the little volume which appeared in 1880, while at the same time he emphatically recognised the promise of real genius. The poems and verses which the critic picked out as choice specimens of "drivel" and "more drivel" seem very soon to have been judged by much the same standard by the poet himself, and he rejected or refashioned till he might almost have sent up his new editions, as a scholar sends up his corrected exercise to the master, pretty sure of getting a good mark for it. The fastidious taste and consummate art with which Mr. Tennyson is for ever giving little finishing touches and polishing to perfect his work seldom leave any mark of artificiality, or make us suspect any lack of spontaneity in his verse; and nowhere has he practised with more perfect success than in the new ballads that art which consists in concealing art. He has written few things in which we think less of the technical skill displayed, or feel more immediately and irresistibly the power of genius which compels us into absolute sympathy with the poet's mind. Most of all is this true of "Rizpah," which is one of the finest things Mr. Tennyson has done. It certainly is unrivalled by anything of its kind in our literature as a living presentment of the deepest and most passionate grief. It is instinct with terrible pathos, and is an instance of the intensest "realism" of a truly noble and moving kind. A poor dying woman, who has been crazed by her cruel grief, tells the story of her son who had been hanged for having robbed the mail, an exploit to which he had been dared by his wild companions. She had gone out, when the nights were dark enough, to gather up his bones, as they fell from the gibbet, and kissed them, and buried them in the night by the churchyard wall. Her whole life had gone out to the son whom the law had murdered, and the passion

of her maternal love and anguish have an overwhelming effect upon us as we read. We cannot pick out specimens for quotation. We cannot criticise, or inquire whether the "lyrical cry," and so on, is present, or ask how it is that the poet contrives to affect us so. Indeed, we can scarcely turn over the pages of this strangely powerful poem again with any equanimity while we are writing about it. The poem entitled "In the Children's Hospital" has a simpler motive, and to attempt to tell in prose the pathetic story of the little patient's innocent trust and prayer would be to transform a most touching poem into a nice little "leaflet." We do not envy any reader who could resist the tender pathos of the incident, as the poet has presented it. "The Northern Cobbler," again, might be turned into a famous temperance tract, if any testotaller could venture to suggest such an heroic procedure as that by which the rough drunken fellow masters his vice. But with what vigour, what clear, bold humour, the story is told of the man's stand-up fight with the enemy, in the shape of a big black bottle of gin, which he fetches from the public-house, and puts into his wife's hands!

an' I says to 'er, "Sally," says I,  
"Stan' 'im theer i' the naäme o' the Lord an' the power ov 'is Graäce,  
Stan' 'im theer, fur I'll loök my hennemy strait i' the faäce;  
Stan' 'im theer i' the winder, an' let me loök at 'im then,  
'E seäms naw moor nor watter, an' 'e's the Devil's oän sen."

To say that "The Northern Cobbler" is just what we might have expected from the author of "The Northern Farmer," is to give the highest praise to this latest fruit of that choice gift of humour by which the author of "In Memoriam" took us all by surprise. The village gossip's story of the misfortunes of the Squire and his family, told in "The Entail," is full of the same shrewdness and original character, though less taking and remarkable as a whole. There are some inimitable sayings of the old wife, as when she tells how—

"hoffens we talkt of my darter es died o' the fever at fall:  
An' I thowt 'twur the will o' the Lord, but Miss Annie she said it wur draäins,  
Fur she hedn't naw coomfut in 'er, an' 'arn'd naw thanks fur 'er paäins."

She invents a wonderful figure of speech when she says—

"Ya wouldn't find Charlie's likes—'e were that outdacious at 'oäm,  
Not thaw ya went fur to raäke out Hell wi' a small-tooth coämb."

And when the old man and his son had both died, after letting the estate go to ruin—

"Parson as hesn't the call, nor the moonney, but hes the pride,  
'E reads of a sewer an' sartin 'oäp o' the tother side;  
But I beänt that sewer es the Lord, howsiver they praäy'd an' praäy'd,  
Lets them inter 'eaven eäsy es læves their debts to be paäid."

It would be interesting to inquire how much the humour of these unique poems owes to the dialect in which they are written. Something, no doubt, is due to the odd and grotesque effect of the language itself. But

the essential thing is that we have the native speech of vigorous, original character which has not been blended in the featureless average of commonplace life. And Mr. Tennyson has used this quaint literary instrument with wonderful effect.

We have not space left for saying much about the other poems in the new volume. "The First Quarrel" satisfies us less than the other ballads. We feel that the young husband ought not to have treated so lightly the discovery which had aroused his wife's jealousy, and when he goes away for a little while to some work, and she says harsh words and refuses him a kiss at parting, the catastrophe which follows seems too tragic for the "situation." In addition to the five ballads we have mentioned, and "The Fight of the Revenge" and "The Defence of Lucknow," which we knew before, we have an idyl somewhat of the type with which we were made familiar in earlier volumes. "The Sisters," however, is not to be put on the line with "Dora" or "The Gardener's Daughter." The subject is not a pleasing one, and while the treatment of it is essentially Tennysonian, it is in no way remarkable. There are two fine studies, in blank verse, of Columbus in his imprisonment, and of Sir John Oldcastle in retreat amongst the Welsh hills, where he kept his fealty to the new doctrine of Wiclif, "in God's free air and hope of better things." The other noteworthy poem is "The Voyage of Maeldune"—a version of an old Irish legend, wonderfully picturesque, and pleasantly suggestive of a "moral," so long as we do not tease ourselves with too detailed an interpretation.

There will probably be few of our readers to whom the volume itself will not have become familiar before these pages are in print. But we could not take this new gift from the poet's hands without a word of record and a hearty tribute to the lofty genius and true heart which continue to work such wonders of insight and sympathy. The poet has often before dealt with some of the more difficult problems of life and thought; and if it is with simpler and more elementary feelings and affections and purposes that he has here concerned himself—a mother's passionate sorrow, a little child's naïve prayer, a drunkard's sturdy self-conquest—he has made them the theme of poems which may be ranked with some of his finest and most enduring work, and which, once read, can assuredly never be forgotten.

R. CROMPTON JONES.

FOR Christians of every nationality, Palestine is *the Land*, and the Bible is *the Book*.\* To a large extent the study of these two must be carried on in their connection, for the journeys of prophets, the battles of kings, and the many allusions to scenery and physical features which the Bible contains, require detailed topographical knowledge for their full appreciation. Dean Stanley's "Sinai and Palestine" is a precious store-

\* *The Land and the Book*. By William M. Thomson, D.D. T. Nelson and Sons, London, Edinburgh, and New York. 1881.

house of material; and in a different manner Dr. Thomson's work has partly supplied the same want. Resident for forty-five years in Syria and Palestine as a missionary, he has had unusual opportunities, and he has made excellent use of them. His almost innumerable excursions are not imaginary, but real; and he tells us in easy conversational form what he has seen, selecting always the scenes and scenery, the manners and customs, which connect themselves with the books of the Bible.

This volume is not a reissue of a former edition. Since Dr. Thomson first published "*The Land and the Book*," learned and scientific explorers have penetrated every part of the Holy Land and given to the public some of the results of their researches. In 1864, Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) Wilson, of the Royal Engineers, conducted the ordnance survey of Jerusalem, at the cost of the Baroness Burdett-Coutts, and the results were published in two expensive volumes. In 1865, the Palestine Exploration Fund was established in London, and the committee engaged Captain Wilson to conduct a preliminary expedition and probe the country from Damascus to Hebron. From 1867 till 1870, Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) Warren, R.E., was engaged in patiently excavating at Jerusalem. Since that time the systematic survey of the whole of Western Palestine has been successfully carried out by Lieutenant Conder, and the great map of Palestine, on the scale of one inch to the mile, is already in the hands of subscribers. The memoirs, drawings, and special studies connected with the survey are not yet issued; but many of the more important results have been forestalled in the various publications of the Palestine Exploration Fund, and the books and articles written by its officers. No future writer on the topography of the Holy Land will be able to dispense with the mass of new material accumulated, and the flood of new light thrown upon hundreds of Scripture passages. Dr. Thomson has done wisely in revising his work, so as to bring it into harmony with the latest results.

On taking up this new volume—which is very handsomely got up, with toned paper, gilt edges, and a large number of well-executed pictorial illustrations prepared specially for the work from photographs taken by the author—our first thought was that it was simply a new edition. But these words will not describe it. Although it is called by the old name—"*The Land and the Book*"—it is only half the land and half the book. "*The Land!*" and yet there is nothing about Tyre and Sidon, Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, Lebanon! "*The Book!*" and yet the life of the Lord in Nazareth and Capernaum, and the teaching of the Lord "*on the Mount*" and in the plain of Genesareth, are not at all illustrated. The title-page, we might have noticed, proclaims in red letters that this volume is on "*Southern Palestine and Jerusalem*." It will require another volume of equal bulk to deal with Northern Palestine, Phœnicia, and Lebanon. So we may suppose the present volume to be only Part I., although it calls itself comprehensively "*The Land and the Book*," and no hint is given of a second part to follow. Looking into the edition of 1872, issued by the same publishers, we find that the writer begins his

journeying from Beirut and covers all the ground, whereas in the present volume he lands at Jaffa, sets his face towards the Philistine country and Jerusalem, and never reaches the north.

But although the book now extends over only half the ground, it contains two-thirds the full amount of matter of the 1872 edition, and is a sufficiently bulky volume. Southern Palestine and Jerusalem have some 50,000 more words bestowed upon their description than was previously the case, and now get 140 illustrations all to themselves, as against 128 formerly for the whole country. Dr. Thomson speaks from a much longer acquaintance with the districts he describes, and has the advantage of the recent explorations we have referred to.

The Preface, which is dated "New York, 1879," rightly credits the Palestine Exploration Fund of England with having made a thorough survey of Palestine Proper. When Dr. Thomson adds that "the American Exploration Society have sent several expeditions to the regions east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea," this statement is somewhat euphemistic in its reticence; nothing is said about the results of those expeditions, and perhaps the less said the better, as the English will have to do the surveying over again. The topographical work of Wilson, Warren, and Conder is often referred to by Dr. Thomson although, of course, he could not find room for very much of their matter without suppressing his own. Sometimes he quotes their descriptions; sometimes he criticises their conclusions. He accepts Conder's identification of Scopus near Jerusalem, and approves the location of Gilgal at Giljuleh, but rejects the site proposed for Bethabara beyond Jordan. Concerning Nob he says that the exact site will probably never be known; yet he clearly inclines to place it on Olivet, and seems to ignore Conder's very strong argument in favour of Nebi Samwil. Jerusalem topography receives a fair share of attention, and the tangle in which it is involved is fully recognised—"On approaching the Holy City you enter upon an arena of great uncertainty and endless controversy." The author himself disputes the traditional site of the Holy Sepulchre, because he "cannot believe that the spot upon which the present church stands was originally without the wall of the city;" no practical engineer would select such a line for the second wall as would be necessary for leaving this site outside. In speaking of the Pool of Siloam and its rock-cut connection with the Virgin's Fountain, the author quotes Warren's graphic description of his perilous crawl from one end to the other of this confined passage. He inclines, and rightly, we think, to accept Robinson's suggestion that the Fount of the Virgin, an intermittent spring, is the pool by the sheep-gate, where an angel used to trouble the water. The present so-called Pool of Bethesda is a great cistern, artificially built in an ancient valley, as Warren proved. In speaking of En-rogel in connection with the present well of Joab, our author is silent about M. Ganneau's discovery of the Stone of Zohaleth as bearing upon the identification. Underground Jerusalem is not forgotten, both Robinson's arch and Wilson's arch being described, and reference made

to the cisterns and aqueducts discovered by Warren, and the ancient masons' marks (supposed to be of Hiram's Tyrian workmen) some eighty feet underground at the south-east angle of the Haram wall. After this it seems a little paradoxical that Dr. Thomson should despair of any ingenuity or research being able to do much towards reconstructing the ancient city (page 419). But, perhaps, if we view this book as a development from the edition of 1872, with variations induced by changed circumstances, this despairing sentence may be regarded as a survival of a passage which appears there on page 626, and was natural before the work of exploration was so far advanced.

Besides the publications of the Palestine Exploration Fund, Dean Stanley's well-known work is laid under contribution, and his description of topographical details endorsed as vividly accurate; the explorations of Palmer and Drake are made use of; and Canon Tristram's last journey through the land of Moab. But we do not find that the Rev. Canon's identification of Zoar is mentioned, though so important with reference to the Cities of the Plain; and it can only be an unintentional injustice which accepts the Ciccar or Round of the Jordan as the true locality of those cities, and yet makes no reference to Mr. Grove's articles on the subject in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. The antiquated "orthodoxy" of Dr. Thomson disturbs his calmness in a few places; though when he insists that Abram must have been the first to receive circumcision, because Moses says so, and conjectures that if the Egyptians practised the rite they received it of Joseph, he may be ignorant of the monumental testimony which shows it to be as early as the fourth Egyptian dynasty. But this does not lessen the value of his description of Palestine scenes and scenery, manners and customs. One who has seen so much of the Holy Land, through many years of vicissitude and adventure, speaks upon these topics with an authority from which there can scarcely be any appeal.

GEORGE ST. CLAIR.

**D**R. CUNNINGHAM GEIKIE, in his "Hours with the Bible; or, The Scriptures in the Light of Modern Discovery and Knowledge,"\* gives us the first instalment of a popular history of the Israelites, written on the principles of strict Anglican orthodoxy. The book is only in small part a reproduction of the biblical narrative. Most of it is a connection of this with the physical history of the world and a comparison with the history of foreign religions and civilisations. The popular form in which this history is presented does not hinder an elaborate learning from illustrating every side of its subject except the critical. How far Dr. Geikie has penetrated into the critical demonstrations of even half a century ago may be gathered from his opening assertion that the authorship of the book of Genesis "has been assigned by the Jews from the earliest ages to Moses, and modern controversy has done

\* London: S. W. Partridge and Co. 1881.

nothing to shake this belief, although it has shown that the great law-giver made use, as might be expected, of documents ancient even in his day, and has, perhaps, pointed out, here and there, minute additions of a later hand" (p. 1, *et seq.*). This statement will by itself decide the book to fail in the elementary condition of historical writing which calls for an examination of the sources as preliminary to even the most guarded recognition of their contents. Dr. Geikie not only ignores this, but professes, in regard to the *Pentateuch*, his "acceptance of all its parts as the inspired word of God in the form in which we have received them" (p. 9). He has, in fact, travelled no further than the point arrived at by the present Dean of Peterborough in Dr. Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible" (art. *Pentateuch*), in 1868; and since that time the critical position has been built up afresh by the researches of Graf, Noeldeke, and Kuenen, the last of whom has given it an unassailable strength by placing it side by side with the inner history of the Hebrew nation. But none of these writers appear in Dr. Geikie's pretentious "List of Authorities;" his book is only a history written from the presumed point of view of Moses, annotated by a servile disciple of to-day.

In the scientific part, the pains Dr. Geikie is at to prove the antiquity of the earth and the non-universality of the deluge may excite surprise among those who are not familiar with the stumbling-blocks that everywhere present themselves to theological literalists. But Dr. Geikie has nothing of the crude insolence that repeats the fallacy we still hear declaimed from pulpits, "God is true: if science contradict the Word of God, science is false." On the contrary, his temper is moderate and his reasoning careful; his knowledge is such as we should expect from one of his name. When he comes to the question of the age of man he decides, it is true, in favour of a recent origin, and considers the divergences existing between scientific men as a sufficient reason for rejecting their general tenor. It is impossible not to see that in his advocacy of the traditional view he has been led to exaggerate the doubtfulness of the question, and to lay too heavy a stress upon the uncertainty of details. "It staggers our faith," he says, "in the whole chronological scheme to find, at the outset, that, while one high authority reckons the boulder clay in which old stone implements are found as marking 200,000 years, another, no less eminent, sets it down as 990,000 years old" (p. 138). But Dr. Geikie does not see that the important fact in the argument is the relative and not the absolute date assigned. Every estimate must, in dealing with immense tracts of time, be necessarily conjectural: all we get from them is a general probability of a remote distance, and 200,000 as much as 990,000 is fatal to the biblical scale of chronology. But we are not concerned to support the modern position. It is the literalists who have now to stand on their defence; and they have already deserted most of their outposts. Dr. Geikie himself is fluent in his derision of those who talk of a universal flood (pp. 210, *et seq.*), a belief that not many years since was held an essential constituent of revealed truth. Doubtless, he guards the admission by requiring the extermination of the human



race; for "the descent of all mankind from Noah is, of course, a renewed testimony by Scripture to the unity of the human race—a doctrine so intimately connected with the Divine plan of Redemption, and so vital to the brotherhood and mutual sympathy of man with man" (p. 280). But the vital doctrine seems to have a lax hold upon the author's mind. The reader of his book will be puzzled to say where he seeks the origin of the negro (pp. 239, 244), or whether he holds the Celt and the Accadian to be the brother-descendants of Gomer, the son of Japhet. In fact, the harmony Dr. Geikie attempts to construct between biblical and external history leads him into perpetual contradictions. At one moment the Cushites appear as a "branch of the Semitic stock" (p. 278); at another they are claimed as Hamites (pp. 238, 259). In one place the theory of Ebers, which regards the Philistines as "the remains of a powerful branch of the Caphtorim" of Crete, "who, reaching Egypt first, necessarily advanced towards Palestine, their final home, through the lands of the Casluhim" in the north-east of Egypt, is gladly adopted (p. 247), and the Philistines are ultimately "settlements of Phœnicians;" in another they are only "allied to the Phœnicians, . . . a branch of the primitive race which had once spread itself over the whole district of Lebanon and in the Jordan valley, and had in part launched off to Crete and other Mediterranean islands" (p. 355).

Yet Dr. Geikie's attitude towards modern scholars is throughout respectful, if with a touch of suspicion. Forgetting, for instance, "the kings of the Hittites," whose power is implied in 2 Kings vii. 6 (*cf.* 1 Kings x. 29), he wishes to distinguish the tribe mentioned in the Bible from the Kheta whose wide dominions and lasting importance have recently been discovered (p. 353):—"If of the same stock they must have been a very limited and comparatively feeble tribe" (p. 252). The author is evidently afraid of the change in his literary position which would follow from granting that the book of Genesis is ignorant of the fact of a Hittite empire, and even uses Hittite, Hivite, and Horite indifferently. In the same way, he dismisses the lofty Proverbs of Ptahhotep as "a string of platitudes, often trivial, and never rising above a very humble level" (p. 2), lest they should be brought into an advantageous comparison with the Hebrew Proverbs. But perhaps this example reveals rather the fact that Dr. Geikie's learning, however extensive, is singularly deficient in accuracy.\* The real value of the book, indeed, lies very little in the author's handling of the facts, which is throughout inexact and unscientific; it consists rather in the mass of comparative illustration he has brought together: for we have here for the first time, collected in a convenient and popular shape, the main results of recent discovery in Egypt and Assyria;—unhappily, however, with the old assumption that everything is traceable to Genesis as the original source. For this work of compilation Dr. Geikie deserves cordial praise: it is only to be re-

\* Thus he makes Merodach in one place the planet Jupiter (pp. 272, 321), in another Mercury (p. 322). Such a note, too, as that on page 235 implies an astonishing haze of scholarship.

gretted that he has marred the pleasure which his book should otherwise give by the intermixture of so much that is irrelevant and so much that looks like "cuttings" from his sermons, and by the prevailing influence of a decaying school of religious thought. It is interesting, at the same time, to notice that even in questions that are supposed to concern dogmatics, the author shows at times a certain tendency to travel beyond the limits observed by the traditional orthodoxy. He takes no pains to justify the entire characters of the patriarchs; he goes so far as to regard the temptation of Abraham as intended to prove that he "was not behind the servants of Chemosh or Baal in self-surrender to his God" (p. 399), an admission which has commonly been held derogatory to the unique dignity of the supposed Hebrew monotheism. Nimrod, too, he considers a hunter "well pleasing" to the Lord, perhaps one who, in the special phrase of biblical commendation, "walked before the Lord" (p. 280 and note); so that he does not, with most of his predecessors, confine such an attribute to members of the chosen family. It is unfortunate that he stops short at this distant approach to modern views, and, that, instead of a calm survey of the religious and social relations of the oldest Hebrew stories, we have only a storehouse of material, in which the author's contributions are the least in weight.

It is pleasant to have to notice a third edition of the Rev. J. M. Rodwell's version of the Book of Job,\* as giving evidence of that growing interest in the literary side of the Bible which Mr. Matthew Arnold sought to encourage in his "reading" of the Babylonian Isaiah. Mr. Rodwell's translation has the finish and vigour with which his *Koran* has before made us familiar; but, while it retains in a wonderful degree the poetic force of its original, it has the fault of being too modern. Mr. Rodwell may doubtless claim the precedent of Milton for his antipathy to the ending of verbs in *-eth*; but long usage makes one regret its exclusion from a biblical translation. It is certainly difficult to English so thorny a text as that of Job without increasing the vocabulary of the authorised version; but Mr. Rodwell's additions are not always happy, and such words as "condolence," "wearisome" (used of persons), "vindicator" (for "avenger"—the A. V. "redeemer"), "retract," "cohere," and "saturate," give a sense of discord with the prevailing pitch of the style. This incongruity is emphasised by the retention of the Hebrew names of God, which, however necessary to a translation made for students, are only distracting to the ordinary reader. But these are little faults to find in a book that deserves to be as widely read as possible. It is because the book is so good that we wish for changes that might make it even more acceptable.

Very different, in the matter of style, is the version of the Psalms contained in the Rev. E. Johnson's translation of Ewald's "Commentary."†

\* The Book of Job; translated from the Hebrew by J. M. Rodwell, M.A., of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Rector of St. Ethelburga, London. Third edition. F. Norgate. 1880.

† Commentary on the Psalms. By H. von Ewald; vol. i. Theological Translation Fund Library, vol. xxiii. London: Williams and Norgate. 1880.

For this Mr. Johnson is only partly to blame, since he is in the hand of one of the most obscure and turgid even of German writers; but he has added the confusion of a too great literalness, which often requires a knowledge of German syntax to get at the sense of the English. If, however, Mr. Johnson has failed to make the book readable, he has only failed where every one else has failed; and the failure suggests whether a scheme could not be arranged to give in English the summary of Ewald's total work, and leave out only his personalities, his digressions, and whatever remains too fantastic or too obscure to be worth keeping alive. For, as things are, while no one will dispute his position as the critic whose intuitive grasp of Hebrew history, equally with his inspired faculty of conjecture, sets him by himself above the scholars of this century, at the same time the defects in his intellectual temper, his arrogant dogmatism, his disdain for others and others' work, cannot but endanger his permanent hold upon the thought of Hebrew students. But it is too daring a hope, at present, that the scholar's greatness should survive alone upon the grave of his littleness; and in the interval we are grateful to have a new part of his writings added to the English literature of the Bible.

R. LANE POOLE.

"THE CHURCH OF THE FUTURE" \* is a sounding title for an archiepiscopal charge, and Dr. Tait has certainly made a bold attempt to rise above the commoner church politics, and to direct the attention of his clergy to their responsibilities in relation to those great controversies in which the *raison d'être*, not of an Establishment, nor even of Episcopacy, but of any Church whatever, is involved. Touching on the Burials Act and the Public Worship Regulation Act—of which latter, it should be noted, he still with complacency assumes the chief responsibility—only to make them the text for lessons of charity and caution, saluting with a generous Christian greeting the great Nonconformist communities of England, the Catholic churches of the East, and the Evangelical communions of the West, he presently takes up the main and threefold theme of his charge, the conflicts of the Church with the Atheist, the Deist, and the Rationalist.

We do not propose to do battle for the Atheist in either of the guises in which the Archbishop has challenged him to the conflict—that of the dogmatic denier of Deity, or of the more cautious, more modest, or more reverent Agnostic. We proceed rather to notice a point here and there in the criticisms which the Archbishop, presenting it under the ill-flavoured names of Deism and Rationalism, lays against a liberal and undogmatic faith.

We find, then, that under the title "Deists" the Archbishop proposes to deal, not with any group of persons so describing themselves, for he assures us that "the old giant [Deism] who frightened, not without

\* The Church of the Future. By Archibald Campbell, Archbishop of Canterbury. London: Macmillan and Co. 1880.

cause, our fathers of the last century was certainly smitten by the Davids of that time with their sling stones, and they were able even to cut off his head as he lay prostrate" (p. 67). No; the persons to be refuted are those who have preferred the name of "Theists"—a distinction which Dr. Tait will "leave them to explain." This they have indeed done, though they have not enjoyed the advantage of embodying their explanations in an archiepiscopal charge. They have done so in this country by the writings of Professor Newman, Miss Cobbe, and Mr. Voysey; but the great coiner of the terms "Theism" (and "Theist") was the American, Theodore Parker. From him the terms have been adopted to signify certain notions (and those who entertain those notions) of the relations of man to God, whether those who have adopted them have chosen, like Parker, still, in combination therewith, to claim the Christian name, or have relinquished that to such as hold by the supernatural personality and mission of Christ.

Theodore Parker, then, being the original professor of "Theism," as distinguished from Deism, it will tend to greater distinctness if we retain him and his teachings in mind while we weigh the charges laid by Dr. Tait against the Theistic position. We proceed to ask of the Archbishop exactly what he understands this Theism to be. Nor does he keep us waiting for an answer:—

A God who hides Himself except so far as He may be known through the efforts of the pure intellect, or in the voices of the loving heart; a life on earth in which He scarcely can be held to interfere, as all things move on irresistibly by the laws which He has established; a life of the spirit hereafter, if there be such life, not assured by any direct manifestations from above, but dimly conjectured as a probable expectation; this, I think, is the residuum supposed to represent the sacred substance which all the confused earthly copies have been caricaturing (p. 73).

Now, let us imagine for the moment—if, indeed, our imagination will stretch so far—that Theodore Parker, whose faith is thus represented, were Primate of all England, that his Theism were embodied in Thirty-nine Articles and were the established religion of this realm, and that Archibald Campbell Tait, a poor American preacher, had died in a foreign land twenty years ago, worn out with self-sacrificing toil at what should have been the zenith of his manhood, and that his name had been a by-word of reproach among men, and he had been driven out of communion with the churches because he had striven to teach those doctrines which, on the contrary, do now actually constitute the doctrines of the Church of England. Then we might have had Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, charging his clergy thus, describing the "sophistries" of the doctrine of poor, dead Archibald Tait:—

A God who hides Himself except so far as He may be known on the mere authority of a book written eighteen hundred years ago; a life on earth in which He scarcely can be held to interfere, as the day of miracles is past and they are the only reliable revelations of His activity; a life of the spirit hereafter, not assured by any inalienable trust of the human soul, but dimly conjectured as an inference from the alleged resurrection upon earth and

ascension into heaven of one Man, who, however, was also God—this, I think, is the residuum supposed to represent the sacred substance, &c.

Such a presentation of Archibald Tait's faith would, it seems to us, have been liable to be accounted by some ungenerous, unjust, and untrue; yet we experience difficulty in explaining to ourselves why it would have been more so than the language actually selected to describe the Theism of Parker and his followers by the Archbishop of Canterbury. The modern Theist—between whom and the Deist the difference seems to the Primate so trivial that the names may be used indiscriminately—is distinguished by the ardent vivacity of faith with which he recognises the energy of the living God in every movement of outward nature and every sacred motion of the human heart, by his intense conviction that the hand of God guides the whole order of the unmeasured universe, and (speaking generally, while acknowledging exceptions in men like Professor Newman, whose utter faith in the divine goodness and wisdom seems to have removed them from any keen longing for personal immortality) by the strength of their assurance that this life but preludes a nobler and eternal activity in the service of God. To them the harking back to the Bible for the sole revelation of God seems a miserable failure of the spiritual discernments with which the soul is normally endowed. To them the assumption that the laws which God's own hand imposes on nature both fail themselves to speak of him and so far lack perfection as to have required occasional amendment by miracle seems irreverent and unreasonable. To them the relegation of the doctrine of a future life to proofs by merely literary and historical evidence seems unnecessary and fool-hardy. They believe in no special revelation by the Divine Being at this spot or at that epoch, because his normal revelation in every inch of space and every hour of time seems to them perfect for all those whose eyes are unsealed and their ears unstopped. They may, of course, be wrong. But which view is "sacred substance," and which is justly to be called "residuum," is a matter quite debatable.

But the Archbishop presently dismisses the Theist with the advice to read his Bible, and turns to a yet more unwelcome figure—the Rationalist. Here, too, there seems some laxity of terminology; for the Rationalist with Dr. Tait, is not the critic of the early days of criticism who rationalised the alleged miracles of the Bible, offering natural explanations of seemingly supernatural phenomena. No; he is the Dutch or German critic of to-day, of whom, however, it is assumed, among other characteristics, that he denies the possibility of miracles. It would be too flattering to the pretensions of this *Review* to suppose that it could ever engage the archiepiscopal attention. But it would not have been amiss had the Primate's eye fallen on the emphatic sentences in which Professor Kuenen repudiated, in these pages, the charge of any *a priori* disbelief in miracles.

Be that as it may, however, this chapter is in the main a contention that we should do well to believe in a miraculous and supernatural Christianity. But the force of such a contention is seriously weakened

when we find the Archbishop using the word "supernatural" at one moment to mean "unseen," and at the next to mean "miraculous," and thus deducing with ease from the premiss that the Rationalist recognises the supernatural (*i.e.*, the unseen) in God the conclusion that he may well be prepared for the supernatural (*i.e.*, the miraculous) all through the ministry of Jesus (p. 103).

On the whole, we cannot feel that Dr. Tait's manifesto is, as an effort in apologetics, worthy of the clerical head of a great historic Church. Still less is it adequate to the solemn title which he has given to his charge. "The Church of the Future" will be far too great and noble a temple to stand on the lines which the Primate has drawn for it in the chapter on "Its Dogmatic Teaching."

#### RECENT OLD TESTAMENT STUDY.

THE last instalment of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Descriptive Sociology" deals with the Hebrews and the Phœnicians.\* The compiler, Dr. Scheppig, has perhaps made the best of an exceedingly difficult task. The method of arrangement adopted by Mr. Spencer serves well enough for the exhibition of the apparatus of life, but is singularly ill-fitted for tracing the growth and progress of moral and religious ideas. The compiler is no doubt conscious of this, and will not wonder that his treatment of these subjects should be found inadequate by students of Old Testament literature. So far as we have consulted the sections dealing with government and various secular concerns, they appear to compress into small compass a really prodigious amount of information very carefully arranged. The sketch of ecclesiastical institutions is also judicious. Dr. Scheppig has surrendered himself to Kuenen's guidance, after having vainly endeavoured to trace a satisfactory line of development on the old theory of the priority of the Book of Origins. We shall certainly not quarrel with him for assuming the exilic or post-exilic origin of the Levitical Legislation; and as the method of supporting the tabular statements by extracts does not admit of the discussion of controverted points, he has, without doubt, chosen wisely in presenting a single and harmonious view. Down to the establishment of the Levitical Law this is expounded with sufficient elaboration; but the subsequent treatment is woefully imperfect, and the various tendencies of Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes receive very scanty recognition. Still, the growth of the religious polity of Israel is delineated with a certain unity of plan. The sections on the progress of religious ideas, however, are not equally consistent or clear. On the one hand, we have Professor Max Müller's version of Renan's doctrine of the primitive monotheism of the desert (p. 75, col. 1); on the other, there is abundant evidence of Israel's ancient polytheism. The prophets are, of course, credited with the development of a lofty ethical monotheism; but the stages of it are not distinctly

\* London: Williams and Norgate. 1890.

marked, and, in particular, the Book of Deuteronomy, though its importance for the history of ecclesiastical institutions is made sufficiently plain, altogether fails to receive proper recognition as the first great exposition of the principle of the sole Deity of Yahveh. This is just one of the points which only a careful student of the history of Israel's religion thoroughly understands: it is not surprising that it has not been adequately grasped by the compiler. The short time available for getting up his subject was naturally too brief for mastering the niceties of the criticism of the Pentateuch, or Dr. Scheppig would not have ascribed any part of the story of the intended sacrifice of Isaac, Gen. xxii., or of the brazen serpent, Num. xxi. 6—9, to the Elohist writer—*i.e.*, the Book of Origins (p. 49, col. 2; p. 75, col. 8). And admitting, as he does, the post-exilic authorship of that document, it appears highly unsafe to found on the statement that mankind first lived on vegetable food, Gen. i. 29, the inference that vegetable offerings preceded animal ones (p. 48, col. 8). Nor does it seem quite clear that the story of Jephthah supplies an indisputable instance of human sacrifice (p. 44, col. 1). Unquestionably, the author of the Book of Judges treats it as such; but it is one of the strongest cases in Dr. Goldziher's list of ancient nature-myths. The brilliant treatise on "Mythology among the Hebrews" has not, however, been employed by Dr. Scheppig, though it would certainly have enabled him to enrich his sections on Myths. It is further to be regretted that so many misprints have been allowed to disfigure the work. Still, when all deductions are made, it will remain a useful compilation. Students who desire to see the setting of the great ideas which Hebrew thought and piety contributed to the development of the race will gather here abundant materials happily brought together. But the ideas themselves, and their effect upon life, must be sought elsewhere. The spirit which bloweth where it listeth cannot find a home in the tables of Descriptive Sociology.

The acceptance of the hypothesis of Graf and Kuenen by Dr. Scheppig is not the only recent instance of the change of view wrought by fresh study of the evidence. Dr. Schultz a year or two ago issued a fresh version of his treatise on Old Testament Theology, rewritten on the new basis;\* and now Dr. Smend comes forward with a commentary on the book of Ezekiel, to take the place of that formerly contributed by Hitzig to the well-known "Kurzgefasstes Handbuch."† Dr. Smend formerly advocated the early composition of the Book of Origins. But his study of Ezekiel has convinced him that its priestly legislation follows instead of preceding the sketch of the organisation in Ezek. xl.—xlviii., "the crown and coping" of the prophet's book. Here is the beginning of a new departure for Israel's religion, worked out at greater length in the Levitical Law. In the face of the results thus secured and so candidly avowed, it is worthy of note that critics are still eagerly at work here and there on the old lines. In the "Jahrbücher für Protestantische

\* Alttestamentliche Theologie. Zweite Auflage. Frankfurt-a.-M. 1878.

† Der Prophet Ezechiel. Leipzig. 1880.

Theologie" (1880, Nos. 1 and 2), Marti has made a vigorous effort to discover traces in the prophetic writers of acquaintance with the "Grundschrift" of the Pentateuch. His argument depends chiefly on very slight indications in the use of language, and appears to us enormously overstrained. The occurrence of two or three similar words—not consecutive—in passages in Exodus or Leviticus and in Isaiah and Jeremiah cannot be held to establish the dependence of one upon the other. All literary propriety is violated by the stress thus laid upon exceedingly remote resemblances. And even where the resemblances are stronger, as between Ex. xxxi. 13 and Ezek. xx. 12, the order of priority must be determined by other considerations than that of the wording of the two passages, or the existing arrangement of the Old Testament books. Dr. Marti holds that Mic. vi. 8 is a distinct quotation from Deut. x. 12; and even finds in Is. vii. 12 an appeal to Deut. vi. 16. It would not perhaps be fair to him to say that these are the grounds on which he refuses his assent to the widely-accepted view of the composition of Deuteronomy in the seventh century B.C. But it may be justly affirmed that it will require evidence far more convincing than any he has yet produced to prove the acquaintance of Isaiah and his contemporaries with the Levitical Legislation.

J. E. C.

#### TWO BOOKS ABOUT BUDDHISM.

THE volume of "Buddhist Birth Stories," translated from the original Pāli by Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids,\* appeals first to two classes of readers, and deserves a warm welcome from the students of Buddhism, and from the larger number of cultivated persons who, whether or not professedly interested in folk-lore, can yet appreciate the vivid presentment of ancient forms of popular thought and life in the East. Nor is this all. This book (or, rather, its Pāli original) further stands in a close relation with many of the fables, apologues, and stories which have been for the last two thousand years the delight of the children of the West. In the very careful Introduction, which must have cost the translator a prodigious amount of labour, Mr. Davids has pointed out some of the channels by which tales of Indian origin gradually passed into the literature of Europe. We cannot now follow him through an investigation conducted with sound and cautious judgment; it will perhaps be more serviceable to say a few words about the contents of the book itself. What are the Jātakas? Why are these stories called *Birth Stories*? Most persons who have heard of Buddhism have a hazy notion that it teaches the transmigration of souls. Mr. Davids has done his best to correct this misconception, and points out that what it really does teach can be better described as the *transmigration of character* (p. lxxv.). When a man dies, the elements of his body, and with it the whole organisation of his consciousness, are dis-

\* Buddhist Birth Stories, or Jātaka Tales. Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids. London: Trübner and Co. 1880.



solved, and disappear. All that remains is the moral sum of his thoughts, words, and deeds, his *karma* ("doing"). Out of this there grows, by an inexplicable mystery, a new being, whose condition, habits, and powers are all determined by the conduct of the individual preceding him in a former birth. Properly speaking, indeed, Buddhism does not recognise any individuality in the organisms which are for a time distinct. But it slid insensibly into the use of common language, to which it gave a new meaning, while it could not wholly throw off the traces of old beliefs. Now, the Birth Stories in their present form are founded upon this theory. They are said to have been related by Gotama Buddha in explanation of various incidents occurring in his ministry. If a disciple was despondent of his ability to attain salvation, if he was refractory, quarrelsome, greedy, fond of display—the brethren brought him to the Teacher. The Teacher, perhaps, inquired into the case, and, having administered encouragement or reproof, as might be needful, he "told a tale." There is the clever young fellow who started in life with only a dead mouse for his capital, and ended by marrying the High Treasurer's daughter, and inheriting the family estates. There is the foolish ox who envied the nice food with which his master fattened up the dear little pig, "Sausages." There is the daughter of the king of the Golden Geese who chose the peacock for her husband, but the silly bird in his elation spread his tail and began to dance, and so exposed himself, that the royal Golden Goose was shocked, and refused his consent to the match. There is the ass in the lion's skin who got along very well—till he brayed. The great personages of Eastern life, the king, his officers of state, his courtiers, the travelling merchants with their huge caravans, the pedlars crying their wares up and down the street, the farmer and his bullocks—all are here. Here, too, are the most delightful of animals, sketched evidently from the life, such as the elephant who made friends with the dog, and pined away when the dog's master sold him to a distance. Through all phases of society do these tales range, with a marvellous variety of incident, and a rare amount of humour and insight. Each has some bearing, more or less direct, upon the circumstances which are said to have called forth its relation; and at the end, we read, the Teacher "made the connection"—that is, identified the personages of the story with himself and his hearers; or, more strictly, declared the moral continuity between them. These, then, are the Birth Stories, set in a frame of narrative which has often an independent value of its own. Besides the charm of the stories themselves, therefore, this volume offers us many precious illustrations of the Buddha's method of dealing with the difficulties perpetually arising among his disciples. And the commentator on the stories has further enriched the collection with an account of the life of Gotama up to the conversion of Anātha Pindika, and the foundation of the monastery at Jetavana. This is the oldest version yet published of his early years and the struggles which culminated in his attainment of Buddhahood

and his resolution to found the Kingdom of Righteousness.\* All students of Buddhism will turn to this part of the book with the greatest interest. Those who wish to follow up the inquiries which such a collection suggests—what was the real origin of the tales, how were they combined with the teachings of Gotama, and similar questions—must consult the Introduction of Mr. Davids. We can only hope that he may be able to continue the task he has begun. It is no light one, for we have here only forty out of several hundred stories. And it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find another translator combining such rare qualifications, with a scholarship so complete, a knowledge of Oriental life so extensive, an English style so racy and vigorous, and so keen an appreciation at once of the beauty and the fun of these fascinating tales.

Mr. Ernest de Bunsen has produced another of those singular books which are the despair of reviewers.† They are too painstaking to be dismissed with a laugh; yet not the most serious argument directed against his perversities would ever produce conviction. The purport of the present volume is to prove that Paul, not Jesus, was the cause of the separation between Judaism and Christianity. So far, good. But on what is this conclusion founded? On the supposed fact that Paul took up a doctrine concerning the Angel-Messiah borrowed by Stephen from the Essenes, who in their turn had derived it from Buddhism. Mr. de Bunsen inverts the whole method of inquiry. He first of all reads Christianity into Buddhism, and then has little difficulty in extracting it again afterwards. But he ought to know that his representation of Buddhism is wholly incorrect. Gotama was not "conceived by the Holy Ghost," he was not born upon Christmas-day, he did not teach anything about "the most holy Father of all truth," *karma* is not conscience, nor instinct, nor connected with the "Word," *Nirvāna* is not the sun! Mr. de Bunsen boldly translates the Buddha's title, *Tathāgata* (or, as he prefers to spell it, *Tathāgatha*, p. 18, and *Tathāgatta*, p. 151), "he that should come," and then represents John the Baptist as inquiring whether Jesus was the Buddhist *Tathāgata*. But the smallest acquaintance with Pāli etymology, or even a glance at the dictionary of the late Prof. Childers, would have shown him that the word can have no such meaning. We say nothing about the difficulty of establishing any of the other links in the chain which the writer evidently regards as so firm and sound. He is not afraid to announce that the discrepancies between the Hebrew and Alexandrian Chronologies of the Old Testament depend upon the circumstance that the "authors of the Septuagint" took as their point of departure the date of Buddha's birth, according to the era of his death, recently determined by Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids. Mr. Davids will, no doubt, be delighted by so satisfactory a confirmation of his investigations :

\* A portion of a very similar account was translated many years ago by Mr. Turnour in the "Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal."

† The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians. By Ernest de Bunsen. Longmans and Co. 1890.

the sober critic, however, undazzled by these brilliant results, still refuses to believe that the Alexandrian translators looked upon Buddha, Moses, Abraham, and Adam as "precursors of Christ as incarnations of the Angel-Messiah." Mr. de Bunsen evidently aims at bringing out the essential truths of the teachings of Jesus. But he has gone the wrong way to work; and, in spite of his unquestionable earnestness, the book wholly fails in its end. J. E. C.

THE work before us\* appears without preface, table of contents, or indexes. The reader is left to find out for himself, if he can, what is the aim and what shall be the extent of the work. We suppose these volumes are only an instalment, for the first of them deals with some of the lyrics, epic hymns, and smaller prophetic pieces of the Old Testament, while the second confines itself almost entirely to the prophetic books of Micah, Amos, and Hosea. If this natural supposition is correct, Mr. Heilprin has commenced a great labour; if it is not correct, he takes a very arbitrary view of the limits of his subject. Indeed, in any case, is must be regarded as a mistake to bring the writings of the prophets under the head of Historical Poetry. The distinction between the poetical and the prophetic literature of the Hebrews is marked enough.

We are not much better pleased with the way in which the author has executed his work than with his plan of it. The translations from the Hebrew are generally pretty accurate, clear, and forcible. The introductory sketches of the history and circumstances in which each piece it supposed to have been written are sometimes vivid and picturesque. There is a good deal of careful scholarship introduced into the notes. And all this deserves praise. But the book is, after all, mainly a compilation of criticisms and notes from German works. This would be very commendable, particularly as Mr. Heilprin compiles well, had that kind of thing not been done more satisfactorily in the best commentaries on the various Biblical books. Moreover, the value of our author's compilations is greatly lessened by the credulity with which he follows such wild inventions as those of Bernstein in his monograph on the legends of the patriarchs.

Mr. Fenton writes very interestingly upon an interesting subject.† He works, too, in a field which has hitherto been but little cultivated. Comparative sociology is but a recent study, and there has hardly been time to apply its results in detail to Hebrew social institutions. Mr. Fenton attempts such an application. It is not difficult for him to illustrate Hebrew customs by parallels from India and elsewhere; and often light is thus thrown on otherwise unintelligible phenomena. But we must confess that the author does not seem to us either to establish the fact of

\* The Historical Poetry of the Ancient Hebrews. Translated and Critically Examined. By Michael Heilprin. 2 vols. New York. 1879-80.

† Early Hebrew Life: a Study in Sociology. By John Fenton. London: Trübner and Co. 1890.

the particular line of development which he seeks to trace, or, in many cases, to prove the existence of the law or custom which he makes its basis. As an instance, his deductions with regard to the terms *Migrash* and *Sâds* may be referred to. But though these reservations have to be made, the general reader and the Biblical student may both derive larger and clearer ideas of the ancient Hebrew world from a perusal of this little book.

We also record the appearance of Dr. Dillmann's commentary on Exodus and Leviticus.\* Though nominally a second edition of Dr. Knobel's work in this valuable series, it is in reality an entirely new work by the distinguished Orientalist of Berlin. This book has been looked for with special interest, from the fact that its author is the most important opponent of the view of the Levitical Legislation adopted by Graf, Colenso, and Kuenen. J. F. S.

THE success of "Sister Dora" has no doubt led to the translation into English of the German "Memorials of Amalie von Lasaulx," and the issue of the volume by the publishers of the former work, under the title of "Sister Augustine."† Amalie von Lasaulx leaves the record of a life nobly devoted to the tending of the sick and wounded, now in the peaceful wards of her own hospital, now hard by the battle-fields of Schleswig or Bohemia. But that which gives this book its greatest interest is the movement of her pure and heroic life through the ecclesiastical convulsions which were to her of even deeper significance than the political and military conflicts in which her country was involved. From the charming sketches of her light and careless girlhood in the quaint society of Coblenz half a century ago, we are led past the brief day of her romance on to the season of her 'early womanhood, when the longing to enter on a religious life induced her quietly to slip away from the home of her youth and pass over the border to Nancy, there to enroll herself in the congregation of St. Charles Borromeo. Sister Augustine strove hard to bring her fine, freedom-loving nature into subjection to the rules of her Order. "How often," she wrote, quite early in her career, "I have to seek help at the large chapel crucifix, in order to hear from the Saviour's lips that He is not held a prisoner there by the sharp nails, but by His infinite love to humanity!" (p. 44) "This biography," says the author's preface, "has been written in consequence of a promise given to the Superior that after her death I would see that her memory was not forgotten" (p. viii.); and it is evidently from the hand of one who stood with her in the midst of those movements from which arose the Old Catholic revolt in Germany. Nor would it be easy for the English Liberal to lay his hands on any other book which in such short

\* *Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament. Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus von August Dillmann.* Leipzig. 1880.

† *Sister Augustine, Superior of the Sisters of Charity at the St. Johannis Hospital at Bonn.* London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

compass should give him so vivid a conception of the motives, the aspirations, the principles, and the faith which made venerable to the hearts of thousands in the Rhine-land the sturdy fame of Strossmayer and Döllinger. "Sister Augustine," says her biographer, "loved her own Church with all her heart, and from her childhood she had ever looked on it with pride. The great and simple doctrines of Catholicism were engraven on her soul" (p. 120). What seemed to her the first departure of the Vatican from those "simple doctrines" was the proclamation, in 1854, of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin. Ten years later came the Syllabus, with its list of eighty heretical opinions. "I find myself condemned sixteen times," said Sister Augustine, after she had read the Syllabus (p. 172). A few years more, and the great Council of the Vatican assembled. Very vivid is the sketch of the interest at Bonn in the progress of the Council towards the declaration of Papal Infallibility, the intense opposition it aroused in the bosoms of the Superior and her friends among the professors, the popular excitement in the resorts of the tradesmen and working classes, the long and painful anxiety as to the action of the German bishops, ending, to the grief and shame of the Liberals, in their complete submission to the yoke and acceptance of the dogma. Friends of the Superior on every side were called upon to elect between obedience to the Vatican and persistence in their opposition. "To the remonstrance that was often made to her—'of two evils, one must choose the lesser,' *i.e.*, excommunication must at any price be avoided—she replied very earnestly, 'We must at any price remain faithful to the truth; we are not responsible for the consequences'" (p. 268). "Rather would I shake the dust from my feet than accept one word of the new Credo," she exclaimed; "we will remain in the old Church, won't we? and God and His sacred Gospel will help us" (p. 255). And again, "Döllinger sends a flash of lightning into the deepest recesses of Romanism; the bats and moles will indeed start back affrighted!" (p. 275). Englishmen will understand the better for reading this book how the "old Church," with its "simple doctrines," and "Romanism," stood contrasted in the minds of the non-contents, and how they felt themselves, and not the Ultramontanes, to be the true conservatives and defenders of the faith. Sister Augustine was not herself to escape the ordeal of confession. When her time came, already the kind hand of death was on her. She boldly declared her faith, and was immediately deposed. Amid the sobs of the Sisters, to whom she had been indeed, as an old Protestant pastor loved to call her, a "Mütterchen," the "little mother" passed out of the convent doors. In her refuge at Vallendar she, though excommunicate, received the Sacrament of Supreme Unction from a brave young clergyman who, while celebrating Mass at Bonn, had "hid a consecrated wafer in a small case" (p. 317). A few weeks afterwards, having to the last resisted all importunities to declare her acceptance of the Papal Infallibility, and so reconcile her soul to God, she passed away. The mild, firm countenance of Sister Augustine, which even her close and heavy veil cannot quite

conceal in the beautiful engraving on the frontispiece of this book, will, we hope, induce many readers to peruse its interesting and instructive pages.

"THERE are clear signs," says Mr. Dale, of Birmingham, discussing the "Evangelical Revival," \* "that the movement of theological speculation which began in the early part of the sixteenth century, and which has assumed a permanent form in the confessions and creeds of the great Protestant Churches, is coming to an end" (p. 18). But this emphatic statement does not preface any proposal to make peace with Rome, or to go over to the swelling ranks of Christian Theism. It introduces a volume full of forcible and noble pleadings for that Faith which has usurped to itself the fair name of Evangelical.

But Mr. Dale is profoundly conscious of the defects of Evangelical Christianity. He asserts that "as yet the Evangelical movement has produced no original theologians of the first or even the second rank" (p. 24); a state of things which we must ask permission to explain by the fact that men who have it in them to be theologians of the first or second rank are decreasingly likely to hold by the Evangelical movement. He alleges that "in the development of the idea of the *Church* the Evangelicals have been singularly ineffective" (p. 80). Lastly, while holding that the Evangelical Revival begun by Wesley and still, as he believes, energetic and effective, unquestionably accomplished a great moral reformation, Mr. Dale adds, "that in its moral aims and achievements it has proved to be seriously defective" (p. 88).

It is, accordingly, in striving to fortify the moral side of the Evangelicism to which he clings with so passionate an ardour, that Mr. Dale expends his greatest strength. And here we find his preaching altogether noble. It is direct, vigorous, moving, dealing with men and things as they are to-day. Seldom have sermons manifested a keener intellectual insight, still seldomer a more rousing moral power, than the two great discourses on "Natural Morality" and "The Education of the Conscience." Could anything be in more vivid contrast with the ordinary Evangelical preaching than this?

Are any of you conscious that the sharp contrast between truth and falsehood is gradually melting away? That it seems a less dreadful thing than it once seemed to violate the law of integrity? That for you there is a less awful difference to-night between purity and impurity than there was five or ten years ago? If so, then moral blindness, moral paralysis, has already begun. You ought to be infinitely more alarmed than if you had discovered that a film was coming over your eyes, or that there was a numbness in your right arm, which sometimes almost prevented you from raising it. With God all things are possible. He who can give sight to the blind, feeling to the paralysed, reason to the idiot, may breathe the breath of life into a dead conscience, but He alone can do it (p. 46).

The whole series of sermons to which this belongs are one long appeal

\* The Evangelical Revival and Other Sermons. By R. W. Dale. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1880.

to the moral faculties. Mr. Dale has a perfect understanding of their energies, their laws, and their diseases, and rarely, indeed, has a preacher with such directness of purpose addressed himself to their awakening and their education. Nay, this Evangelical preacher, while he hotly repudiates the notion that a true Evangelical faith can be content without morality, again and again admits and insists that moral force and culture are often far stronger and deeper in the non-Christian than in the Christian; and he cordially recommends the young man perplexed about his duty in some difficult commercial transaction to consult, not the "excellent Christian woman" who "was a housemaid before she was married, soon lost her husband, went out as a charwoman for thirty years, and for twenty years has been in an almshouse," but rather the "man with no [?] religion," "of stainless character," and "large knowledge of affairs," who "has been at the head of a great firm for twenty years." "His conscience has been trained;" "you value his moral discernment" (p. 101).

After breathing with delight the clear and invigorating moral atmosphere of these splendid sermons, it is almost impossible to conceive that the preacher to whom we owe them cleaves to the belief that "faith in the Son of God," "belief in Christ," is not only good, true, desirable, but actually "*the condition of salvation*," and of "*the gift of eternal life*." Yet, astounding though it be, this dependence of salvation on faith in Christ, says Mr. Dale, is among "the truths to which the Christian preacher must incessantly recur" (p. 126), "the very heart of the Gospel" (p. 127). We have tried to draw from the latter part of the sermon on "Morality and the Evangelical Faith" the inference that Mr. Dale does not really mean to exclude good men who do not share his faith from eternal life; but we are compelled to doubt whether his language will bear the strain of charitable interpretation which we should so rejoice to put upon it.

DR. CLEMANCE'S little book,\* which has reached a second edition, is one more manifestation of that revolt all along the line against the current doctrines of future punishment, which has of late inspired the pens of Canon Farrar, Mr. Cox, and even Dr. Pusey. The last-named writer, indeed, expressly replies to "Dr. Farrar's Challenge." Yet, for all that, he asserts that—

The merits of Jesus reach to every soul who wills to be saved, whether in this life they knew Him or knew Him not; and that God the Holy Ghost visits every soul which God has created, and each soul will be judged as it responded or did not respond to the degree of light which He bestowed on it, not by our maxims, but by the wisdom and love of Almighty God.

If Dr. Pusey assists in the break-up of the popular Catholicism, Dr. Clemance promotes the dissolution of the popular Protestantism. We

\* Future Punishment: Some Current Theories respecting it Stated and Estimated. London: John Snow and Co. 1880.

find him devoutly thanking a *Church Quarterly* reviewer for saying that what is really wanted "is a restoration of the primitive doctrine of the intermediate state, with all its possibilities known only to God." Dr. Pusey expounds the view of the Church. Dr. Clemance appeals from the Church to the Bible, and comes to the conclusion that this does not shut us up to the doctrine of the absolute endlessness of future punishment, though such as in this life reject Jesus Christ can never make up lost time. For ourselves, we are bound by neither Church nor Bible; but we rejoice that even men of great reputation for orthodoxy are recoiling from the hideous libels on the divine love which have blotted the fair fame of the Christian religion.

WE turned with no little eagerness to a new volume on the evidential value of the Book of Acts, by so famous a Pauline scholar as the Dean of Chester.\* Here, we thought, we shall find what one well versed in a minute biblical scholarship and familiar with the whole literature that has gathered round this book has to advance in reply to the scholars who have so very much weakened its historical authority in the estimate of free-minded students. We have closed these lectures, however, with a sincere sense of disappointment. It is not enough for one who would maintain a thesis to show that there are many phenomena consistent with it. There are many phenomena consistent with the astronomical theory of vortices, and many, also, with the molecular theory of light. But if any man would now support those hypotheses, he must also deal with the phenomena which men of science have adduced as inconsistent with them, and show that they are not really so. And even when he has done that, if he would quite firmly establish his own view, he must show that no other hypothesis but his will really cover the whole of the phenomena. And the like must he do who would uphold the authenticity and authority of the Book of Acts. Yet not only does Dean Howson not take the third and conclusive step; he does not even attempt the second. Baur's name he names once, quite vaguely, Zeller's not at all, and the only citation from a hostile critic is made from some unnamed writer, who, he is "sorry to add, is an Englishman." The whole historic criticism of Tübingen and Leyden is passed over as "nibbling objections." Almost the whole of Dean Howson's argument—save in the final lecture on "The Usefulness of the Book for Edification," in which, curiously enough, some really interesting antiquarian and geographical points in favour of the accurate knowledge of the historian are adduced—consists in statements of coincidence between Acts and the Gospels on the one hand, Acts and the Epistles on the other. No apparent contradiction is so much as mentioned. Paul's autobiography in Galatians—the standing disproof of the accuracy of the biography in Acts—is not once referred to. The three accounts of Saul's conversion within Acts

\* The Evidential Value of the Acts of the Apostles. By the Very Rev. J. S. Howson, D.D. The Bohlen Lectures. 1880. London: Wm. Isbister.



itself are cited in support of one another, while their mutual inconsistencies are passed over without a word. Finally, Dean Howson, having marshalled his array of agreements and what he deems appropriate and natural adjuncts occurring in the narrative, declares "this kind of evidence" to be "peculiarly strong," and has the assurance to add, "This I infer from the determined way in which it is neglected, or only very slightly noticed, by those who have theories to construct regarding the origin and texture of the Acts of the Apostles" (p. 102). After experiencing "the determined way" in which the whole mass of modern criticism "is neglected"—not even "very slightly noticed"—by Dr. Howson, in the interest of the pre-scientific theory of the origin and texture of the Acts of the Apostles which he is striving to reconstruct, we emphatically endorse his statement that "by developing out of our own thoughts a bold general theory of the intention of this book, and by leaving out of view the minute evidence of the facts of the case, we might make anything out of the book" (p. 103). Yes, we might make of it even an echo of the synoptic Gospels and the four great Epistles of the Apostle to the Gentiles; we might see "the grand shadow of the Baptist thrown over the whole range of the Acts of the Apostles" (p. 76); we might find Paul and Peter meeting "in this book, not, like Laban and Jacob, for a great separation, but for perpetual and sacred union" (p. 84). We are quite sure that Dr. Howson desires to be fair and to approach his theme with an unbiassed mind; but what a pity that he should have travelled to Philadelphia to lecture on Acts in precisely the language that he might have used if Baur never had been born, and with no better epithet in his mouth than "nibbling" for the vast yet minute erudition of the greatest students of this book that have ever lived! The Dean of Chester is himself a man of genuine learning. Would that he displayed also the diffident and scrupulous habit of the genuine critic!

THE indefatigable industry of Mr. Sharpe has given us, in a very convenient form, the curious writing, regarded by some old authorities as part of the New Testament Canon, which is known as the "Epistle of Barnabas."\* No one contends that this production has any great intrinsic value, but as Mr. Sharpe most truly and appositely says (p. 11)—"There are many things in the New Testament which we should understand better if we had more contemporary Christian writings. Even if they were of little value of themselves for religious instruction, yet they would be of the greatest value as offering us examples of style, of the use of words, and of modes of thought for comparison with the New Testament." There is abundant reason, then, why we should pay an amount of attention quite out of proportion to their intrinsic value to the most ancient uncanonical Christian documents we possess; and indeed the conviction

\* Βαρνάβα Ἐπιστολή. The Epistle of Barnabas from the Sinaitic Manuscript of the Bible, with a Translation. By Samuel Sharpe. Williams and Norgate. 1880.

must grow in the mind of every serious student that the vexed problems of New Testament criticism can never be solved, or even fairly stated, without a thorough knowledge of such literature as the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, the Pastor of Hermas and the Epistle of Barnabas.

Mr. Sharpe, in opposition to the prevailing opinion amongst critics, regards the "Epistle of Barnabas" as genuine, and urges that conceit and want of originality on the part of the author do not at all prove that that author was not Barnabas. On the other hand, the more general considerations which induce scholars of the school of Baur to bring down this epistle to a later date than that of Barnabas hang together with their general view of the development of Christian doctrine and the composition of the canonical books of the New Testament, and can have no weight with one who adopts Mr. Sharpe's views on these subjects. But whether we accept or reject the translator's critical views, we may be equally grateful to him for giving us so handy an edition of the Epistle; and even if we are not prepared to accept as satisfactory his rather startling translations of some obscure and doubtful passages, we always have the original text faithfully reproduced on the page facing the translation, and are specially directed in the preface to those passages in which Mr. Sharpe's rendering differs most widely from the interpretation of other scholars who have studied this curious work. In a word, while giving prominence to his own special views and interpretations, Mr. Sharpe has done everything in his power to put his reader into a position to judge for himself of their value, and to make his little book welcome and useful to all students of early Christian literature, whatever may be the school to which they belong.

P. H. W.

#### SOME PHILOSOPHICAL BOOKS.

MESSRS. BLACKWOOD and SONS have just published a volume on Descartes,\* being the first of "the series of Philosophical Classics for English Readers," of which Professor Knight is the Editor. Mr. Mahaffy appears to have done his work well: the biography of the Father of Modern Philosophy is finely sketched, and the exposition of the salient features of his philosophical system, though brief, is neither meagre nor inaccurate.

Among the forthcoming volumes of this series is one on Spinoza, from the pen of Dr. Martineau. "Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy,"† is also the theme of a portly tome by Mr. Frederick Pollock, which has recently appeared, and which is at present *facile princeps* among English books on the life and doctrine of this great philosopher. On turning to that portion of the exposition of Spinoza's views which treats of "the intellectual love of God," we find that Mr. Pollock is far from endorsing

\* Descartes. By J. P. Mahaffy, M.A. William Blackwood and Sons. 1880.

† Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy. By Frederick Pollock, M.A., LL.D. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

the opinion, so often entertained, that there is a deep and rich mystical vein in Spinoza's thought and sentiment. His conclusion is "that for Spinoza the divine love is nothing else than conscious acceptance of universal law, the 'welcoming every event' of the Stoics; and that the secret of blessedness and glory (for those titles are expressly claimed and justified) is none other than a mind steadfastly bent on the truth." Some critics will, no doubt, call in question this verdict, and will rather side with Schleiermacher's appreciation of the spiritual side of Spinoza's genius. An adequate account and criticism of Mr. Pollock's important work requires a separate article; but we think the readers of the *MODERN REVIEW* will be better pleased if we postpone essaying this task till the appearance of Dr. Martineau's treatise affords us the privilege of comparing Mr. Pollock's estimate of Spinozism with that of an eminent thinker of a philosophical school very different from that to which the friend and disciple of the late Professor Clifford belongs.

Mr. Turner's treatise on "*Wish and Will*"\* is a vivacious defence of the Libertarian position in the Free-will Controversy. Though it evinces no great originality of mind, and might with advantage have been condensed into half the size by greater conciseness of thought and expression, it is still a valuable and seasonable protest against the present widespread disposition to allow evolution theories to override the clear testimony which self-consciousness bears to man's power of free choice in moments of temptation, and, therefore, to man's true responsibility. The first half of the volume is occupied with an interesting psychological study of the distinction between Desire and Volition, and of the relation of the latter to the other capacities and faculties of the soul. It is in this introductory portion of the work that the chief instances of original treatment appear. While adopting much of Mr. Bain's psychology, Mr. Turner rejects this writer's explanation of the genesis of Volition, saying that it is not an account of Will at all, but simply of Spontaneity, a mode of action essentially different from Volition. Mr. Turner also admits his great indebtedness to Sir William Hamilton; but in dissenting from Hamilton's doctrine of Causality, he shows, we think, as sound judgment as in his repudiation of Bain's theory of the growth of the Will. The following passage will make it evident to our readers that on this important subject (and we may add in the general drift of the treatise) the author is rather in accord with Dr. Martineau's philosophy:—"This merely formal idea of Cause, as that which is 'the invariable and unconditional antecedent'—which is J. S. Mill's definition of Cause, and virtually the notion which Sir W. Hamilton was content to adopt of it, that he might show it to be an illustration of his pet doctrine of the 'Law of the Conditioned'—is a miserable ghost of 'Cause' complete and proper. For of that 'power,' 'efficiency' is the central and most important factor; and the notion of what 'power' is, and what

\* *Wish and Will: An Introduction to the Psychology of Desire and Volition.* By George Lyon Turner, M.A. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1880.

'efficiency' is, is realised first and most completely in this special case of Volitional *Effort*."

Referring, accordingly, all the causality in nature to the Will of God, Mr. Turner argues that our consciousness of personal origination in acts of moral choice and the accompanying sense of moral accountability demonstrate that man is not wholly either an effect or a phase of that divine causality of which Nature is the expression, but, in his power of free choice between motives of different moral rank, must be regarded as an energy above nature—a true uncaused cause.

"But," says Mr. Turner, "this being so, the investigator recognises the fact that the question is unique in its character, standing quite alone, and in important particulars apart from all other questions of scientific investigation. For it is the one matter in which the sphere of the phenomenal is pierced. It is the one thing, in the whole range of our experience, which acquaints us with the noumenal. To this extent the investigator finds himself an *Ontognostic*, because in *Volition* we are made acquainted with our 'selves' or *conscious-subjects* as the central source of all control."

The treatise closes with some appendices. In one of these is discussed the question of the relation of man's Free-will to God's Foreknowledge; but, as it seems to us, in a manner not wholly satisfactory, owing to the writer's dogmatic bias. In another appendix he treats of the relation of Volition to Miracle, and, as may be expected, finds that philosophy is bound to admit the possibility of miracle. The reality of reported miracles becomes, then, a matter for testimony to determine, and a little testimony, of no very solid description, seems to go a long way with Mr. Turner, for he writes as if he seriously believed that God held a conversation with Adam in the Garden of Eden, and personally handed the Tables of the Law to Moses on Mount Sinai. Such indications of an uncritical spirit will not recommend his book to the scientific world; nor will his appeal, in one passage, to the reported utterances of Jesus of Nazareth, as to an ultimate and final authority on matters moral and spiritual, avail, we think, to settle any question which remains insoluble on purely psychological grounds.

Christians of all denominations are buckling on their intellectual armour to defend the faith against those anti-theological prejudices to which extravagant ideas concerning the nature and capabilities of Evolution have given rise. If these gallant champions were not themselves hampered by certain unscientific theological prejudices, they would prove much more formidable opponents to the scepticism which they seek to refute. But we must not omit to thank them for the good work they do in spite of this drawback. Mr. Turner, as we have seen, ably holds, on the basis of a more accurate psychology, the central citadel of human Free-will against Determinist assailants; and, simultaneously with the appearance of his volume, a medical man of no less than thirty years' practical experience, and who is evidently well read both in the book of nature and in current literature, issues the first of five volumes, the aim

of which is to examine in detail all the recent discoveries of science, and to show that those features in Evolution, which are substantiated by ascertained fact, do not invalidate, but rather confirm, the foundations of Christian belief. The title\* of his book at first repelled us; but we found, on perusal, that the writer's orthodoxy is of a very harmless sort. He recognises within the limits of the Bible a development of opinion on important questions, and except that he occasionally refers certain moral difficulties in creation, which he cannot otherwise solve, to "the malice of Satan," we do not meet with very much that the Christian theist would find objectionable. Dr. Painter accepts the Pauline view of human nature as consisting of Body, Psyche, and Spirit, and in discussing this subject displays no little literary culture as well as scientific knowledge. The style is somewhat diffuse, and we cannot always see the force of his reasonings; but the book is readable, and in addition to summing-up many of the Theistic arguments that are scattered through the writings of Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Beale, Professor Mivart, and others, it contains some original ideas which are worth considering. C. B. U.

MR. ALLEN'S three Addresses† will be welcome to many an English reader. He first treats of Calvinism as a force in history, and exhibits, in that appreciative spirit which is happily becoming more familiar to criticism, "the mental vigour, the moral courage, the intolerant hatred of Evil under all disguises, the stern loyalty to Truth," which he hopes will remain "an imperishable possession of mankind" after Calvin's system has for ever passed away. It is well for us to be forcibly reminded just now of the great things which Calvinism has helped men to do; it was the creed of the Huguenots of France; it was the faith of the Netherland Reformers throughout their fifty years' struggle for freedom; it sustained the English Puritans and the Scotch Covenanters; it inspired the founders of New England, and furnished the force which caused their little germ of local liberties to grow into the gigantic system of self-government which now stretches across the whole Continent of North America. One mark of its characteristic temper is Sabbatarianism, "protesting in a certain blind, hard way against the spirit of the pagan revival," the mere love of Beauty for its own sake, the devotion to pleasure, the giving way to self-indulgence. Calvinism—

Is also a fountain head of stern, aggressive, self-sacrificing virtue, rising often to the height of moral heroism, so necessary to brace up the tone of morals in an age of licence, and even, at a crisis, to save the very life of a State, political as well as social. Take, for one type of it, the self-devotion shown in the missionary enterprise; divest it of the horrible dogma it

\* Science a Stronghold of Belief; or, Scientific and Common-sense Proofs of the Reasonableness of Religious Belief, as based on a plain and candid Study of Nature and the Scriptures. By Richard Budd Painter, M.D., F.R.C.S. London: Sampson Low and Co. 1890.

† Three Phases of Modern Theology: Calvinism, Unitarianism, Liberalism. By Joseph Henry Allen, A.M., Lecturer on Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University. Boston: Ellis. 1890.

proceeds upon,—that the souls of the unconverted heathen, without it, must drop incessantly, or rather pour, in a perpetual cataract of eighty thousand souls a day, into the gulf of endless perdition,—and see it only in its spirit of endurance, courage, sympathy, enthusiasm, such that, to a young man looking forward to a career, it shall seem the highest joy to die a martyr in tropical swamps (and I have myself known such); and where else shall we look for a type of character that does more honour to what is highest in human nature?

Or take, again, a movement like the Anti-Slavery or Temperance crusade, —assuming, as under the conditions of human society we may fairly do, that at a given time and place such a crusade is necessary,—and where shall we find the agents and weapons for such a warfare, hearts hot and valiant, weapons tempered and keen, except from that enormous reservoir of moral power which it has been the great mission of Calvinism to keep from running dry? As an intellectual system (as I began by saying), its day is long past; but, as a moral force, there was never, perhaps, more need than now of the spirit it represents. The forms of Puritanism cannot long survive, but from the heart of it, even yet, are some of the best issues of our life.

Of at least equal interest is the second essay on "Unitarianism: Then and Now." It gives us an admirable picture of Boston Unitarianism thirty-five to fifty years ago, when its adherents thought they had done with internal controversy, and established a satisfactory religious system on a secure foundation. It was a form of religion specially adapted to the mind of serious and educated laymen. They clung tenaciously to the historic Christianity which Lardner and Paley had so ably vindicated; the practical side of their faith showed itself in "rational piety, personal morality, and civic virtue." Naturally they shrank, even with intolerant dislike, from any inquiry into the title-deeds of this faith. The Bible was a minister's credentials. "Christianity without a supernatural revelation of truth, without miracles, without the divine authority of Jesus, was a weak delusion, if not a wicked and hypocritical pretence." Nevertheless, it was from the best and soberest scholars they had, from conscientious conservatives, that the first shocks came to the received liberal theology of the day. Professor Noyes's argument on the Messianic prophecies, followed by Professor Norton's rejection of the first two chapters of Matthew, gave the first blow, and the rest followed as a matter of course; Emerson widened the breach, so did Dr. Furness; and Theodore Parker's sermon on the Permanent and Transient in Christianity fairly showed that the days of rest were at an end, and commenced the controversy which cannot yet be said to have subsided. Mr. Allen thinks, however, that this much is now established "among us,—that one may distinctly rule out from his belief everything that is technically supernatural; yet it is free to him, if he will, to profess himself a Christian, and claim the fellowship of his birthright Church. In fact, many of us are rather disturbed if he prefers a different name." With regard to modern scientific discoveries and speculations, Mr. Allen gives us many wise thoughts and suggestive hints which space forbids us to discuss, but which will serve to encourage every earnest worker and devout thinker. Nor can we dwell on the last address, given to the divinity students of Harvard University. The Gospel of Liberalism is indicated with impressive touches, though its

features are hardly brought out as clearly as when our author's subject is a matter rather of the past than of the present and future. Its watch-word is neither Culture nor Salvation, but Service, and when we have learned what are the unbelief and despair, the hollow mockery of refined Materialism, which now threaten to overwhelm mankind, "we shall begin to know the privilege and the burden that belong to our better faith." The work of developing the new religion is likely to need centuries for its consummation; the phenomena that have to be watched "include, the height of aspiration, the depth of passion and contrition, the wealth of experience, that make up the higher life of men." Much that was formerly deemed essential to religion has been swept away, but there is compensation even in the loss of the near and comforting sense of the Divine Personality, which, as at present held, is often mere idolatry, but which will surely come back in a glorified form when our minds are sufficiently grown to think more worthily on the divine reality. The fading of the clear vision of the future life will render impossible the familiar appeal to craven fears and selfish hopes, and the sacrifice of the urgent duties of this life to self-indulgent broodings on the life to come. In any case, what we have now to do is to return to the deepest moral convictions of the soul, and seek in the eternal dictates of conscience the foundation for the higher creed and the higher life.

Rightly to appreciate Hegel on Art,\* requires a combination of artistic interest and metaphysical capacity which, we fancy, is very far from common in England. What Hegel said on the subject, however, is full of penetrating truth and fertile germs of thought, and is acknowledged by his countrymen to have inaugurated a new era of art-criticism. The Beautiful he conceives as the outward manifestation of the Idea; it is the indivisible unity of the concept and its realisation, of spiritual contents and outward form. All the various manifestations of beauty, in different times and countries, in architecture, in sculpture, or in painting, music, and poetry, are classified and criticised according to the relation in which they exhibit these two constituent elements. The present volume deals chiefly with the historical development of the three great phases of art-activity, termed respectively—the Symbolic, which finds its home chiefly in the ancient religions of Persia, Hindostan, and Egypt; the Classic, supplied by ancient Greece and Rome; and the Romantic, for which Christianity and Chivalry furnish the main ideas.

H. S. S.

WE have before us a volume of sermons by a German clergyman, full of eloquence, fervour, and faith.† If we mistake not, Erhard Schultz is a member of the *Protestantenverein*, for he was present at the meeting in Gotha held last Whitsuntide. The discourses do not belie

\* *The Philosophy of Art*: being the Second Part of Hegel's *Æsthetic* Translated, with an Introductory Essay giving an Outline of the Entire. *Æsthetic*, by Wm. M. Bryant. New York: Appleton and Co.

† *Predigten gehalten von Erhard Schultz. Zweite Auflage. Mülhausen in Elsass. Bußebsche Hofbuchhandlung. 1880.*

their motto, "Wahrheit, Freiheit, That." They are acutely reasoned, dogmatically untrammelled, and practically suggestive. A few of them preached on State occasions are a little too courtly for the taste of the British Nonconformist; but Herr Schultz is neither a Briton nor a Nonconformist, and if here and there he shows a somewhat exaggerated reverence for the powers that be, his veneration never sinks to the level of servility. A very little of his enthusiasm would go a very long way in some of our liberal pulpits; and they would be none the worse for a slight infusion of the same. Unlike most printed sermons, these are nowhere tedious, and none but perfect saints or irreclaimable sinners, if any such there be (which Herr Schultz does not believe), could rise from their perusal without at least desiring to be both wiser and better men.

In the work of another "Protestantenvereinler," Herr Simons, we recognise a most painstaking and scholarly production.\* It is rather alarming to some of our old-fashioned admirers of the Gospel according to Baur to be told that the priority of Mark as against Matthew is no longer an open question; but granting this assumption, and also the still larger one, that there were no other Gospels of any account current in the time of "Luke," save only the "Logia" and Matthew and Mark, we must admit that, working from these premises, the affirmative answer to the question put by the title is given with as near an approach to demonstration as the case admits. But then what becomes of the third evangelist's prefatory words, *Ἐπειδήπερ πολλοὶ ἐπεχείρησαν κ.τ.λ.* ?

E. M. G.

MR. JENKINS' book† is a poor and disappointing one. It entirely omits much which, from the title, the reader has a right to expect, and the treatment of the parts of the subject which are not wholly neglected is imperfect and unsatisfactory. As the laws regulating the doctrines and discipline of the Church of England are either omitted or alluded to only in so far as they affect Dissenters, it is a mere misnomer to speak of the book as containing "The Laws Relating to Public Worship." It might with more propriety be described as "A Sketch of the Progress of Religious Liberty and of the Laws affecting Nonconformists;" but even under this title, which would apparently correctly indicate the author's intention, it would still be a disappointing work. The larger half of the book is taken up by an historical sketch of the rise and progress of religious liberty in England, of which the greater part is stated to have been "written more than thirty years ago, when the writer was young and vigorous and active in the performance of professional duties," and which he now feels it his duty to reproduce from its shelf in order to help to counteract "the ascendancy of High Church and Tory principles and parties." Considering the great additional light thrown on English

\* Hat der dritte Evangelist den Kanonischen Matthäus benutzt? Abhandlung der Theologischen Facultät an der Kaiser-Wilhelms-Universität Strassburg: eingereicht von Eduard Simons, Lic. theol., Bonn, Universitäts-Buchdruckerei von Carl Georgi. 1880.

† The Laws Relating to Religious Liberty and Public Worship. By John Jenkins, Esq., Registrar of County Courts, and Delegated Judge in Bankruptcy, &c. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1880.



history during the last thirty years, it may be doubted whether the author's decision is a wise one. His essay was not discreditable as the production of a young man filled with admiration of the Puritans and zeal for religious liberty, and regarded as such, may be read with interest and general approval. But it is somewhat superficial, contains little, if anything, that is original, and is overloaded with commonplace reflections and superfluous rhetoric. The second chapter of the book consists of about thirty pages, containing a digest of decisions upon the Mortmain Acts, and an account of the Acts relating to the Registration of Dissenting Chapels. The rest of the volume consists of an Appendix, containing a few recent statutes (chiefly relating to the acquisition and conveyance of sites for chapels) and four forms for Chapel Trust-deeds for the use of various denominations which, especially that for a "Congregational Chapel," with its schedule of doctrines, would a good deal restrict that liberty of thought for which the author is so eager. This statement of the contents of the book will prevent the reader from expecting too much from it. When it is added that no mention whatever is made of the Unitarian Relief Act of 1818, of the important litigation which led up to the Dissenters' Chapels Act or of that Act itself, or of the Burials Act of last session, and that no allusion is made to the principles adopted by the Courts in interpreting and enforcing trusts for religious purposes, the incompleteness of the work will be still more apparent. Those who desire more information from the historical side will still have to turn to Mr. Tayler's scholarly "Retrospect of the Religious Life of England;" while those who wish for a more adequate treatment of the subject from the lawyer's point of view (apart from mere conveyancing details) will find it in Mr. James Paterson's recent treatise on "Liberty of Speech, of the Press, and of Public Worship."

L. M. A.

CHRISTIANITY and Christian duty have been preached about and written about for many a long year. Dr. Stuckenberg claims to have discovered "a new subject" for consideration in "Christian Sociology." \* But, after all, his new subject is only the old one under a new name. He deals first with the nature of Christ and the special relation of the Christian to Christ; then with the duty of the Christian to himself, to his fellow Christians, and to the rest of the world. His Christ is not Jesus of Nazareth, but the Christ of the Fourth Gospel (pp. 73—76).

"Christian Sociology makes Christ the source of all that is, just as it makes him the source of all that Christian society is. It begins with him, lives in him, and tends to him. From Christ, in Christ, to Christ—that is the whole system" (p. 87).

The fact that Christianity perfects the life both of the individual and of the race is emphatically stated, and the statement is fairly worked

\* Christian Sociology. By J. H. W. Stuckenberg, D.D., Professor in the Theological Department of Wittenberg College. New York: J. K. Funk and Co. 1890.

out. Good principles are suggested, for the most part, with regard to duty and amusement. But there are few who can really treat any principle without personal bias, and we could not but smile to find that, while in matters indifferent in themselves we should often be willing to yield to the weaker brethren, and not offend them by our exercise of liberty, an example of an occasion "when it is to the best interest of the weak brother that the strong one do the very things that offend him" is easily found in "the duty" of eating meat on Friday (by which, of course, only the conscience of a Roman Catholic or a Ritualist is offended).

Another little volume which we have received from America takes a similar view of the nature of Christianity, but deals mainly with Christ and the Christian Religion, and but very slightly with Christian conduct.\* The first chapter, which treats of the character of Christ, is not without insight, and points out one or two things very necessary to remember just at present in England as well as in America, *e.g.*, "He [Christ] does not find it necessary to stand upon his dignity, and he is never lawless in his manner. There is nothing eccentric about him. He never uttered words which brought down the house in a roar of laughter. The majesty of Christ is the majesty of absolute truth and absolute righteousness" (p. 18). But we are tired of the utter ignorance of the origin and history of the New Testament which can say "Christ is either a divine saviour" (of course in the writer's sense) "and Christianity is true, or he is a daring impostor and Christianity is false" (p. 38). We should have thought, moreover, that a writer whose idea of Christian duty must rest almost entirely upon the words "inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me," might at least have understood the beautiful story of how St. Elizabeth took a poor leper into her palace to nurse him, and how, when her husband came in anger to drive out the miserable suffering brother, he found not the leper, but Christ himself.

FRANCIS HY. JONES.

MR. SYDNEY C. BUXTON seems to us to have inherited from his father a very rare faculty of seeing both the gold and the silver sides of the political shield,† and to know how to exhibit either side with conspicuous impartiality to the reader. If it generally comes out quite clearly that the shield *is* golden on one side and silver on the other, that is the fault of the shield, and not of Mr. Buxton. He is, of course, a genuine Liberal, and it is, moreover, easier to present forcibly the reasons for change than the reasons for not changing. Yet we think Conservatives will not complain of any undue bias in the arrangement of the neat antithetical sentences in which Mr. Buxton sets forth the *pros* and *contras* on the leading political topics of the day. Conscientiously used, the book will be of wide and substantial use, and it has well earned its rapid passage to a second and enlarged edition.

\* Christ and His Religion. By Rev. John Reid. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1880.

† A Handbook to Political Questions of the Day, being the Arguments on Either Side. By Sydney C. Buxton. London: John Murray. 1880.

# THE MODERN REVIEW.

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APRIL, 1881.

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## *THE PROPHECIES OF ISAIAH.\**

### II.—THE CAPTIVITY.

THE literary phenomena of the book of Isaiah are, perhaps, even more perplexing than those of the Pentateuch itself. It has long been recognised that the so-called Books of Moses are composed of elements of very various dates, that their narratives bear the marks of different hands, and that their groups of laws were reduced to writing at widely separated eras ; and the last ten years have witnessed the growth of an important consensus of critical opinion, under the leadership of Graf and Kuenen, on what may be called the stratification of the Pentateuch. It would, indeed, be premature while eminent scholars like Dillmann still adhere to some modification of the view so profoundly impressed by Ewald upon Old Testament study, to assert that the relations of the several documents can be defined with substantial accord. But on the constituent portions of these documents there is less divergence. The evidences of language and style are, for the most part, so decisive as to leave no doubt to which general group any

\* *The Prophecies of Isaiah*; a new Translation with Commentary and Appendices. By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M.A. Vol I. 1880 ; Vol. II. 1881. See also the *Modern Review* for January, 1881.

particular passage must be referred ; and further inquiry is continually yielding new evidence concerning the order of time in which they took their rise.

The questions which confront the student of the Book of Isaiah are at once broader and more delicate. They are concerned not only with modes of expression and with the circumstances of history ; they deal with the minutest considerations of the form of the prophetic discourses—whether given by the hand of author or editor, and they lead up to the most subtle and searching of all psychological problems, the nature and limits of the action of the Spirit of God upon the human soul. It is plain that a discussion which has so wide a range cannot be adequately conducted within the limits of a single paper ; and I shall attempt nothing more than to review some of the principal points of the problem which Mr. Cheyne has presented with such fulness and care. My purpose must be not to contribute anything fresh to the solution, but to exhibit to the general reader the grounds and methods by which a solution must be sought.

A very cursory examination of the Book of Isaiah as it stands in our Old Testament reveals at once a number of peculiarities in its composition. In the earlier part of the book a series of prophecies succeed each other, falling into narrative only at one or two points, such as chaps. vii. and viii. The first twelve chapters deal entirely with the people of Israel. These are followed by a group of oracles on foreign affairs, after which the topics of the national life are for a short time resumed again. At the end of chapter xxxv. the stream of prophetic utterance is arrested, and four chapters follow (xxxvi.—xxxix.), in which history, prophecy, and psalm are all blended. The historian gives place in his turn, at the opening of chapter xl., to the prophet, and the strain of comfort with which the new discourse begins passes in the rest of the book through almost every note of divine promise and human entreaty, of hope and fear, of

encouragement and denunciation. Its fresh themes at once arrest attention. It holds up a picture of Israel all unlike that which has gone before; and if the reader pauses to think, as the rapid flow of high-wrought appeal or tender expostulation or scornful rebuke hurries him along, he finds himself in another land, amid new scenes, and listening, so it would seem, to a very different voice. Does he cast back his glance over the previous portions of the book to reassure himself? He discovers that the collection through which he has travelled so lightly is not really homogeneous; he is bewildered by finding amid the oracles dealing with Assyria and Sennacherib utterances that claim close kindred with Babylon and Cyrus. No less than three little groups of chapters (xiii.—xiv. 23, xxiv.—xxvii, xxxiv.—xxxv.) must be ranked with the great series that continues without interruption, save in the successions of its own matter and style, till the last words of the book are reached. What is the meaning of this strange arrangement? Whence these sudden dislocations of thought and language? these unexpected reappearances of seemingly different prophetic personalities? Are they in reality all one? Is there but a single speaker, though in many tones? or have we here a sort of anthology of prophecies collected at some later date, and ascribed with loving reverence to the great master of the elder time? A brief consideration of the circumstances revealed in the last twenty-seven chapters may, perhaps, help us to a reply.

## I.

One of the first things that strikes the reader is the entire change of scene and thought. The great objects of Isaiah's ministry, the powers with which he dealt, have passed away. The whole of the busy life of Jerusalem has vanished. The king, his court officers, and his harem, the

wealthy nobles and the military chiefs, the extravagant fine ladies, the drunken priests, the necromancers and false prophets, the suffering poor, waiting in vain for justice at the hands of their oppressors, all these have disappeared. No more do Moab and Ammon harass; no more do the Philistines watch for revenge. No more does Assyria threaten; no more does Egypt tempt. Has, then, the day of Yahveh come? Has nature yielded herself to its vivifying power? Have the people submitted to the awful process of chastisement and purification, and emerged into the new glory of a life divinely quickened and sustained? Have the great highways been constructed from the Tigris and the Nile, linking the two mightiest powers of the world along with Israel in faithful service to Yahveh of Hosts? No, the day of Yahveh has not come! The king is no more the object of the prophet's hopes, for he has been dethroned, and his dynasty is at an end. The proud city has been laid waste. Famine and the sword wrought on her their deadly work; her most valiant sons perished in her defence, caught at the street-corners by the conquering foe "like an antelope in a net."\* The land, instead of yielding its marvellous supplies, lies desolate; only here and there to the enemy do its fields bear grain, and its grapes yield their juice. So long have the cities stood in ruins that they seem already to belong to "antiquity;" they fell in the days of "the forefathers," they are the monuments of the sorrows of "past generations."† Where, then, are the people? They are in exile, far from their former homes. In vivid language the prophet paints them as "snared in holes, and hidden in houses of restraint; they are become a prey, and there is none to rescue, a spoil, and none that saith, Restore."‡ Jerusalem sits in the dust, with the yoke of bondage upon her neck.§ With the destruction of the capital, and the captivity of the nation, the sanctuary has perished—the

\* Is. li. 3, 17—20. † Lxii. 8; lxi. 4. ‡ xlii. 22. § lii. 1, 2.

sanctuary which Isaiah declared to be inviolable, for Yahveh himself would defend it. Alas! the staff of doom which he would swing against the Assyrian availed not against the new invaders. "Our adversaries," cries the prophet, "have trampled upon thy sanctuary;" nay, with a last entreaty of despair, "Be not wroth, Yahveh to the uttermost, and remember not iniquity for ever; lo! do but look, we are all thy people. Thy holy cities have become a desert; Zion hath become a desert, Jerusalem a desolation. Our house of holiness and splendour, where our fathers praised thee, is burned up with fire, and all our delectable things are laid waste."\* With the fall of the temple the ritual has ceased. The punctual celebration of the new moons by greedy priests, and the solemn assemblies of the violent and extortionate, no more wake the prophet's wrath. The annual circuit of the feasts is suspended; the choral song is hushed. The afflicted nation has no other ordinances than the Sabbath and the fast.†

Is it possible, however, that this time of sorrow is the chastisement of captivity which Isaiah had himself predicted as the indispensable discipline for the regeneration of the people? It was, perhaps, with this in his mind, that he laid on his sons those significant names "A-remnant-shall-return," and "Haste-spoil-speedy-prey." A glance at our prophecies shows us that the age and the power have changed. Isaiah beheld the forces of Assyria closing round the little kingdom of Judah, and serving as the ministers of Yahveh's penal justice. But the oppressions of Assyria are now in the remote past. The historic eye travels back to them through the generations as to the bondage of the forefathers in Egypt.‡ The conquering might of Nineveh has been overthrown, and the sovereignty of Western Asia has passed to imperial Babylon. Proudly does the splendid city rise enthroned in her

\* Is. lxiii. 18, lxiv. 9—11 (Cheyne).

† lviii.

‡ lii. 4.

wealth and state. There are the great bronze gates of her vast walls ; the broad quays thronged with ships that lined the river banks ; the huge warehouses with their secret vaults, where the hidden treasures of her merchants were safely stored away. Amid the crowd of deities the figures of Bel and Nebo, connected with the planets Jupiter and Mercury, loom dimly into view.\* The spells and enchantments of the ancient magic that had been practised possibly for millenniums, the observations of the official astronomers embodied in the monthly reports forwarded to the king from the several stations on the great plain†—these appear in the prophet's pages almost as clearly as in the brick calendars of lucky and unlucky days, and the clay summaries of the events of the heavens, which it is the triumph of modern enterprise and scholarship to have rescued and deciphered.

It was under the rule of Babylon, then, that Jerusalem was in ruins, and her people helpless in captivity. Yet they are not wholly without hope. Israel's Holy One, who guides the destinies of the world, does not forget his children. Are they weary of waiting, do they complain that their way is hidden from Yahveh, and he has let slip their right?‡ The answer is ready : Yahveh has even now called from his distant home the deliverer who shall set them free.§ He comes from the North and from the East, for the powers of Media and Persia are united in him.|| Sometimes his victorious approach seems near, sometimes it appears as though unexpected delays intervene, and the sufferers grow sick with hope deferred, question the divine purposes, and mutter in despair that they have lived in vain.¶ But as the prophet follows the conqueror on his rapid marches, all roads, even the farthest, wind round at last to Babylon. His triumphs have a deep religious significance, though he knows it not. They will be the means

\* Is. xli. 1.

† xlvii. 12, 13.

‡ xl. 27.

§ xli. 2.

|| xli. 25.

¶ xlix. 4.



of the liberation of Israel, of the restoration of Jerusalem. And so the great announcement is made of the rebuilding of the temple and the return of the exiles to their own land.

Thus said Yahveh, thy Goel, and he that formed thee from the womb ; I am Yahveh, the maker of everything, that stretched forth the heavens alone, that spread forth the earth—who was with me ? that bringeth to nought the signs of the praters, and maketh the diviners mad, that turneth wise men backward, and proveth their knowledge to be folly, that maketh his servant's word to stand, and accomplisheth the counsel of his messengers, that saith of Jerusalem, Let her be inhabited, and of the cities of Judah, Let them be built, and her desolate places will I raise up ; that saith to the flood [the Euphrates], Be thou wasted and thy streams will I dry up ; that saith of Cyrus, My shepherd, and all my pleasures shall he accomplish, even saying of Jerusalem, Let her be built, and of the temple, Let thy foundations be laid. . . . It was I who stirred him up in righteousness, and all his ways will I make level ; he shall build my city, and mine exiled ones shall he send home, not for price and not for reward, saith Yahveh Sabaoth.\*

And so, through many alternations, rising at times into the most exulting joy, as in the great ode on the glory of the New Jerusalem, or sinking into a wail of lamentation over the fierceness of Yahveh's chastisement, the prophetic discourses flow on, till they close with the gathering of the nations at the holy mount, and the awful picture of the undying worm and quenchless fire to which the enemies of the righteous are consigned.

Had we met with this book (xl.—lxvi.) by itself, we should have had no doubt to what period the bulk of its contents, at any rate, belonged. We should have judged unhesitatingly that whatever may be the occasional indications, here and there, of the scenery of Palestine, the chief portions of the oracles belong to the locality and circumstances of the captivity.

\* Is. xlv. 24—xlv. 13 (Cheyne).

The foremost of the scholars and critics who have most earnestly pleaded for the unity of authorship of the book of Isaiah, expressed his opinion twelve years ago that "there is not a single passage of the book (Is. xl.—lxvi.) which betrays that the times of the exile are only ideally and not actually present to the prophetic writer." Not even the qualifications which Dr. Delitzsch has since introduced into this admission can destroy its value as evidence that it has been at least possible to interpret these wonderful oracles as the living utterances of comfort and hope to contemporary suffering. Even Naegelsbach, who courageously declares that "one might as well maintain that the writer had stood beneath the cross of Christ and read the letters of Paul, as that he lived in the exile," is compelled to surrender the name Cyrus, and the lament over the burning of the temple. "If some passages in the last chapters show unmistakable traces of exilic origin, they must be later additions to the original work of Isaiah."\* But if the sketch that we have given be correct, it will be seen that the "traces of exilic origin" are not scattered through a few pages in the last chapters. They are the very tissue and substance of the book (xl.—lxvi.) itself. Remove them, and you remove the foundation on which it rests; the whole fabric of the prophetic thought will fall in ruins; and there will be left only consolations for disasters which have not happened, promises of deliverance to a free people, hopes of restoration for a city that sits unharmed upon its sacred hills. If any language is clear and explicit, the language of this book is so. If ever it were possible to gather from an ancient document the circumstances under which the greater part of it was written, the origin of this document may be determined.

\* *Der Prophet Jesaja*, in Lange's *Bibelwerk*, 1878, pp. xxiii.—xxv.

## II.

The question, as we have said, would have been perfectly simple, had it presented itself alone. No one would have dreamed that the descriptions of the Captivity were written while the kingdom of Judah had yet a hundred years or more to live. But their connection with the acknowledged discourses of Isaiah has of necessity somewhat altered the case. The continuity of authorship, assumed with only an occasional doubt till the revival of Biblical criticism, grew almost into an article of faith; and a multitude of critical inquiries must be made and answered ere it can be adequately disproved. For example, what are the relations of language between the two groups of discourses? Do the peculiarities of the one reappear in the other? Can we recognise in the second the clear signs of the author of the first? We cannot think so, and we are glad to fortify our own judgment with the corresponding conclusion on the part of Mr. Cheyne. It is true that Mr. Cheyne adds a qualification which must be taken into account—"Not that I suppose this conclusion to carry with it the non-Isaianic origin of the later prophecies. If on general grounds it is probable that Isaiah, in his old age, entered on a new field of prophetic discourse, it will appear natural to suppose that new forms of expression should have met the promptings of his intellect."\* We are inclined, however, to dwell not so much on the repeated occurrence of specific phrases,† or the appearance of new words, as on the different character of style which must be felt rather than analysed. Compare the short, nervous, pregnant utterances of the first part of

\* Vol. II., p. 230.

† Such as *I am Yahveh, and there is none else; I am the first and the last; who declared these things from the beginning; fear not, I am with thee, or I will help thee; break forth into a shout; and others.*

the book with the long, rolling sentences spreading through verse after verse in the opening chapters of the second. Consider the accumulations of descriptive clauses to unfold the wonderful works of Yahveh in a manner wholly new, or the detailed elaboration of ideas elsewhere summed up in an epithet. Put side by side the pleading of Yahveh with his people in ch. i., and the arguments addressed to the nations in chaps. xli., xlii.; or the scornful denunciation of the idolaters in ch. ii., and the lengthy description of the manufacture of idols in ch. xlv. Have we not here two modes of presentment widely different? This is, perhaps, seen with peculiar effect in the use which II. Isaiah (to adopt Mr. Cheyne's notation) makes of I. Isaiah. But on this topic a few preliminary words must be said.

The subject of quotations is a notoriously difficult one. The parallels which may be drawn between books of certain date and books of uncertain date are almost always liable to be read both ways. And even if a strong affinity can be established between particular passages, there is a constantly recurring danger of attaching undue weight to such resemblances. Thus, for instance, Mr. Cheyne sets down Isa. xii. 26 as a quotation from the Song of Moses, Ex. xv. 2; and finds evidence in Is. i. of acquaintance on the part of the author or editor with the book, or a portion of the book, of Deuteronomy.\* These evidences do not seem to us by any means decisive. On the other hand, it

\* We may note, in passing, that, while commenting on the language of the prayer of Hezekiah, xxxvii. 15 (Vol. I. p. 207), Mr. Cheyne remarks *à propos* of its fervent monotheism, that "it seems a natural supposition that the more developed faith of the later writer has here given a colouring to his language." But what was the great literary expression of this developed faith? It was the book of Deuteronomy. And even if Mr. Cheyne limits his parallels to Deut. xxxii., from which most of his instances are taken, and which can of course easily be detached from the main work, we find in it that same emphatic utterance which he characterises as the sign of a later age. Comp. ver. 39 with Is. xlv. 6, 8; xlv. 5, 7, 18, 21.

cannot be doubted that the following passages are very closely related :—

ISAIAH lii. 7a, 1b.

"How beautiful *upon the mountains* are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings that publisheth peace."

"Henceforth there shall *no more* come into thee the uncircumcised and the unclean."

ISAIAH xlvii. 10.

"For thou hast trusted in thy wickedness; thou hast said, None seeth me. Thy wisdom and thy knowledge it hath perverted thee; and thou hast said in thine heart, *I am, and none besides.*"

NAHUM i. 15.

"Behold *upon the mountains* the feet of him that bringeth good tidings that publisheth peace. O Judah, keep thy solemn feasts, perform thy vows; for the wicked shall *no more* pass through thee; he is utterly cast off."

ZEPHANIAH ii. 15.

"This is the rejoicing city that dwelt carelessly, that said in her heart, *I am, and none besides.*"

Which of these is the original, and which the reproduction? In spite of Naegelsbach's emphatic assertion that no lover of truth can possibly doubt that the passage in Nahum is an enfeebled conglomeration of the clauses in Isaiah, we take leave to say that the question must be determined, so far as it can be determined at all, on more general considerations. Let the following circumstances be taken into account. Whatever may have been the influence of the undisputed prophecies of Isaiah upon later generations, of actual and positive quotations we believe that subsequent writers present but a single instance.

ISAIAH xi. 9.

"For the earth shall be full of the knowledge of Yahveh, as the waters cover the sea."

HABAKKUK ii. 14.

"For the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of Yahveh, as the waters cover the sea."

But the prophecies of the Captivity exhibit an unusual number of connections not only with the oracles of Nahum and Zephaniah, but with the writings of Jeremiah and the book of Job. Mr. Cheyne's judgment of the priority of the

wonderful figure of Job to the Servant of Yahveh is clear and unhesitating; and equally decided is his ascription of Job to the period of the Exile. Now, if the prophecies of the Captivity be referred to Isaiah, it will be seen that numerous writers have borrowed from this source, and left his other discourses alone. Of all his utterances, these only so spoke to the heart of his people as to supply his successors with new thoughts. Is it not, on the other hand, more reasonable to argue that the author (or authors) in Babylonia was a man of large literary culture, thoroughly familiar with the works of his forerunners, so that their expressions sometimes blended with his own? This appears to us to become almost a certainty on comparing the new variations which he introduces on the older themes of Isaiah himself.

ISAIAH xxix. 16.

"O your perverseness! Should the potter be accounted as clay, that the work should say of him that made it, He made me not? and the thing formed say of him that formed it, He hath no understanding?"

ISAIAH xlv. 9—11.

"Woe unto him that striveth with him that formed him, a potsherd among potsherds of the ground. Doth the clay say to him that formed it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands? Woe unto him that saith to a father, What begettest thou? or to a woman, What bringest thou forth? Thus saith Yahveh, the Holy One of Israel, and he that formed him, Concerning the things to come will ye question me? Concerning my children and the work of my hands will ye lay commands upon me?"  
(*Cheyne.*)\*

It is difficult to believe that a prophet would thus reproduce himself, with such amplification, and such curious correspondence, in the midst of so much divergence; and a purely literary judgment must, we are convinced, assign the

\* Want of space prevents us from setting forth two pictures of the ideal future, xi. 6—9, and lrv. 17—25, where lrv. 25 brings together a number of features in the earlier passage.

two groups of oracles thus curiously related to different hands.

More delicate still, perhaps, is the question of the unity or variety of authorship within the last twenty-seven chapters. The peculiar recurrence of phrases, the iteration of epithets, the accumulation of predicates, which seem so far from the manner of the earlier prophet, are much less prominent after ch. lii., and there are no doubt passages like lvi. 9—lvii. 10, which betray the imagery of Judea rather than Babylon. For once, however, Mr. Cheyne seems to throw off his usual caution in the remark that “from ch. liii. onwards it is the exception to find a chapter which is not studded with passages by no means easy to reconcile with the unitarian theory.” We cannot see adequate reason for withdrawing liv., lv., lvii. 12—21, lviii., lix., lx.—lxii. from the discourses which precede, with which they are connected by many subtle links; while the concluding chapters, diverse as they are, present some striking affinities of thought, which indicate that they proceed at least from the same general school. With this reserve we gladly accept Mr. Cheyne’s suggestion that “the latter part of II. Isaiah was once [much] shorter, and that the author, or one of the *Soferim*, enlarged it, by the addition of passages from other prophets.”

### III.

But the criticism of the Book of Isaiah cannot concern itself with style alone. It must deal with something more than words: it cannot escape the larger question of the nature and aims of the prophetic teaching. It is to be regretted that Mr. Cheyne, in his anxiety to confine himself to the duties of a commentator, has somewhat ignored this side of the question. The essays in his second volume might well have found a place for the

consideration of the relation of the ideas of the Assyrian and Babylonian eras. It is true that this involves nothing less than the history of the religion of Israel during the two most important centuries of its development; and our author may perhaps plead that this theme belongs rather to the general treatment of Hebrew literature, which we may look for some time at his hands. But it is really essential to the just appreciation of the arguments on behalf of the later origin of the prophecies of the Captivity that their leading motives should be compared with those of the prophet of Hezekiah's reign. Some hints on this topic must be briefly supplied.\*

Isaiah's anticipations of the future centred in the general conception of Yahveh's Day. They were founded on the intense belief that a holy God could only be rightly served by a holy people. But Israel was not holy, and imposed on its Divine Lord, therefore the necessity of chastising it, to bring back some at least to the way of righteousness. The great instrument of discipline, the rod wielded by Yahveh's mighty hand, was the Assyrian power. Time after time, as invasion was seen at a distance, or actually swept through the land, did Isaiah announce that an inner purpose impelled the troops, a higher call had summoned them to execute the mandates of heaven on a corrupt and sinful nation. But the flood of war should be suddenly rolled back. Out of uttermost woe and desolation should grow up a purer society, beneath the guidance of an ideal king sprung from David's house. High on the mountains should a banner be set as a signal for the exiles to return from the far-off land of their dispersion. The people, divided and despised, should rise in union to its ancient power; hereditary enemies should be once more subdued beneath its victorious might, and universal empire should secure universal peace.

\* Students must consult Duhm's admirable work, *Die Theologie der Propheten*.



In the Babylonian exile, however, all was changed. The future no longer rises in glory after the Assyrian overthrow. The Assyrians had been overthrown; Israel was saved; but the people had not been purified, the ideal king did not come, righteousness and sovereignty were not established in the land. It was noted with bitterness by the prophets of the next century that sin was added to sin, till the measure of Yahveh's indignation was full. The house of David, instead of giving birth to the sovereign on whom the sevenfold spirit might rest, sank into ruin; and the remnant of the people from which the Ten Tribes had been already rent, passed into captivity and despair. The exile was the awful price which Israel paid for its guilt. But at last the price was paid; and the time came when its warfare was ended and its iniquity pardoned. Yahveh's Day, therefore, is no more to come as a day of humiliation on its proud and lofty things, Lebanon's cedars, Bashan's oaks, the towers and fortresses and ships of a wealthy and powerful nation.\* It is to be a day of deliverance for the afflicted and suffering, and a day of vengeance on the oppressor.† Jerusalem, which Isaiah had declared Yahveh would leave his heavenly throne to defend, had long lain desolate. It should now be rebuilt, and thither should the captives return with songs of joy; but the new community would need no king to be the organ of the divine purpose for it: the society of the future is no longer conceived under the form of monarchy. Its officers would be peace, and its governors righteousness,‡ for some civil constitution it must have. But this is all subordinated to the profound conception of the relation of the whole people to Yahveh, won out of the deep experiences of its recent history. It had been among the hopes of Isaiah that the coming age would witness an outpouring of the divine spirit from on high, which should work a miraculous

\* Is. ii. 12—17.

† xliv. 8, lxi. 2, lxiii. 4.

‡ lx. 17.

change in the land and its inhabitants, bringing to the soil a marvellous increase of fertility, to the dwellers thereon justice and righteousness, with the fruits of peace, security, and ease.\* It is impossible to ignore the national and local elements of this anticipation, and the external character of the expected grace. From these limitations the prophets of the Captivity are free. No doubt the restoration of the sanctuary is one of their cherished hopes. No doubt the exultation of approaching release beholds the dreary way of the desert which the returning exiles would have to traverse beneath the burning sun, shaded with trees and sweetened with bubbling springs, which should burst forth at Yahveh's word from the barren ground. Not here, however, lies the essence of their religion. It is in the higher spirituality, the peculiar inwardness, which reveal a new stage of advance. It is not only local, it is universal. It is more than the collective attitude of a people to the disposer of its destiny; it is the soul's own consciousness of communion with the infinite and eternal. Yahveh is still, as in the language of the older prophet, the "Holy One," the "Strong One" of Israel. But he is something more. He is the "high and lofty one who dwelleth for ever," whom no house can be built to contain, the place of whose rest is no lower than the immensity beyond heaven and earth, but who dwells also with the contrite and the lowly spirit.† Suffering has done its work: it has produced an individual as well as a national religion.

The sense of the individual character of religion was not indeed wanting to the prophets of the eighth century. It receives its most elevated expression in the declaration of Micah, "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth Yahveh require of thee but to do justice and love mercy and walk humbly with thy God." But the

\* Is. xxxii. 15 sqq.

† lvii. 15, lxvi.

prophecy of this age is far from having definitely worked out the idea of the relation of the soul to God. Religion still remained a national service, the bond of mutual obligation, between Yahveh and his people. While the Deuteronomist gave to it on one side a new significance, by insisting with reiterated earnestness on the need of individual love for Yahveh, he insisted with equal force on the covenant made by Yahveh with the fathers of Israel, on the oath which he had sworn to fulfil, the pledges which he must redeem. In undertaking to reproduce the law though from a higher point of view, the Deuteronomist could do no more. The law was necessarily social rather than spiritual. The Deuteronomist put the law to a large extent on a new basis, that of personal relationship between the Israelite and Yahveh. But it was still only with the Israelites that it dealt; and while religion was being individualised among them, it was only open to them, so to speak, through membership of the nation.

The writings of Jeremiah show that prophecy was slowly rising above these restraints. The circumstances of the time compelled him to loosen the strictness of the national bond, and retreat for the primitive elements of religious consciousness within the heart. He saw that Jerusalem must fall before the Babylonians, that the centre of Yahveh worship, which Isaiah had regarded as inviolable, would be overthrown. Would this be the end of the religion of Yahveh? When the ritual was suspended, when the temple had perished, would this be the ruin of all that the community had been intended to realise and represent? Not so; a new outlook begins to open before the prophet. The catastrophe of his nation and his own sufferings lead him to retire into the sanctuary of his own soul. The older prophets had awaited the judgment on the people collectively. Jeremiah now sees it in perpetual process within each conscience. "I, Yahveh, search the heart; I try the

reins, even to give to each man after his ways, after the fruit of his doings." \* As Yahveh thus discerns and knows the inmost mind, so it is the true glory of the soul to discern and know him. "Thus saith Yahveh, Let not the wise glory in his wisdom, nor the valiant glory in his valour, nor the wealthy glory in his wealth; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he discerneth and knoweth me, that I, Yahveh, do mercy, justice, and righteousness; for in these things do I delight, saith Yahveh." †

This transfer of the seat of religion to the inner heart necessarily led to the rejection of the doctrine of any peculiar sanctity in the temple or the city which it consecrated. Yahveh was not pledged to defend the place where his name was called against an unworthy people; what he had done to Shiloh he would not hesitate to do to Zion. Vain was it for men to cry, "Is not Yahveh in Zion; is not her king in her?" His presence would be a presence of vengeance and punishment, not of protection. ‡ Yet the vengeance would not last for ever; the punishment would cease when it had done its purifying work. As Isaiah had predicted a return of the exiles from the Assyrian captivity, so Jeremiah sees afar off the Babylonian power brought low, and Israel released. The same hand which had watched over them to pluck up and break down, to destroy and afflict, would watch over them to build and to plant. § Once more should the ancient fertility of the land reappear, and Yahveh's good things—corn and wine and oil, the flock and the herd—should refresh the wearied and the suffering. || But there is more than this. The establishment of the restored community will be signalled by a new covenant marking the new order of spiritual relations. It is the sign of the eternal love, of the father's care which yearns over his children. ¶ This covenant will secure for every soul the

\* Jer. xvii. 10, cf. xx. 12.

† Jer. ix. 22, 23.

‡ Jer. viii. 19; vii. 3—15.

§ Jer. xxxi. 28.

|| xxxi. 12—14.

¶ xxxi. 1, 8, 9.

possession of the highest spiritual privileges. Isaiah had declared that the earth should be full of the knowledge of Yahveh as the waters cover the sea; but he had indicated no means for its diffusion, save the resort of the nations to Zion. Jeremiah, however, deals not with collective and general terms, but with the specific experiences of individuals. Not only the people as a people, but each man as man, shall realise the relation which the soul bears to Yahveh. "After those days, saith Yahveh, I will put my teaching in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know Yahveh; for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest of them, saith Yah; for I will forgive their iniquity, and remember their sin no more." \* The social side of this picture of the restoration of Israel includes the re-establishment of the Davidic house, under whose last princes Jeremiah lived. But that which is chiefly prominent in his mind is the great spiritual renewal. And, as though the disasters and corruptions of the present seemed to throw some doubt on the divine faithfulness, it is enforced with the more earnestness by Jeremiah that the future of Israel is assured by the same order as that which keeps "the most ancient heavens fresh and strong." † There is no need of any further display of Yahveh's might. Jeremiah wants no moon bright as the sun, no sun of sevenfold glow, to assure him that the world is already divine. He has withdrawn within the soul, and found there the true scene of God's dealings. If he looks to the outer world, it is not to suggest expectations of marvellous transformation, but to appeal to its settled usages as the perpetual witness of Yahveh's faithfulness. The glory of Yahveh, which was present to the mind of Isaiah with such overpowering awe, is revealed

\* Jer. xxxi. 33, 34. † xxxi. 35 cf. xxxiii. 20.

to Jeremiah rather in the inner relations of the heart. *There* is wonder, mystery enough. What are the multiplied splendours of the heavens, or the magic suppression of all natural hostilities beneath, beside the ever-recurring marvel to the devout and humble spirit that the Lord of righteousness should love him, and make himself known to him in tenderness and peace?

#### IV.

This great change in the essential conceptions of religion could not but have most important consequences. In particular, it imparted immense expansion to the view of the relations of Yahveh, and of Yahveh's people Israel, to the heathen. It had been the favourite hope of older prophets that in the later days all nations should stream towards Zion, to receive there the teaching of the truth. Isaiah had seen the Ethiopians sending gifts to the sanctuary, he had looked for a highway from Assyria and Egypt to the very heart of Israel. But now there was no sanctuary. The service for which Israel was appointed was higher than that of priest and sacrifice. At any place, in any land, Yahveh might give the new spirit; and though he did not cease to be "Israel's Holy One," he was the God of the whole world. Could he, then, remain unknown to the peoples whom he had set thereon in life and thought? Impossible; there must be provision for spreading far and wide the sublime truths of his universal being. Among the figures delineated by the Prophet of the Captivity, is the ideal of the ancient nation, which had seen so many vicissitudes, and sustained so wonderful a discipline at Yahveh's hands.

But thou, O Israel my servant, O Jacob whom I have chosen, the seed of Abraham that loved me, thou whom I have fetched from the ends of the earth, and from its outlying parts

have called, and I said to thee, 'Thou art my servant, I have chosen and not rejected thee ; fear not, for I am with thee.\*

Chosen, fetched, called ? For what purpose, then ? One of the objects, at least, of the divine plan, is that he may be the great missionary to the heathen of Yahveh's truth.

Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen in whom my soul is well pleased. I have put my spirit upon him, religion to the nations shall he carry forth. He shall not cry nor clamour, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street ; a crushed reed he shall not break, and a dimly burning wick he shall not quench. He shall not burn dimly, neither shall his spirit be crushed, till he have set religion in the earth, and on his teaching shall the countries wait.†

Here is a nobler destiny for Israel than the restoration of its former sovereignty. But it is a destiny that involves peril of suffering and danger and death. For it cannot be forgotten that Israel is still captive, and ere it can step forth to convert the world, must first be set free itself. And here the servant-Israel seems to part company from the people-Israel ; for Israel the servant is summoned to take part in the deliverance of Israel the people, to bring out the prisoners and superintend their settlement in their own land.

Hearken, ye countries, unto me, and listen, ye far-off peoples. Yahveh hath called me from the womb, from my mother's lap hath he made mention of my name ; and he made my mouth as a sharp sword, in the shadow of his hand he hid me ; and he made me a polished shaft, in his quiver he covered me ; and he said unto me, Thou art my servant ; (even) Israel with whom I will beautify myself. But I had said, I have laboured in vain, for nought and for a breath have I spent my strength, but surely my right is with Yahveh, and my recompense with my God. And now Yahveh hath said, he who formed me from the womb to be a servant unto him, that I might bring back Jacob unto him, and that Israel may be gathered unto him (for I am honoured in the

\* Is. xli. 8, 9 (Cheyne).

† xlii. 1—4.

eyes of Yahveh, and my God is become my strength)—he hath said, It is too light a thing that thou shouldest be to me a servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel; so I appoint thee the light of the nations, to be my salvation unto the end of the earth.

Thus saith Yahveh, the God of Israel, and his Holy One, unto him who is despised of souls, abhorred of the people, a servant of rulers; kings shall see and rise up, princes, they shall bow down; because of Yahveh, in that he is faithful, and of the Holy One of Israel, in that he chose thee. Thus saith Yahveh, In the season of favour do I answer thee, and in the day of salvation I help thee; and I keep thee and appoint thee for a covenant of the people, to raise up the land, to assign the desolate heritages, saying to the bondsmen, Go forth, and to those who are in darkness, Show yourselves.\*

The personality of the Servant, it would seem from this passage, is inseparably connected with the captive Israel. His first duty is to take part in the restoration of the exiles, of which Cyrus is to be the immediate instrument; his next and infinitely larger is to preach the truth to the whole world. But there is a strange contrast between his condition and his calling. Those who see him now, despise him; tyrants rule over him; nay, in the language of the subsequent description (lii. 13—liii.) he is so disfigured, he has so completely lost the outward aspect of humanity, that his appearance excites a "stupefied surprise," and even his own countrymen hide their faces in disgust. But there is a deep meaning in these sufferings. The sickness with which he had such sad familiarity, the pains that destroyed all outward grace, were in reality not his own. He bore them, but he had not deserved them; they were the awful penalty of a nation's guilt, but he endured them as a sacrifice on its behalf. He suffers unto death, he is buried, but he still lives. He lays down his life as an offering for guilt, but it is nevertheless prolonged, that he may receive a glorious reward. And so the Servant who was cut off out of the land

\* *Is. xlix. 1—9* (Cheyne).



of the living, stricken for the rebellion of his people, emerges from the tomb to "receive a portion among the great, and with the powerful to divide spoil."

Those who approach the picture of the Servant first suffering and then triumphant, along the line of previous passages delineating his character and functions, cannot help carrying to it the conception which they suggest. They find evidence that the various classes of the exiled people could by no means all rise to the height of their great destiny: and they see reason for believing that the faithful had sometimes to endure no little persecution at the hands both of their fellow-Israelites and their heathen conquerors. It is to these faithful few, who were the real representatives of the ideal Israel in the midst of ignominy and violence, that the prophet points, borrowing, perhaps, a trait here and there from the pathetic picture of some earlier sufferer, and gathering up into one sublime figure the woes and the sins, the patience and the trust, of a whole generation.

With this method of interpreting the prophecies by themselves, however, Mr. Cheyne is no longer satisfied. We can only adequately comprehend the Old Testament, he warns us, when we have first accepted a particular theory founded on the New; and the way to the understanding of the Servant in Isaiah lies through the "God-man" of the Gospels. It is not unnatural that those who accept this doctrine, who see all previous history leading up to it, and all subsequent history pointing back to it, should look for anticipations, premonitions, even for explicit announcements, of so stupendous an event as the incarnation of God the Son in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Our author, indeed, does his best to minimise this expectation and bring it within reasonable limits. "Not that the laws of human nature were violated, nor that Christian interpreters are to explain the prophets unphilologically; but that God overruled the actions and words of his servants, so as to cast a

shadow of the coming Christ."\* Mr. Cheyne's loyalty to the first duty of a critic makes him scrupulously anxious to avoid taking the least advantage of his text, or trying to wrest from it a meaning which it will not bear: and he will admit, we presume, that even the passages which he selects either as foreshadowings of special circumstances in the life of Christ, or as distinct pictures of the suffering Messiah, had a significance which rendered them intelligible and appropriate at the time to the persons to whom they were addressed. That this is the case with the prophecies of Immanuel and the birth of the Wonderful Child, Mr. Cheyne has himself shown: their relation to the contemporary events cannot be mistaken. Mr. Cheyne has, indeed, a theory that "the contents of the prophetic revelations of the Messianic period are unconditioned by time." But Isaiah plainly expected the advent of the Hero-King to follow the overthrow of the Assyrian invaders: the Prophet of the Captivity announces the foundation of the New Jerusalem, and the establishment of the ideal community, in immediate sequence on the liberation by Cyrus. So far are these expectations from being unconditioned by time, that the conditions of time are most strictly defined. The fact is, that Mr. Cheyne does not feel free to deal with the prophetic utterances as they stand. He cannot estimate the aims and forces of prophecy by themselves. He is bound, he conceives, to interpret the Old Testament as Jesus himself interpreted it; the God-man cannot have been fundamentally mistaken in the Messianic character of psalms and prophecies. This position betrays a confident assurance concerning the view entertained by Jesus upon these passages, which we cannot share; and it is noteworthy that three out of four of Mr. Cheyne's specific references are to the comments of the evangelists, and not to the words of Jesus himself. The excep-

\* Vol. II., p. 174.

tion is the ascription to Christ (Luke xxii. 37) of a quotation from liii. 12, "And he was numbered with the transgressors." "The prophet merely meant," observes Mr. Cheyne, "that the servant of Yahveh was regarded as a transgressor: but by a providential 'pre-established harmony' the coincidence with facts is even literally exact. Such honour does the Hand which moves the world put upon the spirit of prophecy."\* Are we, then, to understand that the spirit of God deliberately suggested to the prophet's mind two Hebrew words in the middle of a verse to bear a double meaning, of which the second should not be realised for five hundred years? Surely it cannot be permissible to pick out a phrase here and an expression there. Prophecy cannot be made up of fragments. Is inspiration held in suspense, while the inappropriate passages are written, to descend again with some fresh and pregnant utterance? If the fourth clause (of liii. 12) is to be referred to Jesus, then also the first and second, "Therefore will I give him a portion among the great, and with the powerful shall he divide spoil"—which occasion the Christian interpreters no little trouble.

We differ with reluctance from so accomplished a scholar, whose love of truth cannot be questioned, and whose religious confessions are marked by a simplicity which must needs win them respectful sympathy, even when they cannot command assent. But we are strongly persuaded that Mr. Cheyne's present position is really untenable. Its essence lies in his view of the person of Christ. The subjective justification of this view he is of necessity unable to communicate. Its objective justification lies in some vague and indefinite conception of the authority of the Bible. "The editors of the Scripture," he assures us,

\* Vol. II., p. 184. Mr. Cheyne also refers to Mark xv. 28, "And the scripture was fulfilled which saith, And he was numbered with the transgressors" but he does not notice that this verse is omitted by all the best MSS.

"were inspired; there is no maintaining the authority of the Bible without this postulate." \* We do not know what precise ideas Mr. Cheyne attaches to the terms *inspiration* and *authority of the Bible*. But it is in the last degree unsatisfactory to be told that the authority of the Bible—one unknown quantity—rests on the inspiration—another unknown quantity—of a body of men whose character, principles, and methods of literary treatment are so many more unknown quantities. The Bible, we have all heard, is not one book: it is a collection of books; and there is really no middle course between taking it as it stands and believing it all through from cover to cover, and dealing with it as we should with any other collection of ancient literature. Mr. Cheyne has no hesitation in freely criticising the form of the prophetic discourses, and suggesting an omission here and a gloss there. He recognises with equal candour some of the prophetic limitations. He sees in Isaiah's hopes of revenge on the hereditary enemies of Israel the wishes of a "less advanced stage of morality;" he corrects the views of the Prophet of the Captivity about the religious character of Cyrus by the inscriptions which reveal his concessions to idolatrous polytheism. Surely by so doing he indicates unmistakably that he regards the authority of the Bible as depending on something very different from the inspiration of the Soferim. Its vaticinations must be surrendered if they do not accord with history; its ideals must be condemned if they do not harmonise with the highest witness of the conscience. The authority of the Bible really consists in the repeated verification of its teachings by experience. It reposes on the multitudinous testimony of all those to whom in succeeding generations it has spoken for rebuke and comfort, in whom it has quickened aspiration, or nourished peace and trust. The theory of the "God-man Jesus Christ"

\* Vol. II., p. 205.

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we believe to be out of the reach of verification in this manner. It does not lie among the perceptions of the soul, so far as we can discern, to distinguish the persons in the Deity, or to detect the union of two natures in one person. But the value of the prophetic teaching is not, therefore, impaired for us. The forms of their expectations change; the conditions of their realisation pass away; but the mighty truths of the moral government of the world, of the righteousness and love of God, are reiterated to us in myriad ways as the life of humanity advances; and faith, once led into the sanctuary of holiness, recognises them as a possession for ever.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

*THE OBLIGATIONS OF DOCTRINAL  
SUBSCRIPTION:*

A DISCUSSION.—II.

NONE of those who have preceded me in this discussion allude to the judicial decisions in the various ecclesiastical cases. Yet some of these are of primary importance. Any one signing a bond would naturally ask, *not* "What do these words appear to me to mean?" but rather, "What is their legal significance, and is this significance clearly understood by the parties with whom my contract is made?" The opinion of a law-court upon a theological question is of little or no value, but on the interpretation of a contract it is of prime importance.

Thus a low churchman who believes that *only some* of the baptised are "regenerate" might hesitate to "assent" to the Book of Common Prayer, which applies that epithet to them *all*. But he knows that the Gorham judgment has plainly declared his views not to be inconsistent with the ordination contract. He knows that this judgment has been tacitly accepted by the Church and by the nation. He makes no secret of his opinions, and it would be absurd to charge him with dishonesty.

Similarly the high churchman who believes in the objective presence of Christ's actual body and blood in the Sacramental elements, need not trouble himself to reconcile his views with the black rubric or the Article on Transubstantiation: for the Bennett judgment has authoritatively declared such an opinion not to be inconsistent with his contract; and those who deny his right to make an honest

assent are setting themselves up as supreme interpreters, with a more than papal infallibility.

So again, the judgment in the "Essays and Reviews" cases is sufficient justification to a broad churchman for not letting his disbelief (for instance) in the infallibility of Scripture prevent his signing the solemn contract which a candidate for ordination is required to make.

My first proposition, then, is this. Our assent as clergymen is given to the Doctrine of the Church of England, as this Church and Realm have received the same, and not as we (still less as Mr. Crosskey) might interpret it.

But there are many points on which no judicial interpretation of the contract has been given. The position of those who dissent in any direction from the popular theology is in these cases a more delicate one. A candidate for ordination seems to me bound (in such cases) to make his opinions known to the Bishop. No honest man would wish to sign a bond which should be differently understood by the contracting parties. Now, the bishop is the representative both of the State and of the Church. Wisely or unwisely, he is the official appointed to inquire into the opinions of those who seek Holy Orders. He is, therefore, the interpreter, in the first instance, of the *animus impo-*  
*nentis*, and would, I suppose, be liable to prosecution if he betrayed his trust.

There still remains the case of a clergyman whose opinions have changed since his ordination. Such an one is not, in my opinion, under any obligation to secede unless his new views are either such as have been condemned by a judicial decision (*e.g.*, by that in the *Voysey* case), or such that, so far as he can judge, they would prevent a bishop from accepting him as a candidate if he were still a layman. No doubt, a man is a bad judge in a matter where his own interests and position are concerned. But it must be remembered that he is always liable to a prosecution for

heresy; and if he makes no secret of his opinions, and honestly believes that the law-courts would sustain him in his position, and would affirm that he was not violating his ordination contract; it seems to me absurd to charge him in any way with dishonesty.

Let me next say a few words on the other and wholly distinct issue which has been raised in this discussion, viz., whether it is desirable to maintain any (and if so what) system of Subscription? Mr. Sarson and "A" agree that a religion should be based not merely on exalted aspirations, but on something of the nature of a fact. But the latter would limit this basis to the two facts—"Man craves for intercourse with God," "God enters into communion with man." Every theist would, I suppose, recognise these two facts as fundamental. But an overwhelming majority of those who call themselves Christians place a third dogma theoretically almost and practically altogether on a level with these two. I allude, of course, to the doctrine that God has manifested Himself in Christ. If Christ ceased to be an object of worship, the practical religion of most Christians would be revolutionised. Mr. Stopford Brooke at once resigned his position in the Church when he found himself out of harmony with this doctrine, and though there may be a few broad church clergymen who do not believe in the Incarnation, the majority make it the very centre of their theology. If Parliament were to declare this to be an open question in the National Church it would be soon seen whether the "loaves and fishes" of the establishment are really the things which keep the clergy in it.

A defence of Subscription (either in its present or in some other form) will, perhaps, be thought the logical outcome of my argument. But, for reasons which I will now indicate, this is not my own conclusion. No Subscription could keep out a dishonest person who wished to be ordained, and the case of honest candidates seems to me to be best met by (a)



the exercise of the Bishop's discretion ; (b) the answers in the ordination services ; (c) the obligatory use of the Liturgy ; (d) the possibility of a prosecution for heresy.

Believing that the Divine Spirit is leading the Church into all truth, I consider it a matter of regret that a formal assent should be required to certain fixed propositions. If an honest candidate can satisfy the bishop of his fitness ; if he is ready to answer such very general and yet very solemn questions as these (from the Ordination Service) : " Do you think that you are truly called according to . . . *the due order of this realm*" (and in the ordination of priests " according to *the order of this Church of England*" ) " to the ministry of this Church ? " ; if he remains in sufficient harmony with the spirit of the Liturgy to be honestly able to use its services day by day—his intellect or his conscience must be of an eccentric kind if an assent, declared at his ordination, to the doctrine of the Church, would afford any additional security for his orthodoxy. The abolition of the present Subscription would, I suppose, afford some relief to a very few tender consciences. It would remove some of the scandal caused (whether justifiably or not) by the fact that men of divergent views declare their assent to the same Articles of Belief. But it would not, unless accompanied by other and far more sweeping alterations, have any appreciable effect upon the latitude of opinion tolerated in the Established Church.

J. E. SYMES.

LIMITS of space compel me to concentrate my attention on the position of one only of the two very different schools of " Broad Churchmanship " which have been represented in this discussion. Mr. Sarson and Mr. Symes consider that their opinions are really in harmony, in a general way, with the true meaning of the formularies

to which they have assented, and only plead that those formularies ought to be interpreted in such a way as to be self-consistent, and have, in fact, been so interpreted partly by the Civil Courts, and partly by the Bishops, in their examinations of individual candidates. They emphatically repudiate the notion that the Church of England either is, or ought to be, a creedless and colourless body; and Mr. Symes even appears to intimate that he should himself leave the Church if Parliament were to declare the Incarnation an open question. For the sake of clearing the main issue between Supernaturalism and Anti-Supernaturalism, I should have been rather glad than otherwise to be convinced by their arguments that the Church on whose side they would naturally fight had really been wise enough to include them. I cannot say that their arguments have had that effect with me, but I must leave it to others to give them that careful consideration which they certainly require, while I confine myself to the simpler, but also far graver, issue raised by Mr. Haweis and Mr. Voysey.

Mr. Haweis disapproves of a clergyman's resigning his position in the National Church who asserts the incredibility of miracles in general, and of the Gospel accounts of the birth of Christ in particular, and who denies the exclusive authority of Church or Bible, the Divinity of Christ, and the doctrine of the Atonement; while Mr. Voysey takes credit to himself for having, while still a beneficed clergyman, contrived "to preach a religion which could dispense with the intervention of Jesus Christ, without verbal contradiction of a single line in the legal formularies" (No. V., p. 86). We have here an issue of almost startling plainness, and it really does seem important that it should be disposed of finally and completely before proceeding further.

But we are met at the outset by a plea on the part of Mr. Voysey, which I am not quite sure that I rightly

understand. He tells us that "this question is so entirely one for individual consciences to decide, that we have no right to decide it for them;" and that "if a man . . . feels it to be his duty to stay and do his best, no one should dare to impugn his integrity, on the ground of some abstract theory, which is upset by actually existing conditions;" those conditions being the self-contradictory nature of the formularies subscribed, the indulgent construction put upon them by the living representatives of the body which imposes them, and the fact that the alleged obligation is equally disregarded by other parties in the Church. If this merely means, that each man must ultimately decide for himself what is his duty under these or any other conditions, and that it behoves bystanders who are disposed to condemn his conduct to recognise their own fallibility, and give him all reasonable credit for good intentions, this is, of course, very true; but how does it distinguish the case from others in which people in general think it right to contribute their confessedly fallible judgments towards the formation of a collective public opinion? If there be any reason why we should be more reticent about the ethics of Church Conformity and doctrinal subscription than about the ethics of the Stock Exchange, I fail to gather it from Mr. Voysey's remarks. If he means that this particular question of morality is peculiarly doubtful and difficult, more difficult (say) than the question whether the directors of a company are justified in issuing a false balance-sheet in order to tide over a financial crisis, that is a matter which I must leave to the reader.

The real simplicity of the question is somewhat obscured by the terms in which it has been here proposed for discussion. "The obligation of doctrinal subscription" would naturally suggest the notion that the duty of a clergyman to retain or resign his position depends upon the interpretation of the so-called contract which he made with the State

by subscribing the statutory declaration under 28 and 29 Vict., c. 122. In point of fact, this subscription is the very smallest element in the case. Mr. Symes has seen this, though Mr. Voysey apparently has not; and I have the express permission of the Editor to direct attention to the points at which the shoe really pinches. These are (1) the Ordination Service, and (2), principally, the use of the Liturgy.

The Form for the Ordering of Priests is strangely quoted by Mr. Voysey as favouring his contention that a clergyman is justified in preaching a religion without the intervention of Jesus or the authority of Scripture. If your readers will refer to the questions and answers, still more, if they read them in connection with the preceding exhortation, I think they will agree with me that a person could hardly pledge himself in a more solemn and absolute manner to a belief in Christ as the Divine and only Saviour of mankind, and in the Scriptures as the supreme and exclusive authority in matters of faith. It will hardly be contended that these principles are unmeaning or contradicted by other parts of the formularies, nor that the adjurations, "Do you think in your heart?" "Are you determined?" &c., mean only that you will not directly contradict them in a way that a court of law can take cognisance of. The whole tenor of the service refutes the notion that the priest's commission is to teach truth in the abstract as it may appear to himself.

Will it be argued that, however absolute these pledges may have been as to the candidate's then present state of mind, he cannot without absurdity be supposed to have pledged himself never to change his mind; that it would be a cruel mockery to confer on him what purports to be a benefice during life and good behaviour, if it were really liable to be forfeited in consequence of a change which he could neither foresee nor control; consequently, that it

must have been intended that he should retain the emoluments notwithstanding his inability to do what was expected of him, especially as, under the old law, his orders would have been indelible, and would have precluded him from secular employment? I answer; this might be a reason why the law should allow the clergyman who has become a rationalist to retain his benefice, paying a properly qualified curate to do the duty, just as if he had been incapacitated by ill-health; it could not possibly justify his doing, in his official capacity, the very reverse of what he was commissioned to do. Since the law, unfortunately, does not take the indulgent course here suggested, but treats his heresy as a crime, there is nothing more to be said than that it is a hard bargain, which a young man should consider well before entering into.

But even if we were to get rid altogether of the notion of plighted faith, a far deeper obstacle would remain, in the obligatory use of a fixed Liturgy. We have here no mere question of contractual obligation, but of irreverence towards God, and trifling with the best feelings of presumably simple and confiding people—men, women, and children—who have been directed to you for spiritual guidance. Either public worship is the expression of sentiments profoundly felt by those who take part in it, or it is a worse than frivolous waste of time. A minister who invites his congregation to join him, or to use him as their mouth-piece, in addressing to the Almighty language which to him is fundamentally false, is surely doing them a wrong for which nothing that he can say in the pulpit or do out of doors can possibly compensate. If he shows by his sermons that the previous performance was to him a sham, he has done his best to destroy for them whatever comfort there is in genuine worship; it is, of course, still worse if he suits the sermon to the prayers, and plays the hypocrite in both.

I am careful to say "fundamentally false," because I am aware that a Liturgy prescribed by the State cannot possibly be an exact reflection of the sentiments of all who are to use it, and I cannot now examine the questions, whether such fixed Liturgies are necessary in a State Church to protect the laity against the caprices of ministers who are independent of their congregations, and how far, if so, that ought to tell against the principle of Establishment. It is sufficient for the present purpose to point out that all untrue language uttered in devotion must have a more or less demoralising effect, but that an elaborate worship framed throughout to express a theory of God's relations to man which the worshipper entirely rejects, must be worse than no worship at all. Now, to me, at least, it seems abundantly manifest that the intervention of Jesus, under the miraculous circumstances recorded in the Gospels and summarised in the Creeds, is the very thread on which the whole series of services is strung, and that to one who disbelieves these facts the greater part is little better than a senseless mummery. It is implied throughout that to commemorate this stupendous mystery is the main reason for the worshippers coming together, and that it is this, and this alone, which emboldens them to address the Almighty as their Father. The exclusive authority of Scripture, as the source of information concerning matters necessary to be known but inaccessible to the unassisted human intelligence, is also assumed throughout, in a manner equally unmistakable. The Apostles' Creed in the ordinary daily services, the Nicene Creed in the Communion Service, are made as distinctly the central points of the whole, as the show of hands on the principal resolution is the central point of the proceedings at a public meeting.

ROLAND K. WILSON.

AS a layman, and looking at the matter with the plain, straightforward common-sense that is supposed to belong to my class, I fail to appreciate the difficulty which Clerical Subscription appears to be once more causing. To hear persons talk, it might be supposed that the clergy were the only members of the community of whom the thing was required; whereas the simple truth is that Subscription, or its equivalent, is demanded of almost every one at some period or other. The Coronation Oath of the Sovereign, the oath of allegiance which is required of every recruit who enters her army, the marriage vow, the temperance pledge—to mention no other examples—include the greater part of the body politic, from its lowest strata to its culminating point. It is quite true that moral and social duties do not spring from the actual or implied promises which people make; but a universal instinct has taught mankind that a person will be more likely to realise the obligations which rest upon him, if he be called upon to recite them and to declare that he will fulfil them to the best of his ability.

If this be so, why should the clergy, whose responsibilities transcend those of almost any other class, and who are less amenable than any other to an exterior forum—why should they be an exception to the rule? I see but one answer to this question—that of Mr. Crosskey, who says that “Subscription presents the greatest of all obstacles to the existence of a broad, comprehensive Church in this country;” that it “drives many of the ablest from the ministry”; and that “it checks the free study of theology, restricting, as it does, the pursuit of that sum of all sciences by conditions which neither astronomer, nor chemist, nor any other student of nature, would for one moment accept.”

If this be really true, the cause is finished, for it would be impossible to conceive a more unanswerable case than

is here made out for Subscription. It must be remembered that the Church is not a *Phrontistèrion*, or "thinking-shop," nor a *depôt* for the manufacturing or vending of subtleties, nor a scheme of endowed research. It is, and always has been, a divine institution for teaching a definite creed, divinely revealed, and for the pastoral care of the flock of Christ. "O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings and oppositions of science falsely so-called," has always been, and always will be, the charge which the Master gives to the stewards of His mysteries. If, then, Subscription has the effect of keeping the Church of England and her clergy to their work, it is the most admirable invention that could possibly have been devised. And as for the "able men" whom it excludes from the ministry, surely if ever the well-worn saw, "*Non tali auxilio*" applied, it applies to them. We do not want teachers, however gifted, who have themselves to learn the lesson they profess to impart.

But it is said that Subscription is "futile," because while it may keep out honest doubters, it is useless as a defence against dishonest men who are seeking holy orders for an improper purpose. Even then it would be a standing call to the offender to repent, and a standing warning to the community against his teaching. Shakespeare speaks of

One  
Who having to untruth by telling it,  
Made such a sinner of his memory  
To credit his own lie ;

and it is quite conceivable that a man may cherish a craze till he is convinced that it is not merely true, but a truth of surpassing importance. It is only in this way that I can account for the extraordinary notions which Mr. Haweis has lately published on the obligations of the clergy with regard to the Book of Common Prayer. I cannot pretend within the



space at my disposal to touch in the lightest way upon more than one detail ; but his congregation have the volume in their hands to which he has pledged his assent ; they can look at the Apostles' Creed wherein every man, woman, and child declares his belief in the resurrection of the " body "—or " the flesh "—as it is in the Baptismal Office, and the service for the Visitation of the Sick—they will see that the reverend gentleman is bound a dozen times every year to recite the words :—" At Whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies ;" and they know that when he attends a funeral he has to read St. Paul's great exposition in 1 Cor. xv. When, therefore, he tries to make them believe that he is pledged only to admit the immortality of the soul, they will know what to think of him. If Subscription be " a life-long trouble and torment to the most delicately conscientious souls," it is just what was intended ; for the Church never meant her ministers to be comfortable while they were holding the reverse of what they had contracted to teach. As for Mr. Voysey's " contradictory propositions," if they are like the example he gives, namely, " the presence in the Creeds and Articles of both Monotheism and Tritheism," they are too ridiculous to call for refutation. Every time he looks at an object he has a practical demonstration of the fallacy on which he relies ; for each eye has presented to it a perfectly distinct and independent spectrum, and yet he sees not two spectra, but one spectrum ;—" one, not by confusion of the images, but by unity of perception." Thus even in the order of nature, it cannot be said that there is necessarily any contradiction in the statement that a thing is at once one, and more than one.

As regards schools of thought, they may, no doubt, at times appear to break away from their engagements ; but they fare as the mighty salmon which has fallen into the hands of a skilful angler. They may rush hither and

thither in the wildest freedom ; but the hook is in their jaws, and the line of an honest intent holds them fast. Their Subscription may appear for the moment to be powerless, but sooner or later it will bring them to bank ; for there is the patent fact that they made the profession to which they have set their hand, and people will ask them—nay, they will ask themselves—“ Is the gloss which you have put upon it really what the words imply ? ”

But here, I suppose, I shall be met with a *tu quoque*. I may be asked, “ Is it not notorious that your friends, the Oxford Tract-writers, invented the doctrine that the Thirty-nine Articles might be taken in a ‘ non-natural sense ’ ? And is not, then, the very existence of your school a *reductio ad absurdum*, on the largest scale, of the whole system of Subscription ? ”

My reply is a very simple one : What the Tractarians did was not to introduce a non-natural, but to restore the natural, sense of the Articles. In *Tract XC.*, Cardinal Newman made an honest and successful attempt to set forth their true meaning ; but he put it forward only as a possible interpretation, and there is always something that grates upon one’s moral sense, in attempting to place upon an engagement any construction but that which it was originally supposed to have. The truth, however, is, that, without knowing it, the Cardinal had hit upon the very *animus imponentis*.

For just look at the facts. The Articles must be considered virtually to have synchronised with the Liturgy of Queen Elizabeth, and as they are declared to have been framed “ for the avoiding of diversities of opinion, and for the establishment of consent touching true religion,” it is clear that their object must have been to establish peace, not between different schools of the New Learning, but between the New Learning and the Old. It should also be borne in mind that 98 per cent. of the Marian clergy had

accepted the Prayer-Book in 1559, and that in order to bring this about, important changes had been made in the Second Book of King Edward VI., which was the one substantially revived. Thus the deprecation, "From the tyranny of the Bishop of Rome and all his detestable enormities," was omitted from the Litany; the ancient words at the delivery of the Sacrament were restored; and the Ornaments Rubric was enacted, which in effect directed that nothing should be changed in the apparatus of Divine worship, provided always that nothing which would have been illegal when the Prayer-Book of 1549 came into use, should be held to have been authorised by the new Act of Uniformity. To suggest that, while all this was done to conciliate the men of the Old Learning, a set of Articles conceived in the spirit of the Church Association was forced upon the clergy, is ridiculous. Nay, more:—Article XXXVI., which every clerical member of the "Persecution Company, Limited," has signed, declares that the Ordinal of the second year of King Edward VI. contained nothing "superstitious" or "ungodly"; and this is equivalent to saying that all the practices revived by the Ritualists, whatever may be thought of their legality, are in themselves innocent.\*

But I must not attempt to go through the "anti-Roman Articles," or say more than that it is a pure mistake to suppose that there is anything in them at which the Highest Churchman need stumble. What they do is to condemn palpable errors and abuses, which the Council of Trent also did its best to put down, or to substitute new and, as it was believed, more expedient, definitions of old truths.† The

\* For the details see a leaflet, "Neither Superstitious nor Ungodly." (G. J. Palmer.) The same publisher has also issued a small volume entitled, "Words for Peace," to which I must refer my readers for a High Church exposition of the Articles generally.

† The only expression in the Anti-Roman Articles which perplexes me is the statement in Art. XXV. that the "five commonly called sacraments"

Church of England speaks with no stammering lips upon any point of vital doctrine, but it is both her pride and her wisdom to have abstained from unnecessary refinements, where neither the Word of God nor Catholic antiquity has spoken.

What I have advanced respecting the Thirty-nine Articles applies with equal force to the Prayer-Book at large. The notion that it is a compromise in the sense that one party gives up a little of what it believes to be true, and the other admits a little of what it thinks to be false, is quite unfounded. Protestants who know nothing about Primitive Christianity, see that the Prayer-Book is almost all Bible, and fall into ecstasies over "our beautiful and eminently Scriptural Liturgy." On the other hand, Catholics are not less delighted to find that the Church passed through the cataclysm of the sixteenth century without suffering material loss; but these two feelings do not involve any sacrifice of the truth on either side. It is natural that the sudden revival of unfamiliar tenets, ornaments, or practices, should make a prodigious ferment; but the number of once hotly-contested points which have already settled themselves is remarkable, and the impossibility of keeping up the old partition-wall fills the small handful of "irreconcilables" with rage and despair. There is some-

have "grown partly of the corrupt following of the Apostles," for it so happens that the Church of England retains four of them, and has never condemned the fifth. It seems to me that this Article must have suffered in committee like the Act of Parliament which ordered an offence, previously punishable with a money fine, to be visited with a whipping, but which neglected to remove the direction that half the penalty should go to the Queen, and half to the informer. To make sense of it, we must understand the statement to refer only to what is peculiarly Romish, and in that case I should have no hesitation in saying that Confirmation had been corrupted by Rome in her substitution of a slap on the face for the laying on of hands; Penance by her system of Indulgences; Orders by her invention of Papal Supremacy; Matrimony by the introduction of frivolous impediments to marriage whereby the rich might get the *vinculum* dissolved under the false pretence that lawful wedlock had never existed; Unction of the sick by converting it into the unction of the dying.

thing wonderful in the promptness with which the Public Worship Regulation Act has been followed by the recent debates in Convocation, by the *articulus cleri* of the Lower House, and by the resolution of the Bishops. In fact, we are infinitely nearer a realisation of the theory which the Reformers of 1559 proposed to themselves, than Archbishop Parker could ever have supposed possible. But if we had not had a Liturgy, and if Subscription to it had not been rigidly enforced, would there ever have been that substantial unity which already exists amongst Churchmen, and the prospect there is of a yet more assured peace?

A HIGH CHURCH JOURNALIST.

INTERVENING, as I do, at a somewhat late stage of this discussion, I should like to state clearly the particular part of the subject on which I shall try to throw some additional light. In the paper that opened the debate two questions were raised [which, I think, should be kept quite distinct; (1) whether it is desirable that Subscription to articles of faith should be imposed on the ministers of the Church of England, or of any other religious body; and (2) what is the precise nature of the obligations that such Subscription involves? It does not seem to me that the former of these points is one on which persons who diverge widely in theology can hope to come to an agreement, until they have first reconciled their theological differences. That Subscription is in many individual cases both a source of painful and perplexing struggles, and a snare to weak consciences, few reasonable persons will deny; but the question whether these evils are not more than counter-balanced by gain in other ways is one which we can hardly help answering differently according to the view we take of the importance of the traditional dogmas of Christian theology to religion and morality. When, however, we pass to

consider what, assuming Subscription and recital of creeds to continue, is the precise duty of an individual subscribing or reciting, we are dealing with a far simpler and narrower issue, which seems to admit of being determined by the application of principles generally accepted by conscientious persons, whether within or without the pale of our existing Churches.

It may, indeed, be said that there are as many and various schools of ethics as there are of theology ; and that the duties of veracity and good faith are inculcated with very different degrees of stringency by different moralists. And this is doubtless true ; it has been held, for example, by writers of repute (other than Jesuits) that these rules ought, under certain circumstances, to give way to maxims of superior obligation ; that, for instance, falsehoods may be told to criminals, or to enemies, or in defence of secrets, and that promises made to robbers may be broken ; and even—what has, perhaps, a closer analogy to the case under discussion—that at a crisis of national existence an oath of allegiance may be taken with the conscious intention of violating it when a fitting opportunity occurs. But moralists of all schools will, I think, agree that an unvarnished declaration, solemnly made, as a means of obtaining or keeping a post of trust and responsibility in any society, is a procedure, morally speaking, of a revolutionary character,—which can only be justified, if it can be justified at all, by showing very important results of general advantage to be obtained in this and in no other way. And in a state of society like our own, in which there are so many other means of influencing human opinion on the most important subjects besides those afforded by the pulpits of the Church of England, if the question is fairly faced, whether the danger of excluding a certain number of thoughtful persons from these pulpits constitutes an emergency so grave as to justify an admitted violation of

the rules of veracity and good faith, few, I think, will be found to reply in the affirmative. Indeed, I do not perceive that such an answer is ever expressly given by Mr. Haweis, Mr. Voysey, or any other thoroughgoing defender of what has been called the "Loose Church." In what they say there is often the suggestion of such an answer; but the suggestion is generally blended with an endeavour to show that the ordinary rules of veracity and good faith, as applied under the peculiar circumstances of Subscription to articles and recital of formularies, necessarily become so lax as hardly to hamper the freest theological thought. That there are certain peculiarities in the application of these rules under the circumstances in question is undeniable; and I think that if we can make clear what these are, and what is the reasonable method of dealing with them according to the received principles of morality, though we shall not (in my opinion) have completely solved the ethical problem presented, we shall certainly have gone a long way towards solving it.

The peculiarities of the case are tolerably obvious. Generally speaking, in the use of language either for affirmations or for promises, a man is free to choose his own words; he can vary them or add to them as much as he pleases, until they seem to him to express with sufficient exactness what he believes, or intends to undertake. In some cases, no doubt, he has to adapt his thoughts to words selected by others; as when a set question is put to him to be answered, or a set promise to be taken. But, even so, if he finds any ambiguity in the words proposed to him, he has, generally speaking, no difficulty in getting it removed by an interpretation of the person who addresses him. Now in the case that we are considering, individual choice of words is, of course, absent; and at first it does not seem easy to obtain an interpretation of phrases whose meaning we find ambiguous. The statements made are

addressed to society at large; but how are we to know how society understands them, as many members of it have obviously never thought about the matter, while many others give evidence of holding very diverse opinions about it?

Here, however, I quite agree with Mr. Symes that the difficulty is removed by judicial decisions, so far as these go. The Subscription, and the recital of creeds, being imposed by the law of England must be taken as addressed to the people of England as politically organised and acting through their Government; and of the intentions of Government in all its legislative acts the courts of law are the recognised interpreters. There seems to me, therefore, no doubt that, as is often said, "the legal obligation of Subscription is the measure of the moral one."

In applying this maxim, however, there is danger of a confusion of thought, to which I wish especially to direct attention, because many writers appear to me to fall into it. It is only incidentally, and often only by implication, that an ecclesiastical judgment answers the general question, "What doctrine a subscriber to the articles is bound to hold": what it primarily decides is "whether A B can be proved to have violated his obligation." It must be evident that the two questions are quite distinct; that the answers to them are determined by quite different methods of reasoning; and that it is the answer to the former and not to the latter question which is reasonably held to supply a measure for the *moral* obligation of Subscription. The ecclesiastical courts have given no support to the view that a man who solemnly declares his "assent" to articles or his "belief" in creeds should be taken to mean no more than that he *consents* to have his teaching tried by the standard of these articles: in fact, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has by implication denied this paradoxical position, in laying down that the words of any test imposed are to be



understood in their "literal and grammatical sense,"\* since there is no doubt that, according to the ordinary usage of language, the phrase, "I assent," applied to an aggregate of propositions, imports a mental acceptance of these propositions; no less than the words, "I believe in Jesus Christ, who was born of the Virgin Mary," import a mental conviction as to a certain historical matter of fact. This being so, to maintain that the *moral* obligation of a man who has declared his "assent" to or his "belief" in statements of doctrine† is merely to avoid furnishing adequate evidence that he has advisedly contravened them, is exactly as absurd as it would be to maintain that a man must be innocent of a murder, if it cannot be shown to the satisfaction of a jury that he has committed it, especially since the evidence of his contravention is properly estimated according to the lenient principles of the administration of criminal law, so that the person accused gets the full advantage of any vagueness or uncertainty in his expressions.

Hence, though I quite agree with Mr. Symes that the decisions of the Privy Council, especially in the case of Dr. Williams and Mr. Wilson, have had the effect of relaxing the *moral* obligation of Subscription—since the most scrupulous man need not now have any fear that in assenting to the articles and creeds he will be understood to pledge himself to a belief in verbal inspiration or everlasting punishment—I yet think that the relaxation, when fairly estimated, is much less than what loose Churchmen have often loosely inferred from the failure of the prosecution of the two clergymen.

\* Cf., Judgment in the case "Gorham v. The Bishop of Exeter."

† I ought to say that it seems to me a doubtful point whether assent to *articles* morally obliges to more than *present* belief. The point, however, is not of much practical importance as regards all of such doctrines as are contained in the creeds, in which persons performing clerical functions are obliged continually to *reassert* their belief.

Finally, so far as doubts may remain with regard to points that the ecclesiastical judgments have not particularly dealt with, the best way of healing them is for each individual to apply to the best of his ability the general principles laid down in these judgments for interpreting the legal obligation of Subscription. The statement of these principles (see especially the case of *Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter*) is too long to quote; but, apart from their judicial authority, they seem to me intrinsically such as would be adopted by a fair-minded man who was considering without bias the question of moral obligation. If any candidate for orders found a difficulty in applying them, it would doubtless be wise for him to consult his bishop, as has been more than once suggested in the course of this discussion. But when Mr. Sarson commends this course on the ground of the superiority of a "living man" to "written formularies," his language is dangerously liable to suggest that the "living man" has some authority to dispense from the moral obligation which the formularies, interpreted according to the ordinary rules for interpreting legal documents, would impose. Now the law gives a bishop no such dispensing power; and therefore if any bishop has exercised it, this can only have been by a usurpation manifestly illegitimate and, in my opinion, demoralising. All the bishop can lawfully do is to assist the candidate to a faithful—though not over-scrupulous—interpretation of the articles and creeds,\* taken in their "literal and grammatical" sense.

HENRY SIDGWICK.

\* Throughout this paper I have used the phrase "articles and creeds" instead of articles and liturgy, because I conceive that—at any rate, since the judgment in the case of *Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter*—the rules of interpretation of devotional expressions must be understood to differ considerably from, and generally to be less stringent than, the rules for interpreting formal statements of belief.

THE writers who have preceded me have confined their attention to the Subscribing Churches, but the problem emerges in still more subtle and interesting form in connection with the Non-Subscribing Churches. All of these feel the difficulty more or less, but it is in my own denomination—the Independent—that its pressure is becoming most severe. The tendency of the officials, and of the able and popular men who represent the body most conspicuously, is to minimise any variety of opinion which threatens to destroy that organisation which is fast becoming their religious ideal. Nevertheless, few outside that circle can avoid seeing that we are on the verge of what may be a very serious conflict between the free and spiritual genius of Independency, and a doctrinal orthodoxy which produces and supports for its purpose an organisation foreign to that genius. The question of the relation of Independency as a spiritual principle to a doctrinal basis of union has never yet been fairly raised or faced. When the great triumphs of Independency were gained, the doctrinal basis was universally accepted, and the variety of opinion amongst those who held it was of a type that now seems very mild. But the idea (for it is in the true and explosive sense an idea) of Independency is now, in the general disintegration of theological belief, beginning to emerge naked and radiant from the foam of subsiding systems. And to many the vision is a terror. Like the Protestantism whose true voice it is, it is beginning to be felt charged with a promise and a potency of life undreamt of by its founders and eulogists. The Independency and the orthodoxy which used to be synonyms are slowly settling into alternatives, and some have already made their choice. By the organised portion of the body—i.e., by the majority—Independency has been surrendered in favour of an imperfect presbytery, and there

seems little doubt that this is welcomed, if it is not originated, in the interest of theological orthodoxy. "Protestantism dreads its own logic."

The present writer is a believer in theology and in the necessity for a theological system as the sustenance of religious thought, and, in the long-run, life. If we discard a divine synthesis, we shall but sink to the other sea of Mr. Harrison's human synthesis. If we cannot co-ordinate humanity with God, we shall co-ordinate Humanity into a God. So, in my own view, for a Church to dispense with a theology is both suicidal and absurd. But that is not the question. The question is, What position in a Church is the theological system to hold? Is it to be a bond of comprehension or is it to be the outcome, flower, and scientific fruit of a community permeated with the Christian consciousness? Is it to be the germ or one of the blossoms of the mind of Christ?

Now Independency has held, and still mostly holds, that doctrinal unity or correctness of system, in a more or less modified sense, is the condition of comprehension. The theology of Independency is not its product simply, but of its essence. It is a test, not a culture. But the Independent spirit has asserted itself thus far, that it shall be left to each one to discover for himself what the theology is which while in the denomination he can honourably hold. So that we have this state of things. The comprehension of the body is defined by a doctrinal bond which, however, is undefined. It is left for adjustment to what is known as the "tacit understanding." The difference between the Subscribing and the Non-Subscribing Churches, therefore, appears to be that, while both insist on a doctrinal rather than a sympathetic bond, the former define it more or less clearly, the latter, with a curious bourgeois mixture of shrewdness and timidity, refuse any definition to which they can be pinned, and leave the taciturnity of their

understanding to be interpreted according to the associations or prepossessions of this or that local gathering or set.

Strange as it may seem, the Congregational Union has of late years devolved its powers in a way that must act most injuriously on the freedom it is understood highly to prize. It has placed its comprehension entirely in the hands of the local associations. But it has not supplied these smaller bodies with any theological instructions to guide so great a power, or to protect applicants on the side of freedom in time of panic and prejudice. It has even, through fear of presbytery, disclaimed the function of a court of appeal, so that *the smaller bodies are totally irresponsible for the use of this power*, except to public opinion. And as much of the business is conducted by private committees, public opinion has no access, and officialism is secure. Some things, no doubt, are better discussed in private ; but cases of comprehension are certainly not. The committee may be small in numbers, or local in mind and prejudice. The proportion may be large of the lay element, whose judgment in such cases is as secondary in value as for mischief it may be primary. And generally it may be said that a local majority is one of the worst depositaries for religious freedom that could be devised. Whereas, except in the interest of religious freedom, Independency has no separate call or special facility for existing.

Such a state of things is in unstable equilibrium. The movement is a half-measure which it is as necessary as it is dangerous either to reverse or develop. It is due to able and honourable men who, however, as reorganisers of a Church have fatal defects. They have never claimed religious genius or philosophic breadth, or any profound acquaintance with constitutional history, with the theology of the past or with the thought of the present. I believe in Independency, but I do not see how it can live in these conditions. If there is a doctrinal basis,

it ought to be, it must be, distinctly formulated, and not merely declared, but authoritatively adopted. A doctrinal basis which is incapable of statement is a contradiction. It is its spiritual halo that cannot be defined, the actinism of the dogmatic spectrum. To refuse to define it for the sake of a reputation for freedom is not quite fair, either to the world or to its own adherents, especially the young, to whom is denied the first condition of honesty. A doctrinal basis implies, unless wholly mystical, a creed, and a creed implies Subscription. Adoption which is not authoritative and binding is futile. It is "playing at Church." We must, therefore, pass from a creed to an organisation, which shall see that the creed, as its palladium, is held. If the Church is built on a system, it must, by the inexorable dialectic of history, issue in a system. Institutions are but thought visualised. Their wreck is but their internal self-contradictions made audible. If political history be a vision of moral judgment, constitutional history is a process of logical exposure. An organised theology, where it is the staple, means an organised Church. If theology, therefore, is the bond, Independency is impossible. And the mistake we are making is to suppose that it is possible. And we let ourselves be blinded by the gleam of freedom in the words "tacit understanding" till we lose sight of the thing in its hollowness, weakness, and readiness for abuse.

I say little here about the claim to spiritual freedom made by a body whose oldest pulpits, including nearly all that are over forty or fifty years, are hampered by trust deeds with ponderous doctrinal schedules. But the late Huddersfield case has made one thing terribly clear. *There is not a single occupant of a pulpit swathed in such documents, whether he has signed them or not, who, if he depart from the least of their commandments, does not owe his position to immoral connivance and breach of faith on the*

*part of his trustees*—men whom it is his duty week by week to rouse to a moral state that would shoot him from his place. He is like a man sitting and hammering on a lump of dynamite which he takes to be a fragment of stony heart.

But this matter has been elsewhere sufficiently discussed. I return to the unwritten formulary. This, it is said, guarantees doctrinal unity, not spiritual or merely Christian unity, but substantial theological unity, coupled with true Christian freedom. I have already said that a doctrinal basis of communion, and such an understanding, are in the logic of the thing incompatible. An organisation based on distinct articles or doctrines ought to schedule them and exact them. But, in actual fact, it may, in the first place, be doubted, whether this tacit understanding really exists and is not deceiving itself and others. Space alone forbids my entering on facts that would give grave ground for such a doubt.\* Conceding, however, that it does really exist, it is still more doubtful if it does virtually, owing to the difficulty of discovering what it is with such exactness as becomes imperative when it is employed justly to define comprehension. For this purpose the *Year Book Declaration* is, by its own words, put out of court. So that if such understanding exist in the integrity ascribed to it, it seems much in the position of the Agnostic's Deity, which is said to be the surest of realities, but the most inaccessible of mysteries. Pursuing the defects of such a system, it is, farther, easy to see what a powerful instrument of tyranny and obscurantism is by it placed in the hands of officials and of the local presbyteries above referred to. They have, for their own area, a monopoly of interpreting the terms of this vague entity, and are, within their local limits, and for purposes of comprehension, the sole and irresponsible "hier-

\* Two of the best-known men in the body are asserting at this moment, one that we are, the other that we are not, essentially Calvinists.

phants of its unapprehended inspiration." This power is often wisely and liberally used; but there is no standing guarantee that in any particular case it will be. In a season of theological change and passion it probably would not be. And this opens still another defect in the system. A tacit understanding on a subject so intricate and yet so exciting as theology is safely workable, if at all, only in a body which, throughout its entire membership, has the flexibility and the sympathies bred by a severe education and a high culture *in the subject*. It is only thus that it works in the Commons or the Cabinet. It will be a failure if worked by men who not only do not allow, but who do not know, much less feel, the force of the best that can be said against their own position. Without going into the condition of education among Congregationalists, it may safely be said that there is no religious body in the world which is in the desiderated position. If an approximation were selected, it would not be Congregationalism. We are still the victims of our past exclusion from the great Universities and of our present cram for the secular degrees of Burlington House and the worldly degrees of the City and the Senate. We are too little cultured in theology, and in too deadly personal earnest about it, to be able safely to commit its power to the hidden, cross, and uncontrollable currents of a tacit understanding. It is not our grand science, but our personal salvation. A discussion on the subject is too like what a budget night would be in Parliament if proposals were introduced which were believed to threaten the personal fortune of half the members.

The state of things represented by the "tacit understanding" can hardly go on. The tendencies of thought are not towards greater unity but greater variety, and this understanding must grow more and more hollow unless defined into something else. Efforts will be made by "declarations" and the like to be orthodox and yet indefinite, to run with the hare of freedom and hunt with the



hounds of propriety. Organisation will draw a tighter cordon round itself for protection. There will be more organisation, if only to divert the local conscience: that means more definition of doctrine as a basis for one party and a refuge for both. Ecclesiastical and theological organisation always have gone, and must go, hand in hand, wherever the articles of association are theological. In either case, Independency goes to the wall. It develops or degenerates into Presbytery, and there is the old call for an exodus and new swarm from the hive of 1662.

What, then, has the future for us? It may be asked, if a Congregational Union is proposed, to include every congregation, of any creed, that claimed the name. No one in his senses would make such a proposal. It may strike many that a union is not an absolute necessity for the kingdom of God, as it strikes others that a powerful Church is not quite indispensable. It may be true that a Church, in the usual sense of the word, cannot exist without a doctrinal bond, which must really bind by being really defined and enforced. I believe that is true. But it may not be quite necessary for the purposes of God that such organisms should exist, or, at any rate, that they should absorb all Christians. Many will meet in congregations round a centre of work, or round some personal centre, who breaks to their longing souls the bread of life; and outside the creaking organisation of Congregationalism will spring slowly the tap-roots of a newer and truer Independency, which will seek not organisation, but simple fraternity as in the days of old.

But there may also be a great field and future for something else than this. There is reason to believe that if the present Congregational Union were delivered from the "tacit understanding" and its inseparable abuses, if it had the courage to take a more frank and decided position, if

it could be brought to adopt a brief creed, Subscription to which should protect men from private committees, unlearned officials, and passing prejudice ; not only are there many who would welcome the benefits of association when joined with such a measure of freedom, but such a body might be of enormous service for a time to the religion of the country. Some of the older men would welcome it as a bulwark against what they take to be the Universal Abolitionism of the juniors. And the juniors would find it a covert from the tempest of suspicion and the violence of contempt which they sometimes experience from the senior quarters. An abbreviated form of the Apostles' Creed might serve the purpose. It would contain the historical facts. The great speculative facts would mostly take care of themselves. The first clause, of course, would stand, and the retention of the words " only Son " to describe Christ might be trusted to repel pronounced Unitarians. All else of a purely theological nature might be left to the free action of the mind and the spirit on what the Church at large already possesses. Such a creed would be understood to deny nothing outside its direct words. It would not profess to include all precious Christian truth. It would be understood simply as a *modus vivendi*, a symbol of unity, not a confession of faith. It would exist only for the sake of the outward association for work. No formal creed seems called for now as a condition of personal salvation. It should, therefore, while truthful, be as brief as consists with its end. Indeed, by many Mr. Baldwin Brown's model Trust-Deed would be thought sufficient. Say, " this association exists for setting forth the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," let these words alone determine status, and then leave speculation and Bible criticism free so long as they were subscribed. Any such creed would, of course, provide for its own periodic revision. This would not be pure Independency, but the only step towards it that suited the time.

It would provide a habitation to receive many when the forces at present working to the surface in Independency have visibly, and perhaps volcanically, emerged, and it might have a long and far from fruitless career. At any rate, it would be preferable to the taciturnity of an understanding which is so hard to understand, to a bond which is itself unbound, whose vagueness cloaks bewilderment as well as agreement, and whose contents are in danger of becoming like the sound of a sacred name that once made a people great, but whose true pronunciation has by disuse become lost.

P. T. FORSYTH.

### *REJOINDER.*

**I**T has been justly pointed out by Sir R. Wilson that Subscription to the statutory declaration of assent to Articles of Faith required from a clergyman as a condition under which alone he can hold office, constitutes neither the whole problem under discussion nor its greatest element. The fetters upon a clergyman's limbs are far heavier than those imposed by the performance of this one act, serious and solemn as I contend that that is. An ordination service has to be submitted to, and in this service a profession must be made of unfeigned belief in "all the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament." The Church does not accept a doctrinal declaration from her ministers simply upon their entrance into her service, giving them permission to be silent during all coming days.

Whenever the Almighty is worshipped in public, a creed must be repeated, and the minister must declare that he personally believes ("I believe") that Jesus Christ was born of a virgin, and descended into hell. Whenever the Holy Communion is celebrated, a profession of personal belief (for again the words are "I believe") must be made, involving opinions regarding "the substance" of Christ and the procession of the Holy Ghost.

The broad question, as brought out in this discussion, therefore, is, What obligations are incurred in making such doctrinal statements as are demanded by the Established Church upon entrance into its ministry, and in the conduct of its various offices?

Except for one or two phrases used by Mr. Sarson, I should not have thought it necessary to repeat what I stated in opening this discussion, that no charge of personal insincerity is made or insinuated against those who interpret the obligations of Subscription in this broad sense far more laxly than others deem justifiable.

Mr. Sarson scarcely describes my arguments correctly when he speaks of them as "directed against the immorality of clergymen who assent to articles which they believe to be untrue." No blinding mist of imputations upon personal character ought to be flung over the question at issue.

Many devout and honourable men claim freedom of opinion on points which appear to others to *be decided for them* by the Articles to which they have subscribed, and the creeds which they are compelled constantly to repeat. Every one must, of course, determine for himself what his duty is; but the facts and principles, of which account must be taken in the formation of a judgment, are surely subjects for fair and frank discussion.

Save on the general principle that a Church ought not to impose a creed at all, as a condition of membership, I have no controversy with those who subscribe the Articles and use the Prayer-Book, avowedly accepting the doctrines contained "in their literal and grammatical sense" within the limits of judicial decisions as to their precise meaning. I do not believe, as Mr. Symes implies, that any individual can override the law with his own private interpretation of the doctrine of the Church. It is precisely *against* this position that I am contending.

Mr. Sidgwick's argument upon the amount of relaxation given by the decisions of the Privy Council appears to me unanswerable.

In no sense whatever, I may add, has it been legally decided that the Articles may be questioned or denied, or shorn of one iota of their strict meaning. On the contrary, the

duty of every candidate for orders carefully and thoroughly to examine whether he can honestly and honourably accept the Thirty-nine Articles as the Articles of his own personal faith, is emphasized and not lessened by the Judgments of the Privy Council. He is proposing to join a Church in which the highest Court has declared that it can exercise no dispensing power in doctrine, and that the Articles to be subscribed and the formularies to be used must be taken "in their literal and grammatical sense." In the judgment in the case of "*Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter*," the following passage occurs :—

In all cases in which the Articles, considered as a test, admit of different interpretations, it must be held that any sense of which the words fairly admit may be allowed if that sense be not contradictory to something which the Church has elsewhere allowed or required, and in such case it seems perfectly right to conclude that those who impose the test command no more than the form of the words employed *in their literal and grammatical sense* conveys and implies, and that those who agree to them are entitled to such latitude or diversity of interpretation as the same form admits.

This is the *legal* measure of the freedom of thought enjoyed in the Church of England.

In the case of the "*Essays and Reviews*," the Court stated that it had "no jurisdiction or authority to settle matters of faith."

Its duty only extends to the consideration of that which is by law established to be the doctrine of the Church of England, upon the true and legal construction of her Articles and Formularies.

On a hundred propositions contained in the Thirty-nine Articles the Privy Council has given no decision, and with the individual who assents to them the sole responsibility of *decision upon their meaning* must lie. Even in the case of the "*Essays and Reviews*," the Court stated that only

"meagre and disjointed extracts" were before them, and that, on the whole Essays, they pronounced no opinion.

This being the state of the law, I submit that no one ought to enter the service of the English Church without being convinced of the truth of every single proposition contained in its Articles and Formularies.

It is replied by some that these Articles and Formularies are hopelessly contradictory, and that it is impossible for any one to make his teaching harmonise with the whole doctrine of the Church.

It may be so; but the demand of a Church for an intellectual impossibility can be no reason for granting its claim. No man is compelled to become a minister of the Church of England. It is no defence for obtaining an office, by solemnly expressing assent to a series of contradictory propositions, to say that there was no other way by which it could be secured. In the administration of the world's affairs a higher price is asked for many an office than many men will consent to pay.

Mr. Sarson claims a broader freedom than the principle I have stated will allow, on the ground that the Church does not say "go to an office and subscribe that document;" but "go to your bishop and make your assent intelligible to him;" and he admits that, "if we had no administrative institution of living men and representatives of the living Church," my objection to Subscription would be unanswerable.

I submit that there is no administrative institution in existence, within the Church, of the kind necessary to give validity to Mr. Sarson's argument, and that, consequently, his whole case falls to the ground. No officer of the Church has any authority to alter its creed. A bishop is bound to respect the doctrine and discipline of the Church as by law established. He cannot assume functions beyond

those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council itself. His decisions cannot overrule Acts of Parliament. He is the servant of the law, not its master. The plea that a bishop had admitted a clergyman whose opinions he knew to be more or less heretical, could not for a moment protect him from a prosecution for heresy. As Mr. Sidgwick has already pointed out, a bishop can do no more than assist the candidate in interpreting the Articles—the Articles themselves remain the absolute test by which his right to be a minister of the Church of England can alone be judged.

Mr. Sarson further contends that the assent asked for the Articles is not of the *kind* implied in the recital of a creed, and appeals to the Articles themselves for evidence, that they may be regarded as “directions and guiding lines.” I confess myself quite unable to follow his argument. In Art. VIII., to which he refers, it is stated that “The Three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasius’s Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles’ Creed, *ought thoroughly to be received and believed.*” And the reason given for this is, that “they may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture.”

There is nothing vague or general in these dogmas; as “directions and guiding lines” they are singularly clear and positive; they do not sanction any deviations on the right hand or the left.

Because in one Article certain homilies are commended, and ordered to be read, it in no way follows that all the other Articles are merely “lines of thought.”

The Articles cannot, of course, be treated as intended to determine every question that the ingenuity of man can torture out of them; but they do contain a distinct set of theological decisions, drawn up for the express purpose of putting an end to differences of opinion on matters of reli-



gion, within the range of their plain and full meaning. In the case of "*Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter*," the following principle is laid down :—

The Church having resolved to frame articles of faith as a *means of avoiding diversities of opinion, and establishing consent touching true religion*, must be presumed to have desired to accomplish this object as far as it could; and *to have decided* such of the questions then under discussion, as it was thought proper, prudent, and practical to decide, but it could not have intended to attempt the determination of all the questions which had arisen, or might arise.

In the Articles, therefore, the Church must be held to have laid down a number of definite dogmatic propositions as essential to its unity; and assent to them cannot be regarded as being *different in kind* on the part of those who make it, from their assertion of belief in the great facts on which their religion is based. The Articles have a larger meaning than Mr. Sarson ascribes to them when he terms them "*statements for our guidance*"; they are, as the quotation I have just given proves, *statements of doctrines to be believed*.

It is as necessary that a candidate for ordination should assent to the Articles, before he can become a minister of the Church of England, as it is that he should believe in the existence of a God; and I, therefore, conclude that no such assent should be given without personal persuasion of their vital truth. I am not, of course, speaking of Mr. Sarson's own position; he finds Subscription no bondage; but I am criticising his attempt to establish a distinction between the *kind of assent* required for the Articles and the assertion of great religious principles. Considering the nature of the Articles themselves, their legal authority, their origin, and the sacredness of the office to which they are the passport, I contend that no one ought to subscribe to them unless he can accept them as great religious prin-

ciples alike with the strength of his mind and the devotion of his heart, and is, at the same time, perfectly convinced that no point of his teaching will be opposed to the natural meaning of their words.

Another and a far bolder claim for liberty within a creed-bound church has been advanced.

To seek protection in the verdicts of "not proven," given in the two or three cases in which heretics alike on the ritualistic and the free-thinking side have been brought to trial; to depend upon the good will of a bishop; to rely upon a subtle distinction between the assent required for the Articles and the expression of heart-felt devotion, are small and insignificant matters compared with the assertion that the solemn declaration of *assent* to the Thirty-nine Articles and belief in the doctrine of the Church as agreeable to the Word of God *binds us to believe neither the articles nor the doctrine*.\*

To establish this proposition, Mr. Haweis separates the clause, "I *assent* to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion and to the Book of Common Prayer," from the clause, "I *believe* the doctrine of the United Church of England and Ireland, as therein set forth, to be agreeable to the Word of God."

The two clauses, however, refer precisely to the same points of doctrine. When it is said that to "assent" to the Thirty-nine Articles and to the Book of Common Prayer is not to believe in them, there is a suppression of the fact that it is expressly provided by the following clause that the *doctrine* "therein set forth" *must be personally believed*. Mr. Haweis's cause is not served by the plea that "doctrine" is not equivalent to "doctrines"; since his contention is that no strict belief at all is involved. He defends his case by an illustration.

\* *Vide* "Freedom of Thought in the Church of England." By Rev. H. R. Haweis. *Contemporary Review*, February, 1881.

I have a Child's Bible, full of pictures, where Peter, James, and John appear in blue, red, and yellow. One is tall, another stout, another thin. I do not believe in the colours, and I do not believe in the portraits, but I agree to it all as a good method of teaching, and assent without a qualm.

" This is not, I think, the kind of assent legally involved in the act of Subscription. The Articles and Prayer-Book are submitted for acceptance *not* as containing "a good method of teaching," but as "agreeable to the Word of God." They form a code avowedly made for "avoiding diversities of opinion," and the doctrine of the Church is held by the Courts to be directly dependent upon their "true and legal construction."

Should the governing body of the Royal Academy decide that no artist should be admitted as an Associate who did not accept the pictures in Mr. Haweis's Child's Bible as *containing the truth in art* so far as understood by that academy, the cases would be more closely parallel. An artistic test on the lines of Mr. Haweis's illustration would run as follows :—

*I, A. B., do solemnly make the following declaration :*

*I assent to the Child's Bible, and believe the coloured portraits as therein set forth to represent Peter, James, and John, as God himself made them ; and in no picture I paint will I give them any other features, or clothe them in garments of any other colour.*

Mr. Haweis regards the pledge to believe the doctrine of the Church set forth in the Articles and Prayer-Book "agreeable to the Word of God," as of "no doctrinal importance whatever." The ground on which he maintains this opinion is that there is "evidently no quantity or quality of doctrine which cannot be shown, with a little judicious handling of texts, to be agreeable to the Word of God."

In this argument two distinct propositions are confounded together. To assert that a certain doctrine is to be found

in the Bible, is one thing ; to assert that other students of Scripture come to a different conclusion, is another. Mr. Haweis treats the proposition that different minds draw from the Bible different conclusions, as equivalent to the proposition that the Bible contains no doctrine at all in which belief can be professed.

In place of the declaration, " I believe the doctrine of the Church . . . agreeable to the Word of God," Mr. Haweis substitutes the declaration, " I believe that anything and everything can be made out of the Word of God by the perverse ingenuity of man."

Suppose a traveller to report that he had seen upon the summit of a hill a large block of stone, perfectly round in shape. On visiting the spot, it is found to be square ; and it is asked with amazement how it could possibly have been described as round. Would it be esteemed a satisfactory explanation if the traveller should reply, " Why, the stone could be cut and carved into the likeness of anything ; a workman might make it a ball or a statue, according to his fancy ; I was quite justified, therefore, in saying that it is round. The term round accurately describes one of the many forms that might be imposed upon it ; I, therefore, call it round " ? In the same way Mr. Haweis appears to contend that he is right in saying that the doctrine of the Church is agreeable to the Bible—because the Bible may be cut and carved into any shape.

Mr. Haweis justly states that, although Subscription were abolished, so long as the Prayer-Book is assented to and used, the question of belief in the Creeds and Formularies of the Church must be faced ; and puts in a claim to separate " in each doctrine the *substance* from the *form*."

In this argument Mr. Haweis, appears to me, to claim the right to use words expressive of assent to a long series of propositions, while mentally he only yields assent to two or three of them. The Creeds and Formularies contain

hundreds of propositions not related to each other as *substance* to *form*, but absolutely needing separate lines of proof for their establishment, and only to be intelligently believed or denied on the evidence adduced in each separate case

Out of a number of independent statements, to pick out a few as credible and dismiss the others is not a process which can be called *re-statement*—it is rather the making a selection of doctrines for the satisfaction of individual scruples ; a process altogether beyond the functions of a body of clergy who stand legally pledged to the whole of the Articles and Formularies of their Church. Let me give one of Mr. Haweis's examples with respect to the resurrection of the body ; he distinguishes between belief in immortality as the *substance* and the resurrection of the body as the *form*, and thinks we may speak of the resurrection of the body when we mean the immortality of the soul, "if we *take care* to explain our meaning."

The two propositions are distinct ; the one may be received without the other, and each must rest on its own evidence ; we may, however, according to Mr. Haweis, assert that *both* propositions are true when only one is accepted.

Would any teacher of any subject, save theology, consent to do this ?

Imagine the case of a professor of history bound, every day before commencing his lecture, to read a statement of his belief that Julius Cæsar visited the Hebrides. On the method elaborated by Mr. Haweis, he could, I think, easily justify himself in so doing. Let the question be put—*Do you believe that Julius Cæsar visited the Hebrides?* The answer, according to the method advocated for securing freedom of thought in the Church of England, would be, "I believe in Julius Cæsar ; that is the substance ; whether or not he visited the Hebrides is an accident. I am, therefore, perfectly justified in saying that I believe that Julius Cæsar visited the Hebrides, and no fault can be found with

me, now I have explained my meaning." It must not be forgotten, of course, that Mr. Haweis directs every clergyman to use the Formularies with openly declared reservations; but the fact remains that whoever recites the Apostles' Creed without believing in the resurrection of the body, does then and there, in the solemn hour of prayer, when the soul is confessing its sins, and placing itself before the awful eye of the Eternal, express opinions which he does not hold.

Practically, a clergyman in this position cries aloud to the Almighty, "*I believe*," and half an hour after, when he speaks on his own account, says to his fellow-creatures, "To be quite sincere with you, I do not believe what I said just now to my Maker."

Such criticism as this, however, it is urged, is not sufficiently historical. As Mr. Haweis writes:—

I must look through the eyes of the past upon the statements of the past; then I understand them. They are not statements that we can make over again, but I see they could not be other than they are; perhaps could not have been better, for in their day, like Cimabue's colouring, perspective, and design, they were the most natural way of expressing the truth of religion and life.

Passing by the point that statements, which it is said cannot be made over again, are actually required to be made over again by every clergyman, Mr. Haweis's argument would, I submit, justify a professor of chemistry in yielding to a demand that he should profess a belief in alchemy as a condition of holding his chair.

In their day, like Cimabue's colouring, perspective, and design, the formulæ of the alchemists were the most natural way of expressing the facts of chemistry; they could scarcely have been other than they were, perhaps could not have been better. Why, then, should a modern man of science, carrying Mr. Haweis's reasoning to its legitimate

conclusion, object to "assent" to alchemy? He ought to look through the eyes of the past upon the statements of the past. He ought to import the historical method. To any one who might protest that he repeated in his chemical creed doctrines he could not verify in his laboratory, it would be enough to reply, if Mr. Haweis's argument has any validity—"Not more speculation, but more history is what we want."

No chemist would consent to occupy a chair in any University, however famous and however ancient, if he were compelled to employ in his lectures formulæ he distinctly regarded as obsolete and antiquated.

A line of argument which so completely breaks down when applied to the teaching of science, can hardly be sustained when the study of religious truth and the exercises of religious faith come into question; unless, indeed, the office of a clergyman is surrounded with responsibilities of a lower type than those of a professor, and what we believe concerning the everlasting God is of less importance than what we believe about the elements of which the worlds are composed.

I have left myself no space in which to examine the second question raised in this discussion—viz., the general question as to the necessity or advantage of a creed as a basis of Church fellowship. I may be permitted, however, in conclusion, to notice one or two points in which theories regarding the proper constitution of a Church come into contact with the obligations involved in Subscription.

Mr. Forsyth is, I think, entirely successful in demonstrating that if a Church have a doctrinal basis at all, it ought to be distinctly formulated and authoritatively adopted. No plan human wit could devise is calculated to engender more painful personal disputes, and to give freer play to pettier influences, than to exact "orthodoxy" from a minister of religion, and yet to furnish

him with no clear information as to what that "orthodoxy" is. A congregation, under such circumstances, readily becomes an assembly of heresy-hunters, while its minister has no fair chance of meeting the accusations levelled against his teaching. Better far to have Thirty-nine Articles, with an appeal possible to a Court of Law to determine their sense, than a "tacit understanding," with an appeal to a private committee.

But when Mr. Forsyth falls back upon a creed as a *modus vivendi* he enmeshes himself in the net of his own arguments.

Short as is the creed he would prefer to the state of things existing in his denomination, it presents every difficulty, theoretical as well as practical, of the "tacit understanding," which he so justly condemns. He wishes it to contain the great historical facts, and not the great speculative facts. Questions regarding the historical facts of the Bible, however, are the very questions on which, at this moment, there is the largest divergency of opinion, and the greatest necessity for a Church to prove itself possessed of an inclusive rather than an exclusive spirit. A Church that draws any sharp line at all about historic facts, excludes not only learned critics but devout Christians from its membership and ministry; and if the line be not sharply drawn the possibilities of endless controversy exist.

Another series of difficulties would arise from the "speculative facts" which are supposed by many to be intimately connected with the "historical facts" of Christianity; and a man could, with equal justice or injustice, be condemned as a speculative heretic on historical grounds, or as an historical heretic on speculative grounds.

Suppose the words which Mr. Forsyth states would be sufficient for many, "say, this Association exists for setting forth the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," to be adopted; I ask, Would it mean, or would it not mean, that a



Unitarian could become a member of the Congregational Union?

Would not any doubt left upon this point call into activity the official committees, whose influence Mr. Forsyth so gravely deprecates? But Mr. Forsyth speaks of retaining the words "only Son" to describe Christ "to satisfy those who would exclude pronounced Unitarians."

As a Unitarian, I may be permitted to say that I can imagine no subject more laden with subtle issues, more perplexing, more intricate, than the determination of the exact points of difference between a pronounced and an unpronounced Unitarian.

My conclusion on the whole matter is, that the obligations of Subscription are the obligations of *bonâ fide* belief in any Articles of Faith presented for acceptance; and that the recital of a creed in the course of public worship ought to imply the personal acknowledgment of its dogmas. The claim for intellectual freedom in a Church which presents Articles of Faith as legal standards by which its clergy must be judged, and intermixes dogmatic utterances with its prayers, is altogether untenable. Those who believe in a non-subscribing Church have no fitting home within a Church based upon Subscription. There is no defence for freedom of religious thought except in the case of a Church which, from generation to generation, depends upon the living sympathies of its members.

HENRY W. CROSSKEY.

## THE MEDICAL PROFESSION AND ITS MORALITY.

ONE profession amongst all those exercised in this country has importantly shifted its position during the past century. The Army, the Navy, the Church, and the Bar stand much where they stood in the days of the Plantagenets; but Edward IV.'s "Corporation of Barber-Surgeons" has made a wonderful ascent from its pristine *status*, passing up from Henry VIII.'s "Incorporated Society of Surgeons" to the "College of Surgeons," in the reign of Victoria.\* A parallel elevation has taken place at the same time in the other branch of the medical profession which previously occupied (so far as its rank and file were concerned) a very humble position, even while a few eminent men in each generation rose to wealth and honour. At last the ignoble squabbles of the surgeons with the physicians, and of both with the apothecaries, are hushed, and the united professors of the Healing Art have lifted themselves as a body altogether to a higher plane than they ever before occupied. By dint of cohesion and generalship they form a compact phalanx, and have obviously suddenly arrived at the consciousness of corporate power. The

\* The Incorporated Surgeons grew out of the Barber-Surgeons, and in its turn became the origin of the College of Surgeons. In 1797, Lord Thurlow, in opposing the Bill for the incorporation of the latter, was rude enough to observe that "by a law still in force the barbers and the surgeons must each use a pole," and that the pole of the surgeons must terminate in a gallipot and a red rag. He would be a bolder Chancellor than Thurlow who, in 1881, would not tremble on the woolsack ere he reminded the surgeons of our day of the pole and the gallipot.

Medical Council, already far ahead of Convocation, has become a little Parliament, destined soon to dictate to the larger Senate of the kingdom, not only concerning its own interior affairs, but also concerning everything which can by possibility be represented as affecting the interests of public health. As medical officers in parishes and unions, factory and prison surgeons, public vaccinators, medical officers of health, inspectors of nuisances, and very commonly as coroners, the doctors are daily assuming authority which, at first, perhaps, legitimate and beneficial, has a prevailing tendency to become meddling and despotic. In the Army and Navy, the surgeons, long unfairly deconsidered, now haughtily claim equally unreasonable precedence. Even the Government of the country appears unequal to the task of contending with the profession since Sir Richard Cross succumbed to the deputation which invaded the Home Office many hundreds strong, and reduced him to the humiliating concession of turning his own Vivisection Bill from a measure to protect animals into one to protect physiologists. The tone of bullying adopted by the medical Press when the same Government presumed at its own discretion to appoint a Registrar-General who happened not to be a doctor, was apparently intended to strike terror into the hearts of any Ministry which should venture again on such a step; and the same may be said of a more recent effort to overawe the present head of the Local Government Board when he desired to limit the penalties to be inflicted on the heretic victims of these modern Inquisitors, the parents who refuse to allow their children to be vaccinated. In all newspaper correspondence, indeed, wherein medical men express their views—notably in the grand battle which has raged for a twelvemonth round the walls of Guy's Hospital—a new tone of dominance, not to say arrogance, is perceptible; nor do many lay writers on the press or speakers in public meetings venture to allude to the

profession without a sort of rhetorical genuflexion, such as a Roman Catholic pays *en passant* in referring to the Pope or the saints. Literature, as usual, reflects in its waters the growth of the aspiring tower on its banks, and represents the heroines of at least half the novels of the last decade as passionately adoring their doctors, to the cruel disparagement of all the gallant soldiers and pious clergymen, who, in the earlier years of the century, were understood to command the affections of the romantic sex. As it will generally be admitted, even by those who most highly esteem the profession, that a lady's medical adviser is the last person with whom it is natural or desirable that she should associate the notion of love-making, this favourite modern legend of Doctor Cupid and Miss Psyche speaks volumes for the space now occupied by the professors of medicine in the popular mind.

This universal uprising of the practitioners of the Healing Art has naturally gone on *pari passu* with an increase among the laity of care for bodily health and ease. It would seem as if our ancestors scarcely realised how painful is sickness, how precious is life—so enhanced is our dread of disease, so desperately anxious are we to postpone the hour of dissolution! As old Selden said, "To preach long, loud, and damnation is the way to be cried up. We love a man that damns us, and run after him to save us." "To preach long, loud, and *sanitation*" is the modern doctor's version of this apophthegm, and we do "cry them up," and run after them to save us from "germs," and all other imps of the scientific imagination. No one can foresee to what lengths our poltroonery may go in this direction under the energetic preachments of such Boanerges as Mr. Huxley and Dr. Richardson. The thunders of the divines have long sunk to a far-off roll of old formulæ, reverberated down the ages and able to disturb us no more. But the claps of the sanitarians are fresh and strong, and we tremble

as we hear them ; for, though we believe little concerning our souls, we have a lively faith in our bodies, and generally follow the example of the French lady whose epitaph records that she

Pour plus de securité  
Fit son paradis dans ce monde.

In short, in every department of public and private life the doctors are acquiring power and influence, and coming to the front. They are new pilots who have boarded our ship and will shortly have a very large share of the handling of the helm. It is a matter of deep importance to us to know who and what manner of men they are and towards which point of the moral compass they will guide us.\*

First, who are the Doctors of Great Britain in 1881 ? From what class of society are they recruited ? Why do they choose their profession ? What is their education and general moral status ?

In America and in several countries in Europe medical men often belong, by birth, to the "Upper Ten." It is not uncommon for French nobles in these latter days to

\* It may be suggested that another reason for the increased honour paid to doctors by our generation is due to the fact that they have ceased to be empirics, and become true men of science, and that they really are able to cure us better than their predecessors. Such is, of course, the common belief ; but it would seem that the faith of each generation of patients in its own generation of doctors had been always as high as it could possibly be, whether those doctors were the veriest quacks or the reverse. Each one has seen new remedies puffed by the faculty, and old remedies falling into discredit ; and we may say in our day as safely as Voltaire did in his time, that a doctor is a man who pours drugs of which he knows little into stomachs of which he knows less. If science, with all its boasting, and after its hetacombs of bloody sacrifices, had really made important advances in therapeutics, we should at least be able to point to some one or two unquestionable specific remedies for the most terrible scourges of mortality, such as cholera, or consumption, or cancer. Nothing of the kind, however, has been heard of, and it is even asserted, on respectable authority and with reference to registrar-generals' reports, that the mortality from the principal organic diseases is actually at a rate *far greater* in England to-day than it was thirty years ago. On this matter we do not pronounce an opinion.

be doctors, and we have lately heard of a German Prince adopting the profession. In Italy—ruled as it now is to a disastrous extent by “Professors” of all kinds—the doctors naturally take large share in the Government. In England, on the other hand (as is generally known, and as the Medical Directory proves), it has not been customary for men of the higher ranks to send their sons to King’s College or Guy’s instead of to Eton or Christchurch; and the Hon. Dr. Herbert, Lord Carnarvon’s brother, is mentioned so frequently in this relation that it would seem he must stand almost alone of men of his grade in the medical profession; while the Army and Navy and Clerical Lists swarm with the noblest names in the land. As a rule, it appears that the majority of British doctors are either the sons of men of the secondary professional classes or of tradesmen, and in some cases (especially in Scotland) of intelligent artisans. Much credit is due to them for the honourable ambition wherewith they have stepped upward; but it is well to bear in mind that they generally enter society (whenever they attain its higher levels) by right only of their personal and professional merits; and that they do not necessarily bring with them quite the same set of ideas on all subjects as are current among the young men educated in the great public schools or older universities. In no invidious sense, but as a simple matter of fact, they should be understood to be both collectively and (generally) individually a *parvenu* profession, with the merits and the defects of the class. Thus they are more apt to hang together, and make common cause against outsiders, than even the lawyers. That there are hundreds of medical men in the truest sense “gentlemen,” judged either by the most conventional or the loftiest standard, we all know from experience. But entry into the profession of medicine cannot be said (as Rochefoucauld remarked long ago happened in the case of the profession of arms) to make

a man lose his vulgarity or his coarseness, if he be originally coarse or vulgar-minded.

The motives which lead men to become physicians or surgeons are not far to seek. The preparatory education is cheaper than that for the other professions, and the average income of the British doctor is said to be £50 a-year higher than that of the British parson, and less dependent on the chance of patronage. The pecuniary prizes within reach of a successful surgeon or physician are enormous; and, though no peerage has yet been given to a doctor, the "Bloody Hand" of a Baronet is a considerable attraction. Finally, beside such mercenary reasons, there are two motives of a higher sort, which undoubtedly exercise great influence on the choice of able and good men. The first is the *Scientific interest* of medical work, wherein the profession stands almost alone, so as to become the natural vocation of a youth with scientific tastes. The second is the motive of pure *Humanity*, the simple desire to relieve the woes of suffering men and agonising women, to diminish the sense of pain in the world, and prolong useful lives. This is a noble, a divine motive for the devotion of a life; and it would be wrong to doubt that many a poor country practitioner and many a skilful London physician has been guided by this exalted feeling in his choice, just as truly as his brother has been led by genuine piety to enter the ministry of religion.

The fact, however, that there are many good men urged by none but the loftiest and purest motives, amid the thousands of whom the profession is composed, ought certainly not to make us leap to the conclusion that all doctors are pure enthusiasts of humanity. As a writer in the *Spectator* recently well observed, it is as absurd to predicate the same moral character for all men who enter the medical profession as for all men who pass over Westminster Bridge. There are, as we have just seen, sufficient

low motives as well as high ones to lead young men to such choice. It is the misfortune of the Clerical profession, that the performance of its ordinary duties requires an assumption of pious feeling which even sincerely religious men do not always hold ready at command. The consequence is (as Hume long ago explained) that genuinely good clergymen are often led into some sort of hollowness and affectation, while men who have entered the priesthood from merely secular motives are apt to degenerate into downright hypocrites. In an analogous way, it is the misfortune of the Medical profession that the performance of its ordinary duties involves the appearance of humane feelings, which may or may not be present on any particular occasion, but which the patient and his friends will usually expect to see exhibited, and the doctor be almost driven to simulate. Where the medical man is naturally kind-hearted, there is no incongruity between his beneficent act and benevolent sentiment, and no shade of hypocrisy tarnishes his behaviour. But where the doctor has adopted his profession as a mere *gagne-pain*, or from love of science rather than of humanity, there a certain affectation of sympathy with his patients and their afflicted friends is forced upon him, and we behold the not very rare phenomenon of a medical Tartuffe.

This matter is the more needful to be analysed, because the idle ideas current about the "kindness" of doctors make it seem, to not a few good souls, almost a sacrilege to question any of the abuses of the profession. These simple hearts totally forget that a patient is to a doctor what a rock is to a geologist, or a flower to a botanist—the much-coveted *subject of his studies*. If patients do not come to a doctor, the doctor must go in search of patients; and if he could not see them in the hospitals for nothing, he would pay to be admitted to see them and exhibit them to his pupils. Very often, when the sufferer or his friends



are with tearful gratitude thanking the doctor for having remitted some portion of his fees, the learned man inwardly reflects that he would have paid a good round sum rather than have missed so curious a case. Let any one try (as the writer has done) to remove to better quarters a pauper suffering from some "interesting" affliction, out of the reach of a doctor who was attending him for "charity," and the sentiment of pure benevolence will not be so manifest as might be expected. On the other hand, a display of sympathy is part of the stock-in-trade of a physician (especially of one who attends ladies), without which he could not hope for a large *clientèle*, any more than a grocer would succeed in business who failed in civility to his customers. Of course, there is much real, most disinterested kindness shown by medical men to their friends and patients. They would not be human if it were not so, and nobody dreams that they are insensible to the claims of charity or sympathy. But the everlasting "kindness" and "guinea-amiability" vouchsafed supremely to the wealthiest patients, is, as we have said, only part of the doctor's stock-in-trade, like the blue and red bottles in the chemist's shop.

Against the attractions of the medical profession now enumerated, sufficient to account for the adoption of it by so many thousands of youths, it is good to set the opposite circumstances, which deter from it a differently constituted order of minds. To begin with, no man of a poetic temperament is likely to become a doctor, for very obvious reasons. To make the weaknesses and maladies of our poor human frames the subject of a whole life's study and attention, so that a man should, as it were, live evermore in a world of disease; to pass from one sick-room to another, and from a distressing sight to a fetid odour, in endless succession; to acquire knowledge by the dissection of corpses, and employ it, when gained, in amputating limbs, delivering

women in childbirth, dressing sores, and inspecting everything ugly and loathsome to the natural senses,—this is surely a vocation which calls for either great enthusiasm or great callousness. The doctor is, in truth, at the very antipodes from the poet or the artist. It would seem to outsiders as if a year of his profession would suffice to blot from the mind all the beauty of the world, and to spoil the charm and sanctity of the sweetest mysteries of human nature. Everything which the painter, the sculptor, the poet touches with reverent and loving hands—the soul-speaking eye, the heaving breast, the lip which meets lip in supremest emotion,—all these are to the doctor the seats of so many diseases—organs where he may look for an amaurosis or a cancer. Of course, we know that men of great refinement of feeling are found to conquer all such natural repugnance, and suffering humanity may be grateful (so far as medical science brings it relief) that there are those who can do so, and even find the wards of a hospital quite as delightful, and much more interesting, than the terraces of a garden or the galleries of the Vatican. But it is not wonderful that Akenside should be the only man on record (except Erasmus Darwin) who united the professions of the physician and the poet, and proved an equally poor poet and cruel doctor.\* To these æsthetic objections to the profession of medicine must be added another of a different but scarcely less effectual kind. Custom has settled that the mode of remuneration for the services of doctors (in the higher walks especially) should take the peculiarly awkward form of a direct transfer of coin from the hand of the private patient. This practice, even among well-bred persons, is liable to involve disagreeable

\* His excesses of brutality to the poor patients in St. Thomas's Hospital, where he was physician, caused one of the governors, Richard Chester by name, to rebuke him, telling him, "Know thou art a servant of this charity." The reminder, perhaps, might not be inappropriate in some later instances of medical arrogance. (Jeaffreson's Book about Doctors, p. 95.)

incidents, and with vulgar and rude ones must cause to a physician of high spirit endless annoyances which are wholly escaped in those professions wherein service is paid by public salary or by fees which pass through an office.

We have seen who are our doctors, and why they choose their profession. Next we may note, in passing, as regards their education, that they commonly change in the transition from a medical Student to a full-blown Physician or Surgeon, in a manner quite unparalleled by other youngsters. The embryo parson, soldier, or lawyer, at Oxford or Sandhurst, or while "eating his dinners," is, indeed, usually a little less sedate than he becomes a few years later; but he only differs from his adult self as the colt differs from the horse, the playful puppy from the responsible mastiff. The medical student, on the contrary, undergoes a transformation like that of a larva, when it becomes a moth. One day we notice Bob Sawyer, as a rowdy and dissipated youth, with linen of questionable purity, and a pipe and foul language alternately in his mouth; the *bête-noire* of every modest girl, and the unfailing nuisance of every public meeting, where he may stamp and crow and misbehave himself. Anon, Robert Sawyer, Esq., M.D., or M.R.C.S., emerges the pink of cleanliness and decorum, to flit evermore softly through shaded boudoirs, murmuring soothing suggestions to ladies suffering from headaches, and recommending mild syrups to teething infants. His old celebrated canticle—

Hurrah for the Cholera Morbus,  
Which brings us a guinea a-day,

has unaccountably been changed for such burning zeal to save humanity from disease, that he is ready to persecute anti-vaccinators to the death, or cut up any number of living dogs and cats in the most horrible manner merely on the chance of discovering some remedy for human suffering.

We now reach the most important feature of the subject, the general Moral Character of the profession; and here we must all thankfully recognise that medical men, as a body (after their studentship), exhibit many virtues, and comparatively few of the grosser vices. So far as the memory of the present writer extends, there have been no worse or more numerous scandals affecting doctors during the last twenty years, than affecting the clergy. They are industrious when poor, and often liberal when rich. In times of war, or epidemics, their devotion to their chosen tasks rises, not seldom, to true heroism. The ordinary English country practitioner, with his small pay, his rough work in all weathers, and his general kindness and honesty, is one of the most respectable and valuable members of the community. This and more may be said to the credit of the profession. On the other side there are grave charges and suspicions (chiefly attaching to the fashionable physicians and surgeons of the great cities and health resorts), which, though not often openly expressed or marshalled together, are yet sown broadcast through the minds of the laity, and which it is highly desirable should be fairly stated, and then either rejected as unjust, or allowed their due weight in the guidance of conduct between the public and the profession.

It would be exceedingly unjust to include among the elements of such a judgment as this the exceptional crimes—murders, adulteries, and seductions—which may be laid to the charge of individual offenders in every profession. The only point regarding these which here concerns us is the obvious fact that, *if* by any misfortune a man with criminal proclivities enter the medical profession, he possesses, as a doctor, unparalleled facilities for the commission and concealment of crime. A Prichard or a La Pommeray—handsome and gentlemanly—who may desire to remove a rich wife or mistress out of the way, either to inherit her money or marry another

woman, can scarcely find any difficulty in administering a slow poison, or so arranging things as that the victim shall swallow a rapid one by mistake. Even the purchase and possession of deadly drugs (in other men a damning evidence of guilt), scarcely afford ground of suspicion against a doctor. Of course, we know that not one doctor in 500 can for a moment be suspected of such crimes; but who will venture to say that not one in 5,000, or one in 25,000, doctors may prove another Palmer or Webster or Prichard, or such a reckless wretch as he who, three years ago, answered the advertisement offering £60 for a poison? \*

It is a serious question whether, in the event of the commission of such crimes, we should find medical coroners alert and firm in dragging to light every suspicious circumstance and sending the case unhesitatingly to trial, or whether they would let down their colleague as easily as might be practicable, and direct their jury to find a verdict of "Misadventure." The same remarks apply to crimes of another cast—seduction, adultery, and offences committed on narcotised victims. Doctors are as little open to such charges as other men, but not *less* so; and again it must be borne in mind that they possess facilities for committing and concealing such offences which fall to no other lot. The writer who touches this subject labours under difficulties, since it is at once dangerous to be precise, and ineffective to speak in generalities; but probably the memory of more than one reader will supply food for reflection on this head, and possibly instances of medical men who, having notoriously abused their opportunities, instead of being scouted and disowned by their colleagues, have, by their influence, been allowed to retain their positions. No other profession deals thus with its *mauvais sujets*.

Leaving now this question of exceptional crimes, which

\* In the Census of 1871, the professions of Physician, Surgeon, and Druggist are lumped together, and for England and Wales number 44,214 persons.

ought to be excluded from our judgment of the general character of the profession, let us inquire, first, what are the principles supposed to prevail amongst medical men? and then, secondly, what can we glean concerning their practice?

It has been long generally believed that while the profession on the Continent is almost to a man, Atheist, a milder and less defined Materialism is usually accepted by English medical men as their philosophy of the universe. Of late years the homage paid by the profession to certain eminent men of science has, rightly or wrongly, conveyed the impression that nine doctors out of ten, if they spoke out, would call themselves Agnostics. These gentlemen may perhaps say that it is no business of their patients to ask what are their private opinions on theology and morals so long as they administer to them the right drugs and set their bones, *secundum artem*. But, in truth, it is the business of everybody to learn what are the genuine beliefs of men who are certain ere long to leaven society therewithal. The doctors are now much more to us than drug administrators and bone-setters. Few prospects are more profoundly alarming than the advance to ubiquitous influence of an order of men who, as a rule, reject and despise those ultimate faiths of the human heart in God and Duty and Immortality, which ennoble and purify mortal life as no physiological science can ennoble, and no physical "sanitation" purify. It is a matter of importance to every individual amongst us to know whether the man who will stand by our death-bed and the death-beds of our beloved ones, will help us to look up beyond the gaping grave, or will throw the pall of his silence and disbelief over the flickering flame of dying hope and prayer.

There are missionary physicians now sent forth into many heathen countries (notably to Japan), where they effect more conversions than all the clerical missionaries

together. Who can help foreseeing that the converse will happen at home, if the doctors who come closest to every man and woman in the supreme hours of life and death should exhale their dead and hopeless materialism in every word and look? The man who thinks, like Professor Bain, that the tender emotions are merely glandular "affections," that (as the same Professor asserts) a mother's love, a poet's inspiration, a saint's prayer, are simply transformed beef and mutton, bread and beer—this man must, even if he be never so reticent, draw a trail of cold and slimy doubt over the fairest and noblest things in human life. There is, of course, a great and ever-present temptation to a physician to view things from the material, or (as our fathers would have called it) the carnal side; to think always of the influence of the body on the mind, rather than of the mind on the body; to place the interests of Health in the van, and those of Duty in the rear; to study physiological rather than psychological phenomena; nay, to centre attention on the morbid phases of both bodily and mental conditions rather than on the normal and healthful ones of the *mens sana in corpore sano*. All the more reason, then, is there anxiously to desire that the man subjected to such downward pressure should possess some faith on whose wings he may be lifted above the mire. Woe to him, and to all whom he may influence, who is at once in theory and practice, a Materialist and a Disease-monger.\*

Be the principles and opinions of the medical profession what they may, we have now to consider their practical conduct. The observations to be made on this matter may fall under five heads.

\* There exists a Medical Ritualistic Brotherhood, styled the Guild of S. Luke. Hopes were entertained at its formation that it would set itself to oppose the abuses of the profession; but they have been regretfully abandoned since the publication, in *Macmillan's Magazine*, of a paper by the secretary, defending Vivisection with the usual base appeal to human selfishness and cowardice.

1. The *raison d'être* of the medical profession is to cure the diseases, relieve the pains, and, when possible, prolong the lives of men. To attain these beneficent ends, Science must be the guide—Anatomical Science, Physiological Science, Chemical Science, and so on. Honour is justly due, then, to the physician who *studies science in order to cure his patients*.

But is it equally honourable to *study patients in order to acquire science*? Is it well to treat a suffering human being as a mere subject of experiment, and to consider hospitals as primarily existing, not that patients may be cured, but that doctors may be trained? Assuredly, whether it be, or be not morally justifiable to look on men and women in such a light, it is not to do so that *doctors are paid*, either by their private patients or by the public which supports the hospitals. The impression may be false, and is necessarily vague, but it is extremely strong and widespread that the primary beneficent object of the profession, its only ostensible object—namely, Healing—is daily more and more subordinated to the secondary object, namely, Scientific Investigation; in short, that the means have become the end, and the end the means. It is believed that patients having diseases scientifically interesting, are needlessly detained in hospitals, and, instead of being treated with a single-eyed view to restoration to health, are subjected to experiments calculated to elucidate pathological problems even at the cost of prolonged suffering or increased danger.\*

Similarly, in private houses, if experimentation be rare, the physician yet often betrays that his interest centres on the purely scientific aspect of the case. He gives himself great pains to make "an accurate diagnosis," to be verified, perhaps, hereafter, by a "successful post-mortem;" but of

\* The scandalous hydrophobia case in the Glasgow Infirmary two years ago was one of the (necessarily rare) instances when such doings find their way into the newspapers.



the means of *cure* he thinks so little that he has been sometimes observed to start, when asked by the not unreasonably vexed patient, what he recommends him to do? and to reply, "Oh, to be sure! you ought to do something; I will write a prescription." By-and-by, patients will begin to recalcitrate at paying heavily to afford their doctor another "case" to classify in the tables of his learned work on the lungs, the liver, or the brain, whereon he expects to found his claim to immortality and profit. They will say with Pliny, "*Discunt periculis nostris et per experientiam mortem agunt.*"

Nor is it only for the sake of acquiring knowledge, but also for that of imparting it, that medical men are believed to sacrifice their patients' interests. The poor sufferers who accept the charity of the public hospitals do so on the condition of allowing the students, as well as the doctors, to inspect their cases. But it is plain as daylight that this condition becomes morally abrogated when the patient's recovery would be postponed or imperilled by the distressing circumstances of exposure and bedside lecturing. Such limitation, however, is rarely, if ever, regarded, and decent women, afflicted with some of the most dreadful diseases of humanity, find, in these so-called charitable institutions, moral tortures of outraged modesty added to their bodily anguish. No doctor can be dull enough to ignore the fact that the feelings of a woman with a crowd of curious young students round her bed of agony must be almost worse than death, and must lessen her chances of recovery if any such there be. But when does one of these teachers and guides of youth spare the shame-tortured woman at the cost of Mr. Bob Sawyer's disappointment?

Again, patients are sacrificed not merely at the shrine of knowledge, but on the anvil of manipulative skill. That operations are performed for the sake either of acquiring

such skill, or keeping the surgeon's hand well "in"—as well as of earning enormous fees—we have the best evidence. The late eminent and honest surgeon, Mr. Skey, openly denounced this abuse, and said, "A man who has the reputation of a splendid operator is ever a just object of suspicion." Probably every reader will recollect cases where a leg or arm has been amputated, and after a time it was found that the frightful sacrifice might have been spared.\* These are the men who, as Tennyson says, are

Happier in using the knife than in trying to save the limb.

When we think of the cruelty—as bad as that of any tyrant of old—of reducing a man or woman to the miserable condition of a one-armed or one-legged creature, and the selfishness which can make a surgeon, for the sake of either his skill or his fee, recommend an operation which might have been avoided, we have some measure of the hardness of heart which is at least *possible* in the profession, according to the testimony of one of its most honoured members.

And here we must recall to those who forget it, that this recklessness and pitilessness of medical men was betrayed forty years ago, when they permitted Burke and Hare to bring them corpses for anatomical study, which they could not doubt were those of foully murdered men. If *this* were possible among the first medical men to whom the "Burkers" brought their victims, it is idle to doubt that others may amputate limbs which might be saved, or detain interesting "cases" for years on beds of pain—"all in the sacred interests of science."

2. It is not only for the sake of science that the interests of patients are believed to be sacrificed by medical men. The

\* A pair of the most beautiful eyes known to the writer were only preserved in the handsome head to which they belong, by the refusal of the young owner to profit by the urgent recommendation of one of the first oculists of the day to allow him to relieve her of one splendid orb, at the moderate cost, perhaps, of £50 or £80.

pecuniary interests, either of individual doctors or of the profession at large, seem to outweigh such considerations in numberless cases. To take a simple example. What are the motives of those luminaries who recommend all the bad wines and sickly beverages which we see advertised every day in the newspapers? A more certain way of promoting disease than the recommendation of some of this rubbish is scarcely conceivable. An American medical man was recently offered £1,000 to puff one of these drinks (by no means the worst) and act as its usher to the New York market. This doctor, being honest, declined the bribe. Are we to consider that others do not entertain similar scruples?

The same question may be asked respecting all the remedies which by turns come into fashion. We look back with amused disgust at what doctors have done in times past in the way of recommending useless and noxious nostrums one after another; but we forget that they are always at the same tricks, and that every year sees some new and costly *fad* of medicine solemnly adopted by all the lights of the profession, as surely as a new cut in dresses is adopted by the milliners, and just as certainly next year quietly dropped into oblivion.

The reckless multiplication of expensive prescriptions is another "bone" which patients with limited means may well pick with their doctors. Did any one ever rally from an illness, or clear a room after a death, without finding at least twenty half-used bottles of draughts and embrocations and gargles, and as many boxes of pills on the table? The *entente cordiale* between the physician and the chemist, and perhaps certain percentages, are not unconnected with these "untasted relics of the feast."

A much more serious matter, however, is the question, How far do medical men generally really and honestly strive to cure their well-paying patients? How far do they

deceive them about their ailments, and give them advice which, instead of restoring them to health and vigour, is calculated to keep them on the sick list? Medicine can, at best, not do much; some of us think it can do very little, and the great new sect of "Natural Doctors" in Germany are beginning to show cause for trusting nature to herself alone, without drugs or blisters or phlebotomy, and only securing for her the best conditions of quiet and air, warmth or coolness, at our disposal. But assuming that medicines can really cure disease, how painful is the doubt whether the doctor whom we employ to use them for our benefit may turn them to our hurt! To be robbed by the policeman, or to have our premises burnt down by the watchman, is a small vexation compared to being kept ill by the man we pay to make us well. But does this disaster never befall us, though, perhaps, we rarely recognise the humiliating fact? We have all read the mutual accusations of making business for themselves, which the lawyers have been bandying about; and we remember the good story of the old solicitor who received with horror from his son and partner (left in charge of his office during a trip abroad) the intelligence that the foolish young man had brought to a sudden conclusion a great Chancery suit which had provided an income for the family for ten years back, and might have done the same for ten years more. Similar grim jokes concern every profession and every trade. The difference in their application to the medical profession is, that much closer interests are involved, and the fraud practised is infinitely more cruel.

Let us consider what are the *presumptions* against the doctors, since of actual evidence, from the nature of the case, there can be little. Let it be granted that in cases of febrile and acute diseases there is reason to hope that they do their best to effect a cure. What of other and chronic diseases? What of the worst of all,—of Lunacy, for

example? Does the mad-doctor of the private asylum, who makes £200 or £300 a year by a wealthy patient, really lay himself out, with all his skill, to heal the poor bewildered brain? Does he never allow the patient to excite himself before the visitors, so as to bring on accessions of his disorder, and confirm the belief that he still requires incarceration when he might be set at liberty? A clear-sighted author talks of "unconscious bias produced by pecuniary interests;" and truly, human nature being what it is, nobody can think it otherwise than a misfortune that the interest of a physician in cases of such extreme doubt and delicacy should always be on one side, and the recovery of the patient on the other. The Press has pronounced again and again that lunatics ought only to be confined in public asylums, where the physicians should receive fixed salaries, and a *bonus on recoveries*,—not payment by the case. By such judgments they have tacitly avowed the belief that this most grievous of the woes of humanity is left, by the cupidity of the doctors, to press on many a soul from which it might be lifted off. To quote the direct evidence on the subject would involve endless controversy. It is well known to all interested in the subject.

And what of other chronic diseases—neuralgia, and gout, and heart-disease, and headaches, and all the nameless woes of rich and feminine mortality? We laugh at the legend of the physicians of the Chinese Emperor, whose salaries are stopped when their celestial patron is ill, and only run again when he is restored to health. But though we cannot copy this ingenious plan from the Flowery Land, we most of us believe that out of our twenty thousand doctors there are not a few (and they, *by the hypothesis*, among the rich and prosperous) who are far from insensible to the temptation of keeping a well-paying patient for months and years in a state of valetudinarianism. When we see a peevish

old man always in the gout, or a fine lady always stretched on her sofa smelling *eau-de-Cologne*, we may safely look out of window for the carriage of the unctuous doctor, whose yearly income would be considerably lessened by the restoration of the gentleman to the moors, and of the lady to the duties of her household and nursery. If we ask one of these poor medical *pièces de résistance* why he or she does not at least try fresh air, or riding exercise, or Turkish baths, it is singular how invariably they have been told by dear Dr. Hushaby that any such efforts would involve deadly danger to their "hearts."\*

A medical treatise, intended only for the profession, contains these significant words:—"If cure be an object in the case, then" so-and-so is to be done. Apparently there are cases where cure is not an object! Plumbers are popularly believed never to mend one hole in the leads of a house without making another. The gentlemen whom we call in to tinker our internal pipes and gutters, it is to be feared, sometimes adopt similar tactics. Let us suppose a true specific remedy found for gout, neuralgia, or dyspepsia, which, by cheap and easy private application, would make every patient suffering from those diseases as sound as a trivet. What welcome would that blessed remedy receive from the medical Profession? When the news of its existence became irrepressible, how many rich patients would be assured that, for their particular case, a trial of it might entail fatal consequences?

3. Beside these matters, wherein the individual doctor's profits are in one scale and the patient's in another, there is a still more important class of cases, wherein the interests

\* To the personal knowledge of the present writer, three ladies, after periods varying from six to fourteen years of the sofa, were roused to break their silken chains, and suddenly found they could get up and live like other people. In one case the poor dame, having renounced her doctor and all his ordinances, after long childlessness, became the joyful mother of a healthy little babe.

of the profession are on one side and those of the public on the other. In these latter there is reason to apprehend that a tacit trades-unionism exists among all medical men, whereby the interests of the laity are systematically sacrificed to those of the profession.

As a first example of this trades-unionism, let us take the case of Consultations of doctors, wherein it is obvious that some well-understood bye-law forbids the physician called in consultation to allow a suspicion to go abroad that his colleague, originally in charge of the case, has made a blunder and brought the patient to death's door. Proverbially, "doctors differ," and agreement under other circumstances is so rare that it may be dismissed from calculation. But let great Dr. A., from London, be summoned to Cornwall or Northumberland to consult with Dr. B., a country practitioner of respectable standing, about a case of imminent peril, and what becomes of the proverbial "difference"? Dr. A., with a solemnity which must tax his gravity and that of his colleague like the meeting of two augurs of old, assures the heart-broken mother, or wife soon to be a widow, that "everything has been done in the very best and wisest way possible, that the patient could not be in better hands than those of Dr. B.," and, finally (as if to save the appearance of utter inutility of the costly visit), that "the patient may now take a second tablespoonful of the same mixture as before." When this solemn farce has been played, Dr. A., who has eaten an excellent luncheon in the house of mourning, presses the hand of the miserable wife, pockets his magnificent fee, steps into the carriage waiting to carry him back to the station, and reads on his way up to town a charming article on that intense sympathy of medical men for suffering humanity which "makes them ready to sacrifice hecatombs of brutes to save the smallest pain of a man."

What has that smooth-spoken doctor done? In the sight

of God he has told a shameful and cruel lie, and has taken money from the very victim of his falsehood. He has betrayed the trust of loving and simple hearts, and left them to break, when with a word he might have done what in him lay to save their earthly treasure.

If doctors will do this cruel and wicked thing for their trades-union, what will they *not* do likewise? And who amongst the readers of this paper can recall any case where they have acted otherwise, and spoken the truth; except when the doctor, perhaps, whose patient they visited, happened to be of so humble a class, that the great man could venture to treat him as he pleased? \*

Let us, for heaven's sake, know where we stand. Will the doctors tell us truth beside the sick-beds of our friends, or will they *not*? If they will not, then let us be

\* An instructive episode, throwing light on the matter, is that of Sir William Gull's evidence on the recent trial of the Guy's Hospital nurse. The Court asked Sir William Gull, "In your opinion, should a skilful physician have known that brain disease existed?" Sir William replied, "There I must be careful. There is, no doubt, great difficulty in recognising brain disease at that stage . . . but I cannot doubt that suspicion ought to have existed." Later on, he refused to say, though pressed by Dr. Pavy's counsel, that suspicion was often very incorrect. For this breach of medical etiquette, Sir William Gull, a man at the very top of the profession, was actually complained against by Dr. Pavy (the physician who might have entertained the "suspicions") before the College of Physicians, and the President and Censors having solemnly deliberated on the matter, pronounced judgment on the 19th January of the present year to the following effect: That they "do not deem the character of the evidence which a member of the College has given on oath in a Court of Justice a proper subject to investigate when the Court has expressed itself satisfied in regard to the truthfulness and sincerity of the witness," &c.

In reviewing this decision, which truly to the non-medical mind appears a matter of course (the converse sentence being inconceivable) the *British Medical Journal* (Jan. 29, p. 167), says—"The evidence given upon oath in such cases is in the highest degree privileged. . . . But it must be a very delicate matter for a chartered body, such as the College of Physicians, having certain powers entrusted by law to its Board of Censors, to deal with a complaint against evidence given upon oath by one of its fellows in a Court of Law." Very "delicate" indeed! But what if the evidence were not "privileged," and only given at the bedside of a dying man, in return for a fee of a hundred guineas?



relieved from the monstrous cost and heart-breaking disappointments consequent on summoning them to consultations.

This question of the secret understanding and trades-union bye-laws among medical men rises to the level of political importance when we note that our coroners are now so generally taken from the profession. The particular duty of a coroner and his jury in scores of cases is to deal with charges directly concerning doctors, and to decide whether they have administered wrong medicines, or connived at child-murder before or after birth, or neglected to attend to a dying pauper patient, or discharged a patient from a hospital who ought to have been retained, or vaccinated in such a manner as to entail death. It is essential we should know what are the rules of behaviour for a medical coroner under such circumstances according to medical morality. What will his professional conscience require him to do as regards his colleague? Is he to act simply as an honest coroner in the interest of the public, drag every case fully to light, and send such as seem to deserve it to trial? Or is he to screen his medical brother by every available artifice and all the influence over the jury at his command, and never let any scandal come to light or any case go into court which he can by any means smother and suppress?

Reference to another evidence of the extent of the trade-unionism among medical men has been already made in speaking of the unanimity wherewith the profession as a body, having itself very little concern with Vivisection, has supported the handful of physiologists in their demand for a "free vivisection table." The memorial against Lord Carnarvon's Bill, presented to the Home Office on the 10th July, 1876, was signed by 3,000 medical men, and presented by such a crowd as never before invaded a Ministerial office, except, perhaps, in a revolution; and all this

excitement was drawn forth at a moment's notice.\* Previous to the manipulation of their wire-pullers there were numerous medical men ready to denounce the abuses of the practice. Sixty of them at first signed the original Memorial to the Jermyn Street Society, and before the Royal Commission, eighteen of them gave the opinion that the practice ought to be placed under legislative restraint. The Bill introduced by their ordinary Parliamentary representative, Dr. Lyon Playfair, was entirely in the same spirit. But the stupid cry was raised that any restriction on the cutting up of live animals would be an affront to their profession (which had very cheerfully submitted to a similar restriction in cutting up dead men!), and from that moment there has been a closing of the ranks, from which only a few brave and self-respecting men have had the courage to come forth.

The Vaccination controversy is one on which it would be idle here to enter; but if the reader bear in mind the fact that between 1841 and 1871 the doctors received £1,647,000 out of the rates for vaccination, independently of private practice (See "Fashions of the Day," p. 30), the zealotry and cruelty wherewith this medical "rite" is upheld, will scarcely escape the suspicion of the before-named "unconscious bias produced by pecuniary interest." Baptism was never urged by those who believed that it could save souls from perdition, with such relentlessness as Vaccination is insisted upon by men who assume that it can save bodies from small-pox.†

\* For a full account of the attitude of the Medical Profession on this subject, see a paper by Miss Frances Power Cobbe in the *Contemporary Review*, "Mr. Lowe and the Vivisection Act," reprinted by the Victoria Street Society.

† The trades-unionism, which commands at once the doctors who register deaths, the doctors who profit by compulsory vaccination, and the coroners who direct the juries in cases of alleged death from vaccination, is amusingly illustrated by such facts as the following, quoted by Mr. Peter Taylor in Parliament: Mr. Henry Hay, Health Officer to the Aston Union, Birmingham,

Beyond the demand for unrestricted Vivisection, and for compulsory Vaccination, there is another matter whereupon difference of opinion exists among medical men, and a few of them have honourably distinguished themselves by denouncing the abominable oppression. But as a *profession*, the guilt and shame of the atrocious Contagious Diseases Acts lie at the door of the medical men of England, and it is their gross materialism, their utter disregard for human souls when lodged in the bodies of the despised and wretched, which has made such legislation possible.

4. And now let us turn away from this last and darkest charge against medical men, and ask what truth there may be in the boast that they are the best friends of women, and that women may rightly trust them with grateful minds and unhesitating confidence? To the *fallen*

writes: "A death from the first cause (erysipelas after vaccination) occurred not long ago in my practice, and although I had not vaccinated the child, yet in my desire to *preserve vaccination from reproach*, I omitted all mention of it in my certificate of death." Again, the value of a medical coroner was exemplified at Leeds, where an inquest was held on a child who had died of the results of vaccination. The coroner declined to accept that statement as a verdict, and told the jury "there was no such thing known to the law as death from vaccination," and they must bring in "died by the visitation of God." Vaccination may be good or may be bad—the present writer offers no opinion on the matter; but if it be the worst thing possible, we shall never get at the truth in the face of the interests which support it. In the three years' epidemic of small-pox—1870-71-72—44,000 died of the disease in England in spite of compulsory vaccination. But whenever any vaccinated patients died, the doctors had two doors of escape from the arguments thus furnished against their beloved practice. The wretched patient had either not been efficiently vaccinated, or had not been sufficiently revaccinated. In short, by the hypothesis, it must have been one or the other, for if he had been efficiently or sufficiently vaccinated and revaccinated, then, as the whole profession proclaims, "he could not have died." It is truly insolent of laymen ever to question the validity of reasoning of this kind, or to notice that they are bidden to believe one *dictum* at one time and an opposite *dictum* ten years later all by the same authority, and with the same imperious demand for implicit confidence! Ten years ago the most eminent medical men pledged themselves that another most dreadful disease *could not* be communicated by vaccination. Now, they nearly all agree with Sir Thomas Watson, who speaks of the "ghastly risk."

we have seen they have gone out of their way to add a yet deeper degradation to their miserable fate, and long after the Contagious Diseases Acts are repealed, the memory of them will make the hearts of all women burn with indignation against the profession which first projected, and then dishonoured itself by carrying into effect, such odious legislation. Neither can the doctors boast that they can set against this any effort on their part to extend relief or comfort of any sort to well-conducted women of the working classes, and it has been left for a woman-doctor (Dr. Frances Hoggan) publicly to claim for such poor women their rightful share of the rates in the erection of resting-places for themselves and their young children as they traverse London. The male doctors have known all the sufferings and disease entailed on poor mothers by the lack of such temporary shelters, yet never have troubled themselves to say one word on the subject. Such are the doctors to women of the humbler classes, What are they to ladies? Undoubtedly they know their interests too well to fail to ingratiate themselves with them. But for real help what have they to show? Did they ever make any serious effort to stop the senseless and health-destroying fashion of women's dress, the reckless dissipation and late hours which have sent thousands of thoughtless girls to their graves? A few Eli-like words of mild advice was all they ever uttered against these deadly and wicked follies.

The case was reversed, however, when there was a movement for the Higher Education of women, and it became obvious that one of the aims of that education would be to fit lady doctors to enter the market as competitors with the men who had hitherto monopolised the profits of the profession. Then, indeed, the doctors grew earnest and made a grand discovery—namely, that mental labour is peculiarly injurious to the weaker sex—much worse, it

would appear, for their feeble constitutions, than any amount of ball-going and dissipation; and that, in short, a term at Girton was worse than five London seasons. Women would perish, and the human race cease to multiply, if female intellects ascended from gossip to Greek! This spectre is nearly laid after ten years' exorcism, but women should not quite forget to what order of men they owe its humiliating introduction.

But, in spite of these solemn warnings, the ladies insisted on reading both Greek and Latin, and eke all the learned treatises on anatomy and physiology and chemistry where-with the intellects of doctors are supposed to be as full as a doll is of bran. Then came the tug of war! Should ladies be admitted, first to medical tuition and then to medical degrees, and licence to practise? The remembrance is fresh in all our minds of the struggle in Edinburgh and elsewhere, and the chivalrous conduct of the doctors and medical students on the occasion. Never, indeed, has there been a more absurd public manifestation of trades-unionism than this effort to keep ladies out of the lucrative profession of physicians, and crowd them into the ill-paid one of nurses—for which (they were assured with the most eager iteration) they were specially and solely qualified.\* At last Nemesis sent a bevy of lady nurses to Guy's Hospital; and the doctors will probably in future find infallible physiological reasons why they should no more be nurses than physicians.

5. We pass lastly to the outlook for the public in future years supposing the ambition of the medical profession to proceed at its present rate of growth for another half-century. It is obvious that Acts of Parliament, of which the

\* For a history of the long struggle of the lady doctors and the behaviour of their opponents, see an article in the *Contemporary Review* by Right Hon. James Stansfeld, M.P.

Compulsory Vaccination Act and the Contagious Diseases Acts are the preludes, will then be multiplied till it may be hard to name the department of human existence—birth, marriage, education, employment, sickness, or death—in which a doctor's certificate, a doctor's attendance—in short, a doctor's well-paid sanction, shall not have become imperative, and the power of the profession to intrude and trammel and interfere and enforce its exactions rendered practically boundless. As a single specimen of what is already contemplated in this way, we will only cite the correspondence which has been going on in the *Times* respecting the horrible proposal to compel parents, children, husbands, and wives to submit to be separated from their beloved ones in cases of infectious disease, and to send them to be treated at the discretion of a medical man. The day when this atrocious scheme is legalised, either in Switzerland (where it has made some progress through the Legislature), or here in England, will be "the beginning of the end" of all family happiness. Cowardice is always cruel, but the cruelty of this proposal to tear asunder the holiest ties in the hour when they ought to be closest drawn, is a surprising revelation of the poltroonery to which we are advancing in our abject terror of disease. Better would it be that pestilence should rage through the land, and we should die of "the visitation of God," than that we should seek safety by the abandonment of our nearest and dearest in the hour of mortal trial, and leave them to the tender mercies of the men who could call on us for such a sacrifice of affection and duty.\*

\* And while the laity are patiently listening to this vile project, the men who propose it are themselves running about with the utmost carelessness between infected and non-infected patients. Are doctors, forsooth, of different flesh and blood from other men that infection does not cling to them and they cannot convey it, since no one thinks of *them* as the ever-active

Space forbids that we should proceed further now in pointing out the many lines of legislative interference which the medical profession is sure to try, and which it will behove the public to watch with closest jealousy. It must suffice if we have here succeeded in placing before the reader some solid grounds for accepting the following conclusions :—

1. That the proper beneficent objects of the medical profession are being daily supplanted by the ardour of purely scientific investigation.
2. That the pecuniary interests of the profession continually override the interests of patients.
3. That a trades-unionism exists in the profession which militates against the proper performance of the duties of medical men in various public and private offices.
4. That the profession has proved doubly treacherous to women.
5. That the further increase of the power of the profession holds out a serious threat to the personal liberties of all the lay members of the community.

Should these conclusions seem just, it will remain for the reader henceforth to watch wakefully and resist steadfastly the ambitious advances of this formidable order, and (as reforms rarely proceed from within) to bring public feeling to bear from the outside world to recall medical men to their proper beneficent and disinterested work. There is yet disseminators of zymotic diseases all over the country? *They* have never been required (as they ought to be) to abandon one or other half of their practice, and confine themselves either to infectious or non-infectious cases. *They* are not even bound by any custom of their own to take the trouble to go home and bathe or change their clothes before they pass from a small-pox patient's death-bed to the bedside of a woman giving birth to a child! *They* must be asked for no such sacrifice of profit or time; but they call on *us* to sacrifice what is infinitely more precious—our fondest affections and the most sacred duties which Providence has laid on us between the cradle and the grave.

reason to hope that by such means the practice of the Healing Art may become really and in truth, what it ought unquestionably to be, but is now only in the language of conventional adulation—a “Noble Profession.”

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It is not without a grave sense of responsibility that we publish the above article from the pen of an esteemed contributor, who prefers to withhold his signature. Our contributor has laid a heavy indictment against a profession that has ever been jealous of its honourable name. Yet our duty has seemed to us very plain. Without committing ourselves to every view or statement to be found in this elaborate criticism, we hold with our contributor that public opinion has been too timid in its attitude towards the great Profession of medicine, and that it is of vital moment that it should become both informed and pronounced. Hitherto a silent convention has protected the Physician and the Surgeon from the wholesome play of criticism. Language which has been common with regard to lawyers, and still more common with regard to clergymen, has been held a mark of ill-breeding if applied to doctors. It has been essential on the platform and in the magazine to allude to the latter as this noble or honourable profession, while their legal and clerical compeers have been subject to every kind of derogatory reference. Now few will deny that criticism has done the clergy a world of good. Why should it do their medical brethren any harm?

All sweeping charges against a community, however carefully guarded, must appear unjust. Nothing could seem more unfair than the assaults of Jesus on the Pharisees of his time. Many of them were upright and pious men. But



the better individuals had not stood out against the worse or made protest against their self-seeking and hypocrisy. So came the condemnation which the Galilean pronounced to be divinely just. It is so in other cases. There are the best of men among the physicians and surgeons of England. But all are held together with tremendous force, by what some will call a fine *esprit de corps*, and others a pernicious spirit of trades-unionism. Hence they must be criticised as a class.

The parallel between the physician and the priest is close. In spite of the temporary revival of a sacerdotal party in the Church of England, the people of this country, broadly speaking, have made up their minds that the influence of the priest in the home is inimical to morality; and the pretensions of the spiritual adviser to enjoy the exclusive confidence of others men's wives and daughters can amongst us never be very widely revived. The power of priesthood is broken for ever. But in the doctors we have a class of men who are more and more gaining the confidence of the boudoir, and scrupulously honourable as multitudes of these men are, this growing social fact is pregnant with perils precisely parallel to those which are generally recognised among Protestants in the hold of priests upon the home. Nay, if there remains any truth in the proverb, *deux médecins, un athée* (and its truth increases rather than declines), the danger from the private medical director exceeds that from the spiritual.

But peril from the assumption of the office of private adviser on the part of the physician demands consideration most of all in the case of our youths. Any one who will make a few casual inquiries will be amazed to discover the frequency with which medical men of high repute—men who are admitted to the friendship of good and unsuspecting women—offer counsel to young men and even to boys which strikes at the root of all morality, and, indeed, can

proceed from nothing else than scepticism concerning the very possibility of morality itself. We speak what we know not of one, but of many, and what no medical man will deny, though many a medical man will revolt from the action of his fellow-practitioners as vehemently as we ourselves. What we ask of these purer spirits in the healing fraternity is that they will speak out on this and other matters of professional practice, and condemn their less honourable colleagues with no faltering tongue.—ED.

## *RELIGIOUS FORCES OF THE REFORMATION ERA.*

THE ecclesiastical history of the last three centuries is for the church historian "the doom he dreads yet dwells upon." He is perfectly conscious that to us in modern times the study of the patristic and mediæval period is chiefly valuable as affording an explanation of present religious impressions. He is perfectly aware that to complete his task it will be incumbent on him to trace the principles of these earlier ages into their phases of latest development. And yet, with a full recognition of this fact, the church historian instinctively shrinks from these phases of latest development. He feels more at home in the past than in the present. He would fain linger with the Gnostics and the Montanists, with the Jews and the Gentiles, with the Dominicans and the Franciscans, with the forms of faith and practice which the nineteenth century has outgrown. With the facts of ecclesiastical history which are within the range of his own atmosphere he is afraid to deal; he touches them with caution, and abandons them without regret. At first sight this is very surprising. We should have expected that the church historian would have found most pleasure in recording those annals which he could trace to causes rooted in living experience. We should have expected that he would delight most to deal with events and with opinions commensurate with the intellectual sympathies of his own age. Nor can there be any doubt that, other things being equal, he would have been

greatly influenced by such a consideration. But, then, it so happens that other things are not equal. If we examine the question more narrowly, we shall find that the historian's objection to modern church history is not the unwillingness to trace the development of the modern church ; it is the difficulty of finding any such development. Through the first fifteen centuries of the Christian era he feels himself guided by a golden thread. He can distinguish a clearly marked line of progress permeating all the struggles of the patristic and the mediæval church. He can detect in her incipient conflicts with Judaism and Heathenism at once a prophecy and a source of her future development. He can trace in her gradual approximation towards the empire the preparation for her coming triumph. He can recognise in the intellectual speculations which surrounded her a stimulus to her conscious appropriation of truth. He can determine, with unfaltering accuracy, those stages of advancing power by which she laid her hand upon the possessions of the world one by one, and successively claimed them for her own. Nor is it difficult for him to see a still further point of progress in that great reaction of individualism which culminated in the Reformation movement. Even this will not at first strike him as a necessary breach of Catholic unity, for he will find that the preparation for this movement has been laid in the ages of mediævalism and matured in the Catholic world itself. All this to the ecclesiastical historian is clear, and thus far he travels joyously. But after that is the deluge. The moment the Reformation ceases to be a movement, and becomes a fact, it forthwith seems to become a chaos. The golden thread is snapped in the centre, the line of progress seems broken, the course of Christian development appears arrested. The old landmarks are swept away, and there seem to be no new landmarks. Another creation appears to be rising out of the great deep whose connection with the

original creation is no longer visible, and history fears that it must seek in vain for the continuance of that principle of unity which has hitherto been the guide of all its way.

For let us remember that the one thing which above all others facilitates the ecclesiastical study of the first fifteen centuries is the unity of the study. The historian is never for a moment drawn aside—never for an instant tempted to diverge from the subject in hand. Strictly speaking, there is no room for divergence. Almost from the close of the apostolic age the line of demarcation between the church and the world begins to fade away; with the incorporation of Christianity in the empire it altogether disappears. Henceforth all history becomes ecclesiastical history; the church is a state, and the state is a church. The secular and the sacred cease to be two separate powers; all secular authority has a sacred side, and all sacred institutions have a secular arm. The kingdom of the church and the kingdom of the state represent themselves respectively in the pope and in the emperor, yet, to all intents and purposes, these two are one. The pope is a sacred sovereign endowed with political power; the emperor is a political sovereign possessed of sacred authority. The result is that throughout the ages of mediævalism the entire mechanism of the world is essentially a church apparatus. There is nothing that can be called secular history; wherever secular history exists, it exists in the form of schism. The plan of the mediæval world is an ecclesiastical plan, and it moves upon a large scale. It is a world which exists not for the individual, but solely for the collective church membership. It assumes that the individual has no life, and no right to have a life, outside the community; that the personal will must be sunk in the universal will. The individual will, from being repressed, ultimately becomes suppressed. The varieties of personal life are lost in the life of the whole. The great men of each generation are rather the incarnations than the

leaders of their age : they lead because they follow. They do not originate movements ; they are themselves the originating product of movements which have already taken place in the life of the collective church, the individual manifestation of laws which are permeating the universal system. Accordingly, the historian has no need to study men in order to find the cause of things ; he has only to study the principle which regulated the movement of the life universal. When he has reached that, he has arrived at the secret of all. The actions of men are but the effects of this great, all-embracing atmosphere which assimilates everything to itself, and history moves along in an almost unbroken monotone obeying the majestic rhythm of an infinite sea.

But over this state of things the Reformation brings an entire change, a change amounting to absolute dissolution. It reverses the position of effects and causes ; it makes individual men the movers and universal laws the product of their action. The personal will which has been hitherto only a feeble manifestation suddenly becomes the primal manifester. The collective church ceases to be collective ; it breaks up into fragments, and each fragment claims to be a whole. The streams refuse any longer to run into the rivers, the rivers refuse any longer to mingle with the ocean ; the passion for unity has died away and the passion for isolation has begun. The ecclesiastical student is in a new world, a world more interesting, because more human, but on that very account more difficult to analyse. He is no longer confronted by the movement of one great dynamical law levelling down into uniformity with itself all the variations of human character and all the idiosyncrasies of human action ; he is confronted first and mainly by these very variations. The long repressed individual life comes up to meet him on the threshold of the new world. It appears before him in an attitude of antagonism to the old law of

uniformity, and for a long time he finds it hard to reduce it to any law. He sees men asserting their rights over humanity, refusing to be reckoned as the mere drops of an ocean, claiming an independent existence and seeking an independent course. He sees as the result of such a claim the tendency to lawlessness and anarchy, the breaking up of cosmos into chaos, the dissolution of the body into fragments, and he feels at the outset disposed to shrink from entering on a task whose materials are so unpromising, and whose scientific completion is so doubtful.

But now let us ask if the prospect of the modern church historian is after all so dark? We have admitted that the Reformation era is a dissolution of the body into fragments, but the very statement implies that it is dissolved into something. Dissolution is not annihilation in the social any more than in the physical sphere; it destroys the existing whole, but it only destroys it as a whole, it resolves it not into nothingness, but into its original component elements. The Reformation era broke up the unity of the mediæval world, but it did not destroy one element of that world; it simply disintegrated it, dissolved it, separated it into its natural parts. It annulled the union of those forces which for centuries had striven together, but it could not annul the forces themselves; it could only send them back to their primitive isolation. The Reformation, therefore, simply sends the historian back. It takes away from him none of those materials which he possessed at starting; it just requires him to begin again. It gives him the old materials in their oldest form, puts into his hand the original elements gathered from the broken unity, and tells him, if he can, to reconstruct them into a new unity. He is in reality in no worse a position than he was in studying the first century, in one sense in a better. In the study of the first century he had first to discover what were the existing forces of mental and social being, and afterwards to

follow these forces in their mutual approximation and union. Here the latter part of the task alone awaits him. The forces are already discovered, the elements are the same as those which met him in the primitive age ; he has simply to find for them a new principle of union. The materials are ready to his hand, and in order to lay his hand upon them he has only to go back to the dawning life of Christianity, where the identical forces of the sixteenth century existed in the same disunion and exhibited a similarly hopeless antagonism.

What, then, were the religious forces of the first century? To this question the subject really narrows itself. They will be found to be three, which may be shortly expressed by the names Judaism, Romanism, and Hellenism. Judaism was essentially the secularising of the sacred. It was that force which strove to reduce everything within the limits of a theocracy, or reign of God in the world. All government was divine government, all education was religious knowledge, all law was the command of God. Secularism, strictly speaking, did not exist. Second causes were not. There was only one cause of all things—God. In all movements of nature he was still saying, "Let there be light;" in all movements of mind he was still proclaiming, "Let us make man." He was not only the primary source of everything, he was the only source of everything ; all the laws of thought, all the laws of government, all the laws of society, were but forms and manifestations of the one great will of God—the law of righteousness.

The force we have called Romanism, from its highest and latest representative, was one which moved in a precisely opposite direction to that of Judaism. If Judaism strove to secularise the sacred, Romanism struggled to make sacred the secular. By this aim it did not mean the sanctification of outward things by an unworldly motive ;



its aim was to invest the secular *as* such with a sacred character, to elevate the worldly principle itself into the rank of divinity. Accordingly it deified power in its most physical aspect; it worshipped an emperor in Rome as centuries before it had adored an emperor in China. It revered the form more than the spirit, it preferred the manifestation to the thought. Like Judaism it surrounded its religious services with a cumbrous ritual, but there the similarity ended. The rites of Judaism were only symbols whose observance indeed was necessary, but whose efficacy lay not in themselves; the rites of Romanism were contemplated by the worshipper as the actual source of religious benefit. Secularism remained true to itself; even in its devotions it never for a moment allowed the sense of the spiritual to absorb the value of the visible. If Judaism, in short, contemplated the reduction of the state into a church, Romanism had for its leading object the reduction of the church into a state.

Hellenism was in some sense a force intermediate between the other two. It was the attempt to substitute for the ideas of secular and sacred a third conception different from either, yet fulfilling some of the functions of each: that conception was the culture of humanity. The Hellenic mind contemplated the reverence for human culture in all its forms as a possible substitute for religion: it was the worship of something invisible, something ideal, something not made with hands, and as such it was fitted to awaken an emotion kindred to that which is stirred by the objects of the religious faculty. On the other hand, it was in the world though not of it; itself immaterial, it was yet the harmony of material things; itself supersensuous and spiritual, it was to be found in the contemplation of the seen and temporal. Here was an object which seemed to preclude any longer the necessity either for merging the secular in the sacred or for absorbing the sacred in the

secular, an object in which the distinction between secular and sacred was annulled, which was at once each and both and neither. Within this refuge congregated those spirits who were dissatisfied alike with the pagan and with the Jew, who had failed to find rest in the observance of a hollow ritualism and failed to meet satisfaction in the submission to an absolute authority; the enthusiasm of humanity presented itself to these as at once a religion and a life.

Into its all-absorbing bosom Christianity lifted these forces one by one. It took them up successively and assimilated to itself each in turn. It took up Judaism, and in the sense of a Messianic mission it found the stimulating power of hope. It took up Romanism, and in the construction of an imperial church it found the sense of regal authority. It took up Hellenism, and in the utilising of philosophic speculations it realised that the new religion was capable of union with natural culture. But although Christianity took up these forces into its bosom, it did not unite them there. It embraced them with a maternal fondness, but it did not induce them to embrace one another; they experienced their mutual antagonism and struggled to be free. Each took the name of Christianity, but each repudiated the Christianity of the other. The Judaic tendency was at war with the Gentile force, the Hellenic tendency was at war alike with the Jewish theocracy and with the efforts at ecclesiastical imperialism. It was only when Christianity became the religion of the state that the appearance of antagonism ceased. Mediævalism exhibited the semblance of a Christendom whose forces had been blended into unity. Judaism, Romanism, and Hellenism, seemed at last to co-exist without struggle. Judaism had her theocracy represented in the sacred sovereignty of the pope. Romanism had her ideal recognised in the regal sanctity of the emperor.

Hellenism had her claims admitted in the permission afforded to church believers to confirm their faith by Aristotelian philosophy. Yet even here it is manifest that there was no union in the proper sense of the term. The elements were not really blended: they were simply tied with a string. Their struggle was prevented by restrictions from without, not by union from within. The fact revealed itself repeatedly by unmistakable signs. So early as the twelfth century the mediæval forces were already in full antagonism; the empire was struggling with the papacy, the papacy was struggling with the culture of southern France. The schism for a time seemed healed, and the unity appeared to be restored; but it was only for a time, and it was only in appearance. In the fourteenth century we find that the regal has crushed the papal power; the pope is torn from his capital, and compelled to live a vassal at Avignon. The great western schism completes the prostration of the once triumphant papacy, and that barrier is broken down which mediævalism had opposed to the power of kings. Culture becomes more bold in its aims and more ambitious in its flights. It had never been attached to the church by anything more than an artificial bond—the bond of papal authority. The shaking of that authority looses the frail cord that unites them. The age preceding the Reformation is already an age of independent inquiry. Philosophy has separated its sphere from theology. Natural science, in its primitive forms of alchemy and astrology, has begun to seek a principle of unity in nature. Biblical criticism, stimulated by the treasures gathered from the ruins of the Greek empire, has initiated its career of study by examining the manuscripts of the New Testament. Mysticism, wearied with the long repression of the individual, has risen up in the soul of a Thomas à Kempis to claim for the heart of each man an immediate and personal vision of God.

Now let us distinctly understand how much this implies. It is frequently averred that the Reformation was not a united movement. It is not sufficiently considered that the Reformation, in order to be a reformation, could not be a united movement. The Reformation was not a united movement, simply because Catholicism was not a united church. It attacked the Catholic Church in three distinct lines, which became in the sequel three mutually conflicting lines; but it did so because, in the heart of the Catholic Church, there were already concealed three mutually conflicting tendencies. Beneath the semblance of outward unity there lay unreconciled in the bosom of mediævalism the antagonistic forces of Judaism, Romanism, and Hellenism, bound together by the strength of an external cord, but with their natural characteristics unsubdued and panting to be free. In order to attack Catholicism, Protestantism had to attack the tendencies of Catholicism, and these tendencies were opposite in their nature. It was impossible that the same movement which should crush Catholic Judaism would extinguish its opposing element of Catholic Romanism; it was impossible that either of the movements or the two united would suffice to extinguish Catholic Hellenism. These forces in Catholicism, which were naturally opposed to one another, could only be met by forces in the Reformation, which were also naturally opposed to one another. There was an element in the Reformation which attacked the Judaic force, and in the very act it became the Protestant Gentile tendency. There was an element in the Reformation which attacked the Gentile force, and in the very act it became the Protestant Jewish tendency. There was an element in the Reformation which attacked the old Hellenic force, and in the very act it became the new tendency of Protestant culture.

The anti-Judaic form of Protestantism was the movement distinctively called Lutheran. It considered the principle of

the Reformation to begin and end with the formula of "justification by faith." It found in that formula the assertion of the rights of the individual man against the authority of the collective church. It was the revolt from the principle that the soul was under law, the protest against the doctrine that the actions of the human mind should spring from no other source than obedience to a foreign command. Justification by faith, whatever else it may or may not have meant, certainly conveyed to the Lutheran the idea of a right to private judgment. It was to him the antithesis of Judaism. It told the human mind that its liberty lay in its individual humanity, that its reason for any hope must be a hope within it. It told it that, in order to find the reason for its hope, it must cease to consider itself traditionally, must cease to view itself as the mere member of a Jewish family, or even as the mere subject of a visible theocracy; must retire within its own being to discover the ground of its religious assurance. That was pre-eminently what the Lutheran saw in the Reformation—an emancipation from the mechanical obedience to law, a transference into the glorious liberty of individual sonship. In so far as the Reformation was an anti-Gentile movement it had for the Lutheran little interest; nay, it received from him much antagonism. He had no decided objection to the use of images; he had a very decided objection to the disuse of sacraments. He refused to strip the Lord's Supper of its inherent efficacy, refused to separate the spiritual benefit from the elements of the bread and wine. He was still under the dominion of the secular; the objective rite retained for him its primitive value; his antagonism to the Judaic element proceeded from his antagonism to the conception of a God who could only speak to him in the accents of theocratic command. He was weary of worshipping a Being who, by the law of his own righteousness, was rendered incapable of union

with the world of material things, and he strove to give stronger prominence to that Gentile element of the Catholic Church which recognised in the material symbol an inherent efficacy, and saw in the forms of worship the actual presence of the divine.

The anti-Gentile form of Protestantism was the movement which is generally considered distinctive of the Reformed as opposed to the Lutheran churches. Holding, like the former, the principle of justification by faith, it found its main sphere of action in the assertion of another principle. The chief force of its attack was directed against the Gentile element of Catholicism. That part of the Catholic worship to which it felt itself most allied was precisely the Judaic principle to which the Lutheran movement was most opposed. It was impressed with the idea of theocracy; it was eager to allow no intervention between the soul and its invisible king. On that very account it objected to the transmission of a pagan ritual into Christianity. It was unwilling to suffer, even for the sake of illustration, the presence in divine worship of any graven image, or visible pattern of heavenly things. It was resolved not to permit the ascription to the elements of communion of any natural power, or any inherent efficacy. Like the Lutheran movement it was opposed to Judaism on the question of a particular priesthood: but there its opposition ended. It took its ground on the fact that all men were potential priests of God, and that therefore each individual had direct and immediate access to the secret of his pavilion. But it still insisted on believing that his pavilion *was* secret, that it was invisible, intangible, a house not made with hands. It would not consent to enclose his presence in a rite, or ceremony, or sacrament. It would not brook to contemplate his enshrinement within the limits of a form which was incapable of transcending materialism. It would not submit to seek the avenue of communion with

him in the contact with purely secular appliances which had constituted at one time the materials of heathen worship. It was essentially a Judaic Protestantism striving to go back to its primitive Hebrew type, seeking to retrace its steps beyond the region of Mosaic ritualism and formalism into the atmosphere of that patriarchal age where the soul lived and moved in the sense of an invisible but all-compelling presence.

The Neo-Hellenic form of Protestantism was the movement of a new against an old culture. It was the assertion of the rights of reason against the scholastic dictum that "faith precedes the intellect." The Catholic Church had been allowed to exercise human reason to the extent of proving by argument what it believed by faith, but as in the Catholic Church faith meant submission to authority, the concession to human reason was rather apparent than real; the earth was allowed to rest upon the elephant, but the elephant itself rested upon nothing, and there was therefore no basis for either of them. It was to establish such a basis that the new Hellenism arose. Nowhere was the spirit of Protestantism more distinctly Protestant than in its assertion of the rights of reason. Here, if anywhere, it claimed for the individual life the privilege of initiating its own process of inquiry. It denied that faith in authority should be compelled to precede the intellect: it denied that any faith could exist which was not itself preceded by the intellect. It required that every branch of secular study should be thrown open to the human mind without restriction and without qualification—should be investigated for its own sake, and read by its own light. It asked that nature, philosophy and poetry should cease to be merely the instruments by which the church expressed its mind and will, but should become themselves expressions of the mind and will of humanity. And the answer to this demand will be found in the great intellectual movement of the sixteenth

and seventeenth centuries. That movement carried individual research into every sphere, approached every department of knowledge with a purely secular eye. In the critical labours of Erasmus it laid the hand of the Gentile on the sacred monuments of the Jew, and subjected to human analysis those Scripture oracles which the church had claimed as her peculiar property. In the imaginative theories of Paracelsus it began what may be called an independent study of physical nature. In the bold speculations of Bruno it initiated the birth of modern philosophy, and became the inaugurator of German transcendentalism. In the analytic researches of Bacon it pointed to the new as distinguished from the old method of science, and recognised the study of fact as the only legitimate road to the knowledge of theory. In the speculations of Descartes it carried into the sphere of mind that Protestant individualism which Bacon carried into the sphere of matter, and proposed to construct a metaphysical science on the basis of an investigation which disclaimed all past conclusions. Even in the dramatic poetry of Shakespeare it revealed the influence of the new spirit, for there for the first time it presented to the contemplation of the poetic eye the image of universal man, the thought of humanity in itself apart from creeds and symbols, apart from nationalities and ages, but bearing the features which mark it in all nations, which distinguish it in all creeds, which characterise it in all ages. The poetry of Shakespeare is essentially the poetry of the renaissance, for it seeks to represent the spontaneous instincts of nature unrestricted by conventionalism, and untamed by ecclesiastical domination.

These, then, were the three religious forces which permeated the Europe of the sixteenth century. Of that Europe, perhaps, our own country is the microcosm. In the heart of the English nation the religious forces of the age were focussed and concentrated, presenting a miniature



picture of the condition of Europe at large. There was one party which held by the Gentile tendency. It was opposed to the theocratic dominion of the papacy; but it desired to hold fast by the mediæval forms of ritual, to adhere to the inherent efficacy of sacraments, to recognise one necessary mode of visible church organisation. There was another party, whose attitude was distinctively Judaic. Like the former, it was opposed to the papal theocracy; but it was by no means disposed to set up in its room the theocracy of a visible church. Its desire was rather to go back to that primitive Judaism which endured as seeing Him who is invisible, to retrace its steps into the empire of the unseen God, to recognise itself as the member of a theocracy whose Head ruled from afar, above the possibility of visual representation, and above the efforts of man to question or modify his will. The germ of English Puritanism was the resurrection of ancient Judaism, the protest of the spirit against the form.

But in the heart of the English nation there remained yet another tendency, and a tendency which was destined to have fuller and larger developments. There was a Hellenic party in the British microcosm—a party nurtured by the influence and fired by the spirit of Erasmus. It valued the Reformation not so much for what it did as for what it made it possible to do. It hailed the new movement of the human mind because it *was* a movement of the human mind, and because it saw in movement the evidence of life. It was comparatively indifferent to the change from one creed to another; it was keenly alive to the import implied in the *fact* of change. The transmutation of systems was a small thing, but the power to transmute was a matter of vast importance. That power meant freedom, and the very thought of freedom was the new birth of humanity. It revealed an object for divine influence more worthy of the divine than incorporation in mate-

rial elements. The human soul itself opened its doors as the possible habitation of the theocracy, and man beheld a new fountain of sacredness in the potential greatness of his own humanity. It was the perception of this new fountain which refreshed the heart of Elizabethan England. Man felt himself to be free, and that feeling was like the breath of ocean ; it gave him a sense of the infinite, it filled him with immeasurable hopes. It was this sense of boundlessness, or, which is the same thing, this sense of being unbound, which impelled the mariner to traverse unnavigated seas, and to seek undiscovered shores. It was this which inspired him with the hope of finding in some region of the earth a Utopian paradise, a land rich with unappropriated gold and luxuriant with ungathered fruits. It was this which gave wings to the new literary impulse, which led man to recognise the poetry of the human soul, the changeless in the mutable, the universal type surviving the individual variations. It was this even which prompted much of the recklessness of that age. Men played with freedom as the child with a new-found toy. It was a new sensation to feel one's self unbound ; it was an unparalleled experience to see no barred gate on life's journey. It is hardly surprising that the sensation proved at first intoxicating ; that the immediate effect of the experience was overbalancing. Yet the light which led astray was the same light which, in other departments, was leading the way to truth. Men had been called to freedom ere yet they had been trained to be free, and the chain which had bound them for ages had been suddenly snapped asunder. They were brought into contact with a force whose nature they had never studied, and whose powers they did not know. It was only to be expected that, for the moment, they should be unable to control that impulse which itself had made them free.

These, then, are the materials for the modern church

historian, the identical materials which met the historian of the first Christian century. His task is to recombine the elements which the spirit of the Reformation has dissolved, or, to speak more correctly, it is to show what law these elements should follow in their process of recombination. It is quite certain that their process of recombination is not yet completed. There has not yet been found that second Roman empire which is capable of blending into the outward unity the forces of Latin secularism, of Jewish theocracy, and of Hellenic culture. As we survey the ecclesiastical history of the last three centuries, we find that each of these forces has in turn borne the pre-eminence. The first period of Reformation history may be called the age of the Gentiles. It was the elevation of the secular into the place occupied by the papal power. The king aspired to be the head of religion and the head of the state at the same time. The one aim was furthered by the decline of the papacy, the other by the fall of feudalism. Yet the century had not closed till there began to appear the democratic or Jewish tendency—democratic because theocratic, unimpressed by earthly kingship because overwhelmed by the sense of divine sovereignty. With the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 the power of this new force turns the scale, and for a period of fifty years the theocratic tendency wears the crown. Then opens the eighteenth century—essentially a century of destruction. The secular and the sacred forces are alike opposed by the third great force of humanism asserting that its time for empire now has come. Church and state crumble together beneath the assaults of this long-repressed spirit, and in the conflagration of the French revolution their ruin seems complete. Then humanism enters on its reign. The culture of humanity claims universal power and universal worship; philosophy aspires to know the absolute, and poetry to feel the life of God. For the first thirty years of the nineteenth

century the empire of the third force is supreme, the next twenty years reveal it on the decline, and the present hour exhibits its decay. Science professes to have shattered the hopes of human absolutism; positivism has denied the claims of philosophy; and agnosticism preaches to man the doctrine of humility. So far, we would seem to be on the return to Judaism, a Judaism whose theocratic law is built no longer on religion but on the principles of physical nature. Yet through all these shiftings of the balance one thing is evident—that beneath these tendencies there lies a common life. The very fact that none of the forces singly has been able for long to hold dominion is a proof that none of the forces singly represents the sum of human need. The constant action and reaction which for nearly four hundred years has been kept up between the forces of the Reformation proves that in some manner yet undiscovered they are necessary to one another. The discovery of that necessity shall be the day of their union, the birth of the new Roman empire, the revelation of that life which subsists by the combination of opposites. It shall be the accomplishment, in fact, of what Latin Christianity accomplished only in form—the amalgamation of the secular with the sacred, and the identification of the sacred with the human.

GEORGE MATHESON.

## *MONASTIC REMINISCENCES.*

**R**EQUESTED to give a few memories of bygone days, not without reluctance do I comply. I have to remind myself of ideal hopes and of their disenchantment. No thoughtful man, no woman refined by the sense of spiritual beauty, can suppose the monastic and conventual life to have existed for 1,500 years in Christendom, for 2,400 years in Buddhism, without containing elements of beauty and of truth. No great religion has existed solely through the power of its errors. No great system has ever flourished solely by means of its faults. It is possible to eschew an error whilst recognising in it a germ of enduring truth. Even a festering heap of corruption contains within itself a spark of light and heat. All forms of faith, all systems of life, being human, must embody elements of goodness, piety, earnestness, and beauty. If one of these, to any mind, has ever been a temple of hope, to revisit the temple bereft of its illusions is not without pain : as when a traveller returning to the home of his youth, revisits the ivy-covered tower, and, wandering round its staircase, finds it leading nowhere.

I shall be guided by my personal memories when describing the general tenor of life aimed at in well-ordered and fervent conventual institutions, and by established facts when very briefly touching upon the ethical and political side of the question.

In the year 1860, being Roman Catholic incumbent of St. Andrew's, I delivered a public lecture in the Town Hall of

Newcastle-on-Tyne, in presence of a great and mixed audience, wherein I gave a sketch of the Dominican Order, which I was arranging to enter that summer, after having made over to them my Parochial House, four schools, and two of the churches then under my jurisdiction. From that lecture I will presently quote a few passages, which still appear to me to be historically true, though truth becomes a lie, unless we also remember that there is another parallel line of truth. The Dominican Order has doubtless encouraged a finer moral type of character than the Jesuit, and a finer intellectual type than the Franciscan; it has in each country been more national than some Orders of later date, and has frequently done for Art what the Benedictines accomplished for Literature. But whilst all the best monastic Orders have claims upon our gratitude which result from the exercise of those human virtues which illustrate all religions and all sections of society and of thought; we must remember, on the other hand, that, next to the power of the episcopate, monasticism has ever been instrumental in the hands of the papacy in endeavouring by any means, physical, penal, and spiritual, to suppress all forms of science, of free inquiry, of free investigation, of mental, moral, political, and national liberty, likely to endanger the sole absolute supremacy of the Roman Church. Such procedure is essential to the theory of a Theocratic Infallible Church; it must be not only an *imperium in imperio*, but an empire over every other empire. However, the Roman Catholic Church and her monastic Orders belong to us as men and women of the nineteenth century; they form part of the complex action of human life, of the providential development of the cosmic growth. Thus we, standing on the platform of humanity, can, with sympathetic interest, with compassion, with regret, with a not inhuman censure, look round upon the diversified provinces of our *orbis terrarum*.

Here let me express regret as to a very important dete-

roration pervading the entire Roman Catholic Church, and affecting all her institutions,—the mental and moral deterioration produced by the increased and increasing system of centralisation and personal absolutism.

The best days of the Dominican Order were the days of its greatest liberty. Each priory elected by ballot its own officers and governing body. Groups of priories elected their own Provincial. The representatives of the national priories elected their General. Pio Nono was the first Pope who interfered with this liberty, and forced upon the entire Order a creature of his own, who intruded upon individual priories foreigners obnoxious to the members and alien to the national sentiment. So complete is the bondage now accomplished over the whole of the Roman Catholic Church, that the Dominican, though the boldest of the religious Orders, has been compelled to a sullen submission. Another evil which has of late years permeated the whole of the Papal Church, is the deliberate introduction of the spirit of Jesuitry, and its odious system of "direction" and of espionage, previously confined to the Jesuit society, but now pervading the episcopate, ecclesiastical institutions, and domestic life. It is sad to witness the lessening of happiness, as well as of the best moral characteristics, induced by this deplorable change. To an old English Roman Catholic, it would seem like a new religion, with all the festering evils of episcopal despotism, servile submission, secret manœuvring, and in hearts noble but believing, suffering silent because without hope. The extent of this tyranny is quite unrealised by the English mind. To cite an instance, one of the most learned theologians of the Dominican Order is always appointed to the office of "Master of the Sacred Palace;" to him belongs the censorship of books and other functions of high trust. A few years ago, the friar holding that office expressed to Pius the Ninth his respectful objections to a course of action imposed upon him. Such

frankness of utterance was quite in harmony with the traditions and usage of the Dominican Order ; but to the new *régime* it was intolerable, and the aged priest was, by order of the Pope, seized by two Papal guards and carried off to prison. Though Rome was at that time full of visitors, the incident never (as far as I know) reached the public ear, or got reported by the Press ; it was communicated to me by a Dominican Father who was in Rome at the time.

The Bishops, acting as Papal Prefects, are now, far more than the religious orders, the powerful enemies of all national, domestic, and individual liberty ; entirely subservient to the Pope, they have an otherwise irresponsible power, can suspend, remove, and punish. Thus, Sister Melainie, the foundress of the great Pilgrimage and Church of La Salette, was, as stated to me by a Roman Catholic bishop, imprisoned without trial, in a French convent, when doubts regarding her supposed miraculous gifts caused her to wish to leave the convent in England where she had been professed.

The picturesque beauty of monastic ruins must not cause us to forget that the monastic rules require that in each monastery and priory there should be a prison, and that the ecclesiastical authorities of those communities are enjoined to imprison therein any member of their body who violates specified rules, or is deemed unsound in his belief of any article of the Roman Catholic faith. These rules are still in force and studied by novices in their novitiate, as may be seen by consulting the approved rules of the Dominican Order ; and the Roman Catholic Church teaches emphatically that when the State dares to interfere with her internal government, the civil law ceases to bind, and that, if yielded to, it is only temporarily, and for the sake of prudence. When the law asserts itself, troublesome ecclesiastics pose as martyrs, and not only in the Papal Church. These grave



and fundamental facts must be remembered, lest we should otherwise allow our judgment to be borne away to the encouragement of the injurious, under some aspect of beauty or beneficence. And it is still my opinion that, if we frankly own the evils and errors of Papal and Anglican monasticism, we might therefrom gather suggestions capable of beneficial realisation, in some modes bereft of all ecclesiasticism, absolutism, false asceticism, and superstition. Thus, I think, men or women when engaged on some literary or charitable or personal matter of importance, would feel it a great boon were there existing amongst us something analogous to the house for retreats built by the lay brothers of St. Laurent-sur-Sèvres, where, in a peaceful seclusion, in silence, unmolested by any household cares, without singularity, with cloister, gardens, and library, those plans which need tranquil thought could be worked out effectually. It was with some such idea that I said, in the lecture already alluded to, "Who has not sometimes in the midst of tempestuous years gone by, pictured to himself and tenanted in spirit those spiritual fortresses which have stilled so many passions and protected so many resolutions?" The courtyard, surrounded by its cloistered walk, in the middle of the court, the well emblematic of the living water of divine wisdom, the sacred inscriptions around the walls, the refectory, library, scriptorium, and church communicating with the cloister; up a flight of stairs the long corridor hung with its old pictures of miracles and of saints; the symmetrical range of doors all opening into the corridor. At the sound of a bell all these doors open with a kind of sweetness and respect. Then appear in long array to refectory or to choir old men with white hair, serene and benevolent; young men of early maturity, novices in whom youth and tranquil study blend into a shade of beauty by artists deemed almost peculiar to the cheerful, frank, active, social seclusion of the sons of St.

Dominic, called the "Angelic Order," in consequence of their white habit and supposed heavenly origin.

In many foreign countries the condition of the Monastic Orders is fearfully and hopelessly corrupt ; but no censure of that kind could attach itself to the novitiate at Woodchester. Its situation is singularly picturesque, being on the side of a hill adjacent to the beautiful park of its founder. We are probably all of us alive to what is unreal, untrue, detrimental, and dangerous in the tendencies of a life based upon a principle essentially erroneous ; but the honest inquirer ought to be made aware that those young men wending their way to the choir, whilst on one side humiliated by regulations worse than frivolous, are the conscious inheritors of many noble traditions. The Friar preachers were founded to be at once students and missionaries over the entire world ; they have produced four Popes, forty-seven Archbishops, and 2,150 Bishops. They have, in a special way, encouraged theology, philosophy, painting, music, and the fine arts. Fra Angelico has made us familiar with those countenances, crowned with stars and luminous with purity and tenderness, easily causing us to forget that the novice of seraphic face might, under the guidance of his Church, become a judge in the Court of the Inquisition. But, in spite of the connection of the Order with that suppression of free investigation demanded by the essential constitution of the Papal Church, the antagonistic fact remains equally true that, with the reserve just stated, the Dominicans were *otherwise* in all countries on the side of the oppressed. " The Indian, hunted like a wild beast, has found shelter behind their habit ; the negro still bears upon his neck the sign of their embrace ; the Chinese have sat down to listen to those wondrous strangers. The Ganges has seen them communicate the divine wisdom to pariahs ; the ruins of Babylon have lent them a stone whereon to rest for a moment and think on the ancient days. Every coast bears a trace of their

blood; the echoes of every shore have been awakened by their voice. What lands or forests have they not explored? What tongue have they not spoken? What wounded soul or body has not felt the pressure of their hand? And while some made again and again the circuit of the world under every flag, their brethren argued in the councils and assemblies of Europe; whilst others, blending genius with piety and taste, took in hand the pencil or the pen, the chisel of the sculptor and the compass of the architect, thus elevating to God both humanity and art."

The Chapter-house at Woodchester was decorated with frescoes by two of the novices. In that room each week the entire community assembled. After singing the invocation of the Holy Ghost in Latin, and a brief exhortation having been given, a monastic exercise called the *Culpa* took place. Each rose, and, after accusing himself of any fault he had committed against the Rule, or against fraternal charity, prostrated himself full length on the floor, whilst other members of the community rose, and assisted his memory by proclaiming any fault he had witnessed in his brother. Notice here the marked difference between the Dominican and the Jesuit Rule. Until of late, when some foreign superiors have, under the influence of the modern Papal system, endeavoured to introduce into all religious Orders an imitation of the Jesuit system, the proclamation of faults was, at least in the Dominican order, straightforward, in hearing of the accused and of the community. The Jesuit system constitutes every one a secret informer upon every one else. Every boy, especially if admitted into the "Sodality of our Lady" (a confraternity existing in all Jesuit colleges), is expected to be a spy upon every one else, and to go secretly and inform his superior as to even the smallest detail. This system of espionage is extended over private families wherein any member of the family or house-

hold is under Jesuit direction. When such statements regard persons of importance or priests of the Order, they are not only noted down, but handed on to a higher superior. The exceptional dislike with which the Jesuits are privately viewed by three-fourths of the clergy and educated men of the world is partly in consequence of this odious system, which, operating in secret and unexpected ways, drags so many into the entanglement of nets of exposure or of destruction. The Roman Catholic Bishops are compelled, by motives of prudence, to keep up a public appearance of cordiality towards the Jesuits, seeming to encourage their colleges and churches; but people behind the scenes know full well that most of them would be heartily glad to have the Jesuits out of their dioceses. The same sentiment of dislike, a similar want of confidence, has animated many of the Popes, including the present and the last. I know how opposed this is to the popular idea, as also to many external actions, such as Pio Nono placing the "*Civiltà Cattolica*" in the hand of some Jesuit fathers, after the Dominicans had refused to undertake it. If time permitted, the reasons might easily be given. Suffice it to say, that it is not convenient for rivals to be playing at the same game near to one another. The Roman Catholic Bishops are now Papal prefects, scheming against nationalities and opponents in the interests of the Papacy with which they are identified. The Jesuits are emissaries of a foreign General scheming against all opponents in the interests of their own Order. Hence the barely-veiled jealousy between Cardinal Manning and the London Jesuits; the open enmity which existed between these and the late Cardinal Wiseman. But to return to the *Culpa*. When the proclamations are finished, the Father presiding enjoins a penance. The penance is frequently only a prayer; but amongst external penances are the following:—To kiss the feet of all the community; to lie down on the threshold of the refectory

door, and let the community walk over you; to eat your dinner kneeling in the centre of the refectory; to wash some brother's room; to write out a full list of all your faults, and read it aloud; to wear the "catanella;" to use, give, or receive the discipline. The catanella is a chain with internal points, worn round the body or on one of the arms or legs. The discipline is a knotted hempen scourge of several lashes, applied to the bared shoulders, either by the person himself or by one of his friends. A not unfrequent penance is to go to another's room, kneel down, and kiss his feet, and ask him to give you the discipline, which he does during the recital of one of the penitential psalms. He then dismisses you with the fraternal embrace and kiss of peace. In Holy Week, the discipline is taken by the whole community together. Abroad, the laity are frequently admitted to a participation in that privilege. Such is also the case in London at the Oratory of St. Philip. In Holy Week, the ceremony of the washing of the feet of the community is observed; but that being a precept of Jesus Christ, is not peculiar to the Dominicans, and is practised throughout the Roman Catholic Church.

The Dominicans are not monks, but "Brother Preachers," "Friar Preachers." Though their habit is white—a white serge tunic and white scapular—yet they received popularly the name of "Black Friars," in consequence of the black cappa worn when walking out. When within the Priory, they take fish instead of meat. When meat is ordered, as very frequently it is for the sake of health, it is always served in a separate room.

During dinner and supper, one of the brothers occupies the refectory pulpit, and reads aloud. After a portion of the Vulgate and of the Martyrology, an English book of an edifying kind is read during the rest of the meal. After dinner and supper, there is recreation in the spacious gardens, the brothers mingling as they like with one another

in conversation, or joining in lighter games. Once a week the recreation is taken in country walks, or in the woods, or on the water of the lake. On other occasions a not severe silence is expected to be observed. At midnight and thrice during the day the community assemble for the divine office—viz., the recital of the Breviary in the choir of the church. The rays of the moon, falling on the windows of the cloister as the white-robed brothers pass along by the graves of their departed into the beautiful Gothic church, form a picture an artist or a poet might envy.

Each Dominican brother has a room to himself. It is called a cell, but is, in fact, a cheerful little apartment, with his bed, table, books, a few pictures, and window looking out upon the cloister court, or upon one of the fairest valleys in Gloucestershire. The Dominican spirit is essentially a free and cheerful spirit. The fathers and choir-brothers devote themselves to study and preaching. The lay-brothers, gathered from the class of rustics, are the servants and gardeners, the cooks, tailors, and bakers of the Priory.

The *Times* printing-office at Blackfriars is on the site of the old London Priory of the Friar Preachers. Some of the large halls still existing in provincial towns, such as St. Andrew's Hall at Norwich, were built by the Dominicans.

The Cistercians, to whom we owe some of the most picturesque ruins in England, are now chiefly known in their Trappist reform. My excellent deceased friend, De Lisle, of Grace Dieu and Garendon, erected a picturesque Trappist monastery in Charnwood Forest. With the exception of two or three priests and two or three others who have sought there a spiritual hiding-place, the Trappist brothers in Leicestershire are for the most part rustics of the simplest sort. In France and Belgium a considerable number of soldiers join that Order. The Carthusians, Trappists, and Carmelites are properly monks, being bound

to enclosure. Dominicans and Franciscans are not bound to enclosure, and therefore are fratres, not monks. However, in reading mediæval and monastic Latin, it should be observed that *Monasterium* signifies a "Religious" House of Women, *Conventus* a "Religious" House of Men. The Trappist Rule is painfully severe, and trying alike to mind and health, unless to those singularly constituted characters to whom silence, manual work, and choral offices can give peace and comfort. The trial is increased by the absence of any independent solitude. The Trappist, unless in authority, has no private room ; he sleeps in a dormitory, he prays in a choir, when allowed to read for an hour it is again in public. He goes to his work in the fields along with others, but must only speak to others by signs, except when in Chapter. The Trappists are allowed one full meal and one very slight meal, but not meat, fish, or eggs. Unquestionably, they injure their health by eating too much at one time ; and the ill-selected vegetable diet and enormous dishes of soup produce stoutness without strength. The Dominican diet seemed to me singularly conducive to pure health and mental vigour, but the young men looked pale and delicate, as if they would fail in continuous physical energy. The Dominicans, Franciscans, Carthusians, and Trappists are amongst those who endeavour to observe literally the practical doctrines of the Sermon on the Mount. Protestant theologians regard all the sayings of Christ as precepts, and therefore binding all. Roman Catholic theologians invent a somewhat arbitrary distinction, and characterise some as precepts, others as counsels. The precepts bind all ; the counsels only those who aspire to perfection. Thus they say that St. Paul advises the state of celibacy, but does not absolutely forbid marriage ; that Christ enjoins benevolence on all, but to those who would be perfect, the practice of giving to every one who asks. Thus at Woodchester we never refused food to any

human being. We often gave 800 dinners to tramps in the course of a month. The Trappist Monastery, though in a sequestered locality, is visited by countless numbers, who invariably obtain relief, and, so far as there is space, lodgment in the guest department. Those who can afford it are invited, but not obliged, to contribute to the monastic alms-chest. This promiscuous almsgiving is unquestionably injurious, but it is the consistent and conscientious carrying out of Gospel teaching. Experience has proved the Oriental idea to be a mistake. For myself, I confess to a greater respect for those who consistently act out a false theology honestly believed, than for those who are always parading their allegiance to Christ as of divine obligation, and yet do not attempt to obey the most marked of his precepts.

The Leicestershire Trappists, through benevolent motives, undertook the charge of a reformatory; but in spite of their personal kindness and anxiety, it never really succeeded. Indeed, the most experienced Roman Catholics generally admitted that for all worldly purposes, schools and other institutions were better under laymen and laywomen than under the "Religious" of either sex. The "Religious" have only one real object, the endeavour to keep those submitted to their care in a frame of mind which shall induce them to a frequent and docile reception of the sacraments, and thereby to secure their salvation. Now God has not made us solely for the sacraments and for a secure death-bed, but for the healthy development of our complex nature. The monastic and conventual guardians of virtue can, by anxious vigilance, shield off many moral temptations, and produce a home of child-like innocence; but, alas! the characters so trained, though often graceful, tender, simple-hearted, and pure, are morally feeble and dependent as children. Hence the Roman Catholic training has been proved by experience to be a failure; and where there is comparative success, it is in institutions wherein the English national characteristics



especially co-exist, as at the colleges of Ushaw, Oscott, and the Birmingham Oratory. But those colleges, as also the grand Seminaire de S. Sulpice at Paris, of which, and of Ushaw, I was an alumnus after leaving the University of Cambridge, do not belong to my present subject, though I am glad to render a passing homage of respect to the blameless men whom I learned to esteem and love in those and cognate institutions, as also in the "Religious" Houses to which I have previously alluded. It is my sad duty to add that the experience of my Roman Catholic ecclesiastical friends abroad, especially in countries wherein the Roman Catholic system has had full exercise, unchecked by Protestant environments, was in numerous instances utterly opposed to my experiences in England, at Issy, and at St. Sulpice. The evidence from abroad thus painfully forced upon my knowledge made me fully appreciate the observation addressed by Pius the Ninth to a Roman Catholic Bishop after the suppression of "Religious" Houses by the late King of Italy—"It was the devil's work, but the good God will turn it into a blessing, since their destruction was the only reform possible to them." Blanco White, in his profoundly impartial narrative of Roman Catholic institutions in Spain, testifies to a similar fact, showing convents of women not to have been exceptions to the widespread moral depression. It is needless to say that exceptions must have been numerous, but it is unquestionable, by the evidence of fervent Roman Catholics, that the ecclesiastical state of Italy was to a wide extent so flagrantly corrupt, so grossly immoral, that I can well conceive the otherwise doubtful allegations of Henry VIII.'s Commissioners to have been truthful expositions of facts. Those who in the Church of England are endeavouring to create fancy imitations of Papal institutions, ought to be warned by the patent fact that these have failed even from the Roman Catholic standpoint, unless when kept in check by

an overwhelming Protestant or Free Thinking majority; whereas, if these institutions are really beneficial, they ought to have made Italy, Spain, and Monarchical France into terrestrial paradises. Whilst thus slightly glancing at the existence of widespread and deep moral evil and at that of much personal and hopeless misery throughout the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical and conventual bodies in Roman Catholic Europe and in South America, I must emphatically state that such remarks do not apply to the convents of women in England and Ireland. Indeed, the statements received from fervent Roman Catholics as to the moral corruption abroad, would not have commanded my belief if made by Protestants or Free Thinkers, so little are they in harmony with my personal experiences in our happily Protestant England. In English convents of nuns, there are some who lament the state to which they have committed themselves, but when belief in a false theology retains them, no legislative enactments could liberate them. In this matter I can speak with knowledge; having been "Extraordinary" to many important convents, it was my duty to see every member of the community alone, whether she wished it or not. I have known nuns unhappy in their life and in consequence of their life, but they could not be induced to apply for a dispensation from their vows, lest they should "lose their souls in the world." Convent life unquestionably for the most part narrows the character; but I feel it almost an insult to the blameless and innocent women I have known intimately, peopling our English and Irish convents, even to name for repudiation the gross calumnies so unworthily and falsely cast upon them by vulgar and ignorant people.

I do not wish to imply any base insinuation when I add that in my opinion there should be a legal obligation, under pain of fine, binding every community to keep a register, in which should be entered the real name and previous

address of each inmate, and also the real name and address of visitors who sleep within the convent walls. In many "Religious" houses of women, and in some of men, the real name of the inmate is never used, not even known to the community. I have known cases wherein parents and others have tried ineffectually to discover whether an individual missing was in a "Religious" house, or dead. If a register, such as I propose, were kept and periodically sent to a registry office for reasonable inspection, no insult would be implied, but a safeguard obtained; and it must be remembered that occasionally nuns partially insane are kept virtually imprisoned in good and kind communities, but under circumstances not always satisfactory. In France, when the Senate refused to adopt the Ministerial measure approved by the Assembly, and thus drove the Government to fall back upon the existing law of France, requiring all communities to apply for Government recognition, the "Religious" houses refused to obey the law, acting upon the Roman Catholic theory that the Church is above the State, and obeys no laws but her own, or those laws of the State which she consents to tolerate. Such a position no State can recognise; but, as a matter of prudence, it would have been a wise course to avoid enforcing obedience in a manner apparently harsh and affecting those who had no voice in the illegal disobedience. The Pope and his prefects, the Bishops, are the real offenders. Obedience could have been gently and quietly obtained if the Government had signified to the Bishops that all ecclesiastical salaries provided by the nation would cease until they had caused the "Religious" bodies to obey the law. Should the ecclesiastical authorities have elected through political motives to continue to foster disobedience so as to make the "Religious" houses the permanent citadels of Napoleonic or Bourbon reaction, the laity who approved their disaffection could have subsidised

a Church, thus making it independent of the State. In England, wherein the Papal Church is in some particulars more favoured politically and socially than in any Roman Catholic country, it seems to me quite practicable to secure obedience to any reasonable law not accompanied with any conditions implying an insult. Those who hear of foreign legislation in Roman Catholic countries and marvel at its impetuosity, are apt to forget that it is not necessarily animated by the spirit of persecution, but rather of self-protection on the part of those who have but recently escaped an almost successful conspiracy of Imperialists and ecclesiastics. When these ecclesiastics were in full power, no murmurs of opposition, no accents of freedom could have been uttered or published with impunity. No political party desires to deprive Roman Catholics of their religious rites ; but it ought to be remembered that there are millions of men and thousands of women who feel that a nation does not exist merely for the sake of a Papal theory. It is said that one thing or another is not possible because a few years since the Pope forbade it. Then let the Pope withdraw his mandate. Roman Catholics understand full well, when it is for their own convenience, that the Pope can dispense with all enactments and all laws and all bonds but those of clearly natural obligation.

It is patent to all observers of events in modern Europe that the public opposition to Roman Catholicism is more political than theological. If Roman Catholics contented themselves with administering the sacraments, working miracles, interviewing the blessed Virgin Mary, preaching the dogmas of piety and morals according to their ecclesiastical convictions, and endeavouring to convert others to such views, no Government would interfere with them. But now Roman Catholics delight to make it prominent that a foreign and hostile power is not only theoretically

but practically superior to the State. A conquered nation is made to feel its yoke when it cannot make laws without having first to consult the wishes of its conquerors, and the humiliation is intensified when, should such consultation have been neglected, the conquerors set aside the laws, enforce contradictory mandates, and enjoin disobedience to the laws of the conquered race. Surely a nation must be lost to self-respect ere it will tamely yield to such an oppression. When a nation is well established in liberal thought and action, it refrains from the exercise of authority theoretically just, and, therefore, refuses to punish audacious proclamation of theories of rebellion, or to enforce against the theorists existing laws for the protection of national dignity. The Government limits its action to the suppression of deeds of illegality calculated to disorganise society. The question at present before the French nation is, whether or not the scornful rejection of the French law requiring communities to seek for Government recognition constitutes an illegality compromising the public peace as well as outraging the national dignity. It is admitted on all sides that the open disobedience of the Religious Orders was meant to demonstrate that the Pope is superior to the Republic as well as hostile to it. The revival of a disused law in France reminds us that in the English Act of Parliament which emancipated Roman Catholics in the year 1829, a limitation was established, affecting Jesuits and other Religious Orders of men bound by monastic or religious vows. To provide for the gradual suppression and final prohibition of such, it was ordained that any such persons coming into the realm without a licence, which can only last six months, are declared guilty of a misdemeanour, and may be sentenced to be banished for life. Similarly, any persons admitted within the kingdom to membership in any of the Orders in question may be sentenced to banishment for life. If, although banished,

they do not go out of the country, the sovereign in council may have them conveyed to some place abroad. Moreover, if they are found in the country at the end of three months, they may be convicted again and transported. Penal servitude is now substituted for transportation.

True Liberals should move for the repeal of these enactments. A time will probably arise when some line of action adopted by the Roman Catholic Bishops, some ordinance from the Pope, will justly irritate the public mind; and then the Government may be compelled by the popular voice to punish the innocent for the sake of the guilty. We have (happily) no laws against the Papal Bishops, but we could banish or imprison a few hundred harmless Trappists, Dominicans, Franciscans, and Carthusians. It may be replied, "But the law will at least get hold of the Jesuits." And if it did; what then? Our real dangerous enemies are the Bishops. The great political and moral mischief is the system of "direction" exercised by means of the confessional now permeating the Roman Catholic Church. But surely we are not to be asked to legislate against the Papal Sacraments. The Jesuits are quite as much a source of weakness to Romanism as of strength. They are scheming for power for themselves and their General; the Bishops are scheming for power for themselves and the Pope. The two objects frequently harmonise, but not unfrequently are antagonistic.

If Liberal thinkers in England made themselves acquainted with the Canon Law and the existing Papal claims, and even still more with the mode in which those claims are being forwarded to the detriment of domestic happiness, of social peace, and of many phases of personal virtue, they would recognise that able politicians on the Continent are not all the victims of mere vulgar bigotry and causeless panic. There must be some valid reason for the hatred animating three-fourths of the Roman

Catholic laity against what they affirm to be a widespread domestic as well as political conspiracy, combining, against the interests of society, the prying surveillance of the Jesuits and the organised absolutism of the Bishops.

The defenders or palliators of modern Roman ecclesiasticism are to be found amongst English Ritualists and a section of English Liberals. The hostile opponents of Romanism are foreigners who, in Roman Catholic countries, have made their first Communion and been confirmed in the Roman Catholic Church, are still nominally in the same, and have wives and daughters reared in convents and subject to "direction." When I have spoken with French, Belgian, and Italian Roman Catholic laymen, of the cheerful goodness pervading such institutions as Ushaw and Woodchester, and the innocent and inoffensive lives of so many English priests, my words have been met with expressions of indignant disagreement. As a Belgian Roman Catholic professor said to me, "If you were to reside amongst us a few years, and see behind the scenes in domestic life and in political life, you would see why we hate the confessional and all who sit in it—each confessional is the detestable symbol of the humiliation of the parent and of the State."

The casuistry of the Jesuits has now established itself throughout the Roman Catholic Church; what it is like can be learned with perfect accuracy by procuring the small volume published by Charpentier, Paris, and, after a few months, already in its fourteenth edition, entitled, "*La Morale des Jésuites*, par Paul Bert." Each year of my life makes me realise more profoundly the moral injury produced by absolutism and "direction," and by the errors essentially interwoven with Papal monasticism and Papal casuistry. The French are justly alarmed at the enormous wealth of the Ecclesiastical institutions—a wealth untaxed, and in the possession of those who are opposed to the best interests of the nation. England is now incurring a similar

danger. Liberals will not invoke laws to remove the growing evil, but, if wise in time, they will urge upon society and upon the Government not to foster it by patronage, not to encourage it as a fashion, not to palliate it by untruthful courtesies.

Let no picturesque or poetic associations make us blind to the fact that the monastic and conventual life is not the highest life, is not the highest ideal, or that the English home is more full of unselfish virtue, of genuine piety, of pure, tender sympathy, of the true poetry and pathos of the finest human life, than the Papal convent with its false asceticism and its ethics opposed to the laws of nature and of God.

Then, has it all been for nought? All those generous youths, those fervent women, who, mantled with charity, and marked with the wounds of penance, tore themselves from their homes and flung themselves into the arms of Jesus Christ,—was it all an illusion? That Aquinas, who fled from the castle of his ancestors, cast away the diadem of earth, preferred the royalty of thought to the royalty of gold, clothed himself in the white wool of St. Dominic, sought a solitude which had inspired poets, created artists, animated genius,—was it all an illusion when he trampled beneath his feet the passions of youth, and gathering around him the white folds of purity, received poverty as his possession, and from the hands of an ideal Christ the sceptre of meekness, and calmly ascended the throne of philosophy to rule over the empire of mediæval thought? Was it all an illusion, whatever imparted to him the privilege of preserving to his last breath that earnestness of purpose, that generosity of soul, that strength of affection, that simplicity of heart, which often are reserved to the first dawn of youth? Was it all an illusion when there clustered around his solemn lessons the listening hearts of the pure and the young? I trow not. It is no illusion when we follow the highest



ideal that we know. Those great memories belong to our common humanity. Monastic Houses cannot be fairly or beneficially put down by legislation; in spite of what they may frequently have become, they originally sprang out of the enthusiasm of the human heart. They must be confronted with an enthusiasm as noble, as pure, and as beneficent. They presented to a credulous age an ideal, wearing that triple aureola so revered by youth, of charity, of chastity, and of poetry.

In an age when the credulities are fast becoming impossible, Piety, Humanity, and Science, the trinity of the nineteenth century, will conquer a threefold enthusiasm if again crowned, as in the best days of old, by Charity, by Chastity, and by Poetry.

R. RODOLPH SUFFIELD.

*THE REASONABLENESS OF EVOLUTION.*  
*A REPLY TO DR. ELAM.*

CRITICISMS of the doctrine of Evolution are by no means so numerous as they used to be. This diminution of critical activity is due chiefly to the fact that most of the demands of the Evolutionist have been admitted by biologists to be reasonable and just. Otherwise it is impossible to account for the favourable reception which the hypothesis of descent has met with at the hands of the biological world at large. There are, however, still some persons who remain, in accordance with the theory of averages, unconvinced on the subject of Evolution. These persons may be divided into those who "don't know," and those others who "won't know." The scientific objector to Evolution *in toto*, is somewhat of a *rara avis* in these latter days. But one stumbles across him now and then, and mostly in the pages of evangelical magazines, whose readers are only too thankful to be told by some one that man is descended not "from the monkey, but from mud." A review of what has been written on the "other side" during the past year or so, reveals a paucity of material for criticism. One of the most recent declarations appears in the *Contemporary Review* for May, 1880.

In a paper entitled "The Gospel of Evolution," Dr. Elam, criticises, from the standpoint of the "Opposition," the leading doctrine and idea of the present decade of learning. Needless to remark, Dr. Elam writes strongly, even if he is a somewhat biassed critic, as I shall presently strive to

show. But whilst he deprecates Evolution, tooth and nail, he is, at the same time, justly mindful of the claims which its foremost advocates possess upon the hearing ears and understanding minds of the age. With the tenor of his opening remarks upon the value of the labours of Darwin and Huxley, all will agree. The labours of these biologists in extending the bounds of knowledge, and in making large the dwelling-places of wisdom, Dr. Elam would assert—and practically does say—are beyond all commendation or praise. Most biologists, and not a few non-technical readers likewise, may, however, be inclined to supplement the preceding remark by another—namely, that it had been more to the purpose could the researches of these leaders of biological thought have inspired Dr. Elam with a belief in the reasonableness of the doctrines they teach. Still, conscientious objections to this theory, or to the interpretation of that fact, must be respected. If over and over again in Dr. Elam's article one is inclined to mentally ejaculate, "that strain again," and if our author harps pretty persistently on the same strings throughout his criticisms of Evolution, we must not, in barest justice, forget that certain of his opponents are given to a similar repetition of facts which they conceive support and prove their case. Readers of Dr. Elam's earlier papers in the *Contemporary Review* will not find much that is new in the article under notice; but the latter demands special attention as being, *de facto*, a concise enough summary of his previously expressed opinions against the doctrine of Descent. Dr. Elam, one must admit, is an antagonist whom one may well feel pleased to meet, and with whom one may break a lance in fair contest. If in his papers one hears just a little too much of the "learned and modest Dr. Büchner," whose name seems to inspire in our author the feelings excited by the proverbial red rag of bovine philosophy, we must not forget that, on the contrary, the epithet "weather-cock head" is by no

means a flattering appellation as bestowed from the opposition camp. The exchange of scientific sentiment is proverbially acetic, if one may so term it; but the demolition of an adversary may be accomplished without the concomitant attributes of Donnybrook, and *minus* the phrase "you're another" presented in sarcastic guise. If Evolution and its acceptance or its rejection be, as it unquestionably is, an all-serious matter, let us dispense with the frivolity of cleverness, and eliminate objurgatory from our list of arguments. Sensible people may well grow weary of the most dexterous word-fencing, when the question at issue is of grave and portentous kind.

A careful perusal of Dr. Elam's paper leaves upon the mind, as the leading idea of the author's case, that he objects throughout to the status of Evolution as a rational theory of life and nature. He denies that the evolutionists have made out a case worthy a patient scientific hearing. Evolution to Dr. Elam is all theory—all subjective projection of ideas, without any objective correspondence. He is the sworn foe of hypothetical phylogeny and ontogeny likewise. After a perusal of Dr. Elam's demands for proof, indeed, one is tempted to ask in despair, "What science shall delight him, and wherewithal in modern learning shall he be satisfied?" For him the question of "missing links" remains where it was years ago in the eyes of the Cuvierian philosophy. "Amongst animals," says Dr. Elam (p. 731), "we observe at least five distinct types, between any two of which there is no known or suspected transitional form." \* Biologists, and especially zoologists, may

\* Dr. Elam may not, perhaps, be aware that his "five distinct types" do not include the entire animal population of the globe. Where would he set the Starfishes, Sea-urchins, and their neighbours? These are not Protozoal, they are not Coelenterates nor Mollusca, and they are neither Annulosa nor Vertebrates. Our author must renew his acquaintance with elementary zoology. Naturalists who teach that there are types, at least teach us that there are six, and not five, divisions—the missing division in Dr. Elam's list being that of the Echinozoa or Annuloida.

well be inclined to read this sentence over again amid some degree of wonder and surprise when they reflect upon Kowalewsky's researches into the history of the Ascidian-larva—the true bearing of which discovery Dr. Elam does not seem to comprehend (*vide* p. 732). With Dr. Elam's disclaimer of "missing links" in view, zoologists may well be inclined to say, Have *Lepidosiren* and the frog existed in vain? have Protozoan sponges exhibited the *ectoderm* and *endoderm* of *Cœlenterates* for naught? and do birds and reptiles remain distinct—Professor Marsh and the *Hesperornis*, *Ichthyornis*, and *Compsognathus* or the *Archæopteryx* notwithstanding? So firmly fixed, indeed, are Dr. Elam's opinions, that no such thing as Evolution is possible, far less probable, in his view. With Dr. Elam it is not a question of the factors which have inaugurated, guided, and modified the process of Evolution. He does not require to enter into the details and comparison of "Natural Selection" *versus* an "Internal Force" as the ruling idea and power in Evolution; since for him Descent is unproved and, one may add, unprovable. His is the attitude towards Evolution of the modern physiologist towards phrenology. The physiologist denies the groundwork and status of the "science" of brain-pans, because he finds no support for that "science" in the physiology and anatomy of the brain. And so with Dr. Elam and Evolution. It is not, therefore, surprising to find our author objecting to Haeckel when he does not recognise Darwin. His horror of Haeckel's phylogenies can be understood, when we know how closely he questions the *raison d'être* of their construction. His attitude towards Evolution, in a word, is that it is irrational and inconsistent with the facts of nature. Thus starting with the assumption that the doctrine in question has no existence in fact, that it is "an unverified theoretic conception," and, by syllogistic inference, "a mere figment of the intellect" (p. 740), we can perfectly under-

stand how proofs and facts, plain to others as facts can be, are of no weight, and find neither favour in the eyes nor mercy at the hands of our author.

I think it needful to remark the personal attitude of Dr. Elam to the theory of Descent, because I am of opinion such standing towards Evolution is a fact of primary importance in determining the scope and bearing of any man's convictions towards belief of any kind. And I may be permitted to add, likewise, that the fact that Dr. Elam is not a professed naturalist, must count for much in the settlement of the question before us. True it is, that every man of culture is perfectly able to appreciate and understand the general grounds on which belief in Evolution is based. But, at the same time, the exact determination and influence of new facts upon our theory of nature, is a matter in which the trained mind of the biologist counts for much—I would fain add, means everything. For instance, how can any one who is not conversant with the facts of hybridity, or with the definitions and constitution of "species," duly understand the weighty nature of Darwin's remarks on the evidence in favour of the modification of species and of the occurrence of well-nigh illimitable specific change? Am I overstating the case when I say, that the experience of those biologists who, as lecturers and teachers, come most frequently in contact with the public, is all in favour of my contention that only after the lapse of one or two generations will such evidence as is derived from the development of animals and plants be capable of being estimated at its true worth? And, therefore, as a biologist, I appeal to my scientific brethren at large to say, whether or not such facts as development evinces—to select one department of science alone—if properly appreciated, are more than sufficient to establish the innate truth of Evolution as a consistent theory of the origin of the living hosts of to-day? To zoologists such evidence is simply irre-

sistible. It is the knowledge of this single fact which causes me to dwell so strongly upon Dr. Elam's persistently sceptical attitude to the theory of Evolution, and to question, in no offensive sense, Dr. Elam's capacity, as not being a professed biologist, for estimating the bearing and teaching of these developmental facts. If we find Professor Allen Thomson in his Presidential address to the British Association (1877) saying plainly and well, "I consider it impossible, therefore, for any one to be a faithful student of embryology, in the present state of science, without, at the same time, becoming an evolutionist," we may well be inclined to think twice before rejecting the opinions of authority with reference to the theory which best explains the facts biology discovers.

Dr. Elam is perfectly right and just in his assertion when he says that "authoritative assertion" or "felicitous phrasing" cannot settle the grave question before us. "*Evidence*, and evidence alone, must be our guide," says Dr. Elam, "to acceptance or rejection" (p. 721). Exactly so, I reply; but Dr. Elam's remarks on authority cut both ways. If meant to incise evolutionists, they may likewise and more probably divide his own case. Nobody cares for mere "authority" in science, except where authority has given reason for the exhibition of such respect, and has constituted itself a power and influence by its discovery of facts and truths. For the facts of development, for instance, authority of one kind or another in biology must be responsible—let us say, Huxley, Allen Thomson, F. M. Balfour, Kowalewsky, Haeckel, and others. These facts remain as facts; it is only the interpretation of the facts which can be a matter of difference or dispute. But are not the discoverers of the facts of embryology the persons most likely to form correct judgments concerning the bearing of this phase of development or that? Who is most likely to know best the

meaning of a gastrula-stage in sponges, or of skull-formation in vertebrates—Huxley, Haeckel, and Allen Thomson on the one side, or Dr. Elam on the other? I do not think the scientific or cultured world will hesitate in its reply. Reject "authority," as I have defined it, in matters biological, and whom or what have we left as an ultimate court of appeal? That it is a question of evidence, I fully admit; "*Evidence*, and evidence alone, must be our guide to acceptance or rejection." These are Dr. Elam's own weighty and reasonable words; and I repeat, the facts of zoology and botany interpreted by the light of Descent—and discovered and decided by those best qualified to pronounce upon their merits—are all in favour of Evolution and its rational nature.

The question between Dr. Elam and the evolutionists is, therefore, of the widest possible nature. It is not a quarrel over the rights or wrongs of Haeckel's "Monistic Philosophy," or over those of any other modification of Evolution. There are ardent evolutionists who would probably argue against Haeckel in the matter of Evolution. Nor is it a question—as in the present stage of things such matters often become—of how much of "Natural Selection" is true, and how much incorrect. On the broader basis of the entire right or wrong of Evolution, Dr. Elam takes his stand. Logically, Dr. Elam will have nothing whatever to say to this theory of nature. Hence it becomes the duty of his opponent, without entering too minutely into detail, to attack our author on the ground whereupon the latter chooses to dwell. There is neither "Natural Selection" nor any other evolutionary tendency in the world, says Dr. Elam. All evolutionary conceptions are mere figments of the intellect, according to our author. Hence I shall join issue with him on his own terms. I shall not attempt to disguise our difficulties, but I shall formulate, to begin with, my belief in a single sentence—namely, that admitting gaps in our knowledge (and these



are year by year being lessened in a marvellous fashion), there remains above and beyond these deficiencies, an amount of evidence which is amply demonstrative of Evolution as the great law in virtue of which the living nature we see has been produced. I may add that by "Evolution" I mean, as Dr. Elam himself implies (p. 714), that general and universally understood idea of the origin of species of animals and plants from pre-existing species through natural laws of reproduction, modified by various external and internal circumstances—the "Natural Selection" of Darwin, the "internal force" of another, or the operation of "a law of progressive development" of a third. I am not so much concerned in demonstrating the factors and powers to which Evolution is due, as in showing that it is neither scientific nor logical (in the face of *facts*) to deny the existence and operation of the process. And I may lastly state, that I shall hold the idea of Evolution to be opposed to the only other formulated hypothesis of the origin of species, that of "special creation." The details of this latter "theory" are still writ large enough in our temples to obviate the necessity for specifying its teachings or its authority.

Selecting for criticism, on account of its highly important and fundamental nature, what Dr. Elam (p. 722) styles "the broad principle . . . that all living beings are connected together by the ties of relationship and descent from a common ancestry," let us endeavour to see whether this leading doctrine of Evolution is capable of such proof as will satisfy the rational and unprejudiced mind. Dr. Elam, after stating as above the principle involved in Evolution, criticises Haeckel's phylogeny of the animal world, with the view of showing the entirely hypothetical nature of the Jena philosophy. This philosophy we have had criticised before by Dr. Elam, and the familiar strains of scepticism over Haeckel's construction of man's pedigree—

or of that of any other form, indeed—meet us once again. Dr. Elam calls for proof of this genealogical ramble on the part of Haeckel, and with his demand it behoves evolutionists to deal. Not that we are concerned here with the probability or improbability of Haeckel's phylogeny. That is mere matter of detail. Every evolutionist, it will be admitted, must postulate a connected series of forms. The exact order in which the organisms of present and past epochs are correlated to form a great tree of life is a secondary matter. That order may not be approachable in any exact fashion for years to come; but no evolutionist doubts that the development of living nature has followed some such method as indicated by the phylogeny we endeavour to construct to-day. Dr. Elam's quarrel with Haeckel is that the Jena phylogeny is as mythical as Mrs. Gamp's matter of fact details concerning Mrs. Harris; and Dr. Elam's criticism exactly parallels that of Mrs. Gamp's somewhat acidulous colleague: for as she believed "there ain't no Mrs. Harris," so our author maintains that Haeckel's *Gastræada* and *Chordonia*, his *Sozura* and *Planæada* alike, are mere figments of the Jena intellect.

As a first remark, it should be noted that apart from any particular system of phylogeny, the results of recent researches have certainly warranted the evolutionist in seeking to construct a genealogical tree of the animal world as part and parcel of the belongings of the doctrine of Descent. For instance, where, in any system of classification, would Dr. Elam place *Archæopteryx* with its plain bird-characters united to as marked a reptilian organisation? Not in the birds, for wholly bird *Archæopteryx* is not; not in the reptile class, for wholly reptile it is not. *Archæopteryx* must—as a matter of "*Evidence*" let us note—be placed, by common consent, as an intermediate form; and if intermediate, then, by universal admission, as part of such a connected tree of descent leading from reptiles to birds as the evolutionist

desires and expects. Dr. Elam might, it is true, object to this statement, as he objects to Haeckel's phylogeny, by saying that the intermediate position of Archæopteryx is all theory. If so—and one need not trouble to deny the assertion, in face of the opposing "theory" of "special creation"—it is a theory which perfectly accords with, and also explains, the facts of the anomalous character of Archæopteryx. The evolutionist's theory, moreover, is one which is, besides, contrary to none of the other known facts of bird-life on the one hand, or reptile-existence on the other. If Dr. Elam should elect to regard Archæopteryx as a "special creation," in lieu of an "evolved" organism, he may, if he pleases, postulate such a belief. But of Dr. Elam, in such a case, science and scientific authority would say, as our author himself says of Haeckel, he "is one of those fortunate men to whom nothing is doubtful and nothing is obscure" (p. 722). For Dr. Elam's belief there would be no scientific sanction, warrant, or proof of any kind whatsoever. For Haeckel's dictum, or for the evolutionist's assertion that Archæopteryx is one term in the series of intermediate forms connecting birds and reptiles, there is the fullest justification in the facts of nature.

Nor do the "*Gastræada*" of Haeckel appear so utterly devoid of foundation as Dr. Elam supposes. Persons who teach, and persons who make it their business to acquire a knowledge of, biology, look upon *Gastræas* and *Gastrulas* with a large modicum of respect. The reasons for this regard are not difficult to trace. When we inquire of the biologist what a *Gastræa* is, we are not left in doubt for a moment on this point. In all animals above the *Protozoa* (or very lowest) a certain early stage of development results in the division of the *germinal membrane* or *blastoderm* of the developing egg into two layers, respectively named *epiblast* or *ectoderm*, and *hypoblast* or *endoderm*—the *serous* and *mucous layers* of past decades of physiology. These two

layers sooner or later develop a third, which appears between them, and is named the *mesoblast* or *mesoderm*. At the stage when these layers become first differentiated, the developing embryo appears as a rounded sac, with double walls, these walls enclosing a central cavity. Sooner or later this cavity opens at one extremity of the embryo in the primitive mouth; and when in this condition the embryo is named the *Gastræa*. Now the study of development has taught us that in all animals above the *Protozoa* a *Gastræa*-stage is represented. This, indeed, is the first milestone on the developmental journey. Here and there it is imperfectly represented; now and then it is almost suppressed or even obliterated altogether; but the facts remain, firstly, that all animals (above *Protozoa*) pass through a *Gastræa*-stage, and secondly, that some animals remain before our eyes to-day as *permanent Gastræas*. For example, there are some sponges (*Hali-physema* and *Gastrophysema*) which actually remain in the *Gastrula* or *Gastræa* condition. There are also certain lower worms which represent animals that remain as permanent *Gastrulas*; and the common fresh water polypes or *Hydræ* in one sense, are likewise to be regarded as stable *Gastrula* forms. With these facts fairly in view, does Haeckel's contention that the root-phylum of the higher animals is to be witnessed in the *Gastræada*, appear to be an illegitimate or unwarrantable suggestion after all? Is Dr. Elam correct in any sense when he says (p. 722) that as regards the *Gastræada*, "it appears, however, ultimately, that they belong to a purely imaginary world"? We must apprehend that Dr. Elam has never seen a cup-sponge, and that he is unfamiliar with the *Spongida* and with the first pages of comparative embryology, otherwise he could never have penned the words last quoted. It is this ignorance of embryology which accounts for his further statement that "there is no evidence whatever of their (*Gastræada*) exist-

ence at any period ; " and again, that " they are placed here to fill a gap which would otherwise sadly have spoiled the symmetry of the theory." So far removed are these latter statements from the real facts of the case, that an emphatic **denial may be given**, as I have shown, to each and all of them. Gastræas *do* exist; they belong to the world of living beings; they are likewise placed to fill a gap, and they very fully, in the eyes of all competent biologists, succeed in demonstrating to us the first beginnings of higher life. Possibly Dr. Elam may refuse to credit Carl Gegenbaur's views with importance. But if so, that is Dr. Elam's matter and misfortune, and neither the fault of Evolution nor of biology at large. Gegenbaur, in speaking of the Gastrulas and Gastræas, in whose existence Dr. Elam disbelieves, says :—

Starting from the hypothesis that forms, agreeing with a Gastrula in all essential points, were the precursors of all the higher forms of animal organisation, a Gastræa-form, resembling the Gastrula, has been regarded as the primitive ancestral form of all animals. This Gastræa-theory is based, first, on the existence of independent animal forms which resemble the Gastræa; secondly, on the fact that the embryonic body, which commences with a Gastrula, does not, in the lower divisions, rise very much above it, so that even, apparently, considerable complications of the organism can be traced back to the existence of these two layers of the body; thirdly, the presence of these two layers (epiblast and hypoblast) of cells, forming the ectoderm and endoderm, as a general, constant, and, therefore, regular phenomenon, even in the higher divisions of the Animal Kingdom, as well as their constant relation to the same functions, is a fact of the greatest importance for the hypothesis in question; indeed, the occurrence of these layers as the so-called germinal layers which make up the embryonic body, cannot be rightly understood without a reference to a hypothetical Gastræa-form. This hypothesis," concludes Gegenbaur, "may therefore be regarded as justified.\*

These are weighty words as coming from one entitled

\* *Elements of Comparative Anatomy.* By Carl Gegenbaur. London: Macmillan. 1878. P. 85.

to speak with authority. If we reject these views of Evolutionists, what explanation is left to us of the occurrence of the Gastræa-stage in the animal world at large? How, otherwise, are we to explain the occurrence of useless Gastræa-stages in the development of the highest animals? It is for Dr. Elam to reply; but one may be excused for saying of this fact, as of many others in development, that to take any other view than that the development of an animal repeats with modifications the Evolution of its race, "is to admit that the structure of animals, and the history of their development, form a mere snare laid to entrap our judgment."

In the face of the evidence afforded by embryology, regarding the literally amazing likeness between the development of the Lancelet (as the lowest fish and Vertebrate), and that of the Tunicata or Sea-Squirts, the problem of the origin of Vertebrates does not seem very difficult of solution. Dr. Elam attempts to make light of Haeckel's *Chordonia*, the primitive possessors of notochord or spine. Chordonians are not known certainly; but what has Dr. Elam to say of *Appendicularia*? which represents the permanent larval form of an Ascidian-stock, and, therefore, may be taken to represent an example of an unmodified and primitive Sea-Squirt? Let us, however, hear Dr. Elam's criticism of evolutionary views of the origin of Vertebrata (p. 732):—

When the period arrives when the Vertebrata *must* be introduced, there is no craning before he [Haeckel] leaps, no pusillanimous hesitation. He takes a worm, and, with a stroke of his pen, endows it with a spinal marrow and a chorda dorsalis on 'mechanical principles'; and having further improved it, he calls it *Ohordonia*—the parent of all the Vertebrata—and a sort of distant relative, perhaps second cousin, of the Ascidian. It is placed in its natural (*sic*) order as though it had a legitimate claim to be there; and it never seems to have occurred to the author that, even were it true, this process, in no one respect, resembled Evolution. I feel some reluctance to speak of this as

it deserves ; but I consider it as little short of a monstrous literary (*sic*) fraud, as it would be a commercial fraud to pass a forged note in a packet of real ones. I may add that if there be any truth or reality whatever in the principles of the science of Embryology, it is as impossible for the Ascidian to stand in this relationship to the Vertebrata as it would be for any member of a genealogical tree to be represented at one and the same time as his own grandfather and his own grandnephew.

There is something undeniably specious about Dr. Elam's style of writing as displayed in this passage. The introduction of the Vertebrata is surely a fact for which Nature and not Haeckel is responsible, even if we admit that the Jena zoologist, or any other naturalist, endeavours, as a scientific duty, to trace their origin. Dr. Elam, however, seems not merely to indicate that as we have got the Vertebrata—by special creation or otherwise—we should rest content with that fact, but likewise insinuates that Haeckel (and, presumably, any one else) is taking a great liberty in meddling with the highest type of animal life at all. Now, there is nothing sacred or untouchable about Vertebrate animals. No special divinity, so far as I can see, hedges a lancelet, a frog, a cow, or a catarrhine ape, any more than a halo of sanctity pervades a Protozoön or a worm. I suppose Dr. Elam admits *Amphioxus* (the Lancelet) to be the lowest Vertebrate ; and even on the strict Cuvierian principles he professes to admire, he will be forced to own that the body of this lowest fish is built up on a type precisely similar to that of the author of "The Gospel of Evolution." But *Amphioxus* is a transparent fish, an inch or two in length, burrowing in sand-banks, and—tell it not in Gath!—destitute of skull, brain, heart, eyes, ears, kidneys, and of the other and typical belongings of Vertebrate existence. Instead of a skeleton it has a *notochord*, or *chorda dorsalis*. This is a soft cellular rod, lying in its back region, supporting its simple spinal cord or nervous axis, and appearing, curiously enough, in the early

life of every Vertebrate, man included, but being in most cases replaced and superseded by the spine. In the Lancelet, however, as well as in some other fishes (*e.g.*, Sharks, Dogfishes, &c.), and especially the *most ancient and primitive* fishes, the notochord remains persistent throughout life, and is never replaced by a spine.

Now, if such is the lowest Vertebrate, it requires no great exercise of zoological knowledge to discover in the *Tunicates*, or "Sea-Squirts," undeniable resemblances to the Lancelet. To begin with the general organisation of the body, there is a striking similarity in structure. Thus the Lancelet's breathing-organ is constructed on a type exactly resembling that of the Sea-Squirt. Both organisms breathe by means of a curious perforated pharynx, or "respiratory sac." It must be kept in mind that Sea-Squirts, until recently, were ranked, as Molluscoids, with the lowest shell-fish, and that in their adult condition the common members of the Sea-Squirt class exist, attached to rocks and stones and shells—each as a veritable "leather bottle," into one aperture of whose sac-like body water for nutrition and breathing flows, to be expelled by a second orifice. But the similarity between the young Sea-Squirt and the adult Lancelet is very marked. The former begins life as a tadpole-like body, which, we must note, becomes such by stages in development (including the despised *Gastrula*-stage) exactly resembling the early stages in the development of the Lancelet. In its tadpole guise, the young Sea-Squirt swims freely in the sea. In its dorsal region, however, a rod-like structure is soon developed. This is the notochord, and the nervous system of the young Sea-Squirt is formed in *an exactly similar fashion to that in which the nervous axis of Vertebrata is developed*. The ordinary Sea-Squirts soon cast off the tail of early life, and settle down to become the bag-like adults; but a few forms (*e.g.*, Appendicularia) retain throughout life their larval and tailed condition, and



present us, as already remarked, with good examples of primitive Tunicates. We have thus to account for, first, the marvellous likeness in structure between the "venerable" Lancelet of Haeckel (as the lowest Vertebrate) and Sea-Squirts; second, for the likeness, equally close, in early and later stages of development between the Lancelet and Tunicates; and third, for the variations between the two classes.

Evolution explains all three points on the belief that the Lancelet represents a Tunicate Mollusc derived at an early period from the primitive stock of the latter class, and from a type of things most nearly represented by the Appendicularians of to-day. The variations between existing Tunicates and Vertebrates are the result of the laws of progressive development and modification, which have produced—firstly, the modern sac-like Sea-Squirts from their original tadpole stock; and which, secondly, have given origin to the higher Vertebrate forms through elaboration of the Lancelet-type. Is there, after all, anything unreasonable in these declarations? Does the logic or sequence of facts supply no answer to Dr. Elam's travesty of this genealogical Vertebrate tree? Why should not the larval Ascidian represent the *Chordonia* of Haeckel? What is there that is illogical or preposterous in the assertion that the Lancelet and the existing Appendicularia are near kith and kin? Dr. Elam's remark regarding the impossibility of an Ascidian standing in relation to the Vertebrate as founder of the latter type, betokens his entire misapprehension of the grounds on which the belief of evolutionists in this matter is based. What is there that is impossible, let me ask, in the idea of the primitive race of Ascidians (represented to-day by Appendicularian-forms) still continuing to exist contemporaneously with the Vertebrate forms (the Lancelet or its predecessors), to which it gave origin, and likewise with the other organisms (Sea-Squirts), which, ulti-

mately springing from the same root-stock, diverged and retrogressed to become the sac-like "bottels" of the dredger's net? It is not the Vertebrate "grandfather," but the representative of the "grandfather's" *race*, that we see in the *larval* Ascidian of to-day. Evolution amply explains the succession as that from "larval" Ascidian (*i.e.*, Ascidian root-stock) to Lancelet, and from Lancelet to man; and unless development again deludes our judgment, I repeat, Evolution, in thus defining the origin of the Vertebrata, but re-echoes the truth as it is in nature.

But Dr. Elam, with a facile stroke of his pen, says Evolution "takes a worm and endows it with a spinal marrow and a chorda dorsalis 'on mechanical principles.'" We are not here concerned with the "mechanical" or other principles on which Haeckel or any other evolutionist postulates the progress of development; but it is easy to show that what Dr. Elam burlesques is, all unknown to himself, a serious reality of nature. Did Dr. Elam ever hear of a curious worm-like organism named *Balanoglossus*, or of its larva, known as *Tornaria*? If, as I believe, he has not, from his omitting any mention of the animal in his criticism of the origin of Vertebrates, let me recommend him to acquaint himself with its structure and homologies, as these facts are set forth in some recent manual of Comparative Anatomy. The biography of *Balanoglossus* will, in all probability, convince our author that his satirical reference to the worm endowed by a stroke of a pen with "a spinal marrow and a chorda dorsalis," actually describes a state of matters demonstrated by the highest zoological authority to occur in nature. He will find that *Balanoglossus* begins life under a worm-guise, but that it soon diverges from the worm-type and develops a peculiar breathing apparatus, the like of which—sad to relate for Dr. Elam's objections to Evolution—is only found, firstly, in Sea-Squirts, and, secondly, in the Lance-

let!\* Balanoglossus is, in fact, like a tailless Appendicularian, and appears as a natural representative of that worm which, "with a stroke of the pen," one may say, gave origin to Appendicularians, and through these to the Vertebrates by way of the Lancelet. The worm in which Dr. Elam disbelieves and which he despises, has, nevertheless, become, through no fault of its own, an important cornerstone in the Vertebrate type.

The ability of embryologists successfully to defend their conceptions of the evolution of existing forms of life is paralleled by their attempts to account for the origin of various useful structures in animal existence, and likewise for the occurrence, or, it may be, the disappearance, of useless organs and parts. Dr. Elam, in challenging the correctness of "Natural Selection," and in denying that any such principle exists—"a happy phrase for something that has no existence," are his words (p. 719)—exhibits an unfortunate tendency to look at one side of the question only, that side being largely created by himself. Speaking of "Natural Selection" as unable to account for the perpetuation, by *minute variations*, of structures and parts favouring a species in the "struggle for existence" (the existence of which also Dr. Elam denies), our author asks, "Could this principle account for the existence of the weapon of the Swordfish or for the filaments borne on the head of the curious *Lophius piscatorius*, or Angler-fish?" So also, he asks, but to deny, whether "a casually-enlarged cutaneous follicle" could have originated the milk-glands of quadrupeds?

As regards the development of the Sword-fish's snout or the tentacles of *Lophius*, I confess I do not see anything very

\* Mr. F. M. Balfour, in his "Comparative Embryology" (Vol. I. p. 484), says: "One of the most important characters of the adult Balanoglossus consists in the presence of respiratory structures comparable with the Vertebrate gill-slits." The Tornaria-larva, he says, "is intermediate between Echinoderms and Molluscs." Here is a transitional or common larval form which Dr. Elam cannot deny, even if he would—*i.e.*, if one is to respect his knowledge of biology, and especially of recent embryology.

inconsistent or anything which makes demand upon one's credulity, in the belief that "Natural Selection" could have originated these. Were Sword-fishes, let me ask Dr. Elam always as they now are? Surely our author does not mean to insist upon evolutionists accounting first for a Sword-fish and then for the growth of its weapon. Snout and fish together must have grown and have become developed and modified. There is nothing more remarkable or unlikely involved in the idea that the first beginnings of the snout may have been small and minute and have gradually increased, than in the fact that a Sword-fish begins life as a mere speck of protoplasm, and passes from stages in which there is neither fish-form nor snout, to that in which both are developed and perfected.\* So also with Lophius and its fishing tentacles. I see nothing more improbable in the development of these tentacles from very minute beginnings, than in the growth of a hair or feather from a very small skin-papilla. I presume both grow by degrees, both must have had a beginning; and unless Dr. Elam is prepared to assert his belief in the sudden and perfect creation of a brand-new Lophius or Xiphias, like the fabled armed men of old, I cannot conceive of any other explanation of their origin, save that which views their descent from pre-existing forms as a likely, and, if development speaks truly, a correct hypothesis. As Mr. Parker puts it, there exist persons who deny Evolution, in face of the fact that nature does evolve from a little protoplasm and a teaspoonful or two of yolk, the complex body

\* If Dr. Elam will take the trouble to turn to Dr. Günther's magnificent "Study of Fishes" (p. 174), he will find there drawings and descriptions which show the gradual development of the elongated weapon of the swordfish. This weapon, it should be noted, is no new structure, but consists of a high development of the maxillary and intermaxillary bones. Is there anything extraordinary, after all, in the idea that by successive stages of increased growth an animal's jaw should have attained such a development? Is it easier, or more rational, to assume "special creation" in such a case than Evolution?

of a bird. With regard to the milk-gland of Mammalia and its origin, one primary and all-important fact Dr. Elam must not neglect—namely, that a milk-gland is a modified skin-gland, just as a serpent's poison-gland is a modified salivary gland. The problem of Mammalian milk-glands is not very hard to solve after such a declaration from comparative anatomy. It seems to me that once you assert the indisputable nature and homology of the mammary gland as a *skin-gland*, you leave its evolution as a fact requiring explanation merely as a matter of detail—the fact of its origin through descent with modification we are not entitled as a matter of bare logic to call in question.

It is hard, if not impossible, to tell what may or may not have been useful to the ancestors of our existing animals and plants. Neither evolutionist nor anti-evolutionist need make too much of the use or uselessness of the first *beginnings* of organs and parts. Indeed, one may be a perfectly consistent evolutionist, even if one regards "Natural Selection" as altogether a secondary agent in the production of new species. Cases, however, like the origin of eye and ear, said by Dr. Elam (p. 721) to be "quite out of reach of any explanation by Natural Selection," are explicable enough on the broad lines of Evolution. For that matter of it, one might maintain that to see and to hear are advantageous qualities. The first beginnings of eyes and ears in the animal world of to-day may not perhaps explain fully how Vertebrate eyes and ears originated. These are the special possessions of higher life, and in their production may have included new modifications, the existence of which the theory of progressive development does not deny. As, however, Dr. Elam should know, they originate by ingrowth from the outer surface and by outgrowth from the brain; and brain and spinal cord themselves, represent simply a pinched-off part of the outer layer (or epiblast) of the Vertebrate body. Admitting these facts of develop-

ment, he cannot well deny that there is represented that gradual development of special parts from general structures on the existence of which Evolution at large takes its stand. Eyes and ears grow gradually in complexity as we ascend the Vertebrate series. The *quadrate bone*, which links the lower jaw of frog, reptile, and bird to its skull, becomes in the quadruped pushed up within the cranium to form the *malleus* of the ear. Will Dr. Elam deny that in this modification of the "quadrate" to form the "malleus"—in this adaptation of an element of lower life to form a structure of importance in higher existence—there is not evidence of ears being formed, like every other bodily structure, by modification? I frankly admit the lines of modification are often difficult to trace, often entirely hidden from us. But well-grounded scientific "faith," the possession of which is no monopoly of anti-evolutionists, bids us discern the general outline of the modification where special knowledge fails; and enables us, from a knowledge of what nature is effecting before our eyes to-day, to postulate the uniformity of her actions from all time past.

Dr. Elam appears to be apt enough in stating the difficulties of Evolution. Let me, by way of conclusion, suggest a few problems for solution from the anti-evolutionist's point of view, and from that standpoint which regards "Natural Selection" as a stumbling-block, and the construction of a phylogeny as extreme foolishness. How, for instance, does Dr. Elam account for the presence of rudimentary organs in animals and plants—such as the teeth of foetal whalebone whales which disappear before birth, or the rudimentary fifth stamen of *Scrophulariaceæ*? Why have the embryos of those Vertebrates which never breathe by gills at any period of their existence (reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds) gill-arches like the *fish*? If the useful first beginnings of organs are, as alleged by Dr. Elam, a puzzle to the evolutionist, I should imagine the lingering existence of once useful structures to

form a veritable dead-wall to the anti-evolutionist. For on no supposition, save on that of Evolution—only under the idea that these rudiments are the lawful heritage of the beings possessing them, and as such were possessed in perfection by ancestors more or less remote—can their existence be rationally accounted for. As Mr. G. H. Lewes remarked, these rudimental organs have a reference to a former state of things. Like the useless gills of the young Alpine Salamander, which passes its gilled stage within its parent's body, they indicate clearly enough the past condition of the species or race. And if so much be admitted—I do not see how such facts and inferences can be denied—the whole subject argues for specific change, for sweeping modification of species, and for the consequent Evolution of new forms through such modification.

Dr. Elam in a foot-note (p. 730), in criticising the now famous case of the horses and their proved descent from three-toed and five-toed ancestors, seems really to join issue with evolutionists upon a question of evidence. He maintains that "the horse, as we know it now, existed contemporaneously with the *Orohippus* in the Miocene period, and that there had been no change from that to modern times." I reply that may or may not be. Even if *Orohippus* did exist in the Miocene period—and Dr. Elam admits of course that there is no evidence whatever of such existence—such a fact would not militate in any degree against the Evolution of the one-toed modern horse with its two rudimentary toes or "splint bones." Nor would the fact in question serve to explain the very pregnant fact that existing horses are occasionally born with three toes; whilst the origin of *Orohippus* itself would again face Dr. Elam and his theory of creation. In face of the fact that existing horses are occasionally born with three nearly equal toes, Dr. Elam's criticism seems to me of no avail. On what scientific theory—if not on Evolution—can he then support, firstly, the

production of our existing horse with two rudimentary and useless toes, and likewise its occasional reversion to the three-toed type? If "special creation" be adopted here, such a view of nature is at the least degrading to the Power which may be regarded as initiating the laws of animal development. In other words, has the Creator, like a mundane architect with his blank windows, thrown in these useless rudiments by way of maintaining some fanciful notion of symmetry? The "creation" of such useless parts is susceptible of no explanation whatever. Their "production" or "persistence" as a part of the scheme of Evolution is a plain fact of nature which harmonises with our knowledge of the laws of heredity and development. And so clearly demonstrable is this latter fact, that one is tempted to regard opposition to its bearings as the fruit of an anti-Evolution tendency, which, like the reading and writing of Dogberry, comes by nature, and which as a natural but erratic characteristic, may be susceptible of explanation on the hypothesis of "reversion" to ancient forms and types of belief. So clear is the evidence of Evolution, as derived from the pedigree of the *Equidæ*, that Huxley's statement regarding Evolution as a proved fact, and not merely a hypothesis, is fully justified thereby. Whilst concerning those, who, with the evidence not merely of equine descent before them, but with the pregnant evidence drawn from animal development at hand, still deny Evolution, one may perchance most wisely follow the well-known advice of the apostolic philosopher anent forbearance with the foolish as a duty of the wise.

At page 728 of Dr. Elam's article, the question of Palæontology and Evolution is briefly touched upon. No criticism of Evolution could be complete in any sense without a reference to the bearings of fossil testimony upon "missing links" and the evolution of new species. Dr. Elam has, no doubt, read Mr. Darwin's chapter on the "Imperfection of



the Geological Record," but he does not condescend to make any remark upon Mr. Darwin's argument contained therein. We find Dr. Elam, however, quoting from an address by Sir Charles Lyell, of date 1859—the year in which the "Origin of Species" was published!—to the effect that "the advocates of progressive development have *too much overlooked* the imperfection of these records;" the quotation proceeding to maintain that "a large part of the generalisations in which they [the advocates of Evolution aforesaid] have indulged in regard to the first appearance of the different classes of animals, especially air-breathers, will have to be modified, or abandoned." Sir Charles Lyell is said by Dr. Elam to have been "a geologist at least as eminent as any who have succeeded him," and with this statement, of course, all will agree. But surely Dr. Elam, in common fairness to his own powers of discernment, as well as to Lyell's views on Evolution, should have selected opinions expressed by the late distinguished geologist of more recent date than 1859. An opinion expressed concerning Evolution in 1859, bears to the exact facts of Evolution in 1880, well-nigh the same relation that the views of the Early Fathers on fossils as inventions of the devil bear to modern geological opinion. Dr. Elam's quotation from Lyell, writing in 1859, and his application of the opinions of 1859 to the knowledge of 1880, are illustrations of a Rip Van Winkle tendency in science, which must appear astounding to everybody but Dr. Elam himself. If Dr. Elam had taken the trouble to ascertain the opinions of Sir Charles Lyell on Evolution, expressed, say, in the eleventh edition (1872) of his "Principles of Geology," our author would never have committed the error of citing the great promoter of Uniformitarian Geology as a witness against either imperfection of the geological record or Evolution at large. Indeed, so thoroughly natural is the parallelism between

Uniformity in Geology and Evolution in Biology that it is surprising to find Dr. Elam for one moment attempting to rank Lyell as against Evolution. Dr. Elam's quotation from Lyell affords evidence that he is not acquainted with the history of the late eminent geologist's change of opinions with reference to the theory of Descent. As Huxley says (Royal Institution Lecture, March 19th, 1880): "The progress of scientific geology has elevated the fundamental principle of Uniformitarianism, that the explanation of the past is to be sought in the study of the present, into the position of an axiom; and the wild speculations of the catastrophists, to which we all listened with respect a quarter of a century ago, would hardly find a single patient hearer at the present day. No physical geologist now dreams of seeking outside the ranges of known natural causes for the explanation of anything that happened millions of years ago, any more than he would be guilty of the like absurdity in regard to current events. The effect of this change of opinion upon biological speculation is obvious. For, if there have been no periodical general catastrophes, what brought about the assumed general extinctions and re-creations of life which are the corresponding biological catastrophes? And if no such interruptions of the ordinary course of nature have taken place in the organic, any more than in the inorganic, world, what alternative is there to the admission of Evolution? The doctrine of Evolution in Biology," concludes Huxley, "is the necessary result of the logical application of the principles of Uniformitarianism to the phenomena of life. Darwin is the natural successor of Hutton and Lyell, and the 'Origin of Species' the natural sequence of the 'Principles of Geology.'"

Place side by side with the sentence quoted from Lyell (of date 1859) by Dr. Elam (p. 728), another sentence from the "Antiquity of Man" (Fourth Edition, 1873, p. 451)—"It would be an easy task to multiply objec-

tions to the theory now under consideration ; but from this I refrain, *as I regard it not only as a useful, but rather, in the present state of science, an indispensable hypothesis, and one which, though destined hereafter to undergo many and great modifications, will never be overthrown.*"

And if further testimony were required as to the support which Lyell affords to Darwin on the question of the imperfection of the geological record, such evidence will be found plentifully scattered through the "Principles of Geology." There are very many passages which breathe the spirit of the following :—"To one who is not aware of the extreme imperfection of this record, the discovery of one or two missing links is a fact of small significance ; but to those who are thoroughly imbued with a deep sense of the defectiveness of the archives, each new form rescued from oblivion is an earnest of the former existence of hundreds of species, the greater part of which are irrecoverably lost." It is thus sheer misrepresentation to cite Lyell as against Darwin. Dr. Elam's quotations from uniformitarian geology, must, I repeat, to do himself and Evolution full justice, be taken from the geology of to-day, and not from opinions which the march of progress has rendered obsolete.

The function of the critic, from the general standpoint of the existence or non-existence of Evolution as a law of nature, may well be suspended at this point. Into the special questions of man's origin and into the origin and development of ethics, treated by Dr. Elam in the concluding pages of his essay, I cannot at present enter. Neither subject can be exhaustively treated, either in its *pros* or its *cons*, in a few pages of a magazine article. But this much one may add, that it appears to me the difficulties of man's origin, or those besetting the evolution of morals, are certainly no greater or more formidable from the evolutionist's standpoint than on the "special creation"

hypothesis of Dr. Elam. Indeed, I would maintain that physically man's origin is an easier conception on evolutionary grounds, than on the theory of Moses or on the hypothesis which has been dubbed the "Miltonic theory" by Professor Huxley. And the difficult question of an ethical code is likewise one which appears certainly more feasible of explanation on principles of progressive development, than upon the hypothesis of a mystic perfect nature, once degraded, and only now struggling to free itself from the swaddling-clothes of original sin. But I fully admit the difficulties of both subjects. I only record my objection to the often-repeated dogma that Evolution is less competent to explain man's physical and mental origin, than systems of thought which are most notable for their entire disregard of science, and for their proclivities in the way of leaning upon an unquestioning faith and its attendant and not over-intelligent dogmas.

Drawing rein thus, a survey of our position leaves one, without a show of over-confidence, in no fear that Dr. Elam's assault is in the least degree likely to carry even the remote outworks of Evolution by storm. If we turn to "missing links," *Archæopteryx* and a hundred other examples will satisfy the demand of reasonable opponents. If they ask us for "transitional forms" between sub-kingdoms, we shall point to Sponges and to other groups which find a home in no one type of animal life. If they demand of us evidence as to the connected series of forms, the *Equidæ* are at our beck and call; *Pauropus* has been discovered to connect Arthropods and worms; whilst the Lycopods, Rhizocarps, and Gymnosperms link the Cryptogamic plants with their flowering neighbours. If further evidence in favour of Evolution be required, we shall cite the great army of facts brought to light by embryology. We shall demonstrate the Echinoderms with their common larval root-stock; and we shall call into court the Crustaceans—that

large and motley group of crabs, shrimps, lobsters, water-fleas, barnacles, and fish-parasites, all arising directly or indirectly from a "Nauplius" with its three pairs of legs, its oval body, and its median eye. There is a perfect cloud of witnesses in favour of Evolution, in the province of Development alone. All the facts tell in favour of Evolution; and our difficulties arise, not from the opposing logic of facts, but from the mere uncertainties and limits of our present-day knowledge. Professor Allen Thomson's testimony, already cited (British Association Address, 1877), may again be appealed to on this head, when he says:—

I regard it, therefore, as no exaggerated representation of the present state of our knowledge to say that the ontogenetic development of the individual in the higher animals repeats in its more general character, and in many of its specific phenomena, the phylogenetic development of the race. If we admit the progressive nature of the changes of development, their similarity in different groups, and their common characters in all animals, nay, even in some respects in both plants and animals, we can scarcely refuse to recognise the possibility of continuous derivation in the history of their origin; and however far we may be, by reason of the imperfection of our knowledge of palaeontology, comparative anatomy, and embryology, from realising the precise nature of the chain of connection by which the actual descent has taken place, still there can be little doubt remaining in the mind of any unprejudiced student of embryology that it is only by the employment of such a hypothesis as that of Evolution that farther investigation in these several departments will be promoted so as to bring us to a fuller comprehension of the most general law which regulates the adaptation of structure to function in the universe.

My contention in this paper has been that, allowing for deficiencies of knowledge, erroneous deductions, and mistaken inferences, there remains a relatively immense bulk of solid facts which Evolution alone is competent to explain in a fashion satisfactory to the rational mind and to the

demands of biological consistency. Dr. Elam remarks (p. 740) that there is "much *philosophy* afloat, which, if freed from nebulosity, and translated into the vernacular, might easily be mistaken for what is often called by a very different name." This oracular deliverance is, of course, capable of translation in either way—for or against Evolution. But unless I grossly mistake the tendency and teaching of the best and wisest minds of our day, I should say that the "philosophy" which may be replaced by a less complimentary convertible term, is that which denies Evolution and opposes Development. Unless we suppose Dr. Elam to possess some special gift of prescience—and to my mind our author certainly does not seem to be in possession of the latest biological facts and data of observation—warning him of the future overthrow of Evolution, it seems hard to account for opposition at once so strenuous and so futile in the face of the facts of life and nature.

His concluding syllogism may bear quotation here :—

" 'Without *verification* a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect.'

[This is Tyndall's declaration.]

"The theory of Organic Evolution is an unverified theoretic conception.

[Dr. Elam in a foot-note to his second term, says :—  
"Inasmuch as the 'only' recognised proof has not been furnished,—viz., that arising from 'observation and experiment on existing forms of life' (Huxley)—and no other even plausible one has been offered"]

"Therefore, ORGANIC EVOLUTION IS A MERE FIGMENT OF THE INTELLECT."

This seems at first sight a ponderous missile; but it explodes when you touch its second term. Evolution is *not* an "unverified theoretic conception." What Huxley said

in 1862, holds perfectly true to this day, and will, it is probable, hold true everlastingly of Evolution. "Observation and experiment upon the existing forms of life" (Lay Sermons, 1862, p. 226) are the guides to further knowledge, as they have been the ways of wisdom in the past. Dr. Elam says this proof "has not been furnished." Can he maintain this in view of observations upon Development, or experiments upon Hybridization? Has he never heard, for example, of plants whose own pollen is absolutely useless to fertilise their ovules; or of others on whose pistil their pollen acts as a poison? Will he deny the hundreds of observations made year by year in biology, most or all of which go to support Evolution? Surely Dr. Elam's conceptions of "observations" must differ from those of biologists at large, and from those of ordinary persons as well, when we find him seriously telling us, in 1880, that no "recognised proof" of Evolution has been furnished. Recognition of proof may be, and very likely is, a relative matter. But the common-sense of mankind, and the consensus of biological opinion as to what proof of Evolution is, are worth heeding in a matter of this kind, and I maintain that both sources of culture have pronounced for Evolution as a great law and reality of the universe. It is the misunderstood facts of nature or the unappreciated because absurd statements of the anti-evolutionist, which form the real "figments of the intellect" in the biology and science of to-day.

I know of no plainer or franker statement of the value and place of Evolution than that of Sir Joseph D. Hooker, given in his school "Primer of Botany" (Macmillan, 1876, p. 100), and I can find no fitter words wherewith to conclude this article, or which I could with greater satisfaction recommend to the notice of Dr. Elam and anti-evolutionists at large. "There are," says Sir Joseph Hooker, "two opinions accepted as accounting for

this (the Origin of Species); one, that of *independent creation*, that species were created under their present form, singly, or in pairs, or in numbers; the other, that of *Evolution*, that all are the descendants of one or a few originally created simpler forms. The first doctrine is purely speculative, incapable from its very nature, of proof; teaching nothing and suggesting nothing, it is the despair of investigators and inquiring minds. The other, whether true wholly or in part only, is gaining adherents rapidly, because most of the phenomena of plant (and animal) life may be explained by it; *because it has taught much that is indisputably proved*; because it has suggested a multitude of prolific inquiries, and because it has directed many investigators to the discovery of new facts in all departments of Botany."

ANDREW WILSON.



## GEORGE ELIOT AND THOMAS CARLYLE.

**W**HILST England was still brooding over the death of George Eliot and the wealth of wise words that bear her name, Thomas Carlyle at last passed away. They were not writers whom one would naturally have thought of together, but since death put them uppermost in our minds, many of us must have been startled by a similarity in their aim and drift that had not suggested itself before. Unlike as their voices are, so that we may almost say,

One is of the sea,

One of the mountains; each a mighty voice;

one the watchful woman whose world-embracing heart loves most to linger about the home, the other the man-prophet who makes himself heard in the market-place, and gathers a crowd in the desert; yet they often say the same thing, for each is speaking to children of the same generation and speaking out of a very sensitive and responsive heart, and out of a brain brimful of the lore of the same forefathers and teachers.

Though the molecules which were to produce the works of Carlyle were arranging themselves and being impinged upon a quarter of a century earlier than those of George Eliot, yet, owing probably to his far-reaching imagination, he almost as much as she is under the powerful sway of the prevailing methods and tenets of modern science. Slightly altered circumstances might have made either of them a Tyndall or a Herbert Spencer. All those ideas that may be lumped together roughly under the heading

of the solidarity of the universe seem ever present to their consciousness. We can never forget as we are reading them that we are within the relentless grasp of the "not-ourselves." With her the forces that have moulded us and claim us as their own take more definite form than with him, as they would do for one writing those twenty-five years later; but the forces are as real for him as for her. Teufelsdröckh in 1831 feels their might as intensely as Theophrastus Such, whose utterances came even half a century later. On the other hand, Theophrastus resents as peremptorily as Teufelsdröckh, those over-claims of mere physicists which hint to man that he is an automaton, and consciousness a queer, fishy excrescence. For how many of us has "Sartor Resartus" simply smashed the tyranny of the dogmas of the Everlasting No, so that

Like a man in wrath the heart  
Stood up and answered, "I have felt."

Theophrastus Such has furnished pellets of pert, maiden-like repartee, that must for a long time act as dissolvents of the influence of those dogmas in as far as they usurp the kingdom of life. Here are instances of the two styles of dealing with the negations of some teachers with whom, as far as their constructive work goes, each writer is thoroughly *en rapport*; it would be difficult to say which is more effective.

"Has the word Duty no meaning? Is what we call Duty no divine Messenger and Guide, but a false, earthly Phantasm, made up of Desire and Fear? . . . . Happiness of an approving conscience! Did not Paul of Tarsus, whom admiring men have since named Saint, feel that *he* was 'the chief of sinners;' and Nero, of Rome, jocund in spirit, spend much of his time in fiddling? . . . . Is the heroic inspiration we name Virtue but some Passion; some bubble of the blood, bubbling in the direction others *profit* by? I know not: only this I know—if what thou namest Happiness be our true aim, then are we all astray! With Stupidity and Sound Digestion man may front much. But what,

in these dull, unimaginative days, are the terrors of Conscience to the diseases of the Liver? Not on Morality, but on Cookery, let us build our stronghold: there, brandishing of our frying-pan as censer, let us offer sweet incense to the Devil, and live at ease on the fat things *he* has provided for his Elect!"

In "Shadows of the Coming Race," Theophrastus says:—

"I, for my part, cannot see any reason why a sufficiently penetrating thinker, who can see his way through a thousand years or so, should not conceive a Parliament of machines, in which the manners were excellent, and the motions infallible in logic. . . . For every machine would be perfectly educated, that is to say, would have the suitable molecular adjustments, which would act not the less infallibly for being free from the fussy accompaniment of that consciousness to which our prejudice gives a supreme governing rank, when in truth it is an idle parasite on the grand sequence of things."

Theophrastus goes on to imagine the pitiable condition men will be in, as compared with their machines, through the incubus of this "fussy accompaniment of consciousness."

"One sees that the process of natural selection must drive men altogether out of the field; for they will long before have begun to sink into the miserable condition of those unhappy characters in fable, who, having demons or djinns at their back, and being obliged to supply them with work, found too much of everything done in too short a time. What demons so potent as molecular movements, none the less tremendously potent for not carrying the futile cargo of a consciousness screeching irrelevantly, like a fowl tied head downmost to the saddle of a swift horseman. . . . Thus, the feebler race, whose corporeal adjustments happened to be accompanied with a maniacal consciousness which imagined itself moving its mover, will have vanished, as all less adapted existences do before the fittest—*i.e.*, the existences composed of the most persistent groups of movements, and the most capable of incorporating new groups in harmonious relation."

"Absurd," grumbled Trost.

"The supposition is logical," said I. "It is well argued from the premises."

"Whose premises?" cried Trost, turning on me with some fierceness. "You don't mean to call them mine, I hope!"

"Heaven forbid! They seem to be flying about in the air with other germs, and have found a sort of nidus among my melancholy fancies. Nobody really holds them. They bear the same relation to real belief as walking on the head for a show does to running away from an explosion, or walking fast to catch the train."

These writers could never have commanded or deserved the attention and admiration our age has accorded them unless they had been sympathetically penetrated and thrilled by the labours and generalisations of modern science. Each has touched many of the truths of our physicists with a new light and fire for the multitude, and has so speeded the message of physical truth; and consequently each voice has been doubly potent when it has had to say, "Thus far and no further." Though Carlyle jeers at the "Arithmetical Understanding" as a "shallow, superficial faculty" in which, if you plant, it will be "but for year and day," yet his first work was one on the Calculus, and he has left the John Welsh Bursaries for Mathematics in memory of his "dear, magnanimous, much-loving, and inestimable wife," in the assurance that mathematical training is of perennial value. Mill was, as it were, the antithesis of Carlyle, yet he says of him (Autobiography v.) I felt that Carlyle "not only saw many things long before me, which I could only, when they were pointed out to me, hobble after and prove, but that it was highly probable he could see many things which were not visible to me even after they were pointed out." In Carlyle's fiercest denunciations of "the dismal science" of political economy (in "Chartism"), he shows a thorough acquaintance with and perception of the force of the facts on which the science builds.

To miss the constant though not superficial indications that Carlyle was touched by all the truths of dry science, is to miss, perhaps, the chief key to his influence, and the great secret of his power in his own particular dominion. He and George Eliot were both so influential because they

both started, as it were, from the laboratory of life, and not from the tip-top of a magnificent system. For them there were no short cuts to truth's goal. Near the commencement of his latest and most voluminous work, Carlyle describes "genius" to mean "transcendent capacity of taking trouble, first of all ;" "given a huge stack of tumbled thrums, it is not in your sleep that you will find the vital centre of it, or get the first thrum by the end !" We have the very same lesson amongst George Eliot's last words. Klesmer says, "Genius at first is little more than a great capacity for receiving discipline."—(Daniel Deronda, xxiii.) And Theophrastus, "One cannot give a recipe for wise judgment ; it resembles appropriate muscular action, which is attained by the myriad lessons in nicety of balance and of aim that only practice can give."

"A fine imagination . . . is always based on a keen vision, a keen consciousness of what is, and carries the store of definite knowledge as material for the construction of its inward visions. Witness Dante, who is at once the most precise and homely in his reproduction of actual objects, and the most soaringly at large in his imaginative combinations ! . . . In this sense it is as true to say of Fra Angelico's Coronation that it has a strain of reality, as to say so of a portrait by Rembrandt. . . . It is worth repeating that powerful imagination is not false outward vision, but intense inward representation, and *a creative energy constantly fed by susceptibility to the veriest minutiae of experience*, which it reproduces and constructs in fresh and fresh wholes ; not the habitual confusion of provable fact with the fictions of fancy and transient inclination, but a breadth of ideal association which informs every material object, every incidental fact, with far-reaching memories and stored residues of passion, bringing into new light the less obvious relations of human existence." (Theophrastus Such, xiii.)

So much as an account of the attraction of these two for an age of minute and sweeping research. They have shown "science" that she need not and cannot rob herself, and the world, of faith. And the votaries of science have welcomed

their addenda to her dicta. For they have not given us all that the majority of those who specially pose as the votaries of faith could have wished. Neither of them has a theology or a philosophy. But for this reason, perhaps, they have been more powerful as allies of faith. They have been reconcilers. They have given us holy ground on which antagonists *must* meet. They have compelled the physicist to admit that the aim of faith commands reverence. They have illustrated for theologians the humbling uniting fact, asserted by St. Paul at Athens, that men who can rear their altar only to the Agnostic's God may be worshipping the Most High unknowingly. With them we are in the presence of the Most High in whom "we live, and move, and have our being." They, too, like the ancient poets, enforce the Christian message, "For we are also His offspring." I believe the main Christian ideas breathe through both of them, for those who can see and are capable of being influenced. She does not shout them aloud as he often does, but they speak through the life she portrays, because it is true human life with its human loves and human struggles and sorrows.

Certainly, neither of them has formulated a system of sanctions for duty or anything else. Carlyle has endless scorn for "the folly of that impossible Precept, '*Know Thyself*,' till it be translated into this partially possible one, '*Know what thou canst work at*.'"

His ethical philosophy is summed up in the precept, "*Do the duty which lies nearest thee*, which thou knowest to be a Duty! Thy second duty will already have become clearer." He could least be claimed by the Utilitarians. But it would be impossible to rank him in any school except the unlettered school of daily life. And yet although no special school could claim him, none would wish to repudiate him, for his philosophy is that which every earnest, duty-loving man adopts, whatever be his formulated sanction. And that

is why it is his philosophy. He must have one which accounts for every dutiful deed, whether of the tinker or the sage, and one which will be a sure guide for both. If you ask him why you are to do *the duty that lies nearest to you*, you ask a question which bears on its own face its condemning reply, whatever your creed or system may be. He may fairly claim to have summed up his ethics in an indisputable, unquestionable formula. True, he has himself started from something more primal and majestic, and, for him, more elementary, more vital, than any precept; but it seems as if he would not risk morality by making it dependent on his own most supreme conviction. "Conviction, were it never so excellent, is worthless till it convert itself into Conduct." Teufelsdröckh asks, "Is the God present, felt in my own heart, a thing which Herr von Voltaire will dispute out of me, or dispute into me. . . . One BIBLE I know of whose Plenary Inspiration doubt is not so much as possible; nay, with my own eyes I saw the God's-Hand writing it." We are not told more definitely to what he refers. It is something, as he puts it, that you cannot "dispute out of," or "dispute into" any one. But "all speculation is by nature endless, formless, a vortex amid vortices; only by a felt indubitable certainty of experience does it find any centre to revolve round, and so fashion itself into a system. Most true is it, as a wise man teaches us, that—Doubt of any sort cannot be removed except by action. On which ground, too, let him who gropes painfully in darkness or uncertain light, and prays vehemently that the dawn may ripen into day, lay this other precept well to heart, which to me was of invaluable service: '*Do the duty which lies nearest thee*,' which thou knowest to be a Duty! Thy second Duty will already have become clearer." . . . "Your America is here or nowhere. The situation that has not its Duty, its Ideal, was never yet occupied by man." —(Sartor Resartus; The Everlasting Yea.)

George Eliot's ethical system is as rudimentary as Carlyle's. The practical impression that her portraiture of life leaves upon us might be summed up in the last few sentences that I have quoted from "Sartor Resartus." She, too, has her scorn for the failure of the pretentious systems. She does not, like Carlyle, lay bare an inmost heart, with its vision and conviction of God. Nay, there is a sorrowful blank and silence to which we find no parallel in him. She is to be numbered amongst those of whom she says, "In those times, as now, there were human beings who never saw angels, or heard perfectly clear messages." We shall dwell on this contrast hereafter. But we feel that *he* would almost blame us\* for noticing this in her, so radically has she seized, so persistently does she press home, his fundamental and all-embracing law of duty. She declines to exonerate any one, however great, from its imperative claims. Indeed, in her pictures of life, great and small, happy and unhappy, seem to have no colour, or size, or meaning. The difficulties in the path of duty, the character for confronting these difficulties, are of all-absorbing interest and worth. Except in the light of this clue to her works, there is an inexcusable melancholy about them. We are told that she was much distressed to hear them called depressing.† This can only be accounted for by what I am now saying. Her interest in the happiness or unhappiness of her characters was as nothing compared with her absorption in the subtle workings and opportunities and difficulties of duty, predestined or unexpected, from within or from without. She was watching over the growth of duty as over a process of steady and glorious evolution. What to the common eye is striking and dazzling is, as it were, lost upon her—somewhat as the 4,000 feet of moun-

\* Or should have felt so, did we not now know that he could write of "all the Sands and Eliots and babbling *cohue* of 'celebrated scribbling women,' that have strutted over the world in my time."—(Reminiscences.)

† By "One Who Knew Her." *Contemporary Review*. February.



tain, or the stretching acres of plain, are lost upon the botanist in his search for a lichen. As beneath an irresistible spell her sympathetic vision wanders and pauses—

“ To trace love’s faint beginnings in mankind,  
To know even hate is but a mask of love’s,  
To see a good in evil, and a hope  
In ill-success ; to sympathise, be proud  
Of their half-reasons, faint aspirings, dim  
Struggles for truth, their poorest fallacies,  
Their prejudice and fears and cares and doubts ;  
Which all touch upon nobleness ; despite  
Their error, all tend upwardly, though weak,  
Like plants in mines which never saw the sun,  
But dream of him and guess where he may be,  
And do their best to climb and get to him.”\*

She says, speaking of Mr. Riley, one of her objectionable Mudport Philistines—

“ Plotting covetousness and deliberate contrivance, in order to compass a selfish end, are nowhere abundant except in the world of the dramatist ; they demand too intense a mental action for many of our fellow-parishioners to be guilty of them. It is easy enough to spoil the lives of our neighbours without taking so much trouble ; we can do it by lazy acquiescence and lazy omission, by trivial falsities for which we hardly know a reason, by small frauds neutralised by small extravagances, by maladroit flatteries and clumsily-improvised insinuations. We live from hand to mouth, most of us, with a small family of immediate desires—we do little else than snatch a morsel to satisfy the hungry brood, rarely thinking of seed-corn or the next year’s crop.”

This is the secret of the sympathy which, almost against our will, we have throughout for Tito and Gwendoline. But there is with her no obscuring of the fact that men do, by their own deliberate choice, place their hands within the iron grip of the circumstances that seem almighty and inevitably predestined. Amid all our sorrow with Tito and Gwendoline, we are not allowed to forget that “ our wills

\* Browning’s “Paracelsus.”

*are ours."* On the other hand, Dorothea and Maggie are so great in the supreme moments, because of their inheritance from the past. The struggles that mark human life are also the marks of its majesty. The perception of the environment that almost makes us all that we are is a tremendous call to duty, a call whose power must grow with the ages. Yet not the most powerful call, else were some beyond the reach of the Most High. George Eliot's highest sanction to duty is one of which she might say, as Carlyle of his, you cannot "dispute it out of," or "dispute it into" any one. She describes "the hard, bold scrutiny of imperfect thought into obligations which can never be proved to have any sanctity in the absence of feeling."—(*Romola*, xi.) "The sympathetic impulses that need no law, but rush to the deed of fidelity and pity as inevitably as the brute mother shields her young from the attack of the hereditary enemy."—(*Romola*, ix.)

Amongst the last words in "*Romola*" are these. She is speaking to Tessa's boy:—

"The highest sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before anything else, because our souls see it is good. . . . Remember, if you were to choose something lower, and make it the rule of your life to seek your own pleasure, and escape from what is disagreeable, calamity might come just the same; and it would be calamity falling on a base mind, which is the one form of sorrow that has no balm in it, and that may well make a man say, 'It would have been better for me if I had never been born!'"—(*Epilogue*.)

"What is love itself—for the one we love best? An enfolding of immeasurable cares, which yet are better than any joys outside our love."—(*Daniel Deronda*, lxix.)

The very striking piece of information that George Eliot was distressed, and even apparently surprised, that people should think her works depressing, is full of suggestion. It makes us see how likely we are to have missed the meaning

of her works ; for, certainly, to ordinary people they are beclouded with sadness. But so, too, is daily life, and if we have not felt this sadness about life, her works must be inexplicably depressing. If we have faced the hard facts of life, we may find her influence elevating. Not that she would admit that life is a poor, sad thing. She would have the worldly and the other-worldly shift their standpoint, and see things in their true proportions, see what is most precious. "One who knew her," tells us pathetically how she said of a great contemporary genius, "*I always think of him as the husband of the dead wife.*" Intellect, success were, in her sight, tiny, compared with affection, sympathy, dutifulness. If one marked in red letters all the touches of these throughout her works, one would probably be struck with the comparative insignificance attached by her to what one had been thinking greatest. An exquisite patch of moss was as beautiful for her on some tumble-down hovel as on a mountain crag ; what she deemed most lovely grew everywhere, like the simplest herbage, and, in truth, grew often in swamp and foul corners. Life need not be a desert. "It is in those acts called trivialities that the seeds of joy are for ever wasted, until men and women look round with haggard faces at the devastation their own waste has made, and say, the earth bears no harvest of sweetness—calling their denial, knowledge."—(Middlemarch.)

In these lines, from "*Janet's Repentance*," almost her earliest story, we find what was to be a guiding principle in her view of life. "How hard it is to kill the deep-down fibrous roots of human love and goodness, how the man from whom we make it our pride to shrink, has yet a close brotherhood with us, through some of our most sacred feelings." Her secret of morality and life is in susceptible sympathy.

"Yet surely, surely, the only true knowledge of our fellow-man is that which enables us to feel with him, which gives us a fine ear

for the heart-pulses that are beating under the mere clothes of circumstances and opinion." "Do not philosophic doctors tell us that we are unable to discern so much as a tree except by an unconscious cunning which combines many past and separate sensations; that no one sense is independent of another, so that in the dark we can hardly taste a fricassée or tell whether our pipe is alight or not, and the most intelligent boy, if accommodated with claws or hoofs instead of fingers, would be likely to remain on the lowest form? If so, it is easy to understand that our discernment of men's motives must depend on the completeness of the elements we can bring from our own susceptibility and our own experience. See to it, friend, before you pronounce a too hasty judgment, that your moral sensibilities are not of a hopped or clawed character. The keenest eye will not serve unless you have the delicate fingers, with their subtle nerve filaments, which elude scientific lenses, and lose themselves in the invisible world of human sensations."—(xi.)

What tenderness in that often-repeated touch in her picture of Tulliver—"This is a puzzlin' world;" "This world's been too many for me." She must have been always feeling for the brilliant, elegant, and scented, as well as for the other failures of life, what it was Lydgate's ruin not to have realised concerning Rosamond.

"Poor Lydgate! or shall I say, Poor Rosamond? Each lived in a world of which the other knew nothing. It had not occurred to Lydgate that he had been a subject of eager meditation to Rosamond, who had neither any reason for throwing her marriage into distant perspective, nor any pathological studies to divert her mind from that ruminating habit, that inward repetition of looks, words, and phrases, which makes a large part in the lives of most girls."—(Middlemarch, xvi.)

"That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency has not yet wrought itself into the coarse emotions of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly bear much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity."—(xx.) "Lydgate was at present too ill acquainted with disaster to enter into the pathos of a lot where everything is

below the level of tragedy except the passionate egoism of the sufferer."—(xlii.)

There is a fine instance in "The Mill on the Floss" of how an indestructible germ of hereditary duty-power may lie, though choked and spoiled, beneath a mechanical and Phari-saical exterior. Who more odious and more dangerous to society than Mrs. Glegg, nipping life with her hoard of petty Dodson maxims? Yet for the first time in her life she was kind to Maggie when the girl had disgraced the family in the eyes of all St. Ogg's. She "had always augured ill of Maggie's future at a time when others were perhaps less clear-sighted;" but, "if you were not to stand by your own 'kin' as long as there was a shred of honour attributable to them, pray what were you to stand by?" And this hard, repulsive Dodson pride in its own respectability and rectitude is seen in two successive stages of its upward struggle in Tom and Maggie. In Tom it still retains its narrow blindness. But what in Mrs. Glegg was odious has grown in him into something that wins our admiration. But how wretchedly this rigid sense of right and wrong fails to show him his highest duty towards Maggie! And yet again we cannot perhaps overestimate the influence which that Dodson blood had in bringing Maggie to right herself in the supreme moment, when her doing right would have seemed to almost every one the choice of the worse of two evils. We can forgive even Mrs. Glegg.

Yet along with all this insight for the precious amongst the vile, for the minutely majestic amongst the magnificently small, there is not a syllable of condonation for vice or for indifference to elementary duty on the subterfuge of intellectual superiority. She has a fire of scorn in her remarks on "*Moral Swindlers*" for "the supposition that the ablest intellect, the highest genius, will see through morality as a sort of twaddle for bibs and tuckers, a doctrine of dulness, a mere incident in human stupidity." Such

words as the following make us long that she could have left us an autobiography, and wonder whether it may not have been on this account that her sorrow for the work that she must leave unaccomplished seemed a call to almost heroic resignation.

"Let our habitual talk give morals their full meaning as the conduct which, in every human relation, would follow from the fullest knowledge and the fullest sympathy—a meaning perpetually corrected and enriched by a more thorough appreciation of dependence in things, and a finer sensibility to both physical and spiritual fact—and this ridiculous ascription of superlative power to minds which have no effective awe-inspiring vision of the human lot, no response of understanding to the connection between duty and the material processes by which the world is kept habitable for cultivated man, will be tacitly discredited, without any need to cite the immortal names that all are obliged to take as the measure of intellectual rank and highly-charged genius."—(Theophrastus Such. Moral Swindlers.)

For this vision of the glory of the minute elements in life I know only one name. It is simply Christ-like. I have no wish to shirk the fact that she was not what would be technically termed a believer; nor was there in her that conscious looking upward which distinguishes Carlyle. The word "God" is as conspicuous by its absence from her pages as by its frequency in his. It has been said that her characters with soaring aims are her pictorial failures. We should expect this. For her they were on the highest mountain-top who saw most vividly into the plains and valleys of earth. For the loftiest souls there is most, not least, looking upwards; because they only can see how much, on this common earth, is above and beyond them. This is the essence of the central Christian idea. She brings us to the very feet of Christ. It was when the Word was *made flesh* that God dwelt, as in the *σκηνή*, or Shekinah, amongst us. Here Carlyle and George Eliot are seen to be at one. "Well said Saint Chrysostom, with his

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lips of gold, 'The true Shekinah is Man.' Where else is the God's-Presence manifested not to our eyes only, but to our hearts, as in our fellow-men?" . . . "Bending before men is a reverence done to the Revelation in the Flesh. We touch Heaven when we lay our hands on a human Body."

"Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the Earth."

GEORGE SARSON.

## NOTES AND NOTICES.

THE English version of Max Duncker's great work\* has now reached its fourth volume, which deals with the ancient history of India down to the time of Asoka. It is an instructive sign of the times to find the whole of a large volume devoted to the history of a country which was scarcely mentioned in the older manuals of so-called Universal History, and to the history of that country at a time concerning which nothing, or next to nothing, was known but a very few years ago. It is a sign that the cultivated world is beginning to enter upon the fruits of Oriental research in Indian matters, and that the habit of Western historians of considering all things at any distance from the basin of the Mediterranean as beneath notice, and of thus practically ignoring the existence of about two-thirds of the human race, is beginning to be broken through. It would be useless to attempt to predict the measure of the influence which this change of standpoint will eventually have upon our ideas of history : but it may be compared to the results which followed inevitably on the discovery that this earth was not the centre of the universe. And when we call to mind how closely intertwined are religions with historical beliefs and arguments, we may realise in some degree what effect may follow upon the unveiling of a long history of civilisation, independent of Egyptian, Jewish, or Greek thought; upon the curtain being drawn back from a new drama of struggling races and rival religions, filled with ideas strangely familiar and as curiously strange. It is not too much to say that a New World has been once more discovered by adventurers as persevering as Columbus, and perhaps at present earning as little gratitude as he did from his contemporaries : and that the inhabitants of the Old World cannot, if they would, go back again to the quiet times when the New World was not, because it was unknown. Every one to whom the entrancing story of man's gradual rise and progress has charms peculiarly its own, will welcome the new light ; others will have to face the new facts, and find room for them in their conceptions of the world's history ; and all alike will be glad to have the results of these latter-day inquiries summed up and put before them by so competent a hand as that of the author of the work before us. It is true that in the field to which the present

\* The History of Antiquity. By Max Duncker. Translated from the German by Evelyn Abbott, M.A., LL.D. London : Bentley. 1881.



volume is devoted he has no special knowledge, does not attempt to refer to the original sources, and bases his summary upon translations, where they exist, and more often upon second-hand authorities. But the deadly virus of the examination poison has not as yet gained the mastery over the university bodies of Germany; the student is trained there with especial reference to the rules of critical judgment and the methods of research; and no one is better qualified than a distinguished master in such a school of training to distinguish, among translators or writers about a subject, who can be safely depended upon and who can not. In one way, also, such a writer as Max Duncker, with other departments of history familiar to his mind, has an advantage over even those who can consult the first authorities in their original languages. He obtains a point of view from which the various details of the story assume their due proportions; and his attention is not drawn off by those philological and chronological puzzles which it is the especial virtue of the specialist to solve. The faults of the work are of a very natural kind. When a geographer of the time of Columbus combined the various accounts of the discoverers into a description of the New World then discovered, he would perhaps have given an account better, on the whole, than any one of them would have been able to give, and accurate enough on the points on which they were all agreed. But he would scarcely have been the best judge on points where they differed; and it might well happen that in following writers of established reputation, he might neglect corrections since made by less-known men. It would be impossible within the limits of this review to point out the cases in which a similar fate has befallen our author; but a single subject may be selected as an instance. The chapters on Buddhism are an admirable summary of the results arrived at by Burnouf and Lassen, and in a lesser degree of the works of Köppen and Gutschmid. It is no crime to err in such company; but the works of Burnouf and Lassen here depended upon were written thirty or forty years ago, and "a good deal has happened since then." Max Duncker (p. 864) places the date of the death of the Buddha in 548 B.C. No Pali scholar now living would place it earlier than 477 B.C., and the most recent researches would place it somewhat later even than that. Max Duncker (p. 882) speaks of the cruel heaviness of the taxation in the time of the Buddha, giving Burnouf as his authority. But Burnouf is quoting the *Divyavadāna*, a work written about 1,500 years after the time to which Duncker applies its words. Max Duncker (p. 822) takes for granted that the Aryans went from Surāshtra to Ceylon in 500 B.C. But Burnouf, whom he quotes, does not go so far as this, and no scholar would now advance such a proposition with certainty. The whole discussion of Nirvāna (pp. 848—851) teems with misconceptions; and when Max Duncker ventures upon statements for which he gives no authority he falls into grievous errors, such as that the Buddha "called himself Sakyamuni" (p. 889); that he "turned to the heterodox doctrine of Kapila" (p. 841); that "according to Buddha's view the castes must fall to the ground" (p. 861): and even that he

"agreed with the doctrine of Kapila that the soul must be separated and set free from the body" (1). But it would be unreasonable to expect the historian of so large a subject to be abreast of the latest information in each special department of the field. The value of the work is in the breadth and general accuracy of the bird's-eye view which it gives of a very important chapter in human history; and in the sense of proportion by which the description is harmonised. The translation is singularly clear and readable, and we heartily commend the work to the attention of those who wish to know something of what mankind has been outside the range of those influences which have made the Europe of to-day what it is.

T. W. RHYSDAVIDS.

IT would have been an unquestionable literary loss if the late Mr. Walter Bagehot's miscellaneous writings had not been collected and republished in the volumes which have been edited by Mr. R. H. Hutton. They possess far more than the merely personal interest which is often the main charm of volumes brought out after death. The "Biographical Studies" \* which have now followed the "Literary" and the "Economic Studies," are delightful reading. Mr. Bagehot owned the faculty of keen perception, and also that of exquisite precision of style, which enables a writer to impart a peculiar charm to biographical articles. He wrote at once with the zest of a man who is deeply interested in his subject, and with the power to reflect his own impressions upon the minds of his readers. These biographical Studies appeared, most of them, in the "National Review" and in the "Fortnightly." A few shorter papers are taken from the "Economist." The paper on Mr. Gladstone, which was written in 1860, has peculiar interest at the present time, seeing that we can read the estimate and conjectures formed of this statesman by an exceedingly able politician and writer more than twenty years ago. Mr. Bagehot regarded Mr. Gladstone at that time as "a problem;" and affirmed with manifest point, that it was remarkable he should be a problem, from the circumstance that even then more than ordinary means of judging him were at hand. He had then been in Parliament for seven-and-twenty years, and had been a distinguished member of the two great political parties. And yet, Mr. Bagehot contended, there was great uncertainty as to his future course. His "gifts at first sight marked him out to be our greatest statesman," but yet it was uncertain what he might do, or become. "Whether below the gangway, he will utter unintelligible discourses; whether he will aid in destroying many ministries, and share in none; whether he will pour forth during many hopeless years a bitter, a splendid, and a vituperative eloquence?" Mr. Bagehot lived long enough to witness the fulfilment of some of his best hopes for this foremost man in the sphere

\* Biographical Studies. By the late Walter Bagehot, M.A., and Fellow of University College. Edited by Richard Holt Hutton. London: Longmans and Co. 1881.

of politics, and to rejoice that any possible fears which may have haunted his mind in 1860 had all passed away. The criticisms of Mr. Gladstone in this article are so remarkably suggestive and vivid, that they might well form the subject of lengthy consideration. The writer of this "biographical study" indicates with accurate discrimination the peculiar quality in the great orator which has contributed so largely to mark him out as one of the most illustrious speakers in the British Senate. Beyond any other man of the generation, Mr. Bagehot remarked, Mr. Gladstone has the oratorical *impulse*. In addition to his fine intellectual gifts, and his splendid education, he has a vehement longing to convince other people of the truthfulness and wisdom of his own convictions. It is his resolve, if it be possible, to *convince his audience*.

Many readers will turn from the "study" of Mr. Gladstone to that of Sir George Cornwall Lewis. This is as fine a piece of criticism, as, in its own way, we have ever met with. Mr. Hutton points out in his preface, that Sir George Lewis "comes very near to being, in Mr. Bagehot's mind, the ideal statesman;"—but he, nevertheless, reveals an almost perfect comprehension of the defects as well as the excellences of the political and mental qualities of a man who occupied a unique position among the statesmen of his generation. Most of us are aware that his apophthegms are being continually quoted; and that his impeccable sincerity and undoubted clear-headedness have been attested by all political parties. No fairer estimate of the man can be written than that which Mr. Bagehot wrote shortly after his death, in 1868. It should be said, that these "Studies" include, among others, criticisms of William Pitt, Lord Brougham, Bolingbroke as a Statesman, and Adam Smith as a Person. Altogether the book is rich in the best sort of criticism.

Not a few persons expressed some natural surprise when it was known that another Life of Livingstone was to be issued from the Press.\* And yet, why? For in truth no authentic and comprehensive review of the man's personal life had ever been published. We had read much of his travels, and had been furnished with some details of his earlier career, but his really personal life had not been given to the world. Dr. W. G. Blaikie, an author of repute, and at one time editor of the *Sunday Magazine*, has accomplished this useful task with conspicuous energy and skill. He has, as he says, taken much pains to show the unity and symmetry of Livingstone's character. He has been aided in this work by several members of the great Traveller's family, and by many of his old friends. His materials were ample, and he has made admirable use of them.

Dr. Blaikie has unequivocal sympathy with Dr. Livingstone's character and career, such as no man could feel who only knew him and appreciated him as a distinguished explorer. The mere scientist and naturalist could no more measure the greatness of his aims than could

\*The Personal Life of David Livingstone, LL.D., D.C.L. By William Garden Blaikie, D.D., LL.D. London: John Murray. 1881.

the merchant or politician. From first to last Livingstone was on fire with the true enthusiasm of humanity. He could furnish materials for thought and inquiry to the most eminent members of our learned societies, and touch the springs of popular sympathy with a career of daring and self-sacrifice, but he was only partially known by these people. Before all things David Livingstone was an earnest Christian missionary. It was the one passion of his life to do all he could to bring the African race under the gracious influences of Christianity. It is a pity that there were good men living then (some may still survive) who deemed it unworthy of his early religious consecration that he should have severed his connection with the London Missionary Society, and have gone forth as a traveller through the African wilds and swamps in search of geographical facts and materials. The readers of Dr. Blaikie's deeply-interesting book will feel that he was as much a missionary in the latter part of his career in Africa as in the former. He had but one aim, and that was to help and bless the natives of those vast, untravellered regions. His methods were different from those prescribed by the great missionary organisations, but none the less powerful for the achievement of the objects which all profess to seek. It is a grim and dreary mistake to suppose that Livingstone was a merely restless man who had the travel-fever upon him. He was indeed one of the world's most celebrated explorers, but he did not travel for the love of it, much less for the gain accruing to it. His heart had far other and higher motives within it; and all along, until the end came, he travelled, he observed, he wrote his journals, he plied his great endeavour, that he might thereby serve the highest welfare of a race for whose good he gave his life. All Christian philanthropists must be deeply grateful to Dr. Blaikie for having helped us to understand this more clearly, through a fuller acquaintance with the personal life of one, who "ranks with the greatest of our race, and shows the minimum of infirmity in connection with the maximum of goodness."

WILLIAM DORLING.

#### TO THE EDITOR OF THE MODERN REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,—I beg to thank you for the leave granted to say a few words in your pages in defence of my rendering of Galatians ii. 1, in opposition to your Reviewer, who, when noticing my work on the "Journeys and Epistles of the Apostle Paul," had said that my "rendering is quite inadmissible from every point of view. For one thing, the Greek does not allow of it." There were other parts of my work to which he also objected; but they are of less importance. I confine myself, therefore, to the above, and the more so because a large number of critics are in agreement with your Reviewer; and those who deny the trustworthiness of the Book of Acts, and the genuineness of many of Paul's Epistles, very much rely upon this text. The words in the Authorised Version are:—

Then, after fourteen years, I went up again to Jerusalem, with Barnabas, and took Titus with me also.

These words I render :—

Then, in the course of fourteen years, I again went up to Jerusalem with Barnabas, taking also Titus with me.

The difference turns on the force of the preposition *did* when followed by a genitive case, as to whether it means *after*, or *in the course of*. There are eleven passages in the New Testament in which this preposition is followed by a genitive case of time. These we must consider ; and they are, I think, quite enough to establish the meaning of the word.

In Mark ii. 1, the time is of indefinite length, and, therefore, this text is of no use to us in our inquiry, for we may read equally well, "In the course of a few days," or, less accurately, "After a few days." The meaning is the same in either case, and the passage proves nothing.

In Acts xxiv. 17, also, the time is indefinite, and the passage, taken by itself, would prove nothing ; but not so if read in connection with the history, and if we allow the writer to say what meaning his words should bear. The Authorized Version has :—

Now, after many years, I came to bring alms to my nation.

This I render as follows, remembering that the Greek for alms is in the plural, which seems to point to more journeys than one :—

And during several years I came bringing gifts of charity to my nation.

These words are part of Paul's speech when he was a prisoner at Cæsarea, after the Book of Acts had narrated five journeys to Jerusalem since his conversion. The writer, therefore, did not understand them otherwise than I have rendered them, nor as contradicting his own narrative.

All critics are, I believe, agreed about the following eight passages as requiring our preposition to be rendered *during*, or *in the course of* :—

Matt. xxvi. 61.—I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to build it *within* [or *in the course of*] three days.

Mark xiv. 58.—I will destroy this temple made with hands, and *within* [or *in the course of*] three days I will build another not made with hands.

Luke v. 5.—Master, we have toiled *through* [or *during*] the whole night.

Acts i. 8.—Being seen by them *for* [or *during*] forty days.

Acts xvi. 9.—And a vision was seen by Paul *in* [or *during*] the night.

Acts xxiii. 31.—Took Paul, and brought him *by* [or *during*] night to Antipatris.

Heb. ii. 15.—*During* the whole lifetime.

Moreover, in Gal. i. 8, only a few verses above our disputed passage, Paul had written, "Then, after three years," using not the preposition *did*, but *perd*. This, of itself, is no little proof that he knew the different force of the two prepositions.

There is one passage in the Septuagint which may be quoted against me. In Deut. ix. 11 (rendering *did in the course of*) we read, "It came to pass in the course of forty days and forty nights that Jehovah gave to me the two tables of stone." But, if the Alexandrian is to be relied on as a careful translator, we must read "after forty days," for the Hebrew has

"at the end of forty days." But we should not place much reliance upon one passage in the Septuagint against those which the New Testament has supplied, and those which classical Greek would supply; while I fancy that the whole range of classical Greek would hardly supply half-a-dozen passages to support the less accurate meaning given to the preposition in the Authorised Version.

The proper rendering of our passage, Gal. ii. 1, must, for the most part, be settled by such evidence as I have produced; but, in addition, there remains the inquiry what the Apostle is likely to have written. Let it be observed that, while claiming for the Gentiles liberty from the bondage of the law, he does not claim it himself; therefore he is little likely to have let fourteen years pass between any two visits of religious duty to Jerusalem. From that consideration alone it is more probable that the fourteen years relate to the date of the Epistle than to the second journey.

Now, leaving the inquiry into the meaning of a single passage, and turning to the Journeys and Epistles of the Apostle Paul, my point is that the Epistles may be placed in such an order that there is no contradiction whatever as to the facts related in the Epistles and the Acts. I do not speak of the colouring which each writer puts upon the facts, but of the facts themselves. My book is not in a controversial form, but it was written with the hostile criticism of Baur and his followers always in my mind; and I am grateful to any Reviewer, who points out such contradictions as he may think that I have overlooked. By so doing truth is the more likely to be reached. But, in order to make such criticism useful, it should be accompanied with evidence and reasons; and my translation of any passage can only be shaken by the critic producing against me passages more numerous and more to the purpose than those which support me, or reasons to show why my authorities are not to the purpose.

Yours truly,

SAMUEL SHARPE.

DEAR SIR,—I also beg to thank you for the opportunity of replying to the remarks of Mr. Sharpe in the above letter. His diligence in defending his position is worthy of praise, and the point which he has raised has important bearings.

That *ἕως* with the genitive, in cases of time, often means *after*, is stated in every Greek grammar and dictionary. The root meaning of the word is *through*; used with a genitive of time it indicates motion through—*through and out of*, as the German grammarians and Dr. Ellicott in his Commentary on Galatians ii. 1, have it. The action is viewed in relation to the whole of the time spoken of. It is thus translated:—1, *during, throughout*, when the action involves duration; 2, *after*, when the action is one occurring at a point of time. The sense 3, *within, at some time during*, is more remote from the root meaning of the word, is, as Dr. Ellicott says, a laxer one, and is a rare one, but to be recognised in the phrase *ἕως νεκρός*. In Fritzsche's Commentary on

Mark, page 50, and in Winer's Grammar, page 856, a sufficient number of passages will be found to show that the usage of *δὲ* with the sense *after*, though not perhaps a frequent one (for the Greeks had many other ways of expressing an interval of time), was yet a recognised one, and is to be found in nearly every Greek classic from Æschylus downwards while it often occurs in connection with a number of years to fix a date just as in Gal. ii. 1, according to the authorised version. Compare the characteristic phrase, *διὰ χρόνου*, which occurs frequently. *Διὰ χρόνου ἑτάρα αὐτόν*, near the beginning of the Republic, means, I saw him after a long time (during which I had not seen him).

To apply Mr. Sharpe's rendering of *δὲ*, which he seeks to impress on several of the New Testament passages, to this passage of Plato would obviously destroy its meaning entirely; and this is exactly what Mr. Sharpe has done to the three passages, Mark ii. 1, Acts xxiv. 17, Gal. ii. 1. In these passages it is natural to take *δὲ* in the sense which yields the clearest meaning, that sense being one which is current in classical Greek, and the occurrence of which in the Septuagint Mr. Sharpe does not deny. As they stand, these three passages are simple historical statements, that after such an interval such a thing took place. Mr. Sharpe says they are not to be taken in this way, and has then to find for each of them another meaning, and to obtain a *terminus ad quem* in place of that which he has taken away. If the spaces of time do not fix the date of the action in connection with which they are mentioned, why are they mentioned at all? In Mark ii. 1 Mr. Sharpe fails to explain this, and leaves the phrase *δὲ ἡμερῶν* entirely idle. The statement, "he entered the house during some days," means nothing if we are not told what days these are. It is to be remarked that the English reader of Mr. Sharpe's translation of this passage would naturally take his phrase, "in the course of," to mean "at the end of."

In Acts xxiv. 17 Mr. Sharpe has no *terminus ad quem* of the several years, which are thus left entirely vague, so that months or decades might be placed instead of years, and leave the sense unaffected. Here, to get a tolerable meaning out of the words, Mr. Sharpe gives the aorist *παρεγενόμεν* the force of an imperfect, and makes the novel suggestion that the plural *ἐλημυσμένοι* points to more journeys than one.

The attempt to show that *δὲ* does not mean *after* in these passages cannot be thought successful, and we may regard them as examples of this use of the word in the New Testament. I should be inclined to add to these the passages, Matt. xxvi. 61 and Mark xiv. 58. If the Synoptic Evangelists considered the saying to have referred to the resurrection, they must have used *δὲ* with the sense of *after* (compare Mark viii. 81). The English *in* (not *within*) of the authorised version answers exactly to the Greek preposition in all its shades of meaning.

If *δὲ* can be translated *after* in the New Testament, it must certainly be so translated in Gal. ii. 1. Mr. Sharpe does not deny this, and will allow that his rendering of the passage has an awkwardness and difficulty which the authorised version avoids. How can the words,

διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν, mean "at some time during the fourteen years previous to the writing of this Epistle"? If the Apostle had meant this, would he not have said so? Do the words as they stand admit of such an interpretation? They clearly do not. No definition of the fourteen years is given by the use of the article, or by any hint at any other way in which they could be calculated, and their *terminus ad quem* must be given in the interval with διὰ. As the words of Socrates in the Republic διὰ χρόνου τέρατα αὐτόν, mean, "I had not seen him for a long time, but I saw him now," so Paul's words here must mean, "For fourteen years I did not go up to Jerusalem, but at the expiry of that interval I went there." Is the proposed rendering, or is the proposed theory of the meaning of διὰ, derived from anything but a preconceived chronology which is to be supported at all hazards? I submit that the Greek does not allow of the proposed translation.

Yours truly,

ALLAN MENZIES.

A T first sight it seems a little strange that a complete critical edition of a masterpiece of French literature, should be offered to English readers in the English language; \* and so, to a certain extent, withdrawn from the critical cognizance of those who are best qualified to estimate its merits and defects. From internal evidence, however, we should be inclined to suppose that Mr. de Soyres was equally at home in both languages; and we can only rejoice that he has thought fit, for whatever reason, to enrich our literature with what will probably prove to be a standard work. In some respects this edition leaves little to be desired. The text of the Provincial Letters is carefully reprinted, and the variations of the first four editions, noted at the foot of the page. To the end of each letter is affixed a body of explanatory notes, which the careful reader will find of great use. Mr. de Soyres has a large and accurate knowledge of the voluminous literature of the Jansenist Controversy, while, from the general stores of his theological erudition, he is able to adduce much of an illustrative kind. But the fact is that Mr. de Soyres' learning has a little run away with him. His book is exceedingly interesting and valuable to those who already know much, or all, about Pascal, Port Royal, and the Jansenist Controversy. Such readers will find in it some things of which they may have been ignorant, and fresh light thrown upon others, with which they were already familiar. But this is hardly enough. The editor of a literary *chef d'œuvre* is not entitled to rely on the erudition of his readers. He is bound to find them, in succinct if not in extended shape, all the knowledge requisite for their understanding of the text. Now, a reader of Mr. de Soyres' *Introductions* might get to the end of them, without knowing what Port Royal was, who were the Solitaries of Port Royal, what was the connection of Port Royal with the Jansenist Controversy, who Pascal was, or

\* The Provincial Letters of Pascal. Edited by John de Soyres. London: George Bell and Sons. 1880.



how he became involved in the fray. All these things are of course alluded to ; but the story is nowhere clearly told. We could not put Mr. de Soyres' book into the hands of a student who had not already graduated in the lore of Port Royal, in the expectation that it would answer its own avowed purpose. In the absence of this necessary information, the learned and accurate disquisitions with which Mr. de Soyres' pages are undoubtedly enriched, would confuse rather than instruct him. The book before us is a valuable contribution to the library of an expert in Jansenism : it would greatly assist any one who wished to study the Provincial Letters as a masterpiece of French prose ; but we cannot commend it as a complete edition, containing within itself everything necessary for the full comprehension of the author.

CHARLES BEARD.

MR. GERALD MASSEY has given us an extraordinary book.\* If its conclusions are true they are most important. The question whether they are true or not will have to be carefully cogitated by the Christian teacher, by the Hebraist, the Egyptologist, the ethnologist, and the student of mythology and folk-lore. Mr. Massey has been chiefly known to the public as a poet and lecturer, but henceforth he will be known as the author of this book. Ten years ago he retired from the public gaze, as Livingstone disappeared into the heart of Africa ; and now he emerges laden with manifold information which he has collected. Stranger than "travellers' tales" are some things which he has to tell us, yet not on that account to be summarily rejected. Nor is Mr. Massey a mere collector, but his vast accumulations of fact and statement are sorted, sifted, questioned, and made to serve as the basis for theories which are new and astounding. The axe is now laid to the root of the tree in very different fashion from what was done by Bishop Colenso, or the author of "Supernatural Religion." Evolution and the comparative method are here applied, with the greatest boldness, to the study of language, typology, myths, the genesis and succession of the gods, the antiquities of the Jews, and subjects which touch us more nearly still. The evidence may not seem in every case conclusive ; but the author always speaks as one who knows, and as though he had abundance of proof forthcoming by-and-by.

"One object of the present work is to interpret the primitive history and sociology from their reflections in the mirror of mythology and symbolism." It seems (quite in accordance with Darwin's conclusion, arrived at from other data) that Africa is the birthplace of us all. In the far-off past a Central African race got on to the Nile, in its upper course, and gradually descended towards the Delta, halting in Ethiopia, but

\* A Book of the Beginnings. By Gerald Massey. Two Vols. Containing an attempt to recover and reconstitute the lost *Origines* of the Myths and Mysteries, Types and Symbols, Religion and Language, with Egypt for the Mouthpiece, and Africa as the Birthplace. London : Williams and Norgate. 1881.

finding it impossible to stop, on account of the pressure of population behind. Thus the Central Africans became Ethiopians, and the Ethiopians became Egyptians. The continuance of the slow, glacier-like motion and squeeze, launched them from the land altogether, and sent them over the water as colonists. All the ends of the earth were peopled from Africa; and the Egyptian origins are still traceable in Britain, on one side of the globe, and New Zealand on the other—in words, water-names, symbolical customs, and almost-forgotten deities. The Kymry are from Kam (Cham, Egypt), and in Wales the ancient cult has never been altogether extinct. Even the language and cult of the Babylonians are traced to Egypt. This early colonising from Africa has to be borne in mind in reading the book, or else it will seem like insanity for the author to pass, by a quick transition, from the Eight Gods of Egypt to the British Arthur and his seven companions, and to illustrate Egyptian mythology and the meaning of Hebrew words, by instances drawn from the Fiji Islands or North America. "We have to dismiss from our minds the crude notion that the same myths have sprung up independently in various parts of the world. . . . Much that is missing in Egypt is recoverable in the Mangaian and Maori treasury of the mythos" (Vol. II., p. 559). What is it, then, that is at last recovered from Egypt and her ancient colonies put together? It seems that the Egyptian mythology and worship passed through a succession of phases—stellar, lunar, and solar—the two former having been superseded before the monumental records begin. The pre-monumental condition of things, our author has been digging for, as Mr. Pengelly digs for relics of pre-historic man in Kent's Cavern. He is enabled, he believes, to reproduce for us the most obscure cults—namely, the Sut-Typhonian and that of Atum and his son, Iu-em-hept, "the Egyptian Jesus." The first object which arrested the attention of the early observers was the revolution of the Great Bear constellation, with which they connected the star Sirius. The Bear was the first measurer of time, and the Dog-star, as we know, announced the annual inundation. The Bear was the Great Mother, Typhon, and the Dog-star was her son, Sut. The seven bright stars of the Bear, together with the Dog-star, supply the Seven and Eight which are found in so many mythologies. In process of time the Sabeian system or stellar reckoning was superseded by the lunar, which advancing astronomical knowledge had rendered more exact; and the Mother and Son were degraded. Sut, the Dog-star, was followed by Taht, the lunar reckoner and announcer of time. Lastly comes the solar dynasty, and the adaptation to the solar mythos of the symbols and imagery previously extant. This development occupied a great length of time; and Taht had superseded Sut (Ritual, ch. xlii.) when the monuments begin. The symbolism, in fact, points to a birth and origin in *Pieces*; and since it is impossible that this should relate to the last occurrence of the equinox in that sign (B.C. 255), it follows that it must have been 21,000 years earlier, through the precession of the equinoxes. The gods were time-keepers; the first time observed and registered was

Sut-Typhonian, and the writer maintains that the Typhonian religion and types are the oldest extant, whether in Egypt or out of it.

At this point the interest of the book for many students will only begin. The author maintains the Egyptian origin of the Jews, and argues that they were Sut-Typhonians, expelled on account of their adherence to the earliest cult. They were Ius, worshippers of In, the black god of Inner Africa. The Exodus was a going out of unclean Typhonians, moral lepers, accursed heretics. Hence it can be understood that there was more than one exodus; and thus Manetho and Josephus are reconciled. Evidences or relics of this Egyptian origin of the Jews the author believes he finds in the Old Testament Scriptures, the Hebrew writings being largely a restatement of the Egyptian myth as actual history, and containing reproductions of the most ancient Hermean matter. The Creation story belongs to the mythological astronomy. In the beginning the Great Bear, by its revolution, created the first circle, and put a boundary to the boundless. The plural "Elohim" refers to the first revolvers, the seven great stars of the Bear—seven stars but one constellation, plurality in unity. "Jehovah" also is the divinity of the number seven, and feminine in character. The feminine terminal *He* indicates this origin, and on this account, in later times, it was considered blasphemy to pronounce the name. Reverting to the Book of Genesis, Seth is the same as Sut here identified with Taht, and Enos the son of Seth is identified with Sut-Anush, of the Dog-star. In like manner, Abram, Isaac, and Jacob are resolved into divinities, and specifically Jacob is an impersonation of the sun-god, and his 12 sons are the 12 signs of the zodiac. There is much more to similar effect about Adam and Eve, Moses and Joshua, and "David the Hebrew Taht," though it is admitted that there is some slight historic nucleus in the Hebrew narrative. The curious student will also find here new readings of what is recorded about the serpent of Eden and the serpent of the wilderness, about the ark and the deluge, the cherubim, the teraphim images, the Book of Jasher, the Qodeshoth and the monthly prognosticators, the expected Shiloh, and the Messiah son of the coming age. Even the virgin and child of Rome, our author holds, had their origin in Egyptian mythology. Some of the profoundest work in the book relates to burial customs, circumcision, and the practice of tattooing, the results being arrived at by delving to the root-meaning of the hieroglyphics which preceded alphabetic language.

There is very much in these volumes which will be questioned, and there are a few obvious mistakes, but only profound scholars will be competent to question or capable of fairly judging the author's main results. I, for my part, content myself with introducing Mr. Massey's work to the readers of the MODERN REVIEW. They will find in it evidences of wide study, and will, at least, value it for its store of detail, the accumulation of which would have been worthy the industry of a Darwin or a Buckle. The comparative vocabularies—of Egyptian words corresponding with English, with Hebrew, with Assyrian, and with Maori—have themselves been the work of years. They contain three-fourths of the Egyptian

lexicon; and as that is difficult of access (Birch, in Bunsen's "Egypt," £8 8s.) they will be invaluable to students who may seek to apply the same comparative process to other languages. It may be a defect of the author's method that he starts with his own results full in his mind, and frequently alludes incidentally to conclusions not worked out till afterwards, or not attempted to be proved at all in these volumes. The reader cannot be in the same position; but, in arrest of hasty judgment and summary condemnation, it should be understood that these two volumes are but part of an intended whole, and two more will hardly afford room for what the author has to say. He intends to treat of the "Science of Typology"—the typology of the Genesis, of Eden, the tree, the fall; the typology of the deluge and the ark; of the gods and of the Great Mother; the Mother and Messiah-Son; the "two truths" of Egypt; the biune deity, the triads and the trinity; the typology of time and number, and of the Word or Logos; the typology of the cross and the crossing; of the mummy, of naming and of sounds; of the astronomical allegory, the great pyramid, and the great year of the world. The last volume of the series is to be devoted to tracing the current theology and eschatology as the deposit, development, outcome, and final form of the ancient typology and mythology!

GEORGE ST. CLAIR.

NOTHING is more difficult than to obtain just and complete ideas of the men whom the Church has condemned as heretics. With a wisdom which savours somewhat of that of the children of this world, all authentic records of the unorthodox have, as far as possible, been destroyed, and after ages have to reconstruct from fragments in their opponents' writings, and from the scanty remnants of their own works, the thoughts and systems against which ecclesiastical anathemas have been hurled. No one has suffered more from this dearth of information than M. Servetus. But the day has come when justice seems likely to be done to him, and his position as a reformer will be recognised as being side by side with Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, if not above them in thoroughness of Biblical research and ecclesiastical liberality. The labours of the Rev. H. Tollin, of Magdeburg,\* have been unremitting and wonderfully successful in throwing light upon the history of Servetus, and in explaining his theological principles and method. The only regret we venture to express is that the precious results of his unwearied research are scattered in so many periodical publications, and in comparatively brief pamphlets, instead of being collected and arranged in what still is a desideratum—a complete biography of Servetus. No one has such a command of the materials needed for such a purpose, no one has shown greater interest in the subject, and it not common to find in a German author the power of picturesque description and the lucid style which

\* *Servet und die Oberländischen Reformatoren. Quellen Studien.* Von Lic. Theol. H. Tollin, Prediger. Band I.—Michael Servet und Martin Butzer. Berlin: H. N. Mecklenburg. 1880.

characterise the writings of M. Tollin. His latest contribution to Servetus-literature is a most interesting work on the relations of his hero and Bucer, a subject of more than usual interest to the English student on account of Bucer's great influence on our English Reformation. This work is very characteristic of Tollin's method. Nothing that has ever been written bearing upon Servetus seems to escape his notice, and his searching criticism finds traces of the Spanish reformer where former students have found nothing. Where direct evidence for his conclusions is not forthcoming—and, naturally enough, in most matters which concern so hated a heretic, direct evidence is often wanting—circumstantial evidence is adduced with such an accumulation of minute detail, and such skilful arrangement, that it needs the most careful watchfulness not to be led to accept as ascertained fact what, after all, is only a very probable hypothesis. For instance, in a letter to Oecolampadius, Servetus says that "he has with his own ears heard faith differently explained by his correspondent, by Doctor Paul, by Luther, and by Melancthon." When and where did Servetus meet Luther? Tollin follows both men on their travels to discover where their paths cross, and shows that the only possible time must have been when Luther was staying in Coburg during the Diet of Augsburg, and where Servetus had in attendance on his patron, Quintana, the Confessor of the Emperor Charles, accompanied that monarch into Germany. Bucer was at the same time in Augsburg, and Tollin points out how many reasons there were why Servetus, with his newly-awakened love of the Bible, should desire to come into intimate relation with Bucer, whose lectures delivered at Strasburg had greatly influenced Servetus, as can be shown by reference to his celebrated work, "*De Trinitatis Erroribus*." Evidence is adduced in favour of this desire having been gratified. It is shown to be very probable that Servetus transferred his service at this time from Quintana to Bucer, and that as his secretary he accompanied the Strasburg clergyman on his well-known visit to Luther; so that at last we come to fix the very date of the interview between Servetus and the great German Reformer as the 19th, 20th, or 21st of September, 1580. This brief summary does nothing like justice to the careful reasoning of our author, nor does it give the faintest conception of the picturesque style in which the accumulating evidence is marshalled and made to produce conviction.

To the student of the history of doctrine, this work will be a storehouse of suggestion. M. Tollin traces the gradual growth in Bucer of orthodox Trinitarianism, showing how he begins in Erasmian freedom from its fetters, but is gradually led rather by political considerations than real conviction into conformity with symbolical orthodoxy. The picture drawn of Bucer is hardly a pleasing one, but it cannot fail to help us in understanding his conduct in England, where his influence was so great, and must have helped in the establishment of our Reformed Church on such unstable foundations. No injustice seems to be done to Bucer by Mathew Alberus, who (when noticing how among Zwinglians he was a

Zwinglian, and among Lutherans a Lutheran) spoke of him as "an amphibious creature." But it is not only about Bucer, Servetus, and Luther that we receive information in this valuable work. By brief but wonderfully suggestive descriptions, we learn more of the true character of the many sects which divided the Protestant world than in many far more pretentious volumes. The Waldenses, the Anabaptists, the Free Baptists, &c., are described, and their points of contact with Servetus shown. Strasburg, at the time when Servetus took up his abode there, under the protection of Bucer and Capito, seems to have been the very hotbed of sectarian division, and Servetus, if he had been the ambitious self-seeker, full of vanity, whom some writers describe, would have had no difficulty in becoming a most dangerous antagonist of Bucer. But he quietly submitted to his criticisms, and left Strasburg without provoking any open conflict. Indeed, he retracted several things, in accordance with Bucer's request, in his next publication. Bucer did not publicly attack Servetus while the latter was in Strasburg; indeed, Tollin calls special attention to the remarkable fact that no one ever publicly controverted Servetus face to face, till at last, in Geneva, supported by the whole band of preachers, the Senate, and the Public Prosecutor, Calvin assailed the captive Spaniard, worn with illness and persecution, and deprived of the aids which freedom would have offered him. It was only after Servetus had left Strasburg that Bucer is said by Calvin to have declared that "a man who could hold such opinions deserved to have his bowels plucked out, and to be torn limb from limb." Tollin gives good reason to believe that the Strasburg lecturer only spoke of Servetus's works deserving destruction, and that it was the stern spirit of the Genevan Inquisitor which applied the cruel phrase to the Spaniard's body. On his trial in Geneva, Servetus confessed that Bucer "lui était contraire;" but his generous spirit never led him to speak with harshness of the man whose early lectures on the Gospels had largely influenced the formation of his opinions. In concluding this brief notice, I can but repeat the wish I expressed in the beginning, that M. Tollin would before long give to the world a biography of the great Spaniard, as there is no one who can equally do justice to so great a theme.

S. A. S.

**M**R. OVERTON, who is already favourably known as the joint-author with Mr. Abbey of "The English Church in the Eighteenth Century," presents us with a thoroughly good and conscientious monograph on William Law.\* To say that Law is remembered as the author of the "Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life," would probably be to overstate the case; for though most people have heard of the book, it has long ceased, we fear, to be widely read. Probably this is largely due to the fact that Law during his lifetime outlasted his chances of popu-

\* William Law, Nonjuror and Mystic: A Sketch of his Life, Character, and Opinions. By J. H. Overton, M.A. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1881.

larity, and broke with those who, like the Wesleys, directed the supply of religious reading in the great Evangelical revival. His High-Churchism cut him off on one side, his Mysticism on another. His own life of retirement and isolation, only diversified by controversies in which he fought for the most part, like Hal of the Wynd, "for his own hand," was not of the sort to found a school, or to ensure intelligent and appreciative presentation of his views after his decease.

The Hanoverian succession found Law a young Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and his refusal to take the Abjuration Oath ranked him with the Nonjurors, at a time when whatever savour of romantic loyalty had characterised their cause seemed to have departed, and their schism was regarded as an eccentricity that had ceased to be dangerous. Law does not seem ever to have been numbered among the clergy of the Nonjuring church, or to have had any dealings with its bishops or prominent members. During the "ten years' occultation" which followed his leaving Cambridge, he appears to have served curacies and taken pupils in London. To this period we owe his "Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor" (Hoadley), which established his character as a High Churchman and his reputation as a controversialist; his "Remarks on Mandeville's Fable of the Bees," of the first section of which, John Sterling said, "I have never seen in our language the elementary grounds of a rational ideal philosophy, as opposed to empiricism, stated with nearly the same clearness, simplicity, and force;" and the "Christian Perfection," in which Law displays that power of keen observation and analysis of character applied to the commendation of personal religion and practical piety which forms so much of the charm and value of the "Serious Call." *Eusebius* and *Siccus* in the one give a foretaste of *Flatus* and *Matilda*, of *Calidus* and *Succus* in the other—portraits sketched with a hand so true and in a style so transparently natural that we are reminded alternately of Mr. Spectator's acquaintances, and of the Talkatives and Littlefaiths whom Bunyan drew from the life. But in the time which elapsed between the appearance of the "Christian Perfection" and the publication of the "Serious Call," a material change had taken place in Law's circumstances. In 1727 he went back to his old college as tutor to rather a graceless pupil, Mr. Edward Gibbon, who, when he quitted the University in order to make the grand tour, left Law installed in his father's house at Putney. There he remained for at least twelve years, in a position which it would be derogatory to call that of a chaplain, if the name suggests to us the idea of the poor dependent whose calling it was—

With holy words to consecrate the meat,  
But hold it for a favour seldom known  
If he be deigned the honour to sit down.

Law was certainly, as his pupil's son, Edmund Gibbon, the historian, relates, "the much-honoured friend and spiritual director of the whole family." At Putney, Law was the centre of a congenial circle, to one member of which, Dr. Cheyne, he appears to have owed his introduction to the writings of the continental mystics. Here, too, he was free to receive

visitors from a distance, among whom were his life-long friend, Dr. John Byron, to whose journal we owe much of our knowledge of Law's life and thought; and the two Wesleys, who seem to have retained a sincere respect for Law, even after they were constrained to testify against him as "an eloquent but erring man." Here, besides the "Serious Call," were written the "Case of Reason" (against Matthew Tindal), and "Letters to a Lady Inclined to Enter the Church of Rome." But on the death of old Mr. Gibbon, in 1739, the household at Putney was broken up, and Law retired to his native village—King's Cliffe, in Northamptonshire, where he was joined soon after by a widow lady, Mrs. Hutcheson, and his patron's daughter, Miss Hester Gibbon, both of whom desired to pass their days in retirement and works of charity under Law's spiritual direction. In this retreat, in which he lived without a change until his death, in 1761, occupied only in caring for schools, which the worthy trio founded and endowed—and, we must add, in such lavish and misdirected almsgiving as drew forth warm protests from the rector of the village and his parishioners—he was free to practise that ascetic piety which his early writings had enjoined, and to follow that bent of his mind towards mystical theology, which his study of Behmen had done so much to confirm. Mr. Overton appropriately prefixes to his analysis of Law's later theology, three interesting chapters on "Mysticism," which we hope may receive the wide attention they deserve, seeing that in our day preachers often use *mystical* as if it were a synonym for *mysterious*, and their hearers generally suppose it to be classical for *misty*. Law seems to be pre-eminently the writer through whom the English reader may arrive at some comprehension of what mysticism is. He is never visionary, and hardly ever fanatical; he deals with religious subjects in language which seems singularly *adequate* to them; and even his devotion to Behmen could not impart a touch of turgidity or obscurity to his style. It is a perfect instrument wielded by a competent hand. With all his contempt for "human reasoning," and his disparagement of classical studies, he was, nevertheless, a master of controversy, and an over-match for those "who, from long labours in restoring the grammar, and finding out the hidden beauties of some vicious old book, set up for qualified artists to polish the Gospel pearl of great price." The very gist of his mysticism and the solemn secret of his nervous eloquence is to be found in the words with which he continues (in his "Address to the Clergy," *qu.* Overton, p. 486):—"Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth" is the only way by which any man ever did, or ever can, attain Divine knowledge and Divine goodness. . . . Show me a man whose heart has no desire or prayer in it but to love God with his whole soul and spirit, and his neighbour as himself, and then you have shown me the man who knows Christ, and is known of Him, the best and wisest man in the world. Not a single precept in the Gospel but is the precept of his own heart, and the joy of that new-born heavenly love which is the life and light of his soul. . . . That Love which fulfilleth the Law and the Prophets, that Love which is God and Christ, both in angels and men



(as he says in another place, 'Love is my God and wrath my devil') is the love that gives birth and life and growth to everything that is either thought or action in him; and if he has no share or part with foolish errors, cannot be tossed about with every wind of doctrine, it is because to be always governed by this love is to be always taught of God."

Besides Law's truly mystical works, "An Appeal to All that Doubt," "The Spirit of Prayer," and "The Spirit of Love," some of his most powerful *Adversaria*, against Bishops Hoadley and Warburton, and Dr. Trapp, belong to his later days. He retained to the end his scrupulous fairness in debate, his scorn of a merely verbal advantage, and his desire to "posit" rather than deny; and he still had his provoking way (we think the words are Mr. Overton's) of putting his opponent in the wrong. That he drew the same sword against the Freethinker and the contemporary Low Churchman (of whom Hoadley was the type) is obvious, for both started from the premisses of Locke, to contend for the prize of *Reasonableness*; and the thought of competition between Churchmen and Deists for so worthless a guerdon was as smoke in the nostrils of Law.

If, in thinking of William Law, we have too little commended his biographer, it is solely because Mr. Overton has so well realised his own wish in rendering attractive and instructive his sketch of "one of the finest minds and most interesting characters of the eighteenth century."

J. E. O.

THE critic who should undertake to give a distinct and impartial estimate of each of the numerous volumes of verse which are published, or even of those which make their way to the editorial table, would find his task by no means one of the easiest, and it would be, on the whole, a thankless one. Those pretty, attractive-looking volumes, so tastefully bound and nicely printed, contain a great deal that must be allowed to be of very fair poetical quality; and they do credit to their authors as men of culture and intellectual tastes, and as careful and intelligent students of our best poetical literature. It must be said, however, that a good deal more is needed than the fluent expression of excellent sentiments, or the drawing of pleasing pictures, or the treatment—for the thousandth time—of the "Old, old story," to attract much notice in these days of superabundant literary wealth. In the absence of any special mark of originality, or any special skill in the music of words, the most generous critic, if he be also just, will be compelled to award only that faint praise which may be said to bless neither him that gives nor him that takes. He might be able honestly to compliment the authors on having produced creditable literary exercises, which, it may be hoped, have been their own reward in the doing; but it is not often that he could fix upon any characteristic marks which would distinguish one from another, as regards real literary value, or entitle its author to be "placed" among the successful candidates for poetic honours. Sometimes, how-

ever, it will happen that out of the crowd of aspirants for the favour of the muse, and of the public, the voice of some singer of more than average skill and power is heard; and it would not be difficult to make out a good list of minor poets, belonging to quite recent days, who have fairly won a hearing, and who may reckon on an ungrudging welcome from the critics, and from a more general audience, whenever they have anything fresh to say or sing. In such a list the name of Mr. Walter C. Smith would unquestionably be found. He gained a recognised place in it when he published, some eight or nine years ago, his clever and original poem, "Olrig Grange." Since then he has enlarged the scope, and varied the theme of his poetic teachings in "Borland Hall," and "Hilda"; and now, in "Raban; or, Life Splinters," he discourses again in eloquent verse of many things which come very near to the heart and conscience of earnest and thoughtful men. He is broad-minded, charitable, and sympathetic as ever, and, in his sketches of character, and his treatment of those problems of life on which he touches, he shows a kindly wisdom and shrewd insight, and a genial, hopeful spirit, which always make him a welcome companion and a helpful one. Mr. Smith's verse is always easy and fluent, and with this fluency there is an occasional element of weakness. He lets his words run on sometimes in too careless a measure, missing the subtler harmonies which he not unfrequently proves to be quite within the compass of his art. Probably, however, he would say that the more homely and familiar style has been chosen as most suitable, in its place, fitting the particular mood of the author—that is, of "Raban," the supposed writer of the pages to which the somewhat artificial title of "Life Splinters" has been given. This Raban, whose character and experiences, we should say, are not altogether the product of the author's imagination, is described with a firm and sympathetic touch.

Trim and erect, with locks of iron-grey,  
A large eye full of light, and features thin  
That grew with age in beauty; a manner brisk  
And breezy; ready of speech for sharp retort,  
Or flowing period; given to dainty humour,  
Where delicate touches of quaint character  
Flitted like smiles upon his words; he knew  
Affairs and books and men, and it was like  
Great music just to sit beside the fire,  
And hearken his discourse.

He had started life as a licentiate in theology, but was unfitted for the preacher's calling, being unable to satisfy himself with any cut-and-dried scheme of salvation, or to satisfy his hearers without one; and at times—

He seemed to assail their most secure beliefs,  
And sap the main foundation of their hopes,  
When he was merely setting free the soul  
Of Truth, on which they lived, and which he loved.

Accepting the fact of his failure with sadness, but without losing heart for the future, he takes to literary work, and through the press,

and also on the platform, gains a hearing for the truths which he had attempted in vain to preach from the pulpit; and so, with ripening experience, and a wider range of thought and speech, he gets some fruitful work done, and leaves a record of his life in the papers entrusted to the friend who is supposed to edit them, and who in the introduction gives us the picture of Raban himself. This plan of the poem allows of considerable variety of subject and treatment. It includes some clever and interesting sketches of friends and acquaintances, passages from Raban's personal history, meditations on various problems of faith and conduct, and not a few lyrics which make pleasant music. There is a section called "Crystallised Sermon," supposed to contain some of the truths he had attempted to get into the minds of his rustic congregation in his preaching days. Of these the "Parabolic Discourse" strikes us as the most successful. In the two sections, "Stray Leaves" and "Endings," we have some of the author's best work, some specimens of which we should have been glad to find room for. It would, however, have been difficult, after all, to detach any shorter passages for quotation without spoiling their meaning and interest; and we are content to conclude our brief review of a very interesting book by cordially recommending our readers to make acquaintance with it at first hand.

R. C. J.

MR. MORRIS'S *Studies*,\* which are, in main, a reproduction of a course of public lectures, cover a wide range both in time and matter, from Roger Bacon, William of Occam, Edmund Spenser, Richard Hooker, and Shakespeare, to Lord Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hamilton, J. S. Mill, and Herbert Spencer. They are largely biographical, aiming at showing the connection between a man's life and his thought, and often narrate facts of interest for the ascertainment of which wide reading must have been required. With the general spirit of the criticism we are in cordial agreement. Professor Morris is by no means enamoured of the present domination of physical conceptions over philosophic thought and the current negation of all but phenomenal truth. He has studied the best German literature to good purpose, and holds a high place as an interpreter of European ideas to his own countrymen. But, if not he himself, his advertising agent, is under an extraordinary delusion in regard to the supposed excellence of his style. We fail to perceive "the union of *conciseness* with *attractive grace*," and would strongly recommend Mr. Morris, if he desires many readers on this side of the Atlantic, to adopt a simpler and less ambitious way of stating facts and any comments he may wish to make upon them.

The title of Mr. Duncan's little book† clearly indicates its aim and scope, it being understood that it is feeling, not intelligence, which he

\* *British Thought and Thinkers: Introductory Studies—Critical, Biographical, and Philosophical.* By George S. Morris, A.M., Lecturer on Philosophy in the John Hopkins' University, Baltimore. London: Trübner. 1880.

† *Conscious Matter; or, the Physical and the Psychical universally in Causal Connection.* By W. Stewart Duncan. London: David Bogue. 1881.

predicates of all matter. We have here a really noteworthy attempt to bridge the chasm which successive Presidents of the British Association and other leading evolutionists have confessed their inability to cross—viz., that which separates mind and matter. To Professor Tyndall, and, still more recently, to Professor Allman, the gulf which separates physical and psychical phenomena seemed impassable, and many a defender of religion thought that here at least had been found an impregnable barrier to the further inroads of Evolution. The book before us clearly indicates that the insurmountableness of this barrier will no longer be admitted by many scientific men, but that sufficiently daring assumptions will be made and bold hypotheses ventured, to render the subject at least an open question. Of course, when the ordinary conceptions of mind and matter are fully developed, no step from the one to the other is conceivable; the connection between the prick of a pin and the feeling of pain, between vibrations of air or ether and sensations of sound or light, is then an ultimate fact, capable of no explanation. But if you begin lower down, and put into your fundamental conception of matter the germ from which you can educe all the known phenomena of conscious life, and resolutely face all the logical consequences of such a proceeding, then you can soon attain some magnificent generalisations embracing the entire universe, inward and outward, in their sweep. These logical consequences are truly paradoxical, but what of that? The fact that the earth goes round the sun while the sun seems to go round the earth can always be quoted to prove how misleading are mere empirical notions and associations of ideas. So we shall have to admit as conceivable the hypothesis that there exists one homogeneous omnipresent matter; "that what we call Body is but a group of forces more or less complex, in equilibrium;" that every exercise of force has feeling for its counterpart, imparting influence being the mark of energy, receiving influence, the corresponding mark of sentience; that Motion is "not really a translation of Matter, but simply a translation of force-groups throughout continuous and universal matter;" that the Ego is the compound of feelings connected with every body, organic or inorganic, the persistence of the Ego in living bodies being dependent on the continual flux and change of forces. We cannot here dwell on the arguments by which these conclusions are reached, or we would gladly have pointed out the ingenious analogies established between force and feeling, and the way in which a *locus* in time is secured for the feeling which perpetually alternates with force. Nor can we go into criticism further than to say (1) that Mr. Duncan's homogeneous omnipresent matter has a perfect sinecure, and might safely be dispensed with so long as he retains his twin force-feeling and space in which it may be localised; and (2) that, considering how soon monotony turns consciousness into unconsciousness, the feeling which he predicates of the inorganic world must be wholly different from that which belongs to the organic, and surely deserves a different name. These points, however, do not touch the main theory, and could easily be incorporated in a slightly altered hypothesis. The real point at which

the theory becomes wholly inadequate is, we believe, when it meets the fact, old as truth itself, of the freedom of the will. Mr. Duncan, however, is a very modern psychologist, and has advanced till quite out of sight of so antiquated a controversy as that which once concerned the nature of the will.

H. S. S.

IT has become so much the fashion to speak in a patronising way of Jesus as "this young Jewish Rabbi," that few persons will be surprised to find that "Rabbi Jeshua"\* is simply the title of the last new life of Christ. But the book is not likely to throw much light on the life or character or work of Jesus. The author, doubtless, found its composition an interesting occupation, and there is a certain amount of entertainment to be got out of the detection of familiar characters and writings in disguise. John the Baptist appears as Haman, the Gospel according to Mark as "the quaint chronicle of Simeon has Saddik," Luke's gospel as "the chronicle of Saul," Matthew's as "the Jerusalem chronicle," &c. A work of this kind has no value unless it gives the authority for every statement and is strictly accurate in all its details. We find here no reference given to any authority; and as for its accuracy, the Gospel according to Matthew (to drop the strange names) is referred to as stating that Jesus was born in a stable (p. 18), and as giving no explanation of the fact that, though he was born in Bethlehem, the scene of his earlier ministry was in Galilee (p. 19); the birth of Christ is represented as taking place in the winter, the shepherds being kindly sheltered from a snowstorm in a cave; and St. Paul is made responsible for the anachronisms of the early chapters of the third gospel. After this, how is the reader to know whether the author has or has not any ground whatever for the statement that "the Pharisees crowded each Sabbath in the squalid synagogues of the villages; but on the mountains, and beneath the shady terebinths, the poor bowed down in ignorance to the primeval powers of the stars in heaven" (p. 100)? The authority for the statement that the rich Jews wore gaberdines (p. 100) we should take at a guess to be Shakespeare; but as to the grounds on which the gaberdine is described as "closely fitting," we are quite at a loss. Probably the more important statement, that Jesus enjoined celibacy upon the apostles (p. 100), may be derived from some authority of about the same date. The idea of giving an account of the life of Jesus just as one might of any other Jewish teacher appears at first to be a fruitful one; but the attempt must fail from the very simplicity and familiarity of the gospel narratives, and the strangeness to the general reader of everything else that the writer requires for his purpose. Either the reader must know pretty nearly all that is in the book to begin with, or it will all be hopelessly unintelligible and confusing to him.

Less pretentious, with no claim to originality, yet, after all, more valuable as a contribution to Christian thought and an estimate of Christ's

\* Rabbi Jeshua: An Eastern Story. London: Kegan Paul and Co. 1861.

life and character, are Dr. Fairbairn's "*Studies in the Life of Christ.*"\* Dr. Fairbairn has no need to magnify his own learning at his readers' expense, by omitting to give references to easily accessible books from which he has derived his facts, and whether he quotes from the Gospels, from the Pirke Aboth, from Delitsch, Renan, or any other source, he gives us chapter and verse, or page, that we may verify his statements without unnecessary labour. These studies are written from what is called the orthodox point of view. But though the author apparently regards the subject of them as God Himself, he is content in the opening chapter to say, "In Him the Christian ages have seen the manifested God . . . their faith has glorified His sufferings into a sacrifice by the Creator for the creature," and he then proceeds to add that all this makes it necessary that we should see him, "not as He lives in our faith and reverence, but as He lived on our common earth; a man looking before and after, speaking as a man and spoken to by men." The irresistible change which is coming over religious thought is shown again by the fact that while Dr. Fairbairn believes in the miracles, he still says, "The early use of the miracles was an abuse, and almost exact inversion of the truth. Events that were by their very nature sensuous and transitory were made proofs of a faith that is essentially transcendental and permanent." . . . "The claims of truth on belief increase with time, but those of miracles decrease" (p. 150). Though our author apparently fails to see that the two accounts of the birth and infancy of Christ, which he distinctly recognises as very different in sentiment and purpose, are not only different, but in their literal and historical sense quite inconsistent with one another, we forgive this ignoring of the principles of criticism in consideration of the keen appreciation of the poetic and religious truth of the narratives. In the chapters on "*The Historical Conditions*" and the "*Growth and Education of Jesus*," we find thoughtful suggestions as to the circumstances amid which the character of Jesus developed to its full perfection, and the stages of the development itself, and we do not feel it necessary to spend much time in wondering how Dr. Fairbairn can speak of any being as "God blessed for ever" and then invite attention to "the political and social conditions that allowed Him to reach His end," and say that without Judaism he would have been "without an arena on which to live and develop and act" (p. 19); or, again, that "His manhood developed out of a youth that had beneath it boyhood, childhood, and infancy" (p. 49); or, strangest of all, perhaps, that "His study of the Scriptures must have been an eminently educative study" (p. 58). Dr. Fairbairn writes as one who seeks to know Christ, not as one who has an image of Christ to defend. He has partly, at least, drawn aside the veil which is upon the hearts of so many when the evangelists are read. And perhaps he will carry more readers with him than he could have done if he had himself moved more rapidly.

F. H. J.

\* *Studies in the Life of Christ.* By the Rev. A. M. Fairbairn, D.D., Principal of Airedale College. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1881.

DR. HAUSRATH'S "New Testament Times"\* is a book which it is equally pleasant and profitable to read. The author's bright and graphic descriptions and narratives carry the reader with a delightful sense of ease and freshness over the wide field of research which he commands; and the material, social, political, and religious antecedents and concomitants of the ministry of Jesus, together with the main course and purport of that ministry itself, are delineated with the rapid strokes of a master of form. It is true that many readers may complain that Dr. Hausrath's Gospel criticism is not as severe as might be wished, and that great, not to say insuperable, difficulties often lie concealed, except to the eyes of the initiated, beneath the smooth and flowing narrative that seems to make everything so simple. This is no real defect, however. The purpose of the author would have been defeated if he had impaired the vividness of his pictures by interposing elaborate discussions and defences of every position he lays down. His work presents an admirable compendium of the results arrived at by a school of criticism that lies far removed from the orthodox or apologetic position, but declines to follow the "Tübingen" criticism into its detailed consequences. Either as an introduction to the study of New Testament criticism and history for those who are about to enter on it, or as a book to be read by busy men who are not likely to pursue the subject much further, Dr. Hausrath's work may be heartily recommended.

A careful and elaborate essay† on the external evidences of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel only serves to deepen the conviction that the really essential and interesting points concerning this Gospel must be decided on *internal* evidence. The external evidences are insufficient and uncertain, and even if one party or the other were to gain a complete victory and establish all its claims as far as these evidences are concerned, it would still be possible to maintain either of the conflicting hypotheses of authorship. But this does not touch the fact that the question of the external evidences has an interest and importance of its own, though strictly secondary, and that every contribution to its discussion (we can hardly say settlement), bearing the stamp of serious study, deserves a welcome.

P. H. W.

NO revolution in modern society is proceeding more rapidly than that in the social and civic status of women. It is well that one who has rendered such effectual service as Miss Cobbe, in forwarding the best aspirations of her sex, should lift up her genial voice to warn that

\* A History of the New Testament Times. By Dr. A. Hausrath, &c. The Time of Jesus. Vols. I. and II. Translated by Charles T. Poynting, B.A., and Philip Quenzer. Williams and Norgate. 1878, 1880.

† The Authorship of the Fourth Gospel: External Evidences. By Ezra Abbott, D.D., LL.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism, &c., in Harvard University. Trübner and Co. 1880.

there are dangers besetting this, as every other, emancipation.\* Very appropriately does Miss Cobbe place upon her title-page the motto from "Marcus Aurelius":—

Whatever any one does or says, I must be good; just as if the emerald were always saying this: Whatever any one does or says, I must be emerald and keep my colour.

Miss Cobbe's lectures are an appeal to women to "be good"; only she understands by goodness something larger and stronger than the commonly-preached duties of women. "In addressing my country-women in this way," says Miss Cobbe,

I have aimed at inciting them, in the first place, to give deep and well-ordered reflection to the subject of morals in general, and of their own duties in particular; trusting that I might help them to see the fallacy of several errors which have hitherto misled us, and to recognise how noble and brave and beautiful is the ideal of womanly virtue, to which we are bound to lift ourselves up. And, in the second place, I have striven to warn my hearers against the neglect of social *bienséances*, that adoption of looser and more "Bohemian" manners, and, worst of all, that fatal laxity of judgment regarding grave moral transgressions, which have appeared of late years amongst us as the inevitable extravagance of reaction from earlier strictness. These faults and mistakes constitute, I conceive, deadly perils to the whole movement for the advancement of women, and, with all my strength, I would implore every woman who sympathises with that movement to set her face like a flint against them. It is our task to make society *more* pure, *more* free from vice—either masculine or feminine—than it has ever been before, not to allow its law to become one shadow of a shade less rigid. (Pp. iv., v.)

The purpose so clearly stated is admirably carried out, and all who are sensible of the current changes in society must be aware how opportune that purpose is. The recent extraordinary vote at Cambridge is but one of the multitudinous signs that men are, at last, becoming conscious that they have dealt unfairly by women, and that the time is at hand when the daughters of England will receive that justice which the wisest and best of them feel to be so much more wholesome than any amount of capricious and unstable favour. We are among those who profoundly believe in the beneficence of the impending change. But we cannot conceal the fact that the movement involves great root-changes in social relations, and that those changes involve pregnant dangers. If the women of England will take to heart the counsels of their gifted sister, those dangers will be safely passed. We purposely refrain from any analysis of these earnest and impressive lectures, believing that we shall best serve our readers—men as well as women—by urging them to read and ponder Miss Cobbe's volume for themselves.

"THEOLOGY dies hard," wrote Mr. Grant Allen in some recent review in a contemporary literary organ. Mr. Allen belongs to that type of philosopher to whom Theology and Evolution appear

\* The Duties of Women. A Course of Lectures. By Frances Power Cobbe. London: Williams and Norgate. 1881.



mutually exclusive terms. Two volumes lie before us, which strikingly display the two distinct intellectual tempers in which the great modern doctrine may be accepted. Mr. Grant Allen himself reprints the charming little essays which he has contributed to the *St. James' Gazette* under the title of "The Evolutionist at Large;" \* while Mr. Savage, of Boston, deals with "The Religion of Evolution," † in a series of very remarkable chapters or lectures. For Mr. Allen, nature is full of wonderful revelations. The humblest leaf in the running stream tells him the story of its ancestry, and the paddock sheep balancing itself on some bare tree-stump, hints to him of the old mountain life in which its forefathers sought ever the vantage ground of the highest peak. No one could more delightfully teach us to trace the records of primeval times and of age-enduring habits in the sights and sounds of the simplest country ramble; and probably no one could more effectively bring home to the minds of non-scientific readers the actual meaning of Evolution. But this fulness of animal and vegetable life of its own far-back story is to Mr. Allen the negation of all divine energy and the testimony of nature's own self-sufficiency.

Very different is the interpretation which Mr. Savage puts upon the new philosophy. Mr. Herbert Spencer, so far as he goes, has no more eager disciple than Mr. Savage. Theologian though he be, he accepts, not with reluctance, but with enthusiasm, the whole body of the teaching of the evolutionists. But therein he sees only the larger and sublimer revelation of God-action which is vouchsafed to this modern age. We do not agree with Mr. Savage throughout his book. We regret, for instance, that he condemns the language which speaks of conscience as the voice of God. We should have thought that his philosophy, which recognises the constancy and pervasiveness of God's direct action with a completeness with which none of the old philosophies could possibly recognise it, would have adopted with alacrity an expression which forcibly represents the directness of the divine energy in the motions of the human mind. But we rejoice to welcome a writer who, with precision of reasoning and more than ordinary eloquence, vindicates the consistency of the master-thought of our time with the imperishable faiths of humanity, and expounds the largening science which alarms so many, as a sublime expansion of that God-idea which has struggled through the ages towards its robust maturity. Radical to the last degree, fearless and free as the wind, Mr. Savage is yet in the profoundest sense conservative, and builds up religion and the Christian reverence on surer foundations than any Bampton or Boyle or Bohlen lecturer with whom we are acquainted.

\* *The Evolutionist at Large*. By Grant Allen. London: Chatto and Windus. 1881.

† *The Religion of Evolution*. By M. J. Savage. Boston: Lockwood, Brooks, and Co.; London: Trübner and Co.

IT has been reserved for a lady to offer to parents counsels which should long ago have been familiar to every thoughtful father and mother.\* The terrible physical and moral evils arising from sheer ignorance of fundamental physiological laws on the part of the young, and from the absolute silence of their guardians concerning dangers of which every youth should be plainly warned, are only now beginning to be recognised in their true magnitude and moment. Deep gratitude would be due to any competent writer who should attempt to point out the true path of reform. Dr. Blackwell has amply earned such gratitude. The delicacy with which she treats the most difficult of all subjects in social economy would be possible only to one who, like her, believes profoundly in the perfect harmony between true sanitation and true morality and religion. The solemn and urgent teachings of this little volume should be known to every parent and schoolmaster; and though it be not written with a view to such readers, we believe that few young men could peruse it without a quickening of conscience and a truer sense of the obligations of the moral law.

EVERY attempt to draw the affections of the young towards the venerable literature of Israel, while leaving their judgments free from traditional prejudices of interpretation, deserves recognition and encouragement. Such an attempt Mr. Bartram makes.† His little volume is but of modest pretensions, yet its method and its spirit should make it useful in many homes and schools. The old stories are told in the old words, but each is preceded and followed by commentary of the best kind for little children. They are told as *stories*, which, like the child's other story-books, may be true or untrue, or partly true and partly untrue. But their morals are freely drawn. Where these are true, as they generally are, they are carefully pointed out. Where, on the other hand, Abraham or Jacob has conspicuously failed in rectitude, the dereliction is not slurred over, but receives unhesitating exposure and comment. Miss Cobbe somewhere tells how a little six-year-old lad, brought up on tales from Genesis and tales from Homer, without being told that he was bound to like one set better than the other, showed full appreciation of the wonderful, simple, human interest of Genesis. Mr. Bartram will help other boys and girls to do the same.

\* The Moral Education of the Young, &c. By Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell. Second Edition. London: Hatchards.

† Stories from the Book of Genesis. By Richard Bartram. London: Sunday School Association. 1881.

# THE MODERN REVIEW.

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JULY, 1881.

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## *THE EXAMPLE OF JESUS.*

PROFESSOR F. W. NEWMAN has published a brief Essay under the title "What is Christianity without Christ?"\* Professor Newman here contends, with great determination, that the religious and moral life of Christendom is most injuriously affected by the acceptance of the Jesus of the Gospels as a model of human conduct.

Professor Newman desires, above all things, to be answered, and though far from deeming myself a fit champion to enter the lists against him, I comply with the Editor's friendly request to adduce some points in reply to this striking pamphlet. Nor is there any impropriety in some contribution towards the answer coming from a foreigner who enjoys the privilege of counting several of the liberal theologians of England amongst his acquaintance, who watches with the keenest interest the progress of theological studies in England, and who would not willingly fail in paying his tribute of personal respect to Professor Newman as the spiritual guide to whom two generations have owed, and owe, a debt they can never repay.

That Professor Newman should put forth so brave a *brochure*, and that it should be received with respect, is a

\* London: Trübner and Co. 1881.

welcome sign of the times. We should all rejoice in the recognition of this principle of freedom of thought, speech, and publication. This glorious "boldness of speech" brings to light the thoughts of many hearts. And even if they contain what we deem errors—and mischievous errors, too—their undisguised expression gives others the opportunity of meeting them fairly, and endeavouring to remove the misconceptions they involve; and in combating or illustrating our several positions we become more clearly conscious what it is we really know, and what it is we really mean. To defend the truth can never and in no respect be an unprofitable task, "for we have no power at all against the truth, but for the truth." In these convictions and expectations I may certainly reckon upon Professor Newman's sympathy.

None but an earnest conviction deserves consideration and controversy, but even the most strictly orthodox must receive the impression of deep earnestness from the perusal of "What is Christianity without Christ?" However dear to some of us the opinions it attacks may be, yet the attack is made in the name of Truth and Holiness, the two jewels which "Religion is bound to enshrine and conserve," and in the hope of acting "against a pernicious influence." Let us add that in this attack Professor Newman has aimed at moderation and self-restraint. He has uttered only a small part of what he might have said, and we shall no doubt ere long see that he has many shafts still left in his quiver.

It is true that the Professor's attack upon the character of Jesus in the Gospels frequently strikes me as rough, but, on the other hand, I cannot but respect its outspokenness. It needs some moral courage to venture upon such an utterance, especially with the knowledge that many of the writer's spiritual kindred, many of his pupils and friends, entertain sentiments so strongly opposed to his own, and that he will possibly brand himself in the eyes of some or

of many with the mark of social ostracism, inasmuch as society still maintains certain reserves in the matter of freedom of speech. So open-hearted a declaration as Professor Newman's will certainly help on the final triumph of the true principle.

Another ground of gratitude to Professor Newman is that he has once more reminded us how little real hold the words and deeds of Jesus in the Gospels, the synoptical ethics (to use a not very accurate expression), the example of Jesus, the impress of his personality, have as yet gained on the thoughts and lives of men. Professor Newman thinks even that little too much; but to us it seems woefully and disastrously too little; and, to be reminded of this want, to have the consciousness of it rearoused, is for those who know what they can find in the life of Jesus equivalent to an express exhortation to refresh themselves once more at the springs of the highest life, at the fountains of the ideal.

And now, having premised so much, we are free to express our amazement at what we have found and what we have missed in Professor Newman's essay. Had his position been something as follows: "We find so many contradictions concerning the person and teaching of Jesus in our Gospels; by the side of many sayings and traits of character of spotless purity and eternal power we find others, and not a few, of so doubtful, nay of so objectionable, a tone, that the disconnected and contradictory mass of traditions can give us no approach to history, and it is impossible ever to arrive at a knowledge of the true character and gospel of Jesus":—why, then, we might have declined (as I, for one, should certainly do) to accept his conclusions, or we might have given in a more or less qualified assent; but, in either case, an exchange of opinions would naturally have arisen, common ground would easily have been found, and we could have tried to come to some understanding. But

when we are told that "the moral precepts prevalently inculcated by Jesus in Matthew and Luke," in sharp distinction from "the pure and lofty ones of Aristotle and Paul, are low and self-seeking" (p. 24); that "as soon as we begin seriously to compare the conduct ascribed to Jesus with the notions of right which have world-wide acceptance, a *moral shock* is felt in chapter after chapter" (p. 14); that Jesus, not now and then, but habitually, is "arrogant and dictatorial, pleased with abject submission and prostration, haughty to simple questions, irritable, virulent in language" (p. 14), and I know not what more; then we have to make long and toilsome search for any points of contact or any common ground at all; nor can we suppress a cry of painful surprise to find such a man capable of such a colossal misconception! Is it mere reaction against the Christolatry of the Church? we ask. For myself, I confess that I cannot understand it. When our orthodox opponents have reproached us with making Jesus "an ordinary man"—that is to say, a common-place man of ordinary proportion—we have always vigorously repelled the charge. "Far from it," we have said; "a most extraordinary, a unique man!" But here we find it quietly assumed as incontrovertible that Jesus was an absolutely common-place man, so that if he adopts on any occasion a loftier tone than would become a common man, or makes any special claims of any kind, his conduct must be stamped as intolerably arrogant. We must enter an emphatic protest against the false method betrayed at once in the choice of this point of departure. This leveling furor is one of the diseases of our age; and the painful thought crosses our minds that those who are insensible to its want of appreciation of greatness and have allowed themselves to be carried away by the accusations in which it deals are hardly open to conviction. At the bar of sober common-sense, as it is called, or at the bar of utilitarianism,

Jesus must be speedily condemned. But at that bar all that is noble or exalted, every form of greatness and of genius, stands in like case, and all undivided and unreserved self-consecration and self-sacrifice, every deed of moral heroism, becomes mere foolishness.

Let us begin with a remark which may seem to be of minor consequence, or at any rate not to touch the real point, but which refers to a misconception so extraordinary and so obvious that I cannot think it will be difficult to remove it. It concerns the idea of the "*imitatio Christi*."\* The Latin word "*imitari*" is no doubt rather ambiguous, and so, perhaps, is the English "*imitate*," but we know that there is a difference, wide as the heavens, between imitating in the sense of *following* a man, and imitating in the sense of *aping* him. To *follow* Jesus is to take up his principles into our hearts that we may, each in his own way, apply them in our lives; it is to resemble him and bear

\* "The first fact which I signalise is, the evil and odious result which follows, as soon as any one, accepting the letter of the precept, believes himself safe, if he imitate the conduct of Jesus as described in the Gospels. The public press has recently told us of a Baptist minister in San Francisco, who has taken up the cause of a large body of workmen, *so called*; men who will not work, except for such wages as they themselves dictate; men who display ferocious cruelty to the Chinese because they work for less. The preacher severely attacks the avarice of capitalists, to which he imputes the stoppage of white labour, and asks them (in the words attributed to Jesus) *how they can escape the damnation of hell?* No reason appears for doubting his sincerity and his belief that he is doing just the right thing in *imitating the Saviour*. Of course, he is condemned by a vast majority of the educated and the thoughtful. He is declared to be a conceited fool for thinking that because one who could see into men's hearts might pronounce stern and dreadful sentence on them, therefore every one of us may do the same thing. To this I give full assent; but, surely, if even this case stood alone (and it does not at all stand alone), it would suffice to show how dangerous is the precept of imitating Jesus in the only sense in which rude and vehement intellects can understand it. If his position was unique, if his powers of discernment were unique, if his authority was perfect as his knowledge, if his task was wholly peculiar, then it is most improper to imitate him: none but a conceited man with a twist in his mind will do so, and the doctrine IMITATIO CHRISTI, for which so loud a trumpet has been blown, ought rather to be changed into 'Beware of imitating one who was essentially unlike to us.'" ("What is Christianity without Christ?" pp. 9, 10.)

his image in obedience and trust, in love and devotion ; it is to speak and act as we suppose that he would have done in our place and under our circumstances. To *imitate* Jesus would be as far as possible to assume his external style, to adopt his expressions as literally as possible and faithfully repeat his actions without inquiring whether, at the present time and on this occasion, he would still have adopted the line of action or of speech which approved themselves to him eighteen centuries ago, in the land of the Jews. Such an imitation is simply an absurdity and impossibility. For instance, suppose the story of Jesus washing the disciples' feet (John xiii. 1—17) were historical, which it certainly is not, then the holy fathers in the Vatican and their majesties the Emperor and Empress of Austria, in the Court of Vienna, would be *imitating* Jesus every Holy Thursday ; but it is only the noble and zealous friend of mankind, who devotes head and heart, time, money, and person, to the unwearied service of others, who *follows* him. Those who imitate him can never learn to follow him ; those who follow him must, once for all, relinquish all idea of imitating him. That Baptist minister in the capital of California repeated the words of Jesus—if we accept the authenticity of Matthew xxiii. 33, which there is good ground for questioning ; but if he had meant to follow him he should have exhausted every means of persuasion and conviction, he should have left no stone unturned, and devoted himself without reserve to the attempt to rouse the conscience of the capitalists whom he thought so grasping, and to whom, after careful and impartial investigation, he attributed the blame of the existing state of things ; and only when all else had failed should he have given the natural vent to his feelings, which might also have served as a last appeal to the capitalists, by freely expressing his righteous indignation in forms of speech current in our own day. Yet again, Professor Newman returns to this



"imitatio Christi."\* Jesus, he declares, was "a deliberate accomplice in his own death." The effort "to imitate Jesus" bore abundant fruit in this respect. The case of Ignatius is specially cited, but his well-known request to the Roman Christians †: "Nay, rather coax the wild beasts to make themselves my tomb [*i.e.*, to devour me]," is not mentioned. Would it not have sufficed to show both writer and readers of "Christianity without Christ" that the parallel completely fails? But, apart from this, it is obvious that the thirst for martyrdom, and the scrupulous rejection of all intervention on his behalf which distinguished Ignatius, are not at all to the purpose unless it can be shown that he alleged the example of Jesus in support of them. I cannot, however, remember any passage to this effect in his epistles. Moreover, the countless examples of this passion for martyrdom admit of psychological explanation in the sight of which they are by no means enigmatical; but I am not aware that there is the least evidence that any

\* "What judgment may be passed upon Pilate, in comparison with average Romans, for the part which he is said to have played, is of very minor importance; but our judgment concerning the conduct ascribed to Jesus himself, and to the Jewish rulers, is really important. Unless the narrators grossly deceive us, Jesus was a deliberate accomplice in his own death, by refusing to explain an ambiguous phrase and ambiguous acts. When a man has done nothing at all ambiguous, and perceives that his death is determined on, he may afford to be too proud to exculpate himself. But when his judge desires to set him free, and wants only a few words of frank avowal that no insurrection was intended, then to refuse those necessary words and hereby drive his reluctant judge into deadly severity, is surely a greater sin than to rush upon death by one's own direct act. The man who stabs himself or drowns himself does not implicate another in his guilt, as does the fanatic in quest of martyrdom. The effort to 'imitate Jesus' bore abundant fruit in this respect; but, in particular, the conduct attributed to so eminent a bishop as Ignatius may be here alluded to. While he was on his way towards Rome, where he expected (or rather hoped) to be put to death as a Christian, he is believed to have written to friends there, imploring them not to use influence in high quarters to save him, *lest they deprive him of the crown of martyrdom!* And this conduct has not lessened admiration of him in the Christian Church to this day. Such influence has IMITATIO CHRISTI." ("What is Christianity without Christ?" pp. 20, 21).

† The question of the authenticity of the Epistle does not affect the matter in hand.

one of the martyrs supposed this passion to exist in Jesus, and *therefore* cherished it himself. Is it not, then, unjustifiable and unfair, has it not the appearance of party prejudice, to ascribe the morbid tension of mind and contempt of life, which often distinguished the early martyrs, to the "imitatio Christi"? Has not the Gospel tradition produced from of old (Hebrews v. 7), and does it not produce to-day, the very opposite impression? Instead of an overstrained exultation in martyrdom, we find a natural shrinking from suffering, shame, and death, witnessed by the agony in Gethsemane and the cry of anguish upon the Cross. There is, indeed, no weakness in this, but there is the genuine human strife and effort demanded by obedience to God and at last overcoming the fear of death.

Ah! how different the world would be if the Christians who have so truly "regarded the effort to imitate [follow] Christ as identical with an aspiration after all human virtue—an aspiration to obey God," who have held and hold it an axiom "that the life of Jesus of Nazareth attained the highest point of human goodness, and that the more closely we follow in his steps, the more surely do we please God" (p. 5), had been less content with acknowledging all this theoretically, and had given it better and more faithful expression in their lives and characters.

We will not go into many details. Again and again Professor Newman has unadvisedly raised objections which, to say the least, will be seriously challenged from the position of simple scholarship. I do not refer to certain assertions or reproaches which seem to me to be purely imaginary, for which, at any rate, I can see no grounds whatever; but to the charges which partially or completely fall to the ground before an accurate exegesis, or still more often before the vigorous application of historical criticism. For instance, I am not prepared to maintain that the argument in John x. 28—36 is faultless; but all the difficulties urged against

the attitude, the words, or the deeds of Jesus as portrayed in the Fourth Gospel\*—and they are not few!—fall away at once when we note that this Gospel is not, and does not intend to be, a source of information concerning the historical Jesus of Nazareth, but is a profession and testimony of faith put forward a century after his death. And since this conclusion is accepted by all unprejudiced exponents of historical criticism,† there can be no propriety in drawing material from the Fourth Gospel for charges against Jesus. Equally unwarrantable is the use made of the genuine saying recorded in Matthew xxvi. 61 (pp. 11, 12). The passage in John ii. 19, sqq., must on no account be brought into the discussion (p. 17). The hearers of Jesus never for a moment supposed that he was challenging them “to pull down the temple in order to see whether he could miraculously re-instate it!” Our authorities do not read “pull down” (in the imperative), but “I can pull down,” or “I will pull down;” and, moreover, those who heard the words knew very well that Jesus used “the temple,” the centre of the Jewish religion, as the symbol of that religion itself.‡ Nor had the judges a moment’s doubt as to the meaning of this saying, and that was why it told so heavily against Jesus in the minds of the Sanhedrin (Matthew xxvi. 62). And, lastly, we see that the same signification was attached to the saying in early Christian circles, from the additions of Mark,

\* “Nothing can be darker or less consistent with simplicity than his systematic application to himself of the title ‘Son of Man,’ a title which could be at will either pressed as Messianic, or explained away as unassuming. Nothing would be less creditable than the answer, ‘Destroy this temple,’ ascribed to him in John ii. 19, whether he had or had not a secret double sense. No subtle wrangler in a school least honoured for candour can outdo the sophistry which defended ‘I give unto them eternal life; I and God my Father are one,’ by the plea that in Hebrew poetry leaders are styled gods (John x. 28–36). The whole tissue of conduct ascribed to him is such as cannot be justified by a purely moral critic, whatever his theory concerning the person of Jesus.” (“What is Christianity without Christ?” p. 17.)

† Compare Newman’s “Religion not History,” p. 19, sq.

‡ In its external aspects, that is to say. Jesus looked upon it as a necessity, *καταλῦσαι τὸν ναόν*; but to the last he remained faithful to his principle, *μὴ καταλῦσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφῆτας ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι*.

"This temple *made with hands*. . . . *another not made with hands*."\* In like manner the interpretation put upon Luke vii. 42—47, "A harlot's affection for him is avowed to earn forgiveness for her sins" (p. 15), seems to betray a very unjudicial animus; but even if it correctly represented the implication of the words in question, I should still answer, "And what wonder? Would not the sinful woman's love for him, so strong, so pure, so entirely spiritual, have been as a sacred fire burning out every sinful passion, and purifying her whole heart? Would not the saying of Jesus be fully justified by the facts of human nature?" But an interpretation that does full justice to the context (verses 42, 43, 47) shows us that the "forgiveness" had preceded the "love," and that Jesus does not forgive the woman because she has given tokens of love, but judging from the warmth of the tokens of her love he argues, and assures the woman herself, that her many sins are already forgiven.

We might proceed in this way, but we forbear. Neither need we notice all that is urged against Jesus on the supposition of his deity. This is addressed by Professor Newman to the orthodox Christians, into whose hands he hopes his Essay may fall, giving them also the opportunity of reflecting upon their positions. Instead of occupying ourselves, then, with this part of the argument, or dwelling any further on details or side issues, we will address ourselves at once to the main charges which Professor Newman lays against the Jesus of the Gospels. Perhaps they may be reduced to two, and may be concisely stated thus: 1. An over-strained condition of mind, amounting to insanity, which displayed itself in unbounded self-exaltation, and a reprehensible fanaticism pervading his whole mind, and dictating conduct which must be utterly condemned towards the constituted

\* This early gloss is true in the main to the thought of Jesus, though it is not strictly accurate. The *χειροποιήτων* and *ἀχειροποιήτων* reflect the true antithesis; but the *ἄλλον* is less happy, since Jesus did not regard himself as instituting a *καὶνὴ διαθήκη*.

authorities and every one else, especially during his trial ;  
2. A low, self-seeking scheme of morals, which stands far behind that of his own apostles, Paul, Peter, and James.

To begin with the first point. It really is unfortunate for the position maintained by Professor Newman that his expressions, whenever he speaks of Jesus, are so rough and discourteous : "extravagant" and "virulent in language," "enormous" and "immeasurably high" in his claims for superiority, "scanty in expounding his position, bitter and fierce to all who were incredulous," "arrogant and dictatorial, haughty to simple questions, irritable," "pleased with abject submission and prostration," &c., &c. (pp. 11, 14, &c.). I could not repress the question, as I read such expressions as these, "Does the esteemed writer really regard extravagant language as so very sinful?" But however this may be, such exaggerations are always pernicious, and in this case are specially calculated to prevent one from recognising and allowing the relative and partial justice of the attack. For the fact is that the general impression, if expressed in far more moderate language, is not without foundation. The Gospels do contain expressions and demands which have something repellent in them, and which affect us painfully when first we hear them. I will not insist on the fact that many of the passages containing words of self-exaltation or invective, or commands to disciples, fall away under a close examination as unhistorical. The comparison of the Gospels with each other, and allowance for the influence of the apostolic beliefs on the tradition, do indeed reduce the number of the passages in question, but enough remain to convey the impression we are now examining. It is remarkable, moreover—why does not Professor Newman avail himself of the fact?—that the nearest relatives of Jesus himself seem to have believed that he was out of his mind (Mark iii. 21, 31), and under this idea they endeavoured to break off his career,

and get possession of his person, so that he might calm down, and come to himself under the parental roof, and return to his carpentering! Well, and if Jesus had been a carpenter—or a preacher or professor either, for that is not the point—like the rest of the fraternity—in a word, if Jesus had been an *ordinary man*, undoubtedly his relatives, and Professor Newman and his medical friend,\* would have been right. In that case, Jesus would indeed have been indulging in monstrous fancies about himself, and would have been guilty of intolerable presumption, amounting to insanity. To his mother and brothers, who had seen him grow up, play, work, eat, drink, and sleep, but had never been capable of understanding or appreciating him, to them he was an ordinary man, for they were too familiar with the sight of him to suspect anything remarkable in him. Their misfortune was parallel to the proverbial incapacity of the *valet de chambre* to recognise a hero in what is to him simply a thing to put clothes on! But we, who are not blinded or prejudiced by familiarity with the outward appearance of Jesus, we who stand at a distance from which we can take a wider survey of the whole matter, can find nothing but a warning in this extraordinary misconception. We perceive at once, that to link in one personality self-exaltation, presumption, and insanity on the one hand, and such nobility of soul, such sacred love, on the other hand, is unnatural, contradictory, monstrous. We may, therefore, in a certain sense, thank Professor Newman for the

\* "Some years ago I was in a rather large company of strangers, when a gentleman came up to me and gave his name, Dr. —, a physician; then proceeded to speak as follows:—'Since I read something which you have written, I have wished for an opportunity to tell you in private what I have long believed. I take up the Gospels from a medical point of view. I do not think we have the means of knowing the causes which perverted the mind of Jesus, but I am convinced that he was (at least, in the latter stage) *insane*; whether from vigils and fastings, or from agitation of mind and elation concerning Messiahship, I do not pretend to know. But unless I believed him to have been strictly insane, I should have to pass the gravest judgment on his conduct.'" ("What is Christianity without Christ?" p. 27.)

roughness of his words, inasmuch as it makes it clear at once that the point of departure from which such conclusions are reached must necessarily be a wrong one.

This is the root of the matter. Professor Newman fails to appreciate Jesus as a very extraordinary personality, manifesting itself under very exceptional surroundings. He fails to place him in the rank of humanity to which he belongs, and to allow for the background of his age and country. As an Englishman or a Dutchman, in 1881, Jesus is, of course, an impossibility; but what then? "For one of us it would be utterly wrong" to speak as he did (p. 12). But would it be becoming for any of us to write in the tone adopted by Luther, for instance, even in the best and most dignified of his controversial writings? Granted even that the conduct of Jesus, measured by the moral rules of "world-wide" acceptance, is inexplicable or indefensible, this is simply because whatever has attained to world-wide acceptance must by this very fact have reached a dead-level of commonplace which renders it quite unfit for a standard by which Jesus can be tried. There is, so to speak, a twofold system of practical morals: one by which our ordinary life must be regulated, one which we must apply at its supreme moments.\* Politeness is a duty in our ordinary doings, but the hallowed indignation that breaks into the cry, "Woe unto you!" stands to politeness as a mountain to a mole-hill. In the ordinary course of things due care for the life and comfort of wife and child is every man's stern duty; but Sir Thomas More, with his unshaken honour and patriotism, proof even against the reproaches of his wife, fulfilled the highest moral law.

Jesus was a prophet. Let us begin by recognising that. He was the genuine son of Israel's great men of God in the preceding centuries. He was the noblest and the chiefest of the prophets, and was greater than them all.

\* Compare "Religion not History," p. 28.

Were the language and the attitude they assumed less lofty and high-wrought than his? or had all of *them*, too, lost their heads? Was *their* "inspiration" mere insanity? The prophets, surely—in spite of the visionary positions which they maintained, but above which his clear intellect and pure and steady converse with God enabled Jesus to rise—were spiritual heroes to whose religious genius mankind owes an incalculable debt. Professor Newman thinks that we are deeply indebted to Judaism (p. 23). But this seems to me to be a mistake. The Jewish nation and religion had degenerated hopelessly in the time of Jesus. Our benefactors are not the Pharisees, far less the High Priests. They are the ancient prophets.

Jesus then speaks as a messenger of God, as having authority. If ever man has or had the right to do so, he had. He was indeed moulded by his times, but for the most part only negatively. He was the child of his age and his people, but he stood in direct opposition to the substance and the forms of Jewish piety. His positive development took place under the influence of the prophets. It was they that had taught him to recognise the voice within him as the voice of God, taught him that religion consists in a moral life, not in formal observances, taught him that the passionate yearning for the kingdom of God and the realised necessity for its advent are themselves a promise of God. But as concerns the best and highest, *that* was in himself; he was *αὐτοδιδάκτος* or, rather, *θεοδιδάκτος* — self-taught, or, rather, God-taught. Or are such phrases as these mere unmeaning sounds? Is a musical genius—a Händel, a Mozart, a Beethoven—a mere mechanic, or, rather, a mere mechanism? And in the moral and religious life, in like manner, are sacred enthusiasm, inspiration, and indignation nothing but over-excitement?—insight and consciousness of a special mission mere idle self-deception? Has any man, has *man* in his highest moments, when the tone of his whole life is



uplifted, has Jesus, the right to speak in the name of God? Let who will answer "No!" an invincible and sacred conviction drives me to answer "Yes!"

Everything hinges on this inward consciousness of a mission. This is the justification of Jesus. And of this call he was distinctly conscious. Just because he lived so long before any thought had arisen of that contrast between faith and knowledge which obscures our own religious consciousness, or, in other words, just because he was not an anti-supranaturalist, the words: "God says," "God calls and sends and impels," "God wills this," or "that," had higher and truer meaning for him than they have for us. In his moral and religious consciousness, in his sense of duty and his conscience, in his perception of truth and the impulse of love in his heart, in all these things—unfolding in mighty concert—overmastering his thought, his work, his life—in all this God was with him. God was to him more than an hypothesis or the object of a creed. God was to him a present reality, and the greatest of all realities. Ah! he stood so much nearer the central truth than we do!

But, remarkably enough, Jesus never forces an article of faith upon any man. He dares to impress the moral laws upon men's minds with the highest authority, even against the authority of Moses. "Ye have heard that it was said to the ancients, but *I* say unto you——" Bold words, but uttered in the certain conviction that the unassailable and inviolable truth is in question, and that every well-disposed human heart must at once give him its adhesion. He is urging no points of belief as to which each one may have his own opinion, but things which concern the eternal moral law which all alike are bound unconditionally to obey, and the demands of which all alike may receive and take up as he does himself. Nay, he is assured that every son and daughter of God who will accept the Father's command-

ments and promises as he has done, will in like manner enjoy His love.

Jesus makes great demands. Who will deny it? But he himself had sacrificed everything for the kingdom of God, and had gained the resulting blessing. Had he demanded less from others, it would have been an insult to them, and would have stood in the way of their bliss, their peace, and their growth in spirit. For we must not forget the critical character of that earnest and moving time! If, indeed, we think only of our own days, and lose sight of the distinctions which part our nineteenth century wide as the poles from the first, then assuredly the demands of Jesus appear overstrained and unnatural in the highest degree. But if we take the age of the Reformation as a standard of comparison, it is quite otherwise. That, too, was a period in which the words of Luke xiv. 26, sqq., held good in all their emphasis. And so, too, in the days of Jesus, the highest interests of mankind were at stake. What a ferment there was in the minds of men! (Matthew xi. 12). In the religious expectations of such an age there must always be an admixture of illusion. So it was in this case with the *Ἡγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*, which furnishes the key to the appearance and the work of Jesus. The kingdom of God, as he conceived it, was not at hand, and would never come. This does not mean that his expectations were mere fancies. *His* expectations, coupled with *our* cosmogony and philosophy, would be fanciful indeed; but we have not the smallest right to bring them into such an association. To do justice to the expectations of Jesus and his disciples, we must compare them with the anticipations and the proceedings of the Zealots. On the one side stood the Zealots with sword in hand, on the other Jesus with his demand for repentance. The great question was *how* were men to

make ready for the approaching kingdom of God! But to judge the matter rightly, and not to exaggerate the element of illusion which we admit, we must remember, above all things, that the expectation of the approaching kingdom of God rested upon a very real foundation in the soul of Jesus—his own moral nature, to wit, and the attitude of his soul towards God. He, living in unbroken communion with his heavenly Father, in the uplifting and beatific consciousness of His infinite love, had already become a partaker of the spiritual blessings of the kingdom of God in the inner fact of sonship and its resultant peace of soul. He himself, therefore, was already, in a certain sense, within that kingdom of God, into which he fain would lead his own people and all mankind, making them partakers of what he already possessed. Now I would ask whether we can seriously say, as Professor Newman says, with our eyes upon such a time, upon such a society, and upon an expectation which so completely filled every heart and head, set the whole soul in such a glow, and touched the most sensitive strings of every heart, that the twelve were sent out “to repeat a *parrot* phrase: The kingdom of heaven is at hand!”? (p. 15).

If Jesus makes high demands, he never does so for himself personally, except so far as he is identified with the cause of God's kingdom. What did he ever ask for himself? When and where did he ever use his influence for his own exaltation, or pleasure, or enjoyment? Is it not little short of an absurdity to say that “he had induced twelve men to become a sort of retinue of honour to him” (p. 12), when the fact is that he entirely devoted himself, with unutterable toil and difficulty, to the task of educating those twelve men to be his fellow-workers? I will not now insist upon the passage in Matthew xii. 31, 32, as showing how clearly Jesus distinguished between his own person and the cause to which he gave his life, for I believe this saying

refers to a dispute of the apostolic age, out of which it really sprang; but in the commandment\* to love the enemy of our faith and people, and to pray for him who persecutes us for religion's sake, I read the assurance that Jesus was never deterred by any insult or outrage he might personally encounter from advocating the cause he served. No doubt, as long as he was living, it was difficult to separate fidelity to his cause from attachment to his person, or to distinguish between opposition to him and hostility to the kingdom of God. This was inevitable. In his profound sense of the task that was laid upon him, and of the blessings which God had given him to impart, he said to his twelve, "He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth Him that sent me." And if in the same connection he says that in the day of judgment it will be worse for the cities that heard his gospel and rejected it than for Sodom and Gormorrha, the meaning of the saying (which may well have been proverbial) is simply this: that the weight of our guilt does not depend upon the magnitude of our sin in itself, but upon the opportunities we have had of learning the truth and perceiving our duty. Those who at such a time threw to the winds the message of the love of God and the invitation to His kingdom showed a moral dulness which threatened their spiritual life with extremest peril. But it is still his cause and not himself; it is still the object to which he has dedicated his life, and this alone, which occupies his mind. In this course, it is true, he "disowns," in a certain sense, "his mother's claim on him" (Mark iii. 31—35) (p. 12); he who cherished so deep a sense of the sanctity of filial obligations that he would never relax them

\* Matt. v. 44, strangely misunderstood in "Religion not History," pp. 40, 41. See "The Bible for Young People," Vol. V., pp. 292—296, on Matt xxii. 15—23 (which is anything but "evasive"); see Vol. VI., pp. 25, 26; and on Matt xxiii. 15, 33 (*cf.*, "Religion not History," p. 80), see Vol. VI., pp. 299, 300

(Mark vii. 9—13), had also the rare strength to say "No!" even to those who were personally most dear to him, when obedience to the will of God and fidelity to his mission required it. In the interests of the kingdom of God, and for the salvation of mankind, he could relinquish even what he prized so highly. And who shall undertake to say what had preceded this declaration of Jesus, how many attempts had been made to restrain him, how profoundly he had been misjudged? In the same cause, and with the sacrifice of his own person, he embraced at last the task of the Messiah (which, as he understood it, was very far from "a merely mystical title" (p. 22), and was most real and most profound in its significance), though he foresaw the possibility of its ending in his death. Again, I admit that at the present time, and for our feelings, there is "something fantastic" in that Messiahship; but that proves nothing. There was nothing incongruous in the idea amongst the surroundings of Jesus, and we must beware of making him a nineteenth century liberal, and judging his plans and expectations by the corresponding programme!

Professor Newman makes a conjectural sketch of the information possessed and the views entertained about Jesus by the Jewish authorities: "That he had forsaken his trade of carpenter, and had become a wanderer in the land, not working for his livelihood, as Paul afterwards did, but living as a religious mendicant; that he disowned his mother's claim on him, and had induced *twelve* men (Luke says *seventy* more) to become a sort of retinue of honour to him, two of them at least abandoning a parent at his call" (p. 12)—a summary that irresistibly suggests the report of a police commissioner, or an agent of the Charity Organisation Society. And I imagine that the police, and other report-makers, of whatever age or country, from the very circumstance that they content themselves with the "outlines" and "dry facts," and are always suspicious of

anything out of the ordinary line, as likely to threaten peace and order, are never the best authorities for estimating genius, unless it be here and there a police officer (*ὑπηρετής*) who so far forgets professional propriety as to yield to the irresistible impulse that forces the cry to his lips, viz., *οὐδέποτε ἐλάλησεν οὕτως ἄνθρωπος*,—never man spake thus. If, then, “the priests and elders” saw nothing more in Jesus than is set down in Professor Newman’s supposed report, it was the fault of their own unfathomable shallowness. At any rate, they might have inquired *why* he had forsaken his calling and his family and taken to his wandering life, and by what means and for what purpose he had united these twelve men to him, and so forth. According to Professor Newman, then, “nothing was left to commend him to men’s consciences but his *words*” (p. 12), and these words were revolting and shocking; were bitter and passionate; were unreasonable and unpardonable outbursts, explicable only on the supposition of insanity! And “all this,” we are told, “is so very manifest, that reply seems impossible” (p. 13). Surely Professor Newman is not an utter stranger to the prophetic literature! Surely it is with the prophets, and not with a polished French *causeur* of the nineteenth century, that we must compare Jesus! It will make a wide difference in our judgment. And does not Professor Newman mark the different tone assumed by Jesus according to time and circumstance? We nowhere learn how he expressed himself about “the priests and elders, the men in authority and clergymen,” that is to say the Sadducees,\* but the Pharisees, and their leaders the Scribes, he treated at first with respect, endeavouring to win them to his side, and make them his fellow-workers in the noblest possible life-

\* Luke x. 31 is not to the point, though possibly Luke xvi. 19, sqq., may be so. See the “Bible for Young People,” Vol. VI., pp. 40, sqq. Professor Newman apparently has a mistaken conception of the state of Jewish politics. The opponents of Jesus, the Pharisees, were not at the helm of state.

task. Indeed, he associated with them freely enough, recognised their relative merit in having reached the highest point of Jewish piety (Matt. v. 20 ; ix. 12, 13 ; Luke xv. 29), showed how gentle and long-suffering was the Father's love for those proud and obstinate children, as well as others, and, in a word, strove by every possible means to bring them to a better mood. And, finally, in the last days of his life at Jerusalem, whither he had gone to combat them, and to destroy their influence over the people, and where he saw them under their worst aspect, he did, indeed, attack them decisively and expressly, and with little "ceremony" enough ; but it was still the system thus represented, rather than their own persons, that he attacked—and this is the truth that lies in the charge that he attacked them "without discrimination" (p. 13). He attacked that system because he regarded it (but by no means "without proof") as utterly pernicious, and he was determined to warn the people against it, and at the same time to try the only means now left to him of bringing conviction home to its representatives themselves. Ought he to have revered these leaders? Ought he to have revered the High Priests also, the political chiefs of his people? He who thinks so knows not the men with whom he has to do! Doubtless we look in vain for "meekness" and "gentleness" in the invectives which Jesus hurled upon the Scribes and their followers. But are these the highest attributes of a prophet? Can a countryman of Thomas Carlyle, and a contemporary of Victor Hugo, really think so? Are not these the men who have unmasked refined and polished emptiness, respectable hypocrisy, and high-placed scoundrelism, and shaken the world from its self-satisfied slumber? *Bene, optime meriti sunt de literis et de genere humano!* And are we to insist that a lion must squeak like a mouse, and a prophet come with a courtier's bow to point out with a

profusion of compliments and elegancies the errors into which his opponents have fallen?

The religious leaders of the Jews, moreover, and presently their political leaders also, saw a good deal more and a good deal else in Jesus than we should gather from Professor Newman's report. They saw (as Professor Newman himself admits) nothing less than a false prophet in him. His teaching was opposed to the religion of Moses, and was dangerous to peace and order. He was accused and condemned as a blasphemmer (or heretic) and a seducer of the people, and, had not the Roman authorities taken the matter up, he would have been stoned (Deut. xiii. and xviii.). From the Jewish point of view, the sentence appears to me to have been just. Jesus was in open revolt against the Jewish religion, and amongst the Jews there neither was nor could be any conception of freedom of faith and conscience. It was not the triumphal entry into Jerusalem with which Jesus was charged. This event appears to have fallen far short of the dimensions of a great demonstration, and to have made no very deep impression upon the opponents of Jesus. It was a very common thing for the caravans of pilgrims to enter the city of the Temple with signs of joyful excitement. There is not a single proof—nay, there is not the smallest indication—that any reference at all was made to this event during the trial of Jesus; and it is possible enough that the passage in Zech. ix. 9—11 was never applied to it until afterwards. In any case, the entry into Jerusalem had no political significance, and could not have been any reason for Pilate's pronouncing a condemnation. Probably Jesus was never publicly greeted as the Messiah, not even on this occasion. At any rate, it is remarkable that when the men of Jerusalem ask, "Who is this?" the disciples answer, "This is Jesus, the *prophet* from Nazareth in Galilee" \* (Matt. xxi. 11).

\* Compare the "Bible for Young People," Vol. VI., pp. 4—9.



For the rest, I could almost envy Professor Newman his certainty as to the main points in the trial of Jesus. I am myself far from being able to admit, even with reference to the examination before Pilate, that "the tale in this part is self-consistent, and agrees with probabilities" (p. 19). Pilate's government is elsewhere described as full of "venality, violence, robbery, outrage, insolence, *incessant executions without form of trial*,"\* unbounded and unendurable cruelty;† and if he is represented in the Gospels as striving to rescue Jesus, this may be due in greater or smaller measure to the desire of the earliest Christian writers to secure the goodwill of the Romans. It is indeed raised above all reasonable doubt that Jesus was crucified as "King of the Jews," that is to say, as a disturber of the peace, but "the details of Pilate's judgment" are lost, if, indeed, they were ever known. I must honestly confess my own inability to explain either the answer of Jesus, the authenticity of which I suspect, or his silence which I see no reason to question. But that Professor Newman's conception of the affair is purely imaginary seems to me absolutely certain. Does he think Jesus was pretending to be dead, or what? In like manner I confess that I can not explain the trial before the Sanhedrin. I heartily concur in the sentiment that not only "Englishmen acquainted with their national history," but all the rest of us likewise, "are bound to judge mildly of those priests and teachers of the Law" (p. 22). It was the Law that condemned Jesus. But it seems to me perfectly evident that he himself was in no sense "a deliberate accomplice in his own death," and was perfectly free from any fanaticism "in quest of martyrdom" (p. 21). To establish this we need only observe his great caution and frequent retreats, even as early as in the second portion of his Galilean ministry, during which he repeatedly

\* ἀπίστους καὶ ἐπαλλήλους φόρους.

† Phil. Jud. De leg. ad Caium. § 88 [π. 590].

withdrew out of the way of his enemies. And, above all, we must note that during his stay in Jerusalem he invariably slept outside the city and kept it a secret even from the Twelve, where he intended to celebrate the Passover. This is scarcely the conduct of a fanatic in quest of martyrdom ! Finally, we see that the treachery of one of the Twelve was needed to place him in the hands of the authorities, and we are witnesses of the shrinking from suffering and death which oppressed him beforehand and fell upon him so terribly at the decisive moment. Reflecting on all this I find a proud and royal majesty in his silence, when he knew that the sentence of death had gone out ; and, however much remains that I cannot satisfactorily explain, it appears to me not only unjust, but even absurd, to deny the title of "martyr for truth" (p. 22) to the man who deliberately encountered mortal peril because it had become absolutely necessary to do so, because he could only have escaped by a flight that would have compromised his cause and smitten his future work with barrenness, and who died in the firm conviction that his self-sacrifice would bear blessed fruit. If Luther had been seized at Worms in April, 1521, and burned to death as a heretic, would he, too, have been an "accomplice in his own death" ?

But when we consider all the circumstances, the weakness, the incapacity, the faithlessness of his best friends, and the hopelessness of his cause, may not the very confidence in the strength of which he met his death be well considered blind and fanatical ? Once again, what modern anti-supranaturalists might consider unreasonable was by no means necessarily so in the eyes of one whose whole conception of the world was dominated by his thought of God, and the result, in what was truly essential, at least, did not put his expectation to shame !

We have seen abundantly enough that Professor Newman's misconception of the Jesus of the Gospels is largely due to

a confusion of times. He fails to transport himself into the Palestine of the year 35 A.D., in which much that would now be fantastic or fanatical, such as the belief in the resurrection, and return to earthly life, of the dead, in the Messianic Kingdom, and more besides, was the perfectly natural outcome of a true and deep faith. But I am unable to comprehend the respected writer's meaning in declaring that, "when his master walked on this earth, Peter had most imperfectly discerned that the adult and perfect manhood was embodied in him" (p. 7); that James, the writer of the Epistle, deemed Jesus less worthy of imitation than Job and the prophets; that the *πίστις εἰς χριστόν* of Paul simply means "the belief that he was a miraculous personage, who, in a coming High Day of the Universe, will appear as the Divine Judge of living and dead" (p. 5). Such a statement as this from the pen of a scholar is simply bewildering! Professor Newman professes only to write against the Jesus of the Gospels (but the Gospels investigated and winnowed by scholarly criticism), not against the unknown personage that Jesus of Nazareth may possibly have been (pp. 23, f). But, on the other hand, he himself comments with perfect justice on the undemonstrable, and, indeed, improbable, character of the supposition that the "real Jesus was more unblamable, wiser, and purer," than the image which we can recover by aid of the Gospels. And yet in this image he cannot even discover "a man of great spiritual gifts." Surely he has overshot his mark. *Nil probat qui nimis probat.* The humbly-born child of a secluded provincial town, the unlettered carpenter, who produced so mighty and indelible an impression, who inspired those around him with a zeal, a fidelity, a faith, a steadfast devotion such as have seldom been seen, who, without any outward semblance that could suggest the Messiah, was greeted by his disciples, with Peter at their head, as the future ruler of the Kingdom of God, the most

exalted of all God's messengers, and was entreated to attempt the sublimest of tasks, was revered by the most unconditional confidence, in whom such a spiritual giant as Paul found all he wanted, to whom he owed all he was and all he could do—this man is not even so much as a certain person' "of great spiritual gifts"! . . . If Professor Newman has to choose between throwing a stone at "one man" or a whole people, he will not hesitate for a moment (pp. 18, 19). But does he not know that "one man" may have more significance to the world than a whole nation, or than a hundred millions of his fellow-men? And of a truth this was so in this special case more than ever or anywhere before or since.

If there still remains, here and there, something strange and enigmatical in the conduct of Jesus, our natural course must be to explain by analogy whatever an unprejudiced criticism does not reject as unhistorical, applying the principles of Jesus himself to each separate case, and never forgetting either our ignorance of the detailed circumstances or the extraordinary general character of the period.\* And unquestionably those who approach the task in the most sympathetic spirit will have the best chance of hitting upon the true solution. Or, if we choose, we may decline to make any attempt to explain these things, and may simply let them stand side by side with the facts which are neither doubtful nor ambiguous—the consistent life of service to man, of tenderness to the sinful, of true patriotism, of faithful friendships, of fidelity to God, of faith, trust and submission, of undivided devotion to the truth, of hallowed love.

Once more, in conclusion: Professor Newman is so far right that, from the point of view of practical common sense, hero-worship is an absurdity, martyrs are fools, and most

\* Thus, to take an instance, the demand recorded in Matt. xix. 21, is by no means a rule of general application. It stands entirely by itself, and was made on a very special occasion, and with reference to a particular man at a particular and critical moment. Not even the Twelve were ever required to sell all they had and give the proceeds to the poor.

men of genius, together with all messengers of God, are insane.

But possibly much that common sense condemns as absurd is, in truth, rooted in the highest reason, and what is called "overwrought" is, in truth, the state of highest workfulness, the fruit of truest work, and the condition of man's reaching his own truest self, developing what lies in him, being and doing all that he can be and do.

Were we a little more overwrought in this sense, instead of remaining so practical and sensible, we should then see at last what divine and glorious gifts lie concealed within us, how noble and sublime may be the outcome of humanity!

Truly our critical age is in sore need of inspiration.  
*Veni creator spiritus!*

In a supplementary article, I hope to deal with Professor Newman's little book, "Religion, not History," which I have already cited more than once. In this earlier work he has treated the ethics of Jesus more fully and expressly than in the Essay which I have now discussed.

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## EVOLUTION AND THEISM.

EVERY thoughtful reader has fully appreciated the cleverness and force with which "The Reasonableness of Evolution" was set forth in the April number of this *Review*, by Dr. Andrew Wilson. On that phase of the subject perhaps nothing more needs to be said. Popular expositions of so great a theme will frequently be called for by those who are only inquiring the way. But its *reasonableness* is rarely disputed now by any one who is competent to form an opinion.

But, unfortunately for those who are interested in propagating a belief in new truth, it is still necessary to do more than merely to set forth the reasonableness of it. All unprejudiced minds are agreed that men ought to accept truth, whenever it is shown to be true, and just because it is shown to be true. But only a few have yet developed a faith so genuine and well grounded as to believe that truth is always safe, and may be confidently trusted not to injure any other truth. Thus when certain results of human experience, felt to be very valuable—as, for example, faith in God, or a basis of morals—seem to be at stake, it is not, perhaps, unnatural that men should hesitate long before accepting ever so well supported a theory which *seems to them* to invalidate the precious hopes which they cherish. While, then, it is undoubtedly true that men should accept anything that brings satisfactory credentials, still human nature is such that to many the acceptance of a new idea will be much easier if they find that it does not necessitate

the surrender of their deepest faith. On this ground, then, it will be well worth our while to consider the question whether an acceptance of the truth of Evolution is consistent with an earnest and even devout Theism.

And here, at the very outset, it may be worth our while to remember that Mr. Darwin—who may be presumed to know what he means—does not hesitate to use the word God. And Mr. Herbert Spencer declares that the existence of a Power underneath and behind phenomena, and of which phenomena are only manifestations, is the most certain item of all our knowledge; and in personal conversation with the present writer last summer, he said that the sense of the mystery and wonder of this Power deepened and grew in his mind year by year.

The issue, then, between the Evolutionist and the Creationist is only as to *the how*. The world is. How came it to be as it is? Man is here. By what process did he arrive at his present condition? It is no more incumbent on the Evolutionist to settle ultimate questions as to *what* and *why*, than it is on one who accepts the literal story of Genesis. So that when an objector propounds his unanswerable questions to the Evolutionist, under the impression that he is invalidating his argument, he is generally raising barriers which are quite as seriously in his own way as in that of his opponent.

The purely scientific argument for Evolution—as drawn from fossils, from botany, from animal and human life—often loses much of its force with the ordinary reader, because he does not appreciate the meaning of scientific facts and laws that are not familiar to him. There is a simple and forcible way of stating the alternative theories—one or other of which all must choose—which, so far as the present writer knows, has only been used by himself. It may be well to lay these squarely before the reader before we go any further.

Man is here on earth ; and he is what he is. There was a time when he was not here. The question then is, By what method did he make his appearance? There are just three conceivable ways, which, for clearness and convenience, we will mark off and number.

1. The Creation theory says, at first there was nothing, or, at the most, "dust"; then suddenly—man full grown.

2. The second conceivable theory—which, so far as I am aware, nobody holds—is that man is genetically connected with, and was born from, parents *very much unlike* himself.

3. The third and last theory is, that man is genetically connected with, and was born from, parents *somewhat unlike* himself.

Now, it need hardly be said that for the first and second of these so-called theories—though they hardly deserve the name—*there is not one single shred or particle of evidence in existence*. All the evidence that any one possesses is in favour of the third, which is the theory of Evolution. Though the "missing links" then were twice as numerous and three times as serious as they are, only one course is open to a rational man. He will accept that theory which has *some* evidence, however small, in preference to either of those for which there is *none at all*.

But Evolution, even though it had reasonable rivals—which it has not—is by no means poverty-stricken on the score of evidence, as Dr. Wilson has so plainly shown. And it remains yet for somebody successfully to controvert the statement of Professor Huxley, that Evolution rests on substantially the same kind of argument as that which is regarded as demonstrating the truth of the Copernican theory. The system of nature is uniform, or else all knowledge is an illusion. If it is uniform, then proving the truth of development in *one* department of nature proves it in *all*; just as settling the law of planetary motion in one solar system settles it for all. The truth of development



*has been demonstrated* in one department of biology—see Professors Marsh and Huxley concerning the horse ; therefore—nature being uniform—the demonstration is precisely like that on which we rest in any other department of science.

So much, then, as preliminary, and as touching the confidence with which a rational man may rest in the truth of the theory of Evolution. It is our business now to go on and discover, if we can, what kind of thoughts the consistent Evolutionist may think concerning God.

Mr. Herbert Spencer agrees with the poet to whom we owe the book of Job—one of the grandest of the Old World singers—in declaring the Power that manifests itself in the phenomenal universe to be “unknowable.” But this formidable word need not frighten us much if we only take care to remember what is meant by it. It has always been a source of wonder to the writer that religionists should find so much to trouble them in that word. The statements of Mr. Spencer appear to be the simplest common-sense. When knowledge is defined as “a process of classification,” and when this Power is recognised as the one, the unique, it would seem very easy to take the next step and admit that *the One cannot be classified*. It is a good while now since Isaiah asked the question, “To whom then will you liken God?” And one whom the Christian world, at any rate, has been wont to regard as very good authority, has declared that, “No man hath seen God a any time.” If Mr. Spencer’s doctrine is atheistic, it has at least a very respectable biblical backing. And though Mr. Spencer prefers to say “Power,” he is too consistently philosophical and scientific to deny another man’s right to say “God.” This also the writer has had from his own lips.

More than this may be said. When it is asserted that the Power behind phenomena is, *in itself*, unknowable, it is only what must equally be asserted concerning any one

of the manifestations of this Power. It is just as true of a tree or of a man. Consider for a moment so comparatively simple a thing as a tree. Here is a local manifestation, in a special form, of a fragment of the incomprehensible life of the universe. What do we know of it? We only observe and classify the various aspects of it as they appeal to us through our different senses. We know that these are not all of it. It has sides of mystery that run off into the infinite, eluding our keenest search. And concerning what it is, in essence, in itself, we know absolutely nothing. In this sense it is as unknowable as the Power we call God.

So in the case of a man; what do we know about him? We only know the manifestations he makes of himself in dress, in form, in action, in work. What he is, in himself, is all mystery. He is as truly unknowable as is God himself. Even were we sure that we had exhausted all those manifestations of his life with which our faculties bring us into relation, still we could never know but that there were deeps and mysteries in his nature concerning which our present faculties stand in no intelligible relation. All we know of *anything* is certain manifestations; and we have no right to suppose that these exhaust its whole nature. At least one side of everything stretches off into the infinite, beyond our furthest power of search.

While, then, we freely admit that this Power at the back of, and manifested through, phenomena is, *in itself*, or in essence, "unknowable," still we confidently assert that *this same Power, as manifested, constitutes the sum-total of all our knowledge. And we know it, precisely as we know a tree or a man—in so far, that is, as its various manifestations appeal to the human faculties that are fitted to apprehend them.* And, again, precisely as in the case of a tree, or a man, these manifestations show the nature of the unknown reality, *just as far as they go.*

But at this point the bug-bear of anthropomorphism is suddenly thrust in our faces, like a scarecrow, to frighten us off the premises. But we, too, are perfectly willing to quote the dictum of Goethe, "Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is;" and, more than that, we can look it squarely in the face without a single tremor. Evidently the agnostic does *not* know "how anthropomorphic he is;" if he did, he would know that this same bug-bear stands just as much in his way on the borders of *other* fields of investigation as it does in his search for God.

To say that we are anthropomorphic is simply to make the somewhat commonplace and not over-formidable confession that *we are men*. A lion must, I suppose, be *leon-tomorphic*, and a horse *hippomorphic*. But all this only means that each being is itself, and not something else; and that, therefore, man, like all finite beings, lives and thinks inside the limitations of his nature. Man, since he *is* man, must think and utter himself *as* man. And *all* speech—not only that in which he clothes his thought about God, but that also in which he clothes his thought about anything—is, and must be, symbolic. And since it is by his human brain that he thinks, and since it is from his human observation and experience that he draws the symbols with which he attempts to express his thought, it follows, as a matter of course, that all his thought and speech must be shaped and coloured by his human limitations and thus be anthropomorphic.

When, then, the atheist—if there is such a being—or the agnostic says, "You have no right to say anything about God, because all your talk must be anthropomorphic, and so must fall short of expressing the reality," may we not reply, "By parity of reasoning you have no right to talk about anything, for all your speech is anthropomorphic symbolism, and so must fall short of adequately expressing *any* ultimate reality"? When we say, "the sky frowns,"

or, "the winds sigh," or, "the waves sob on the seashore," we are very anthropomorphic; but in these cases there is no danger of being seriously misunderstood. But even when the most severely scientific man talks about strata, or fossils, or species, he is using symbolic language, and is entirely anthropomorphic. If man may never speak except when he is not anthropomorphic, then must he maintain perpetual silence. But if symbolic speech is accurate enough for the practical purposes of science and of life, why may it not be accurate enough for the practical purposes of theism?

We surrender, then, the attempt to know what the Power behind phenomena is, *in itself*, just as we surrender the attempt to know what man is, in himself, or a tree is, in itself, or a globule of protoplasm is, in itself. But, in the latter cases, we study the manifestations accessible to us, and draw what inferences we can as to the nature of that which is manifested. By what authority are we precluded from doing the same in the first case? This Power may be studied in its manifestations; and, so far as they go, we may infer the nature of that which is manifested. Here, as in all other directions, we must always remember that our language is only symbol, and so can only partially express the reality. But in dealing with a Power that, to us, is practically infinite, an under-statement, or no statement at all, is even more likely to be wrong than an apparent over-statement. And such statement as we can rise to, by logical induction from the facts of the world and of human life, is just as legitimate as any scientific inference in any other department of study. So far then as "the things that are made"—or the things that are developed—go, the old words of Paul are true; and "the invisible things of him from the creation—or beginning—of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are." If we may infer concerning the invisible form of magnetism or of

electricity by its effects, why may we not likewise infer concerning the invisible power and life at the back of all?

As to *method*, the present writer wishes to say, in one word, that he most earnestly believes that there is only one for the pursuit of knowledge in any direction, and that that is the scientific method. Even the direct assertions of consciousness must be tested by this method before legitimate deductions as to their significance can be drawn.

Avoiding all *à priori* assumptions, then, let us simply open our eyes to nature. But, in nature, we must not forget to include man; for he is not only a part, but to us by far the most interesting and important part, of the manifestation of this "unknowable" Power.

We will say nothing about any necessity for a "first cause," for the present writer is quite willing to confess that, to him, it is as easy to think of the universe as self-existent and eternal as it is to think of an uncreated and uncaused God. It is practically impossible to *think* either of them. Let us, then, simply open our eyes and see what "the things that are" have to say about the invisible Power of which they are manifestations. We will take our stand on the scientific demonstration of "the persistence of force," and keep in mind the truth that the unseen antecedent must at least contain "the promise and potency" of all its consequents. It is not asserted that we can get at the precise nature of the Power that is phenomenally manifested; much less that the phenomena are identical with the Power. But it is asserted that *the unseen Power is as much as*, and equal to the production of, *the effect*.

We are now ready to open our eyes, to look abroad, and to see some of "the things that are." As we step across the threshold of our own personal consciousness, we find ourselves in the presence of a Being that we are compelled to

speak of as eternal, omnipotent, and infinite. This Being—say universe, for the present—existed before the human race appeared on this planet, and will continue to exist when it has disappeared. Both beginning and end are alike inconceivable. We have only one word adequate to express our thought, and that is the word eternal. So of the display of power. Mr. Mill may tell us that it is an unwarranted logical leap to say it is literally omnipotent. But the force that holds the moon in its orbit about the earth is so stupendous, that it transcends all attempts of the human imagination at an adequate portrayal of it. And when we try to rise from this first step to some high peak of outlook from which we may survey the limitless fields where the stars themselves are but the dust of the azure plains, our thought refuses to use any lesser term than omnipotent. And when we attempt to limit this Being in any direction, we find that anything like a boundary is utterly inconceivable. If we cannot grasp the thought of infinity, still the mind refuses to rest in anything short of it.

Again, this Being makes the impression on us of an absolute and unbroken order. Indeed, so dominant is this impression, as the result of all human experience and study, that even in those cases where things seem chaotic, or where the order as yet is undiscovered, we are mentally compelled to believe that the order exists, and that its apparent absence is only due to ignorance of the law for which we confidently search. This point calls for little or no illustration, for it is the fundamental postulate of all science. From the rain-drop on the window-pane that hastens to form itself into a globe, to the nebula that whirls itself into a sphere in the sky; from the perfection of a frost-crystal to the perfection of a galaxy; everywhere the universal order voices itself in a harmony that the poetic thought of man pictures as the fairy dance of the atoms and the “music of the spheres.”

We next observe that this Power behind phenomena manifests itself as a force of growth. In grass-blades and flowers and trees, in ten thousand forms of animal life, in nations and civilisations, in worlds and systems, this mysterious process is going on. Nothing is dead; nothing is still.

Every clod feels a stir of might,  
An instinct within it that reaches and towers;  
And, groping blindly above it for light,  
Climbs to a soul in grass and flowers.

And those larger clods, the worlds themselves, climb to souls in myriads of intelligent creatures.

Nor is this universal growth hap-hazard. The order manifests itself here also. And as we trace it from the first, we find ourselves borne along on the current of a "stream of tendency" that has about it all the characteristics of what we are accustomed to call purpose. It is not intended here to enter on any argument from a supposed "design." It is freely granted that "natural selection" and "the survival of the fittest" are able to explain many adaptations that were once confidently trusted to as indications of design. But the best thinkers to-day—even such men as Professor Huxley, if I mistake not—are ready to confess that they do not explain that larger, grander sweep of things whose beginnings we can dimly trace, but whose end we can only dream of and hope for. It is not only poetic prophecy but scientific warrant that wings the flight of Tennyson while he sings:—

Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing *purpose* runs.

When a man has traced a river for a hundred miles, he knows it is running *somewhere*, though no living man may ever have seen its mouth. So when the stream of Evolution has been traced from its "fire-mist," on through the lowest forms of life, until along its banks a Shakespeare

sings and a Jesus preaches, is it any wonder that we dare to hope—again with Tennyson—that there is

One far-off, divine event,  
Towards which the whole creation moves ?

Let us pause here for a moment, that we may count up our steps and see how far we have come. This Power behind phenomena has manifested itself to us—using the least inadequate terms we can find—as being: 1. Eternal; 2. Omnipotent; 3. Infinite; 4. Order; 5. Growth; 6. Tendency.

7. We are now ready to raise the question whether this Power is alive or dead. In other words, Is this a materialistic universe, or is it one whose essence is what—for want of a better term—we must call spirit? The old materialism is now declared by the best thinkers to be crude philosophy and inadequate science. Men like Herbert Spencer and Professor Huxley cast it aside. Its famous watchword, “No thought without phosphorus,” John Fiske makes a theme for ridicule. He declares it “a very barren piece of truism.” And when Professor Tyndall speaks of matter as containing “the promise and potency of every form of life,” he is only changing the definition of matter.

If you say that matter is all there is, then you must leave off talking about “dead matter,” and enlarge your conception of it until it includes all that is. If matter is all, then matter lives, matter feels, matter thinks, matter hopes, matter fears, matter loves, hates, aspires, worships. Matter sees visions and dreams dreams. Matter wrote the prophecies of Isaiah, the “Iliad” of Homer, and the plays of Shakespeare. And then this matter turns round on itself, looks into its own face, and criticises its own work. Call it matter if you will, but then we must so change and enlarge our definition as to make it include all we have been accustomed to mean by the term, spirit. And when we have done



that, we find we have only been playing with words ; for the old problems face us still, and are not answered.

Men who do not look deeply are accustomed to think that matter is a simple thing, and that they know what it is. But a deeper thought looks for it in vain. This common drudge that, like a pack-mule, we load and beat at our will, while we look at him turns into a Pegasus with wings, and before we know it, is off among the gods. For what is matter ? Nobody knows. While we grasp it, it slips out of our hands. Like Proteus, it assumes a thousand shapes. It appears like a ghost, and then fades into thin air. It is as elusive as Shelley's "Cloud." We talk of atoms ; but, though they be ever so helpful as a "working hypothesis," nobody has ever seen one. When we think we have found it, we only stand in the presence of Faraday's "point of force." While, then, common sense assumes that it knows matter, uncommon sense is aware that matter is only an influence, and that all we directly know is mind.

Even the working hypotheses of science concerning matter and force are logically contradictory. We are taught that force and matter cannot exist apart—that force cannot exert itself across a vacuum, and that even the inter-stellar spaces must be bridged by a subtle ether that across it the invisible feet of gravitation may travel. Yet if matter were solid, and every point of space were occupied by a particle of matter, all motion would be impossible. Matter and force are both then unsolved mysteries still.

And, once more, as Herbert Spencer has so plainly shown, while we cannot explain thought and feeling in terms of matter, it is possible to explain matter in terms of mind. Consciousness is so far utterly inexplicable on the materialistic theory. We need not stop to expound this, for every leading and competent thinker admits it. But the nature of consciousness is such that it does permit us to frame a rational and consistent theory of matter in mental terms.

We have direct cognizance only of those aggregates of personal feelings that make up our personal consciousness. Whatever is external to this may be, for all we know, thrilling and throbbing with even an infinite life and an infinite consciousness, and yet to us—being outside our consciousness—it may seem lifeless and unconscious. On the theory, then, that mind and life are the essence of things, we can frame an intelligible conception of the universe. On the materialistic theory we cannot. Provisionally, then, and as far as our knowledge has gone, we are more than justified in holding that this Power behind phenomena is alive. And if we are compelled to choose between calling it matter and calling it mind, we are forced by the facts of science—remembering that we do not know much about either of them—to call it mind.

8. The next step leads us naturally to inquire as to whether we are justified in thinking of this Power as intelligent. So far as the present writer is aware, the following method of putting the case is not common; and he does not know that it has ever been in print, except in his own words. And yet he sees no way of escape from the logical conclusion.

Let us start by recalling to mind the fact that all we know directly is the declarations of our own consciousness. All things else are only inference. We will make the statement at once then, however strange or startling it may seem, that we have infinitely more reason for asserting the intelligence of the Power at the back of phenomena than we have for believing that any other intelligence exists beyond the limits of our own personal consciousness. We are apt to assume that we know a great deal more about the intelligence of our fellow-men than we really do know. But the argument for the intelligence manifested in the universe is unspeakably greater than that for the intelligence of any man, except ourselves; and, furthermore, it is of exactly

the same kind. For what is it precisely that we know about our fellows? What precisely do we mean when we speak of a man as intelligent? All we mean, or can mean, is that the manifestations he makes of his hidden and mysterious life—his movements, his actions, his gestures, his words—correspond to what we call the rational and logical order of our own thought. We infer that the man is intelligent when this correspondence exists; we infer that he is not intelligent—he may be ignorant, idiotic, or insane—when it does not exist. Intelligence, then, is a quality, the existence of which we are logically compelled to infer whenever there are manifestations of motion, or order, or tendency that correspond to the rational and logical order of our own thought. This is all the word means. And to make the inference in one case, and refuse to make it in another, is illogical, unscientific, and irrational. Since then this kind of manifestation on the part of the universe is infinitely greater than on the part of any man, the reason for believing that the Power behind phenomena is intelligent—or something transcending that term—is infinitely greater than that for believing that any man, except ourselves, possesses that quality. To suppose that law, and order, and growth, and tendency toward definite ends may exist; that the whole universe, so far as we can trace it, from the infinitesimal to the infinite, should correspond everywhere to the intelligent order of our minds; but, at the same time, to suppose that all this is no evidence of intelligence, is to turn all logic wrong end up, and admit that the proof of a thing may be so stupendous and overwhelming as to be no proof at all. For, in the case of our fellow-men, we draw the inference unhesitatingly from an infinitely smaller amount of proof. Here, at any rate, is overwhelming proof of intelligence in the only sense in which we have any right to use that word.

But if any one says, "No intelligence without brain,"

we reply, Here are innumerable manifestations of what, from our human standpoint, we can only think of as intelligence. What may be the nature of an infinite intelligence; what may be the processes of such an intelligence; whether it must always manifest itself through brain; whether, if so, there may be an infinite something corresponding to brain,—these things we do not know. But this we *do know*—that the Power behind phenomena does manifest itself to us in ways practically innumerable after the fashion that, from our standpoint, *we must call intelligent*, or else use words without any meaning. We do not for a moment forget that our language is symbolic. This universal intelligence may not be *like* ours; it may be something infinitely greater. But the proof is absolutely irresistible that here is a display of something at least equal to, *as much as*, our human intelligence.

9. In spite of Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious," all careful thinkers will hesitate long before they will admit that there can exist an *unconscious* intelligence. If we are to keep ourselves on the safe and only scientific ground of arguing from the known to the unknown, we shall hold firmly—until proof positive is given us to the contrary—that wherever intelligence is, there also is consciousness. Unconscious intelligence is an assumption, and an assumption entirely independent of any support of facts. Our only field for observation here is man. To assert that in the case of a child there is any intelligent action preceding consciousness is to go beyond our knowledge. But even were this proved, it would be most rationally explicable on the ground of heredity, and as thus being the result of ancestral consciousness. For it is perfectly natural that after a conscious purpose has initiated a habit, certain activities may be carried on automatically. But there is not one scrap of evidence going to prove that intelligent activities were ever unconsciously initiated.

If, then, we are to keep to what we know, and argue only on the basis of that, the inference is irresistible that, since the Power at the back of phenomena is what, from our standpoint, we must call intelligent, it is also what, in our human language, we must call conscious. And if these words fail to express the infinite reality, it is only because they must fall short of it. But they are certainly nearer to truth than the opposite terms, or than a refusal to say anything.

10. As to the personality of this Power, that will depend entirely upon definitions. It is manifestly absurd to assert personality in the sense in which we assert it of a man, for this would be to limit that which we at the same time declare to be infinite. But if, with the famous German philosopher and physicist, Hermann Lotze, we admit that "Personality has its basis in pure selfhood—in self-consciousness—without reference to that which is not self," we need no longer stumble at that term.

11. Let us next consider whether this Power manifested in the universe can be rationally thought of by us as good. By this word, "good," we mean no transcendent, unreal thing, that may mean something up in the skies, but does not here on earth. As a definition, let us take the welfare and happiness of sentient creatures. Does the universe seem to care for these things?

Horrible pictures are drawn of the recklessness, hardness, and cruelty of nature. Mr. Tennyson speaks of one who tried to believe in love,

Though nature, red in tooth and claw  
With ravine, shrieked against his creed.

And he lays still darker colours on his picture by telling of

Dragons of the prime,  
Who tore each other in their slime.

And Darwinism, with its law of "the battle of life" and "the

survival of the fittest," seems to turn the whole world into a carnage field. But the horror with which sensitive souls contemplate the scene is largely a matter of misconception.

In the first place, we are apt unconsciously to think of the animal world as possessing nervous systems as highly developed as our own, and thus as being capable of suffering all that we should suffer in like conditions. While, beyond question, the truth is, that they suffer less, preying and preyed upon, than they would if left to grow old, become helpless, and die a "natural" death, which would probably be one of starvation. They suffer fear in flight so long as fear may help them to escape, but when caught, and fear can be of no more service, all we know of the facts leads us to suppose that the fear ceases, and the worst suffering is over. Livingstone tells us that once, when caught by a lion, after his paw was fairly upon him, he was nervously paralysed, and all pain was gone. So it is in almost all forms of death, both animal and human. Thus all physicians will testify that the pain of dying is nothing like what is popularly supposed.

And as to the hardness of the law that goes by the name of "the survival of the fittest," it would certainly be no improvement to reverse it, and have the unfit survive. Then, when it is remembered that, as the world advances, this very law brings thought and love to the front, and makes them superior, because they are the "fit," what at first was taken to be a demon lifts its veil and is seen to wear the face of an angel. It is only caricature or misconception—born of ignorance and lack of thought—that can speak of this Darwinian law as hard or cruel.

As we come up into the sphere of human life, a little reflection will convince us that the pessimist's pictures of human unhappiness are grossly exaggerated. Because *we* should not be happy to fall to the present condition of the lower races, it by no means follows that, on the whole,

and considering what *they* can appreciate, there is not among them a large preponderance of well-being and happiness. As a matter of fact, we know that there is. Were it otherwise they would die off, instead of living and increasing. The whole thing is relative both to their capacity and to our standard of judgment.

Another thing deceives us concerning the masses of those in our own grade of civilisation. Most of the wailing and misanthropy comes from those who are pampered into diseased conditions by an idle prosperity. Most of those who wearily ask at the clubs whether "life is worth living," would find a practical answer to their grief by following the advice of Dr. Abernethy: "Live on a shilling a day, and *earn* it." Their skins would clear if only they had something to live for.

And then the impression is made upon us that the world is much worse than it is, by the fact that sickness and death, and suffering and crime are *news*; and as such are given us in millions of daily papers for breakfast and dinner and supper. But the very fact that these things are "news" only shows their exceptional character. Happiness and health and good conduct are *no news*—they are far too common and too widely prevalent to be entitled to that distinction.

But the problem of pain itself, does it at all impeach the wisdom or goodness of the Power of which it is an expression? What is pain? It is simply a signal marked "Danger" that is set up on the borders of safety, to warn the trespasser to keep his feet in "the way of life and happiness." If the child were not hurt by burning or cutting or breaking or bruising, how often would he grow up un-mutilated, or even at all? Instead of being an evil, pain is a guardian and guiding angel. The laws of the universe are *all good*; when they are known and observed, the universal, inevitable result is life and happiness. Pain is only a sharp

warning that we are in a way that leads, and must lead, to injury. When all laws are known, and all are observed, the result can be nothing less than universal well-being and happiness. This, then, must be taken as the *real nature* of the Power that expresses itself through these laws.

If any one shall ask, "Why did not this Power make men so that they should know and observe these laws from the first, and so be always happy?" the answer does not seem far to seek. Only two kinds of beings are conceivable. One, a race of automata; the other, a race of beings such as man really is. In the latter case, this being can develop and make progress in no other way than by experience, trial, mistake, failure, and the wisdom that comes through these. If any one would prefer to be an automaton, we shall not attempt to argue against such a preference. We can simply say that we would not; and further, that there is no reason for asserting that the author of such a progressive race is other than good and loving.

However painful it may be, a process that leads to something may be justified by its outcome. That the process of human life is to have no justifiable outcome is what no man has a right to assert. And until its negative is proved, the ground of hope and trust is indisputably rational. The simple fact of known tendency and apparent purpose in the direction ever of the better is presumptive proof stronger than any merely negative surmise. History proves "the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." And this equally proves happiness; for happiness is the natural and inevitable result of law-keeping, of which righteousness is only a definition.

12. One more question remains. We stand face to face with a Power that—with the limitations of our human language and from our human standpoint—we may speak of as eternal, omnipotent, infinite, order, growth, tendency, life, intelligence, consciousness, personality, goodness. Re-



membering, too, that man himself is only a manifestation of this same Power, we may declare that it further expresses itself as love, pity, tenderness, self-sacrifice, aspiration, worship, and hope. All these things indisputably are manifestations of this infinite life. By what name now shall we call it? Power, force, law, universe, nature—none of these in its ordinary acceptation is at all adequate. These express only a part. There is but one name large enough; and that is, *God*. If we use this we do not dogmatise; neither do we theologise in any offensive sense. We do not declare for the Christian God, nor the Mohammedan, nor the Hindu. We only use a term large enough to make room for all the facts. We do not settle the dispute about pantheism. We leave the question open whether God is or is not separate from the sum-total of things. We raise no question of natural or supernatural. We only demand a name that is adequate. The real dogmatist is he who forbids the use of the word, and proposes to substitute some such term as *nature* in place of it. The word nature dogmatises, and with most unwarranted assumption dogmatises in the negative. It presumes to close the argument by asserting that what we call nature is all. The word, God, includes nature, and leaves all the great questions open, thus making room for whatever the future may discover, whether it be physical, or moral, or spiritual truth.

It will readily be seen then that, to the evolutionist, all the essentials of the noblest religion remain. The tremulous fear on the part of many that religion may somehow be in danger will appear to be simply absurd in the light of a definition. For what is religion? *Religion is the feeling of man—together with the activities, customs, and institutions springing out of that feeling—concerning the relation in which he supposes himself to stand to the universe.* No religion in the world, from fetichism up, but is covered by that definition. What follows then? Why, this. Just

so long as there continue to exist *the universe and a man*, just so long must there be a religion.

And so far from Evolution having a tendency to degrade religion or lower its type, the precise opposite is the result. Awe and reverence and admiration or worship remain, only deepened and intensified. And there remain also a grander thought of God and a larger hope for man.

MINOT J. SAVAGE.

*Boston, U. S.*

## THE MORALITY OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION.

### A REPLY.

IT has been with great surprise and regret, not unmixed with indignation, that I have read the article entitled "The Medical Profession and its Morality," in your last number; and, after much consideration, I have determined to request you to allow me to reply to it. If it should be thought that my having early quitted the practice of my Profession weakens the force of my testimony in its behalf, I may reply that it ought to increase the confidence with which that testimony is received: since, with a knowledge of the Profession which the writer of that article obviously does not possess, I have been for forty years a keen observer *from the outside* of its doings, a free critic of what I considered its misdoings, a teacher (as well orally as by my pen) of its younger members, in habits of close personal intimacy with several of its acknowledged "leaders," and for twenty-three years in an Official position which gave me unusual opportunities of knowing the tone of thought pervading its "rank and file." And it is because I hope that I may be regarded as not only a qualified, but (so far as it is possible for any one to be) a disinterested witness, that I have, at a considerable personal sacrifice, taken upon myself to defend a body of men who possess my highest respect, and who—I pledge myself to prove—have been treated with grave injustice.

As to one point, indeed, I find myself at a great disad-

vantage. Though not unpractised in the use of the pen, and having more than once felt called on to use it in scientific controversy, I have never had occasion to employ it against an opponent \* so skilled in making "the worse appear the better reason." But, confident in the justice of my cause, I shall use only the weapons of sober truth, in the place of rhetorical declamation. Where I shall convict my antagonist of unscrupulous recklessness in the statement of alleged facts (p. 495), I shall *not* accuse him of knowingly telling "shameful and cruel lies." Where he has imputed the worst motives (p. 522) to men, whom, in their earnest endeavour to save life and avert suffering, I shall prove to be animated only by the best, I shall *not* charge him with doing "a cruel and wicked thing." And where he reviles (p. 495) all such as do not take his view of subjects as to which they have an unquestionable right to form their own opinion, I shall *not* indignantly hurl his calumnies back upon himself; but shall content myself with protesting against the claims of any one who deems such language becoming, to be regarded as a candid and judicial critic of "The Medical Profession and its Morality."

My first careful perusal of that Article satisfied me that its author (whoever he, or she, might be) entertains a strong *animus* against the Medical Profession, arising out of its conduct in respect to two matters in regard to which his own feelings are peculiarly strong; namely (1) Vivisection, or what is called such; and (2) the Contagious Diseases Act. If I can prove the existence of this *animus*, and can adduce "pregnant instances" of its operation, I think that every reader will feel that the force of *all* the charges made under its influence is very sensibly weakened. I shall, therefore, deal with these two points in the first instance.

I have never myself been that *bête noire* of your con-

\* As it will be necessary for me continually to make personal reference to your anonymous contributor, I shall do so in the manner of Acts of Parliament, whose *he* means a person of either sex.

tributor, an Experimental Physiologist : for I have preferred as my own line of study what Cuvier designated as "the experiments prepared for us by Nature," in the structure and living actions of different types of Animals and Plants. But none the less do I recognise the necessity of "putting Nature to the question," when no other way is open for obtaining that "scientific" knowledge, which alone can prevent every dose of medicine, every surgical operation, from being an "experiment" upon *the living human body* ; and which knowledge, as I shall hereafter show (p. 515), is now furnishing a sure basis for the *prevention* of some of the most destructive and most painful of the diseases to which our domesticated animals are subject. And it is in the ability with which these "questions" are now devised, the skill with which they are put, and the care taken to avoid the unnecessary infliction of suffering, that the difference lies between the "experimental physiologists" of our modern school, and those brutal "vivisectors" of Alfort whom I hold in as great abhorrence as your contributor. As Physiology has been the special study of my life, I claim some right to have an opinion of my own on this matter, and to express that opinion publicly as well as privately. And that, in spite of my devotion to Physiological Science, I have never myself made an "experiment" on any animal higher than a Star-fish, may, I think, shield me from the suspicion of personal inhumanity. Nevertheless, those who, like myself, have justified the experiments of such benefactors to the human race as Harvey, Charles Bell, Marshall Hall, John Reid, Brown-Séquard, and others I could name—without which we should be still living in a state of chaotic ignorance in regard to the functions of the most important parts of our bodily organisation—are reprobated as apologists for detestable cruelty. And your contributor, as I shall now show, publicly holds up to the like odium the entire body

of the Profession, with the exception of those "few brave and self-respecting men" who have had the courage not to submit to "the manipulation of its wirepullers" (p. 320).

At his very outset he speaks of the "Medical Council" as "a little Parliament, destined soon to dictate to the larger Senate of the kingdom, not only concerning its own interior affairs, *but also concerning everything which can by possibility be represented as affecting the interests of public health.*"—The Medical Council neither claims any such prerogative, nor has attempted such dictation. The "interests of public health" are not under its charge, but under those of a responsible Government Department. All that the Medical Council claims to deal with (under the Act which constituted it) is the Education and Registration of the different ranks and orders of the Profession; and I do not think that any one who *really knows* what it has done in raising the *status* of Medical Education, can deny that its action has in so far been very beneficial to the public. But when the Anti-Vivisection Bill was introduced into Parliament, the Medical Council, regarding it as having a directly injurious bearing on the *education* of Medical practitioners, passed a resolution against it; as did also, for the like reason, other Medical bodies. The matter was fully discussed, under the same point of view, in the Senate of the University of London; a large proportion of whose "lay" members (including its Chancellor and several other leading Statesmen) voted with the "doctors" in favour of a similar resolution.

Your readers will, perhaps, scarcely believe that this Bill, in its original form, would have made it penal to prick the web of a Frog's foot with a pin, for the purpose of extending it for the observation of its blood-circulation under the microscope; and that, strictly interpreted, it might have

been held to interdict a Teacher from pricking his own finger (as I was myself accustomed to do) to draw a drop of human blood for class-demonstration. And yet it did *not* attempt to place any restriction on the salmon-fisher, who "plays" a fish with a hook in its gills for an hour or more (during which the poor creature is undergoing a gradual reduction of its strength by what I believe to be a slow asphyxia); or upon the sportsman who only "wings" poor grouse and pheasants, which hide themselves in some covert to die in misery; or upon the "courser" of poor timid hares, which run for their lives until tired out by the superior "staying" power of the greyhounds in chase of them. What excited the strong feeling of the Medical Profession when this Bill was introduced, was, that *they* should be held up to public odium for the carrying-on of experimental investigations by a few of its members, which, rightly or wrongly, they honestly considered to be for the benefit of suffering humanity; whilst the "anti-vivisectionists" never attempted to deal with the far larger amount of animal suffering inflicted by "Lords and Gentlemen" for their mere amusement.

The not unnatural opposition of Medical men to that Bill—in which opposition I can myself see nothing either inhuman, self-interested, or dictatorial—is characterised by your contributor as the raising of a "stupid cry that any restriction on the cutting-up of live animals would be an affront to their Profession, which had cheerfully submitted to a similar restriction in cutting-up dead men"! And the Home Secretary is represented as terrorized by the large Medical deputation which waited upon him, into the "humiliating concession of turning his own Vivisection Bill from a measure to protect animals, into one to protect Physiologists;" your contributor obviously supposing it impossible that Sir Richard Cross could have been so far sensible to the force of the considerations placed before him, as honestly

to have changed his mind on the subject. How the Act, as it now stands, gives any "protection to Physiologists," your contributor does not point out. So far from continuing to experimentalists, who could previously do their work at their own time and place, a "free vivisection table," it places them under close restrictions, on any violation of which it imposes severe penalties; and difficulty was even experienced in obtaining such a relaxation of the original rules, as was asked for by Professor Lister, to enable him to devote his vacation-absences from Edinburgh to the prosecution of those important investigations (p. 512), which have resulted in what is probably the greatest improvement in modern Surgery.

One of your contributor's imaginary characters is represented as "reading on his way up to town a charming article on that intense sympathy of Medical men for suffering humanity, which 'makes them ready to sacrifice hecatombs of brutes to save the smallest pain of a man.' " I do not think I am wrong in attributing to him the converse opinion, that it is better that thousands of men should perish, than that one brute should be made to suffer pain to save them. To one educated as I was in a strong feeling of the sacredness of Human life, and the duty of the Medical man to do everything in his power to prolong it, the manner in which its unnecessary sacrifice is spoken of in passages which I shall hereafter have to quote in other connections (pp. 508, 530) is simply astounding.

But how stands the case, when the suffering of a few animals can save from the like suffering tens of thousands of *their own kind*? Some of those who most strongly protested against the Bill in its original form, were engaged on investigations (promoted by the Royal Agricultural Society) which had this object specially in view. These investigations, as I shall presently show (p. 515), have been recently brought to an issue more completely successful as



regards the present, and more promising in respect to the future, than even the most sanguine had ventured to anticipate. And I feel that I may now safely leave it to the judgment of your readers, to say whether I have not proved that your contributor's strong *animus* on this subject renders him incapable of fairly appreciating the motives which animated the Medical Profession in their opposition to the *original* Vivisection Bill, promoted by those who think with him in this matter.

In regard to the Contagious Diseases Act, it is impossible in these pages to enter into any discussion; and I must content myself with protesting against your contributor's allegation that it is "the gross materialism" of the Medical Profession, "their utter disregard for human souls when lodged in the bodies of the despised and wretched, which has made such legislation possible." The Acts originated not with the Profession, but with the Naval and Military authorities; and if the majority of the Medical Profession now defend them, I claim for them that they do so from a disinterested conviction of their value—especially, as urged by Mrs. Garrett Anderson, to *innocent women and children*.

Of the *utterly unfounded* charges which your contributor brings against the Medical Profession, the worst is that in which they are held responsible for the Burke and Hare murders. I never read a grosser calumny than is contained in the following sentence:—

This recklessness and pitilessness of Medical men was betrayed forty years ago, when they permitted Burke and Hare to bring them corpses for anatomical study, which they could not doubt were those of foully murdered men.

Here are two distinct assertions;—*first*, that the anatomical teachers who received the corpses brought in by Burke and Hare for dissection "could not doubt" that they

"were those of foully murdered men;" and *second*, that the "recklessness and pitilessness" which these two individuals are asserted to have "betrayed," were chargeable also upon the Medical Profession as a whole.

As I studied in Edinburgh a few years after this transaction, which happened more than *fifty* years ago (the date is important), and as I heard it still much discussed, I am probably in a better position than your contributor to know the real facts of the case, which may be found by any one who chooses to seek them (as I have myself done for the refreshment of my own memory) in Dr. Lonsdale's memoir of Dr. Knox.

These can be only understood aright, when it is borne in mind that dissection was at that time positively illegal; the mere possession of a dead body—other than that of a criminal executed for murder—for anatomical use, being a punishable offence. The "subjects" absolutely needed for the proper study of Anatomy, had to be obtained by the robbery of graveyards. The poorer students would go out on these expeditions for themselves, braving the consequences, which were sometimes serious. The richer expected the Teacher to provide the supply, for which they were willing to pay; and he had to depend for it on some of the greatest rascals unhung, known as "resurrection-men," whose doings could not be closely inquired into.

Now for this state of things, it was not the Profession, but the Legislature, that was responsible. Attempts had been made from time to time to remove the public prejudice against dissection. I well remember being myself one of a number of Medical practitioners and students, who signed a paper pledging ourselves to leave our own bodies for the purpose. But it was only by the Burke and Hare murders in Edinburgh, and by the occurrence of a similar case in London (in which information of suspicious appearances was given by the "doctors" to whom the body was brought),

that our Government felt constrained to legalize dissection, and to authorise the authorities of hospitals and workhouses to give up unclaimed bodies for the purpose.

Now the only "medical men" who had the least concern with the Burke and Hare murders, were Dr. Knox, then the leading teacher of Anatomy in Edinburgh, and his demonstrators or assistants; one of whom afterwards rose to the highest distinction as a Surgeon, while another is still a distinguished Fellow of the Royal Society. I have no desire to shield either of these gentlemen, and state only the facts as they came out upon the trial of the murderers. *There was nothing whatever* in the aspect of the corpses brought in by them, to lead either the Teacher or his assistants to even a suspicion of what your contributor asserts that "they could not doubt,"—that they were those of murdered men. They were *not* the bodies of men in the vigour of health and strength, bearing wounds or other marks of violence; but for the most part those of half-starved paupers, who had been "done to death" in a manner that would have remained a mystery, but for the confession of Hare, whom the Crown was obliged to admit as King's evidence. The obvious freshness of some of the bodies (which indicated that they had not been buried) *did* excite remark; but Burke—a ready-witted Irishman—accounted for this in a manner sufficiently plausible to check further inquiry. As Dr. Knox courted the fullest investigation, in behalf both of himself and his assistants, a Committee of his townsmen was formed, consisting partly of Medical, partly of Legal, and partly of "lay" members; who, after a long and painstaking inquiry, fully acquitted them of everything save the not having kept their eyes quite wide enough open to the dark doings of the very disreputable agents whom the then state of the law forced them to employ.

One of the signatures to the Report of that Committee

was that of a man whose verdict would alone have sufficed to carry conviction to the mind of any one who knew him intimately. For who that was fortunate enough to come within the sphere of Dr. Alison's influence, does not revere his memory as that of one of the noblest men he ever met?—one whom to know was to respect, to honour, and to love?—one who combined the large-mindedness of the Medical philosopher, with the large-heartedness of the Christian philanthropist; one who never said an unkind word, or did an unkind thing; one who preferred unremunerated attendance on the poorest of the poor, to the taking of fees among the rich, spending the guineas received from his wealthy patients in the New Town, in providing food, clothing, and fuel for the wretched paupers of the Old. When two of the pupils of his best days chance to come together, their talk is always of Alison, the value of his professional teaching, and the moral force of the example shown in the life of one who literally "went about doing good." To have known and loved such a *man*, was (as has been said of the love of some *woman*—I forget whom) part of "a liberal education." And yet your anonymous contributor, in his eagerness to brand the whole Profession with infamy, blackens with unfounded calumny not merely the memory of my late distinguished friend Sir William Fergusson (who was at that time Dr. Knox's principal assistant), but that of the great and good Alison, who though a "doctor," was the very last man to whom "recklessness" and "pitilessness" could be imputed!

Another "scandal" of the past, the raking-up of which, and its application to the present, mark most strongly the pleasure your contributor has in throwing mud at the Profession, is that which relates to Medical Students. It may be freely admitted that the "Bob Sawyer" of "Pickwick"

was a true picture of a certain disreputable class of Medical Students that haunted the "Borough" at the time it was drawn. But it would have been even at that date most unfair to represent him as the type of the entire class, of which I was then myself a member. And with a knowledge of the Medical Students of the present day, which I am certain that your contributor cannot possess, I unhesitatingly affirm that nothing can be more unfair than to reproduce (as he does, p. 305) Dickens's humorous creation as the type of the now "rising generation;" unless it be the still more opprobrious misrepresentation of his metamorphosis into the smoothly-spoken and softly-treading Practitioner, who is animated by "such burning zeal to save humanity from disease, that he is ready to *persecute anti-vaccinators to the death, or cut up any number of living dogs and cats in the most horrible manner*, merely on the chance of discovering some remedy for human suffering." Even in the next page, while "thankfully recognising that Medical men as a body exhibit many virtues, and comparatively few of the grosser vices," the exempting clause "*after their studentship*" is put in.

That your contributor should represent the typical Medical Student of the present day as "the *bête-noire* of every modest girl," and "*the unfailing nuisance of every public meeting*, where he may stamp and crow and misbehave himself," bespeaks either gross ignorance or malicious feeling; for even *Punch* has long ceased to "make up" his vulgar rowdy in that character. No "modest girl" has now anything more to fear from Medical Students, than from the undergraduates of our Universities. And the last occasion on which I can call to mind that *real* "Medical Students" (there are many who *call themselves* such, with as much truth as Sheridan, when he lay drunk in a gutter, called himself Mr. Wilberforce) made a disturbance at a public meeting

in London,\* was several years ago, when an American doctress, Miss Mary Walker, appeared as a lecturer at St. James's Hall. Now I do not for a moment defend or excuse the conduct of the foolish, hot-headed youths who then misbehaved themselves; but I ask if it was worse than that of the grave, middle-aged clergymen, who shouted and stormed, jumped on the benches, and pulled off each others' coat-tails, at the meeting of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, presided over by the Archbishop of York, when Bishop Colenso's heresy was the exciting theme. Any subject which strongly appeals to *class feelings*, whether it be Ritualism or the Confessional, Vivisection or the Contagious Diseases Acts, is pretty sure to excite "a row;" and while I do not claim for Medical Students that they are *better* than other people in this particular, I challenge your contributor to prove that they are *worse*.

I shall now deal *seriatim* with the five counts of the specific Bill of Indictment (p. 325), which your contributor lays to the charge of the Medical Profession; and if I do so at greater length than may seem necessary, it is because I wish to satisfy your readers of the grounds of my repudiation of them, rather than ask them to accept my contradiction upon my own personal authority.

It is affirmed, in the *first* place, "That the proper beneficent objects of the Medical Profession are being daily supplanted by the ardour of purely scientific investigation."

That "scientific investigation" now occupies a much larger share of the attention of the Profession than it for-

\* If Medical Students in Provincial towns have disturbed Anti-Vivisection meetings, ample provocation for such disturbance has been given by the sensational pictures, with which (as I can myself bear witness) those towns have been previously placarded.

merly did, I most readily admit ; and the fact is, to my mind, the most striking proof of the vast improvement which the Profession has undergone during the half-century which has passed since I entered it.

In my early days, the Profession was eminently *unscientific*. Its practice was mainly guided by a routine, which was supposed to be the concrete expression of accumulated experience. Men who tried to emancipate themselves from this were sneered at as "theorists"; it was the "practical man" who had a remedy for every disease, that gained the confidence of the public. I could give most striking instances of this from my own recollection ; in particular as to the practice of "blood-letting" in cases in which my common-sense revolted at what I used to be directed, as a hospital pupil, to execute. The "scientific" inquiries of Andral as to the composition of the blood, and the effect produced by "blood-letting" upon its several components, with those of Louis upon the remedial efficacy of the practice in two of the diseases in which that efficacy had been supposed indubitable, appealed strongly to the younger generation ; which was then breaking loose from slavery to "authority," and was venturing to think for itself, with the advantage of a more "scientific" training than the majority of its elders had received. And the basis was thus laid of a *scientific habit of thought* in regard to the action of remedies, which simply meant this : "What adequate reason have I to expect that such and such a remedy will do good, in the particular case under treatment?" Without such reason *drawn from a principle*, and that principle based on sound scientific induction from well-ascertained facts, all "practice" is purely "empirical." On the disastrous results of what were really "experiments" performed by the ablest men in the Profession, especially in the matter of blood-letting, I now look back with a feeling akin to

horror, mingled with thankfulness for what "science" has done to save us from the repetition of them.

Science, let it be remembered, is nothing but "organised and disciplined common-sense;" and the difference between the old Medicine and the new lies mainly in the aspect in which Disease is viewed. The old-fashioned notion was that every disease is an enemy, whom it is the doctor's business to fight by every means in his power, the result depending upon the efficacy of his weapons and his skill in wielding them; and thus "active" practice was usually most in favour both with the Profession and the Public.

When Homœopathy began to make head among us, and was welcomed as a new revelation by such doctors and patients as were disgusted with the old drugging system, but who still accepted the theory that disease was to be driven out by physic, the more "scientifically" minded members of the Profession saw, in the unquestionable success of much of its practice, the proof of the curative powers of much-abused *Nature*, when allowed to do her work under favourable conditions; and such honestly and openly avowed the change in their convictions. No better example could be cited of this noble disregard of all selfish considerations, than the honourable avowal of Sir Benjamin Brodie in the last edition of his work on "Diseases of the Joints,"—which had become a Surgical "classic," bringing him both fame and fortune,—that, as regarded all but "acute" cases, his former system of "active" local treatment had been entirely wrong; *absolute rest*, with good air, good food, and good nursing, being the treatment really useful, and *Nature* being the true healer. And I do not hesitate to affirm that the like *pronunciamento* on the part of my venerated friend Sir John Forbes, in his article on "Homœopathy, Allopathy, and Young Physic,"



—in which he urged the study of the “Natural History of Disease” (its origin, development, progress, and tendency), as the basis of the “Medicine of the Future,”—had the same effect upon the Medical practice of the present day, as that of Sir B. Brodie had upon the Surgical. The results of both, combined with those of that higher “scientific” training which all the better men in the Profession now receive, can be clearly traced alike in the literature and in the practice of the present day. And while to the outsider it may seem as if the Professional mind was rather exercised on the “scientific” than on the “remedial” aspect of many inquiries now being prosecuted, I reply that it is so exercised in the honest belief that “prevention is better than cure;” and that, as regards curative treatment, the only sound basis for the rational use of remedies lies in the “scientific” study of their action.

Your contributor allows that “Science” must be studied to attain the beneficent ends which constitute the *raison d'être* of the Medical Profession; and says that “honour is justly due to the physician who *studies science in order to cure his patients.*” But his notion of “Science” is obviously limited to that which is to be learned in the laboratory, dissecting-room, or deadhouse. For he goes on to ask, “Is it equally honourable to *study patients in order to acquire science?*” I reply, “Most assuredly, YES.” For without the study of *Disease* as it presents itself *in the living subject*, no Pathological science can exist; and without a scientific Pathology—which includes the action of all curative means—Medicine and Surgery are but empirical “Arts.” Such study is perfectly consistent with the doing what the Physician or Surgeon may deem best for each individual; it being in the careful and minute observation of the phenomena of disease and the action of remedies, and in the careful “scientific” discussion of them, that the

Clinical Medicine and Surgery of the present time are so much superior to what they were in my younger days.\*

It is rather strange that your contributor should at the same time taunt the Profession with not finding out new remedies, and abuse them for making "scientific" experiments, especially on hospital patients, for the discovery of them. Will he tell us how we *are* to determine the virtues of new remedies, without "experiments"? Take, for example, the case of Acute Rheumatism (rheumatic fever). When I was a Medical practitioner, the "orthodox" practice was repeated bleeding; but Louis, by "scientific" (that is to say, careful and accurate) observation of the comparative course of the disease in a number of patients, some of whom *were* bled, while others *were not*, showed that the bleeding really did not shorten the attack, while it lowered the patient's power of sustaining it; and Dr. Taylor (of University College Hospital) afterwards showed reason, on similar grounds, to believe that bleeding did further mischief, by favouring the transference of the diseased action to the heart. That no one would now think of bleeding in acute rheumatism, is because the "science" of Andral, Louis, and Taylor has taught us better. Since its discontinuance, I have known at least half-a-dozen remedies introduced as efficacious, taken up by the Profession, and abandoned after a fair trial;—will your contributor tell us how their value *could* have been tested, except by the use of them? In such cases we *must* have recourse to "experiments" on *man*; and I feel very

\* I may instance the "taking of temperatures," a practice which is not only conducted without any inconvenience to the patient, but, where he supposes it to be a remedial application, is often regarded by him as highly beneficial! Not many days ago, the Resident Medical Officer of the Leeds Fever Hospital showed me a very ingenious instrument he had devised for making the patient's temperature *record itself* during the whole twenty-four hours; and demonstrated its utility by "tracings" of the night-temperature of a man who seemed so well during the day that he was supposed to be "shamming," but who was proved by it to be the subject of a febrile attack at a certain part of every night, in which his temperature rose five or six degrees.

sure that any unlucky "doctor" who gets an attack of this painful disease, would be quite willing to give trial in his own person to "the last thing out." Some experienced men trust in nothing but "six weeks and a blanket"; and the question whether the use of the salicylate of potass may bring the period of suffering down to *one* week, is just now before the Profession for accurate "scientific" observation to determine.

What is true of "scientific" Medicine is equally true of "scientific" Surgery. That there may have been operating Surgeons who (as affirmed by your contributor) have cut off limbs or taken out eyes, either to show their dexterity or to pocket fees, I will not undertake positively to deny; though I think it betokens a very lively imagination to affirm that "*probably every reader*" will recollect such cases. But this I assert unhesitatingly, that the present state of Surgery, like that of Medicine, is *eminently conservative*; and further, that it is becoming so on the high "scientific" principle of *helping Nature to do her work*, instead of interfering with it. The man who saves a fractured limb (p. 512) by the exclusion of those "germs" which your contributor pooh-poohs, or who (as in a case recently brought before the Royal Society) helps Nature to create a new bone in the place of one destroyed by disease, is held in far higher professional esteem, than the "brilliant" operator who dexterously cuts off any number of offending members. And even the skill of the operator is now tested rather by the *result* of his work (the success of which in many instances, as in the one to which I am about to refer, depends upon the most careful observance of the most minute precautions), than by the quickness and dexterity with which he executes it. One of the most tremendous operations of modern Surgery—upon which, when first introduced (about thirty years ago), only the boldest men would venture, and the early results of which seemed only

to afford a poor *chance* of saving what was otherwise a doomed life—has now been rendered so free from risk, that of all the “great operations” it has latterly proved the least fatal. And hundreds (I might, perhaps, without exaggeration, say thousands) of women previously “appointed to die” are now living to thank the able Surgeons, who, in despite of an opposition which at first seemed likely to obtain even a professional condemnation of their conduct, and which even went the length of branding them as “murderers,” have triumphantly vindicated the right they claimed—to be allowed to do the best they conceived “scientifically” possible for the prolongation of valuable lives.

Again, one of the best things that Medical Science is now teaching is, what remedies *can*, and what they *cannot*, do ; and the necessity of care, in the use of them, to *do no harm* by interference with the *vis medicatrix Naturæ*, if we do not see our way to *doing good* by assisting her efforts. It would be well if the Public could be made to understand this ; and to accept the recommendation which the honest Practitioner would often give to “do nothing” (except hygienically), instead of expecting him to “do something.” In no respect is this improved tone more perceptible, than in the mode in which *constitutional* diseases are now viewed. Your contributor (pp. 299 *note*, and 316) taunts the “doctors” as having, with all their science, not yet found out specifics for gout, consumption, or cancer. But a well-educated physician in these days would no more think of seeking *cures* for these diseases, than he would for searching for a medicine which would turn a Cretin or a Cagot into a physically and mentally vigorous man or woman. It was admirably said by Sir John Forbes, that the longer the causes of a chronic disease have been in action, the longer must be the course of the cure ; it being absurd to suppose that the

results of the misdoing of years can be put right by a few weeks' physicking. And so those Constitutional tendencies, which are the cumulative results of the unsanitary lives of a long succession of generations,\* are not to be eradicated by a dosing with any kind or amount of physic, nothing but a *re-creation* of the whole man (or woman) sufficing for their complete removal; while the utmost that the best doctoring can effect, is, while promoting that general re-creation hygienically, to keep in check, by medical or surgical means, such morbid actions as from time to time present themselves. For any one to affirm that he can *cure* either of these Constitutional diseases, would at once stamp him (in the estimation of the best part of the Profession) as a "quack," who will always find people silly and ignorant enough to become his victims; the remedies he trumpets often proving attractive in proportion to their nastiness and absurdity.†

Again, in proportion as the Profession is coming to feel the limits of its power to *cure* disease, it is coming to a stronger conviction of the power of Science to *prevent* it; and this leads at once to the consideration of a subject, your contributor's ridicule of which must already, I think, have excited the surprise of your readers, as it did my own.

If the Medical Profession had been paid, like the physician to the Emperor of China, for keeping their patients *well*, they could not have laboured more earnestly in the cause of Sanitary Reform than they have done; and this, not only

\* I would recommend to your contributor the attentive perusal of Sir James Paget's modestly-entitled "Notes for the Study of Constitutional Diseases;" which afford what is, to my mind, a typical specimen of the mode in which the materials drawn from acute and wide-ranging observation can be utilised by one of our ablest professional thinkers; the product being what is, at the same time, one of the most "scientific" and most "practical" Essays I ever read.

† Some thirty years ago, there was a man in London calling himself M.D., who made an income of some thousands a year as a "curer" of Consumption by the administration of the excrement of serpents!

without fee or reward, but with the certainty of often stirring up local hostility, which could not but be injurious to their professional interests. And what credit does your contributor mete out to them for their disinterested endeavours?—"As old Selden said, 'To preach long, loud, and damnation is the way to be cried up. We love a man that damns us, and run after him to save us.' 'To preach long, loud, and *sanitation*' is the modern doctor's version of this apophthegm."—One would think that your contributor might have been the leader of the "dirty party" at Luton in 1854; whose obstruction to the "sanitation" that had been urged by the Board of Health on account of the increasing death-rate from Fever (caused by the saturation of the sub-soil of the undrained town with the *excreta* of its inhabitants), was the occasion of the most fearful limited outbreak of Cholera I ever heard of. The outbreak occurred in a row of cottages owned by this very man; in which, *in one night*, more than a dozen of the male heads of families were smitten with death. The tale, as told by the *Times* reporter, chiefly in the words of the poor widows, was one of the most affecting I ever read.

"If ye know these things, blessed are ye if ye do them," and "to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin," are apophthegms of older and greater Teachers than Selden; and, as regards this subject, are habitually acted-on by the Medical Profession. But "if ye know these things, keep them to yourselves, and do *not* bother us with your preaching of Sanitation," would seem to be the doctrine of your contributor.

My own recollection goes back to the time when "Sanitation" was in its infancy; when Fevers of various kinds were considered as "visitations of God," which came in the ordinary course of things, and from whose occasional ravages no population—whether urban or rural—could look for exemption. It was the first visitation of Cholera,

which took place in 1831-2 (when I was myself a Medical pupil), that stirred up public attention to the relation between dirt and disease, foul air and pestilence. In every great town the localities most severely visited were, in nearly all cases, those which had been previously known to the medical attendants of the poor as "fever-nests." Sanitary Committees were everywhere formed, which brought to the knowledge of the public a depth of squalor previously undreamt of. Accumulations of filth of every conceivable kind, fearful overcrowding, and almost complete exclusion of fresh air, were the conditions which characterised most of these localities; and where these were wanting, a further search could always discover a cess-pool or obstructed sewer, that poisoned all the air breathed by the dwellers above it.

The alarm died away, however, as the pestilence abated; and nothing of any permanent value was done. But in 1837 a general system of Registration of births, deaths, and marriages in England and Wales was instituted; and from that time the Statistics of Disease, as worked out by the very able Assistant-Registrar, Dr. Farr, began to throw an altogether new light on its causation.\* He was very early led to draw a line of distinction (now universally recognised), separating the *zymotic* class of diseases, which depend on the introduction of a "ferment" of some kind into the blood, from diseases of the ordinary type; and in the course of a few years he arrived at this most important generalisation,—that the excess in the annual death-rate of the worst Town districts, above that of the healthiest Country districts, was almost entirely due to diseases of the *zymotic*

\* One of the charges brought by your contributor against the "doctors," is that they pressed the Government, on the retirement of Major Graham (whose greatest merit lay in his permitting Dr. Farr to work out those valuable conclusions, which his trained ability enabled him to draw from the data collected by the Office), to appoint as his successor, not a Political hanger-on who had to be provided for, but a Medical Statistician capable of carrying on Dr. Farr's work.

type; the mortality from which often equalled, and was sometimes double, or even treble, *that of all other diseases put together.*

The labours of Mr. Chadwick and Dr. Southwood Smith were at the same time showing how strong was the evidence that these "zymotic" diseases might be completely prevented, if the Sanitary condition of the *worst* districts could be brought to the same level as that of the *best*; and a Board of Health was constituted, to which very little power was at first given, but which collected and systematized much valuable information, and placed it from time to time before the public. How little impression it made, however, upon our local Authorities, may be judged from what I well remember of the difficulty which there was in inducing them to take any active measures to meet the second visitation of Cholera, which took place in 1847-8. The duty of personally stirring them up to do so in the Metropolitan area, was committed by the Board of Health to my friend, Mr. R. D. Grainger, one of the most conscientious and benevolent of men; and I well remember his assuring me that he could not have conceived the existence of such pig-headed inhumanity as he almost everywhere encountered in Vestries and Boards of Guardians; the only way of meeting it being to demonstrate that the maintenance of families left destitute by the deaths of their bread-earners from cholera, would be a heavier charge upon the rates than the preventive expenditure he urged; an argument (as I have already shown) too sadly verified a few years afterwards, at Luton. The Report of the epidemic of 1847-8, published by the Board of Health, with its map of the plague-spots of London, marked, to my mind, an epoch in Sanitary Science; demonstrating not only how completely cholera, but zymotic disease generally, could be eliminated by efficient sewerage, pure water-supply, adequate ventilation, and general purification of dwellings,



combined with due precautions against the dispersion of the special poison.

Your contributor seems to me equally reprehensible in his ignorant sneer (p. 298) at "germs" as "imps of the scientific imagination;" for the scientific study of "germs" has not only already been the means of saving a large number of human lives, and of preventing a vast amount of human suffering; but has now put into our hands what seems likely to prove a certain means of preventing some of the most destructive pestilences that affect our domesticated animals. While some of these pestilences are best kept in check by placing our flocks and herds in the conditions best suited to their general welfare, there are others which attack the healthiest animals, nothing being required to produce them, save the "infection" communicated by a diseased subject. The *virus*, whose transmission from one animal to another gives rise to the "zymosis" that constitutes the disease, has now been *distinctly proved*, in a great number of cases, to derive its potency from "organic germs"; which, when they have found their way into the circulating current of an animal, live and multiply therein,—just as the yeast-plant does in beer-wort. The researches of the distinguished French chemist Pasteur, early conducted him to this remarkable result—that not only the alcoholic, but the putrefactive and other forms of fermentation, are due to the introduction, into the fermentible fluid, of organic "germs" of various kinds; and that the exclusion of oxygen (as in the "tinning" of meats, fruits, and vegetables) is *not*—as formerly supposed—the condition of their preservation from putrescence; since atmospheric air may be freely admitted, if the "germs" it ordinarily carries can be effectually removed from it by filtration.

The application of this "germ-theory" to Surgery, which, originally worked-out by Professor Lister, has now been

taken up by the Profession generally, is all but universally regarded as the greatest advance in the healing art since the introduction of Anæsthetics. It has been long known to surgeons, that the entrance of air into any of the great cavities of the body, or into a large abscess or deep wound, produces a most serious disturbance, which always greatly retards the healing process, and in many instances produces a fatal result. This is what makes the essential difference between a "simple" and a "compound" fracture of a leg or arm; the union of the broken bone, if properly "set," usually taking place rapidly and without any general disorder, when its clothing of soft tissues remains unbroken; whilst the protrusion of the broken end of the bone through the skin, enables air to gain access to the depths of the wound, the walls of which, instead of closing-together by simple adhesion, become the subject of inflammatory changes that are accompanied with great constitutional disorder—not only greatly retarding the union of the bone, but often rendering it necessary (in old times) to sacrifice the limb in order to save life. But by the "antiseptic" treatment—which consists in carefully covering the entrance to the wound with pledgets of lint dipped in carbolic acid, so as to poison the "germs"—their entrance into the wound is prevented, and the "compound" fracture is virtually converted into a "simple" one; prolonged suffering, valuable limbs, and numerous lives being thus saved. The surgeons who served on both sides in the Franco-German war, practised this system in the treatment of gun-shot wounds; and were, I believe, unanimous in their high appreciation of its benefits. And the great operation to which I have already referred (p. 506), mainly depends for its success upon the most scrupulous observance of the precautions dictated by "the science of germs."

Again, in the hands of Pasteur and other scientific investigators, this "germ" doctrine is now being applied to the

prevention or mitigation of various "animal plagues," which, to say nothing of material interests, inflict an enormous amount of suffering on their victims, and even extend themselves to man.\* One would have thought that such investigations would have approved themselves to all who love dumb beasts, and are sorry to think that the rearing of them for Man's uses should subject vast numbers of them to painful and fatal maladies. But the contrary is the case. The same parties who have accused the Medical Profession in this country of recklessly sacrificing "hecatombs" of animals, for the sake of obtaining scientific results that may be possibly beneficial to a single man, have shown themselves equally opposed to such an investigation into the causes and mode of prevention of these "plagues," as, based on the analogy of Vaccination, held out to the scientific mind a well-grounded prospect of a vast saving of Animal life and suffering.

How unjust has been the clamour raised against those, who, in despite of it, have been patiently, skilfully, and perseveringly following out the "scientific" inquiries wisely permitted by the Legislature, may be judged of by the following sketch of a single series, that may be taken as typical of the whole:—

A disease extensively prevails among Sheep and Cattle, alike in this country and on the Continent, which is known as

\* The very painful and often fatal malady known at Bradford as the "wool-sorter's disease," has been distinctly traced to the "germs" introduced by the handling of the wool of sheep infected with "splenic fever." To me it seems as if the life and health of a Man, and the welfare of the wife and family presumably dependent upon him, are considerations of so much higher account than the life and health of a Sheep, as to justify the *artificial* communication of a disease to the animal (liable as it is at any time to take the disease *naturally*), which is required for the scientific study of its conditions. But as this view does not approve itself to many persons whose ethical judgment I respect, I shall rest my case simply on the protection from suffering and death, which has now been obtained for untold *myriads* of Animals by the sacrifice of a few dozens of their kind.

"splenic fever." It is not only very fatal, but often produces carbuncles, which become the sources of acute suffering; in its worst form, however, which is known in France as "charbon," killing the animals in a few hours by severe prostration. There is a great probability, also, of its identity with the "Loodiana fever," which is very destructive to Horses in India. Now, though the blood of animals affected with this disease has been found to be loaded with the microscopic plant termed the *bacillus anthracis*, it would not hence necessarily follow that the presence of this organism in the circulating current is the cause of the disease; and the first set of experiments was directed to the testing of this point. The "germs" separated from the blood were "cultivated" out of the living body, in extract of meat or some other solution favourable to their growth and multiplication; and the products of this cultivation being then introduced by inoculation into the bodies of healthy animals, the characteristic disease was reproduced.

The dependence of the "splenic fever" upon the presence of the *bacilli* having been thus established, the next point to be determined was their ordinary mode of conveyance. Of course, the disease-germs may be readily transmitted from one animal to another; but what is the explanation of the fact that the disease often breaks out severely in uninfected districts? Further investigation showed that "brewers' grains" afford an exceedingly fertile soil for the growth and multiplication of the *bacillus*; and as these grains are largely used for feeding cattle, the extension of the disease into new localities is readily accounted for. But again, it has been recently established, by the experiments of Dr. Buchner, of Munich, that what has been known as the "hay *bacillus*," though previously considered innocuous, may, under certain conditions, acquire the poisonous character of the *bacillus anthracis*; affecting animals that feed upon the hay infected by it, with the same disease.

The mode in which this comes to pass, has been detected by the wonderful sagacity of Pasteur; who, finding that the disease often breaks out in flocks that are feeding in pastures beneath which the bodies of animals that have themselves died of it (even many years previously) were buried, conceived the idea that the poison is brought to the surface by *earth-worms*. These, after having fed on the diseased carcasses, rise through the pores and fissures of the soil to the surface, collect round the roots of plants, are swallowed by the animals, and thus communicate to

them the deadly virus. M. Pasteur has collected these worms, separated the virus they contain, subjected it to "cultivation," and thus given it a graduated virulence, extending from the most harmless to the most severe,—its properties being tested by the communication of the disease to rabbits and guinea-pigs, so as to convince the most sceptical of the truth of his view.

All these experiments, however, only point to the measures most likely to prevent or limit the propagation of the disease. I have now to refer to another series, which have led to still more important results, first describing those of which I am personally cognisant:—

In March, 1878, an experiment was made at the Brown Institution, at the suggestion of Dr. Burdon Sanderson, of inoculating a calf with the blood of a guinea-pig which had died of splenic fever. The result was that the calf took the disease, but in a mild form, and recovered from it; and a similar fact was observed in two heifers treated in the same way. This line of inquiry has been since followed up by Dr. Sanderson's successor at the Brown Institution, Dr. Greenfield, with a view of ascertaining whether the milder form of the disease in cattle, resulting from inoculation with the blood of rodents affected with it, confers upon the cattle immunity from the complaint in its fatal form; or, to use M. Pasteur's expression, *whether the cattle have been vaccinated with reference to anthrax*. This question has been answered in the affirmative by Dr. Greenfield's further inquiries: a bovine animal, inoculated several months ago with virus from a rodent, having proved itself, on repeated inoculations, entirely incapable of contracting splenic fever, remaining free from either constitutional or local manifestations of it.

The veteran M. Pasteur, who has himself been working out the same question, has, only a few days since, given a public demonstration of his results; which, presuming the account given of it by the *Times* correspondent (June 3) to be trustworthy, ought to satisfy the most sceptical:—

M. Pasteur, one of the scientific glories of France, made to-day experiments in connection with his latest researches on that malady dreaded by agriculturists, called "charbon," a sickness

which rages more especially among sheep, the mortality of which produced by it is estimated in France at several million francs a year. Having shown how the virus might be modified by "cultivation," he conceived the idea that by inoculating animals with the modified virus, they might be protected from "charbon." This theory, conceived in the laboratory, discussed before the Academy of Medicine, and warmly combated, required to be tested by practical experiments; and the Agricultural Society of Melun requested M. Pasteur to make them in the Department of Seine-et-Marne. On the 5th of May, M. Rossignol's farm and 60 sheep were placed at M. Pasteur's disposal. Ten of these sheep were left untouched, in order that they might later on serve for comparison. Of the remaining 50, 25 were marked with a hole in their ears, and were inoculated with the mild virus, the first time on the 5th of May, and the second on the 17th. On the 31st of May none of the inoculated sheep had lost fat, or gaiety, or appetite. On the 31st of May the 50 sheep were taken without distinction, and inoculated with the strongest virus. M. Pasteur predicted that to-day the 25 sheep not previously inoculated would be dead, and that the previously inoculated animals would show no symptoms of sickness. To-day, at half-past one, a number of spectators, among whom were M. de la Rochette, President of the Agricultural Society of Melun; M. Patinot, Prefect of the Department; M. Tisserand, Director of Agricultural Matters at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce; and several cavalry officers and veterinary surgeons, came together to witness the result. Things turned out as M. Pasteur had foretold. At two o'clock 23 of the sheep which had not been inoculated were dead. At three o'clock died the 24th, and the 25th an hour later. The 25 previously inoculated animals were sound, and frolicked and gave signs of perfect health. Only one of them was yesterday feverish, and the fever disappeared to-day; it was caused by the animal having designedly been inoculated with too strong a dose of the virus; at three it had gone, and the sheep was eating again. The 25 carcasses have been buried in a fixed spot, and on the infected grass which will grow over it experiments are to be made with the inoculated and non-inoculated sheep. *But the result is already certain; and the Agricultural public now know that an infallible preventive exists against the disease in question.* This preventive is neither costly nor difficult; for a single man can inoculate 1,000 sheep in a day.

"I need hardly remark (said Prof. Lister, in his address to the

Pathological Section of the British Medical Association, at its meeting at Cambridge last year) on the surpassing importance of researches such as these. No one can say but that, if the British Medical Association should meet again at Cambridge ten years hence, some one may be able to record the discovery of the appropriate 'vaccine' for measles, scarlet fever,\* and other acute specific diseases of the human subject. But even should nothing more be effected than what seems to be already on the point of attainment—the means of securing poultry from death by fowl-cholera, and cattle from the terribly destructive splenic fever—it must be admitted that we have an instance of a most valuable result from the much-reviled 'vivisection.'

Whether Prof. Lister's conclusion be or be not accepted by your unprejudiced readers, I think that such will at any rate give those who uphold and act upon it, the credit of *believing* in the benefits, of which their full *knowledge* of the subject gives them the right to form a judgment. And if they were to turn round upon those, who, like your contributor, in utter ignorance of the whole subject, meet a well-ascertained "scientific" doctrine with a flippant sneer, and who hold up to public reprobation such as are conscientiously working-out its beneficent applications, I cannot see that they would not be fully justified in doing so.

The *second* of your contributor's charges is that "The pecuniary interests of the Profession continually override the interests of patients." To discuss this in any detail would be to admit that there is even a semblance of truth in the misrepresentations of which your contributor has (no doubt unintentionally) been guilty. As it was pithily said of Miss Martineau's credulity in regard to Mesmerism, &c., that "she would believe anything that is not in the Bible," so I think I have made it clear that your contributor

\* This disease affords no trivial contribution to the general mortality. In the Registrar-General's Report for 1875, I find that while the deaths from Small-pox in that year were under a thousand, those from Scarlatina exceeded twenty thousand.

has a similar proclivity to accept anything that brings "doctors" into discredit. That there may be a few men in the Profession who think more of their fees than of the real welfare of their patients, may possibly be true; but that this is a charge that can be fairly made against the general mass of the Profession, I most unequivocally deny. For every *real* case your contributor could adduce, in which a doctor has continued an unnecessary attendance for the sake of his fees, I could tell of twenty doctors who have either discontinued an attendance when they found that their "honest" recommendations were not acted on, or have been "morally" kicked out of the house for too plainly telling a doting mother that her darling daughter was simply "shamming." And I would ask your readers to compare the *fancy* portraits drawn by your contributor, with the following *genuine* sketch, for whose fidelity I can personally vouch.

When I first knew Sir James Simpson, he was living upon £50 a-year, and working twelve or fifteen hours a day in the acquirement of that vast store of professional knowledge, which would have distinguished him in whatever department he might select as his field of practice. Of his subsequent success, of the world-wide reputation he gained, and of the enormous fees he received as the spontaneous expressions of the gratitude of his patients, everybody has heard. Yet in the fullest tide of his professional work, Simpson would put aside the established order of his lucrative consultations, to receive some poor governess, or minister's wife from the country, whose time he knew to be precious, and from whom he would never take a fee. He would leave the most aristocratic of his patients (provided he could do so without *risk*—of the *offence* he might give he never thought for a moment), if word was brought from his hospital that the condition of any patient there urgently called for his attendance. And



when he was engaged in the persevering search for the most effectual and safe Anæsthetic, Simpson made *himself* the subject of his experiments, and was two or three times in imminent danger of death—once, indeed, being believed by the Medical friends who were with him to have actually breathed his last.\*

In my capacity of Editor of what was, thirty years ago, the leading Medical Review, I was very desirous to form my own opinion on the use of chloroform in parturition, as administered by Simpson himself; the Profession in London being then unfavourable to the practice. He most readily fell into my views, renewed his invitation to the home in which our early friendship made me ever cordially received, and arranged that as soon as a suitable case should occur in the Lying-in Hospital, we should see through its whole course together. The summons came one evening, when Simpson had just returned home after a long and toilsome day's work; and much as he needed rest, he never thought of taking it, but, as soon as he had satisfied his hunger, took me down to the hospital, where he remained with me the whole night, without even seeking the intermittent repose he might have taken,—his desire being that I should thoroughly learn from himself the principles which he regarded as essential to the safe administration of the "pain-killer."

His fellow-townsmen did themselves honour in erecting to Simpson's memory the statue which sits conspicuous in one of the best localities of their beautiful city. But your "esteemed contributor" has forgotten to single out either Alison or Simpson as exceptions to the wholesale condemnation passed on "medical men;" and has left it for me to point out, that if the Profession is to be discredited by the

\* He had at that time a man-servant who was a great "character," and of whom it is related that, on looking into the room where his master was lying apparently dead, he exclaimed, "D—d fool! d—d fool! Killed himself for other people!"

*ill-doing* of some of its members, it should surely be allowed the benefit of the *well-doing* of others. And since, as I have shown, there is at least one matter in regard to which the Profession at large can clearly claim credit for the disinterested philanthropy of its action—namely, its earnest and persistent advocacy of those measures for the *prevention* of disease, suffering, and death, which, if fully carried out, would enormously diminish the need of “doctors,” and most seriously lessen their receipts,—I ask if it be not both fair and charitable, that, until the contrary shall be proved upon better testimony than that of your contributor, it should retain the high place it has hitherto enjoyed, as regards this point, in public estimation.

I now pass on to the *third* count,—“That a trades-unionism exists in the Profession, which militates against the proper performance of the duties of medical men in various public and private offices.” Now I do not for the moment deny that there is “class-feeling” in the Profession, which may, in a certain sense, be called “trades-unionism;” and I consider it a very good thing, both for the Profession and the Public, that it is so. But that this feeling, whilst it tends to maintain harmony among the members of the Profession, acts in any way to the injury of the Public, I most explicitly deny.—If I can fully disprove the two strongest cases of its action adduced by your contributor, it will not be necessary to go into others.

It is undoubtedly the “common law” of the Profession, that a physician or surgeon called into consultation should not needlessly expose any mistake which he may consider the practitioner previously in charge of the case to have committed. He is expected, instead of saying brusquely to the patient or his friends that “the previous treatment has been all wrong,” to inform them that “he thinks that the previous treatment has been carried far enough, and

that the time is now come for a change,"—which he may say without the smallest sacrifice of honesty. I am not ashamed to say that in my younger days I myself benefited by the observance of this kindly rule; whilst, on the other hand, I have known many instances of the mischievous consequences of departing from it. But what is the operation of this rule as represented by your contributor? He describes (p. 317) a "smooth-spoken" Dr. A. (a London physician called into consultation with a country Dr. B.) as *letting the patient die rather than alter treatment which he knows to be a blunder*, as telling what is *in the sight of God a cruel and shameful lie*, "taking money from the victim of his falsehood, betraying the trust of simple and loving hearts, and leaving them to break, *when with a word he might have done what in him lay to save their earthly treasure.*" And your contributor goes much further; for he asserts this to be not only the frequent, but the universal system in the Profession. "Who among the readers of this paper can recall any case when they [the doctors] have acted otherwise and spoken the truth?"—except (he is considerate enough to add) when it was not worth their while to observe the rule.

I do not hesitate to affirm that if, for the sake of covering Dr. B.'s blunder, Dr. A. were to abstain from doing his very best for his patient's welfare, he would deserve, and would incur (if the case became known), the indignant reprobation of every professional tribunal. And, further, if the charge here brought against the Profession at large, were brought against any individual member of it, he would very properly appeal to public justice by bringing an action for libel against its utterer.

I now pass on to a most important Public duty, which, it is asserted, cannot be properly performed by the Profession by reason of its "trades-unionism."

"If the reader," says your contributor (p. 320), "bear in

mind the fact that between 1841 and 1871 the doctors received £1,647,000 out of the rates for Vaccination, independently of private practice, the *zealotry* and *cruelty* wherewith this medical 'rite' is upheld, will scarcely escape the suspicion of the before-named 'unconscious bias produced by pecuniary interest.' Baptism was never urged by those who believed that it could save souls from perdition, with such *relentlessness* as vaccination is insisted upon by men who assume that it can save bodies from small-pox." And in the appended note it is added:—"If vaccination be the worst thing possible, *we shall never get at the truth in the face of the interests which support it*;"—that is to say, the honourable, high-minded men, whom even your contributor admits that the Profession contains, are either so blinded by "class-interests" that they cannot *see* the truth, or are so dishonest that they will not *spea*k it.

Truly a grave charge; and upon what evidence? That of persons who put forth such doctrines as the following, which I quote, as their most recent "deliverance," from the last number (June) of "The National Anti-Compulsory Vaccination Reporter":—

WHAT IS SMALL-POX? It is a *natural crisis* common to all of us, more or less—in short, an effort of nature to throw off impurities. *It is not a dangerous disease, and requires only simple cooling treatment.* Time will show that the fear excited in the public mind about small-pox is quite uncalled for. Doctors seem safe about not taking the complaint. Can they explain the cause of the immunity? *The fact is, it is not infectious.*—J. M.

Confining my reply on this subject to *matters of public notoriety*, which do not rest upon individual testimony, but may be verified by any one who chooses to make the requisite inquiry, I shall first meet the charge of "pecuniary interest."

In the years 1828—1840, during which I was myself

either a Pupil or a Practitioner, not one farthing was paid out of the rates for Vaccination, and very little in ordinary "general practice;" the vaccination of the infant being very commonly considered (as I understand that it still is) to be part of the duty covered by the "midwifery-fee." Yet we not only *then* "insisted," with the zeal of honest and disinterested conviction, upon the performance of this "rite," just as earnestly as we *now* do, but often paid for it out of our own pockets,—giving shillings and half-crowns to induce mothers to bring their children, and incurring what to some of us was no inconsiderable expense in keeping up "stations" for its performance.

The utmost sum ever paid out of the rates as a Vaccination-fee is *half-a-crown*; in many cases it is less. The amount stated by your contributor—which, being spread over *thirty years*, amounts to no more than £54,900 *per annum*—must represent therefore *at least thirteen millions* of Vaccinations. Each operation requires a certain amount of professional skill in its performance, with care in the selection of the subject from which the vaccine is taken; and even if the Vaccinations were all performed at stated times upon infants brought to the operator, the fee would be small in comparison with what is paid for any exercise of similar skill in other professions. But as parents will often *not* bring their children to be vaccinated, the doctor has *to go to them*,—a journey of miles, it may be, in a large Country union. Further, since Vaccination was made compulsory, it is the business of the Vaccinator to *search out*, from information supplied to him by the Registrar, *every child born in his district*; and he is accountable to his Board for having done so. Does the half-crown fee make it the "interest" of a hard-worked professional man to take this trouble?

It is my deliberate conviction, derived from a knowledge of the Medical Profession to which your contributor can lay no claim, that those who practise it are banded together

in this matter, not by the ignoble greed of half-crowns, but by an honest pride in feeling their common cause to be (as recently expressed by the high-minded Medical officer of a large Metropolitan union, who is just now fighting this battle with all his energy) "a noble one, a life-giving one, namely, the abolition and extinction of the pestilential disease, Small-pox."

The "truth about Vaccination," which is to be drawn from the Returns published by the Registrar-General,\* the Asylums Board, and other responsible Officials, stands as follows :—

1. That in those 12 years *before* the Compulsory Vaccination Act of 1854, in which the deaths from Small-pox were separately recorded in the Registrar-General's Reports, the *average* annual mortality from that disease was 420 per million living. (The average death-rate from Small-pox—be it observed—was estimated, a century ago, at 3,000 per million living.)

2. That the *average* annual mortality in the 25 years of compulsory Vaccination, including the two epidemics of 1870—2 and 1876—8, has been  $208\frac{1}{2}$  per million living; that is, *less than one-half* the average of the twelve previous years.

3. That in many localities (whether urban or rural) in which Vaccination has been efficiently carried out, Small-pox has not appeared for many years.

4. That its "epidemic" visitations have been most severe, where there is a large unvaccinated *residuum*, and where Re-vaccination has not been systematically carried out.

This is especially the case in the Metropolis; where (1), owing to the migratory habits of a certain section of the population, a certain number of children even now escape vaccination altogether; while (2) there is a considerable mass of adults who

\* As your contributor himself uses the Registrar-General's Reports to make out his own case, he may be presumed to accept them as trustworthy.

were not vaccinated before 1854; and (3) a great number who have never been re-vaccinated. An examination of the *ages* of the London small-pox patients clearly shows that the disease now *chiefly* prevails among *adults* and *middle-aged* persons; and that this is the explanation of the exceptionally high rate of mortality among the unvaccinated.

5. That, in the recent epidemics, the death-rate among those set down as "vaccinated," is only *one-fifth* that of the unvaccinated—namely, 8·8 per cent., as against 44·4 per cent.

The number of deaths among the *vaccinated* and the *unvaccinated* portions of the Metropolitan population, in each of the two recent epidemics, has been about 5,000 of either class. But as, according to the estimate of the Registrar-General, the number of Vaccinated persons in the Metropolis is *nineteen times* greater than that of the Unvaccinated, if the former had suffered at the same rate as the latter, there would have been 95,000 deaths among them, instead of the actual 5,000.

6. That, according to the accurately-recorded experience of Mr. Marson (for forty-one years the Resident Medical Officer of the old Small-pox Hospital), the general death-rate of 8·8 per cent. in the Asylums Board Hospitals among the reputedly vaccinated, represents a *range* of mortality from less than 1 per cent. among those whose arm-marks show evidence of *thorough* vaccination, to 10 per cent. among those whose arm-marks were very defective, and to more than 20 per cent. among those who only *said* that they had been vaccinated.

7. That the forty-one years' experience of Mr. Marson at the Small-pox Hospital, and the recent experience of the Metropolitan Asylums Board, conclusively demonstrate the *almost absolute immunity* from Small-pox enjoyed by re-vaccinated Nurses and Attendants (now to be reckoned by the thousand), who have been *exposed to its infection in its severest form*. Further, among the very small number of Small-pox Patients who had undergone efficient re-vaccination, *no death has been recorded*.

These last two statements, with which I can scarcely suppose your contributor to have been acquainted, completely dispose of the sneer in which he indulges (p. 321, note), as to the faith of the Profession in the efficacy of *thorough* vaccination and re-vaccination.

8. As to the other article of faith at which your contributor fires his parting shot, I have only to say that it rested ten years ago upon evidence which would *in any other case* have been accepted as conclusive, not of the *impossibility*, but of the *extremest improbability*, of the occurrence referred to. Is your contributor aware that a part of that evidence was that of a Medical practitioner (personally known to me), who had *vaccinated himself six times* with lymph taken from an infected child? Even now the number of known cases of the kind referred to may be counted by *tens*, although at least *sixteen millions* of vaccinations have been performed since vaccination was made compulsory. I believe that even this minute risk would be excluded by calf-vaccination.

If the question of the protective power of Vaccination could be calmly discussed as one of pure Science—like the action of *bacteria* in producing putrefaction—before any unprejudiced scientific tribunal, I do not hesitate to affirm that, instead of being regarded as the “assumption” your contributor affirms it to be, this protection would be accepted as being as fully proved, as that which the slight disorder produced in Sheep by “vaccination” with the “cultivated” *bacillus anthracis*, has been demonstrated, by the public experiments of Pasteur (p. 516), to afford against the deadly “charbon-poison.”

But so long as “sensational” writers, like your contributor,—who bring up the subject merely as one “count” in their bill of indictment against the “doctors,”—who take no trouble to acquaint themselves with the *broad facts* which testify *in favour* of Vaccination, but accept without question every trumpety story told *against* it,—who assert



in the teeth of obvious evidence that the Medical Profession, in promoting it, is animated only by "self-interest," "zealotry," "cruelty," and "relentlessness,"—who accuse "the doctors who register deaths, the doctors who profit by compulsory vaccination, and the coroners who direct the juries in cases of alleged death from vaccination" (I wonder he did not add, the undertakers who profit by the burials), of being banded together by "trades-unionism,"—and who charge Medical men with being "ready to persecute anti-vaccinators to the death,"—continue thus to inflame the public mind, and are allowed to use for this purpose the pages of a respectable Review, so long it *will* be impossible to enforce this "protection" with the completeness required for the utter extermination of the foul pest, against which the Medical Profession (which *knows* its virulence) will never cease to battle—fees or no fees—so long as it holds its ground among us.

The *fourth* count of your contributor's indictment is that "the Profession has proved doubly treacherous to women:" one of the two grounds specified being the Contagious Diseases Act, "the memory of which will make the hearts of all women burn with indignation against the Profession which first projected and then dishonoured itself by carrying into effect such odious legislation;" while the other is "the effort to keep ladies out of the lucrative profession of physicians, and crowd them into the ill-paid one of nurses." Of the *first* point I have already said (p. 495) as much as is editorially thought fitting for these pages. In regard to the *second*, I am quite ready to admit with regret that a certain amount of the "trades-union" spirit has shown itself; but I could, if it were needful, give many excuses for it. I have myself advocated and promoted the admission of Women to the Profession, considering them justly entitled to claim it. But I none the less believe, as a Physiologist, that only

Women of *asexual* temperament—in whom the intellect (as in Men) dominates the judgment, and keeps under that emotional part of the nature which specially fits women for their part in family and social life—will prove qualified for learning and practising Medicine and Surgery. And as the Profession has only *shared* an opinion which was until quite recently (and, I believe, still is) very generally entertained by the Public, I cannot see how Medical men can be fairly charged with having “proved treacherous to women” in this matter.

I am glad to have now arrived at the *fifth* and last count of your contributor's indictment ; which is, “that the further increase of the power of the Profession holds out a serious threat to the personal liberties of all the lay members of the community.”

The “power of the Profession” over “the personal liberties of the lay members of the community,” is neither more nor less than that which the Legislature, in the interests of the Public, thinks proper to give it,—as in regard to compulsory vaccination. The cases specially adduced are the unjust detention of Lunatics in Private Asylums, and the proposal to isolate cases of Infectious disease.

In regard to the first, I have only to say that objectionable, on some accounts, as the system of Private Asylums may be, it affords to the wealthier class of patients many advantages which no Public Institution can provide ; and I could not adduce a better illustration of this, than what I have myself seen of the working of the admirable Establishment for Idiots and Imbeciles owned and carried-on by my friend Dr. Down (whom I am proud to rank as an old pupil of my own), as compared with the limited means he had of promoting the welfare of the same wealthy class of patients when he was Superintendent of Earlswood. A more perfect combination of thoughtful skill, devoted watchfulness,

and desire to profit (no matter at what cost) by any hopeful suggestion that can be made for the benefit or happiness of their patients,—a combination which can only proceed from Dr. and Mrs. Down's devoted love of their work,—I have nowhere witnessed. And if your contributor were to sneer that this "pays well," I should reply that it well deserves to be so paid.

But, in the second place, your contributor charges the Medical Profession with urging upon the public "the horrible proposal to compel parents, children, husbands, and wives to submit to be separated from their beloved ones in cases of infectious disease, and to send them to be treated at the discretion of a medical man." He appears to be unaware that the Legislature, *in the interests of the Public*, has already made provision for such separation, by the Infectious Diseases Act, which *requires* Sanitary officers to enforce it, wherever the surroundings of the patient are such as render him *dangerous to others*. The case was extremely well put in a recent "leader" in the *Daily News*:—

Every patient is a centre of infection, and the spread of the disease from such a centre can only be prevented by rigid isolation. This isolation cannot be accomplished in the houses of the poor. In a roomy dwelling, where a whole floor can be cut off from all direct connection with the rest of the house, Small-pox or Scarlet fever can usually be limited to the one member of the household originally attacked. A kind of quarantine is established. The patient is approached only by the nurse and the doctor; and precautions are taken to cut off all connection between the air of the infected rooms and that of other parts of the house. Where this can be done with something like scientific precision and completeness, there is scarcely any fear of the spread of the disease. The other members of the household may go their usual ways; and there is no need even to regard the house itself as an infected one. If the isolation is complete, and is continued long enough, the evil will be checked as effectually as the cattle plague is "stamped out" by the more ruthless

process. But such precautions can never be taken in a lodging-house, or a small and crowded tenement; and hence the need of ample provision for the removal of patients and their treatment in hospitals. Such removals are to the advantage of all who are concerned. The patient has better treatment, and consequently a greater chance of recovery; the other members of the household are relieved of constant anxiety and danger; and a centre of infection is taken away from among their neighbours.

I am not aware that the Profession has urged any such legal interference, in cases in which the patient can be effectually isolated at home. But supposing that such a recommendation *were* made, it would be clearly *against* its own pecuniary interests; for the spread of infectious disease among the members of families in which it has made its appearance, would bring "business" to their respective medical attendants. But your contributor, unable to give any "doctor" credit for the single-minded desire of preventing disease and death, characterises the recommendation as "atrocious;" preferring that "*pestilence should rage through the land, and that we should die of the 'visitation of God,'*"—as if that can be rightly called a 'visitation of God,' which Man can foresee and avert.

Now, I am not advocating this proposal; it is one on which the Public must and will form its own decision; and the circumstances of each individual case vary so much, that it may be found impossible to decide positively where the line of duty is to be drawn. Some of those, for example, who recollect what a valuable life was sacrificed two years ago by "a mother's kiss," may think it, at any rate, an arguable question, whether the strong maternal affection which prompted the act might not have been justifiably controlled in its manifestation, by the consideration of its possible consequences to the illustrious family whom it has deprived of such a wife, mother, daughter, and sister as is not often found in any station of life.

However coldly prudential this view may seem to your contributor and such as feel with him, I would ask even them whether they have no word of approval for the heroism shown in the following case, which fell, during the same epidemic, within my personal knowledge :—

An English widow lady had long resided in the capital of one of the German States, with an only daughter; the two had come to be "all in all" to one another; the mother had been the subject of several most distressing attacks of illness, in which she had been most tenderly nursed by her child, whose affectionate sympathy and thoughtful ministrations had throughout proved her mainstay; and the two were entrusted with the care of three young ladies sent to them from England. One evening, the whole party went for a drive and walk in the country neighbourhood of their residence, and passed a cottage, from the door of which the English mother, who happened to be nearer to it than the rest, perceived a very offensive smell to issue. Next day she was attacked with *Diphtheria* in its severest form. As soon as she was assured by her medical attendant of the nature of her malady, she at once decided upon placing herself in an Institution of the kind referred to, where she would be nursed by nuns whose language she could not speak, and who could not understand a word of hers; where her daughter would only be allowed to look-in upon her from the door of her chamber once a day; and where she had to pass through a crisis of twenty-four hours' most imminent danger—supported in her loneliness by a feeling of thankfulness that she could be both skilfully and kindly cared for, without exposing either the daughter she most tenderly loved, or the daughters of other parents entrusted to her charge, or any of the circle of attached friends who would have been ready to take upon themselves the risk of attendance upon her, to the danger of infection.

I fearlessly ask whether the view which that woman took of her duty, or your contributor's denunciation of "the cruelty of this proposal to tear asunder the holiest ties in the hour when they ought to be closest drawn," most approves itself to the calm judgment of your readers. Quite accepting it as a truth that "cowardice is always

cruel," but having been brought up in the "class-feeling" that it is the doctor's business to do his utmost for saving and prolonging Human life, I cannot help thinking that the "cowardice" and "cruelty" lie with those *who will not consent to a sacrifice of their own feelings, to preserve others from suffering and death.\**

I have now concluded what has been to me a task so ungrateful, that nothing could have led me to undertake it save a strong sense of duty to the Profession which has been so grievously maligned, of duty to the Public which has been so grossly misled, and of duty to the *Review*, whose character for truth and fairness I earnestly desire to sustain. I trust that it will be felt by your readers, that in defending my Profession, I have not indulged in any overpraise of it; that in endeavouring to set it right with the Public, I have kept the best interests of the latter quite as fully in view as those of the body I have ventured to represent; and that in trying to serve the *Modern Review*, I have neither expressed nor implied anything, which can be fairly regarded as a departure from the sober dignity of tone which I am most anxious it should preserve.

WILLIAM B. CARPENTER.

\* There is a class of cases of an entirely different description, which has long been the despair of physicians specially skilled in the maladies of women, and of which a successful method of treatment, *based on such a complete separation of the patient from her previous surroundings* as your contributor would denounce as "atrocious," has been recently worked out by an American Physician, whose practice has been adopted with like success by Dr. W. S. Playfair. (See the *Lancet* for May 28th.)

## THE MORALITY OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION.

### II.

BY TWO OF THE PROFESSION.

**T**O the article which appeared in the last number of this *Review* upon this subject, the Editor appended a note, in which he expressed an opinion that the Medical Profession might benefit, as the clergy had done, by being subjected to public opinion and criticism. With this view we wholly concur, and we candidly confess, from a life-long, wide, and very varied experience of our Profession, with a knowledge of its motives and methods of working, which only such a personal experience can give, that there are many things in which improvement is necessary, and that many reforms are possible and desirable.

But we must point out that libel is not criticism, and misstatements cannot form a proper basis for the direction of public opinion.

We have read the article more than once, but one reading is enough to show that the writer is the victim of four distinct crazes, the resultant of which is an anti-medical delusion. We do not mean to say that the objects of these strong feelings are mistaken, for it so happens that in one of them our opponent has the most profound sympathy of both of us, and in another he has the hearty support of one. These sentiments are:—(1) Anti-vivisection ; (2) Anti-vaccination ; (3) Anti-Contagious Diseases Acts ; (4) Anti-men doctors, or perhaps, rather, pro-lady doctors.

Let us first clear away the ground of prejudice by saying that we both have the most hearty sympathy with lady doctors, that we have written, spoken publicly, and acted vigorously for very many years in support of women doctors, and that our names if published would prove this. We both entirely disapprove of vivisection save under the most stringent restrictions, and one of us would almost go for its total suppression. One of us is a strenuous advocate for the abolition of the Contagious Diseases Acts, and he is only prevented from lending his assistance (which, without egotism, it may be said, would be pretty effective) to those who are agitating in this direction, by the way in which the agitation is conducted, and by the misstatements by which it is sought to advance the movement. The agitators themselves are the most effective obstructives to their object. On the question of vaccination we may say that the position of both writers is such that they have no concern in it of a personal kind, as neither of them now practises it, and one of them has not done so for very many years. But, in the opinion of both, it is a question in which figures are conclusive, and so earnest is this conviction, that he who contributes the present sentence is actually in pain as he writes, from the formation of the pustule of re-vaccination.

We regret to have to say that, with very few exceptions, and to these we shall specially allude, the statements in the article are wholly inaccurate, and the inaccuracy is most palpable in cases where correct information could have been easily obtained. Thus he tells us that the College of Surgeons was incorporated in the reign of Queen Victoria, whereas this occurred in the reign of George III. He has a remarkable sentence to the effect that the "Army, the Navy, the Church, and the Bar stand much where they stood in the days of the Plantagenets." The Plantagenet race ended in 1399, at a time when there



was no Navy and no Bar, and certainly no Army as we now understand it. Since then the trifling incident of the Reformation has occurred in the history of the Church, a matter which our author seems to think of little moment, and therefore we need not allude to the influence of Methodism and many other movements. The Medical Profession alone has "importantly shifted its position," whatever these words may mean.

Upon all matters concerning the domestic life of the Medical Profession, our author is wholly wanting in information. He says, "The Medical Council, already far ahead of Convocation, has become a little Parliament, destined soon to dictate to the larger Senate of the kingdom, not only concerning its own interior affairs, but also concerning everything which can by possibility be represented as affecting the interests of public health." Such statements will make the members of the Medical Council stare should they ever see them. And still more surprised will the members of that Profession be, which is taxed for this Council's existence, and of which the majority regard the Council as the biggest sham in England, as nothing but the embodiment of wind-bag, and of no manner of use for either the public interest or the welfare of the Profession. If the Council concerned itself for one day in the year with matters concerning public health, some good might be done by it, but it does not.

Another equally inaccurate sentence follows the one we have just quoted: "As medical officers in parishes and unions, factory and prison surgeons, public vaccinators, medical officers of health, inspectors of nuisances, and very commonly coroners, the doctors, are daily assuming authority which, at first perhaps legitimate and beneficial, has a prevailing tendency to become meddling and despotic."

The picture of a parish surgeon ruling it despotically over a tame and submissive Board of Guardians is too impressive

for real life. Medical Officers of Health are meddling, truly, because it is the direction of the Government and their Sanitary Authority that they should be, and they are sharply reprimanded when they are not. Only the people who have bad drains and who spoil their neighbours' wells complain of this meddling. Finally, there is no such thing as a Medical Inspector of Nuisances.

Our critic further tells us that Sir Richard Cross succumbed to some hundred doctors, and turned "his Vivisection Bill from a measure to protect animals into one to protect physiologists." Not one item of his statement is correct, and the modern physiologist is not a doctor, but a Master of Arts of Oxford or Cambridge, and may therefore safely be left to look after himself.

Our critic even drags novel-writers into a false position when he asserts that "the heroines of at least half the novels of the last decade are represented as passionately adoring their doctors"—a statement which practised novel-readers tell us has in it not one particle of truth. Perhaps the gravest charge we have to make against the writer of this article is that he sneers at the classes from which most of the members of our Profession are drawn, "the secondary professional classes, or tradesmen, and in some cases (especially in Scotland), intelligent artisans." Such conditions, if they be opprobrious, apply, with equal force, to the legal profession, to the scholastic, to the clergy to a very large extent, and, probably, to the whole body of the Dissenting clergy. He tells us that the preparatory education in our Profession is cheaper than that for the others; but on going into the matter we find that it is, nowadays, higher than any by nearly 15 per cent.; and when we are told that the average income of the British doctor is £50 a-year higher than that of the British parson, we only say we wish it were true. Remembering the comfortable and rent-free rectories, we think of the scantily-furnished houses of the country

doctors, and we see that the statement is not true. We know that there is not a single living practitioner of medicine who makes the income of the Archbishop of Canterbury, or of the Bishop of London, or Winchester, or Durham; and no doctor ever made the fortune which hundreds of Chancery and other barristers are now in possession of, or are in process of acquiring. Some twelve baronetcies have been conferred upon the Profession during this century, but in every instance, save that of the late Sir James Simpson, they have been given for political or Court reasons, and not for service to science. If the hope of pecuniary or titular rewards is to influence young men in their choice of a profession, let them keep out of medicine. If any one has adopted it to whom its peculiar lines have no other attractions, his lot will be one of the most miserable that could befall him, and will end almost certainly in disappointment.

The author and other critics always forget one thing in speaking of bodies of their fellow-men. It is the simple fact that they are human, and are afflicted with all the defects of humanity. The present state of the Medical Profession, full of faults as it is, must be looked upon as the outcome of the present stage of human development. It is part and parcel of it, and cannot move faster, nor will it be permitted to move more slowly, than the waves of human progress. Just criticism will therefore do good, but misinformed invective, by hardening the skin and closing the ears of those against whom it is directed, will do nought but harm. Since the very dawn of civilisation, man has been constant in his efforts to allay his physical sufferings and to avoid their unknown causes, in the early stages of development by amulets and philtres, nowadays by science or exact knowledge. This science is not yet very far advanced, but what it has done is a perfect earnest of what it will do. Modern medicine is the embodiment of all that

science has yet placed at our disposal for the alleviation of human suffering. Chemistry produced chloroform and ether, and we have been able to abolish the pangs of child-bed and to save life by operations which were beyond the wildest dreams of imagination thirty years ago. Our critic is under the impression that no man of poetic temperament is likely to become a doctor, whereas our calling is full of themes for the highest culture of the divine art; and, to keep within our own days for our illustration, let us point to the verses of Andrew Wood, M'Gilchrist, M'Lagan, and Bradley, to the plates of Haden and the canvas of Henry Thompson, in proof of this. A writer who quotes Erasmus Darwin and Akenside as the only men who united the professions of the physician and the poet, must be singularly ignorant of the lives of English poets, and must ignore the names of Goldsmith and Keats, with others of less note. Even the ready-money payment which custom has fortunately provided for the consulting practitioner, does not escape this carping critic, who is oblivious of the fact that a huge proportion of our social miseries is due to the system of credit, from which none suffer more than the ordinary practitioners of medicine.

Eliminating from his sweeping condemnations the "ordinary English country practitioner," the author of this article vaguely proclaims "grave charges and suspicions against the fashionable physicians and surgeons of the great cities and health resorts," which we readily challenge him to specify. With an italicised *if*, and with singular and most audacious ingenuity, he hints that this limited body of men may, "with unparalleled facilities for the commission and concealment of crime," be guilty of murder, adultery, and seduction, illustrating his infamous insinuation by the names of Pritchard and La Pommeray, altogether oblivious of the fact that it was only by the honesty and painstaking skill of their professional brethren that these scoundrels

were brought to their well-merited scaffolds. Instead of showing any desire to condemn or conceal the crimes of the poisoners, because they were medical men, Penny and M'Lagan spent weeks in unravelling the evidence which hanged Pritchard; Christison and Taylor spared no pains to convict Palmer; and the very fact that a suspected poisoner is a doctor is one of the strong elements of the certainty of his conviction if guilty. In fact—and we speak from a knowledge of the science of toxicology—it is almost beyond the limits of human possibility that a medical poisoner can escape detection, so easily is suspicion aroused, so certain is the detection of the crime when suspected.

It is a very curious thing that our critic has not hit upon the crime which might be most readily adopted by members of our Profession, but which has never yet, to our knowledge, been brought home to them, or even been publicly laid to their charge. We mean the crime of intimidation and extortion of money. There is probably not a doctor in England who has not become the depository of information, of which he might easily make money by threats of exposure. Yet no instance of such an attempt has ever yet, so far as we know, come to light.

One case, indeed, of something like this was exposed and condignly punished some twelve years ago by the Medical Profession itself. It was a case over which the law could have had no hold; yet so keenly did the Profession feel the disgrace and the danger of the offence in question, that they took steps at once most unusual and most effectual to secure the punishment of the offender. They not only did not hide the sin or shield the sinner, but they constituted themselves at once the police, the judge, the jury, and the executioner.

Upon this same point the very serious charge is made against persons holding the responsible office of coroner, who happen to be medical men, that they may, for the sake of a

criminal member of their own profession, burke the inquiry, and direct their jury to find a verdict of "Misadventure." We have no affection for medical coroners, but has there ever been such a case? We know of none; and as all inquests are attended by representatives of the Press, and as all suspicious cases are inquired into by a magisterial court on behalf of the police, we venture to think that such a perversion of justice is simply impossible.

The next charge brought against our Profession is that they are "materialists and agnostics." We cannot profess to know what meaning is here attached to these terms, but what we do know is that nineteen out of twenty of all the members of our Profession are Conservative in politics and belong to the Church of England. In country districts it is almost impossible for a doctor to live if he does not possess these qualifications. In large towns some of them are orthodox Dissenters, and the few who dare to hold unorthodox views are men either of exceptional position, or of still more exceptional wealth and independence. The sentence in which we are told that we are "an order of men who, as a rule, reject and despise those ultimate faiths of the human heart in God and Duty and Immortality, which ennoble and purify mortal life," is as untrue as it is offensive. Assuming, further, that his statements are correct, the writer asserts that the doctor "will throw the pall of his silence and disbelief over the flickering flame of dying hope and prayer," thus painting a perfect fiend in the shape of the respectable and highly-respected family doctor, a picture of which we have never seen the original.

The next grave charge laid at our door is that we "study patients in order to acquire science." It is honourable to "study science in order to cure patients; but is it equally honourable to study patients in order to acquire science?" Was ever such a nonsensical question asked? Where are

the scientific facts of a disease, such as pneumonia, to be found save in the lungs attacked ? \*

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In this connection, however, there is a joint in the armour which the critic's lance has penetrated by accident, and not skilfully ; but we have no hesitation in laying bare the weak place, for reform in this matter is greatly needed, and is fortunately being rapidly effected. A story is told of "a pair of the most beautiful eyes being preserved by the refusal of the owner to allow one of the first oculists of the day to relieve her of one of them." This story, we say at once, must be based on a mistake of some kind. No oculist, nor any one pretending to the name, could or would propose to remove an eye which was not either diseased or damaged beyond remedy, and then there could not be "a pair of most beautiful eyes." But the allusion is quite enough for our purpose, and will serve for a peg on which to hang our complaint and appeal for reform. The critic tells us that "patients are sacrificed on the anvil of manipulative skill ;" and this is true, though not quite in the way he suggests.

The whole aspect of our social life has been altered to an immeasurable extent by the introduction of railway travelling. It has altered everything, and, amongst other things, it is revolutionising medical and surgical practice. Let us take the small cathedral city of Bishopston, now little more than an insignificant village in the neighbourhood of Ham-merton, a huge modern town of nearly half a million people. Forty years ago, Bishopston possessed the only consulting practitioners of the whole district, and to them all difficulties in medical and surgical art were referred. The same man was asked for a prognosis in a case of bad pneumonia, was called in to a difficult midwifery case, and had to undertake an operation for cataract. He could not by any possibility

\* We have omitted such passages in the present article as are covered by the article preceding.—[Ed.]

do all these things well, but he did them as well as he could, and there was nobody at hand to do them better. If, indeed, the Bishop were ill, or wanted an operation on his eye, he could fetch a physician from London, or he could go up to a metropolitan oculist. But the farmer had to trust to the same man for everything. But now Hammerton has its specialists and its special hospitals for the poor. It has its pure physicians, its obstetric practitioners, and its oculists. Yet there still linger in the minds of a great number of medical practitioners the traditions of the past, to the effect that a qualified practitioner can do everything equally well ; and we hear of men essaying operations for cataracts, &c., who can by no possibility expect to perform more than six or ten such operations in their lives. This we unhesitatingly denounce as "sacrificing patients on the anvil of manipulative skill." Every patient with cataract, or with any other disease which the division of medical labour has elevated into a special field of practice, is entitled, however poor, to the highest skill which his case can command ; and a general practitioner has no more right to attempt to extract a cataract, or remove an ovarian tumour, than he has to assume the command of an ironclad. The resistance to this important public interest, which still lingers, is one of the factors which is sure, if persisted in, to lead to a sapping of public confidence in the Medical Profession.

Another hole in the armour, we have to confess, has been reached by our critic in his allusion to the recommendations of "useless and noxious nostrums one after another," and the adoption "every year of some new and costly *fad* by all the lights of the Profession." The words of the quotation are too strong, of course ; but there is far too much truth in them, we regret to say. The wine merchant and the soda-water maker, and countless others, have discovered the commercial value of eminent medical names ; and their owners, we fear, are not above being alive to their value as



well. It is a disgrace to our Profession that men are to be found capable of such acts of thoughtlessness (or of purchased mendacity), and if we can influence public opinion at all, we say, Avoid the man, and despise him, who gives a testimonial to a commercial article.

Upon the question of new drugs we would speak even more strongly. No sooner is anything announced than every one rushes to try it. No judicious and well-conducted experiments are made, but a set of higgledy-piggledy observations are published—as “Therapeutical Notes”—from which all failures are carefully eliminated.

The most terrible instance of this infatuation, perhaps, was Chloral—a drug which has done a thousandfold more harm than good, and which has slain its thousands. The moment it was announced it rushed into universal use, and did universal mischief. Its trial ought to have been limited to the hands of a few of the most competent observers; its dangers would then have been speedily recognised, and hundreds—perhaps thousands—would have been saved. It is not the principle of experimentalism which is faulty, but the method, and chiefly the inconsiderate extension of the process.

The charge made against us of over-drugging our patients is hardly true now; it is a tradition of the past. It was, and where it exists still it is, not so much the fault of the doctors as of the patients. They do not believe in a man who does not give them plenty of “bottle-physic.” Just as a minister has to preach the theology which suits his congregation (if he is a *voluntary*), so a doctor must suit his *clientèle*. Homœopathy is curing this abuse. Another count, that we have “an unconscious bias produced by pecuniary interest,” and therefore do not strive to cure our patients, but try to keep them on our sick list, is simple nonsense. There is only one way to success in medical life, and that is to get one patient to send others. This can only

be done by curing the first, and doing it speedily. The public is constantly discussing its experience in this matter, and the public is by no means foolish about it either.

Upon the question of the treatment of lunatics we entirely agree with the writer of the article we are discussing. There ought to be no such things as private asylums. We do not know of any abuses of them in our own experience, but there have been grave abuses, and there should be no possibility of their recurrence. Every lunatic should be absolutely under the care of the State. Similarly, we agree that there should be no such officer as a medical coroner—in fact, it would be much better to abolish the office of coroner altogether, and carry on the work as it is done in Scotland, by the system of Procurators Fiscal. The office at present may be held by any one, there being no specific qualification of any kind. That there ever should have been a medical coroner has arisen from an altogether erroneous impression of the duties of the office, and this mistake is so deeply ingrained in the minds of the Medical Profession as to lead them into all kinds of blunders. The duty of the coroner is not to ascertain the *cause of death*, but to discover if in the conditions of the death there are any indications of some one having criminally contributed to it, and, if so, to present the guilty person before a Judge of Assize. The duties, so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, have been entirely superseded by the modern system of police; and therefore the coroner might quite well be dispensed with, were it not that the coroner's jury is very often a convenient medium for the expression of public opinion in an official and uncontrollable fashion. A private person cannot pronounce condemnation without risk of an action for libel, and yet its utterance is often of the greatest possible service. But the medical notion of a coroner's function is to discover scientifically the cause of death, and therefore it is that we so often hear of medical practitioners—especially young ones—ex-

pressing dissatisfaction at inquests not being held in many cases where they think they should be.

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The final count of this most unfair indictment concerns the question of medical consultation—a matter on which it is evident that the writer has no knowledge whatever. He imagines the great Dr. A., summoned to Cornwall to meet a country practitioner of respectable standing, pocketing a splendid fee, and returning, after having told the wife, soon to be a widow, a wretched lie to the effect “that everything has been done in the very best and wisest way possible, that the patient could not be in better hands than those of Dr. B.,” &c., &c.

Now it so happens that such consultations are rarely required by the friends until they are persuaded, either by their own observation or by the opinion of the attendant, that the case is hopeless. Then they rush for “further advice” when it is too late to be of any use. The question for the consulting physician then becomes solely one of prognosis and consolation. “Will the patient recover?” The very fact that the “further advice” has been called is in itself an indication that all hope is gone, and upon the case there is no room for difference of opinion. The consultant has been summoned for “the satisfaction of the friends.” Ill-natured people would have said after the death that “further advice should have been called,” and, if it had not been, somebody would have been blamed. The question, therefore, is not one for difference, but for concurrence only, ninety-nine times out of a hundred. The treatment of the case in the past is of course discussed, and here there may be abundant scope for difference of opinion between the two doctors. There probably is in every case. But the consultant can speak only of what he sees, not of what is past; and upon the latter he has, of course, far less right to speak than one who saw it. But suppose the consultant

has really good ground for finding fault with the treatment of the past, what good purpose would he serve by exposing the culprit?

In the first place he would ruin the poor country doctor, whose fault it may not have been. A country doctor has a limited range of experience. He may not have seen a case like that under discussion for many years, while the consultant may see such every week. The income of the former will probably amount to £300 a-year, and that of the latter to £3,000. If the country doctor were as specially experienced as the physician, his services would be equally valuable. The patient pays the first five shillings a visit, and the second fifty guineas. Is it reasonable to expect the same value for these two sums? The consultant, therefore, points out the mistakes of the country doctor privately, to save the latter from wholly undeserved ruin, but also for a stronger reason—to save the unavailing regrets of the surviving relatives. They would never forgive the country doctor, and they would never forgive themselves for having employed him, and for having delayed “further advice” till too late. The exposure of the mistake would, therefore, do no good to any one, but would bring misery to all concerned.

But suppose it were introduced as a new custom that such mistakes should be exposed, what would be the result? Consultations would cease altogether. It is absolutely impossible to expect a man passing his life in a country village in general practice to know the whole realm of medicine and surgery—to know every branch of it as well as each is known by special practitioners. The best practitioner is he who recognises this, and at once recommends a second special opinion early in the case. It is the ignorant and bumptious doctor only that pretends to know everything and resists a consultation. But suppose the honest man who recommends a consultation had to submit to a public correction by the expert, the inevitable consequence would be

that he would become dishonest, and would resist consultations as long and as often as he could. Further, there would inevitably be developed a tendency to quackery in the consultant, who, if he were human, could hardly resist the temptation to make capital at the cost of his less experienced brother. There is already a good deal too much of that in his class, and only the present rule could prevent its destructive increase. On this ground, again, consultations would speedily cease with the innovation. The public may quite depend upon it, that any difference of opinion in a medical consultation is best discussed in private, and that the person really to be distrusted is the general practitioner who never suggests consultations, or who resists them. He is a dishonest man, and probably very ignorant.

Then comes the last point. Is it a fact that there is any large number of cases in which there is good ground for the consultant finding fault with the practitioner whom he has to meet? One of the writers of this has been engaged for many years very largely in purely consultative practice. He has attended probably as many as ten thousand consultations, and the number of times in which he has seen reason to believe that the patient had suffered from culpable ignorance or carelessness could be reckoned on the fingers of one hand.

In conclusion, we believe that we have shown that our Profession is by no means so black as our hostile critic has painted it. That it is better than others we do not pretend, or that it is free from faults or from black sheep. We only plead that its faults are those of humanity, to be remedied only by fair dealing and kindly criticism, not by hostile prejudice. We fear that the effect of the article we have discussed may be to check the progress of those intra-professional reforms which we are sincerely anxious to promote.

## THE PLACE OF THE ISRAELITES IN HISTORY.\*

THE Israelites were the first historians who recognised the necessity of a philosophy of history.† Other nations, ancient and modern, were content with annals. The Hebrews alone demanded *histories*. The author of Judges ii. 11—22 gives us a succinct statement of his views of the connection and sequence of the events his book records which we cannot fail to regard as in the highest degree remarkable, inasmuch as it constitutes the first known sketch of a philosophy of history.

According to this author, the course of Israel's history during the period of the Judges followed a distinctly traceable law which raised the series of events out of the sphere of mere recorded succession into that of coherent and connected sequence. When Yahweh (Jehovah) had given his people deliverance and victory, they grew proud and self-satisfied, and no longer feeling the deep need of his succour, they ceased to lean upon him and cleave to him as they had done in their distress. Accordingly they turned aside to other gods, since there was no pressure upon them sufficiently strong to restrain their inherent levity of disposition. Then the jealous wrath of Yahweh was stirred, and since his people had deserted him he deserted them, and sold them into the hand of their enemies. But when their groanings rose to his ears, Yahweh pitied

\* The Old Testament in the Jewish Church. Twelve Lectures on Biblical Criticism. By W. Robertson Smith, M.A. Edinburgh. 1881.

† Compare Hooykaas *God in de geschiedenis*. Schiedam. 1870. Pp. 43, 44.

his oppressed children, and sent a hero to deliver them, and for a time his repentant people served him. But when the hero died, and when prosperity had again corrupted the people's hearts, all restraint was again removed, and the Israelites went after other gods, and waked the wrath of Yahweh anew.

That this deserves to be called a philosophy of history can hardly be denied. Given the supposed character of Yahweh on the one hand and of the Israelities on the other, the whole cycle of their faithlessness and his wrath, of their groanings and his relenting, of the consequent deliverance succeeded by the repeated relapse, seems naturally to follow.

No doubt the historian distorts his materials to make them fit into this scheme—in this, also, he is the prototype of philosophical historians !—but the essential point to note is that he cannot be content to record the mere succession of events without discovering in them an internal cohesion and causal connection in dependence upon a higher order of things.

The principle so distinctly formulated in this passage is frittered away into insignificance by such a historian as the Chronicler, but is transformed by the Prophets into a conception of unexampled scope and grandeur.

The philosophy of the historian of the Judges makes no provision for progress or development. There is no real change of heart in the people. Even their temporary repentance under oppression is left to be inferred rather than stated. And, on the other hand, Yahweh's chastisements and deliverances of his people are equally far from conducing to the realisation of any settled divine purpose to which all things are made subservient. There is oscillation without progress. The cycle of changes returns into itself and has no goal.

But according to the Prophets the succession, "sin, punishment, deliverance," is not constantly repeated, but

takes place once for all, and is accompanied by a genuine, a deep, and a permanent change of heart in the people, leading to the realisation of Yahweh's purpose with them. The whole history of Israel, up to the time of the particular Prophet who is speaking, is a history of ungrateful rebellion against Yahweh amid the gathering storm of his vengeance. That vengeance is near at hand, and when it falls obstinate sinners shall be crushed under the weight of Yahweh's wrath; but the remnant shall return, purified and repentant, into closer communion with him and the enjoyment of richer blessings. Nor shall this regeneration be for a time only. It will last for ever; and in this final state of reconciliation and blessedness all the events of history find their goal.

In this steady advance to the fulfilment of Yahweh's purpose room may likewise be found for the foreign nations to play an important though subordinate part. Thus the great Assyrian power is to Isaiah an instrument in the hand of Yahweh for the chastisement of his people, brandished by him as the axe is brandished by the woodman; and the series of events that culminated in the splendid exploits of Cyrus are regarded by the Prophet of the Return as strictly subordinate to the fulfilment of Yahweh's promises to his people.

This interweaving of the history of foreign nations into that of Israel, as though the fates of all other peoples were but minor and incidental circumstances in the development of Yahweh's plans for his chosen people, reaches its culminating point in the visions of Daniel, which, in their turn, became the type of the whole series of apocalyptic *résumés* of history.

No further development of the Hebrew Philosophy of History seemed possible; but at this point the new life of Christianity and the genius of Paul and the unknown author of the Epistle to the Hebrews transformed the whole con-



ception of the history of Israel and prepared the way for the Catholic "drama of redemption."

The prophetic idea had taken too strong a hold on the heart of the people to be destroyed by the mere logic of facts and the early Christians found in the life of their Master, and still more in the anticipated glories of his future reign, the fulfilment of the visions of the ancient prophets; while the Law, which to the mind of the Jew justified itself and was the supreme manifestation of God's will, found its explanation in the Christian scheme as a preparation or foreshadowing of the revelation in Jesus Christ.

Finally, the Catholic Church, giving greater prominence than Paul had given to the conception of man's disobedience and death in Adam, arrived at a scheme which was modelled closely upon the old prophetic idea of the history of Israel, but was so widened as to embrace the whole human race.

In place of the disobedience of Israel, we have the disobedience of "man;" instead of Yahweh's wrath with Israel, we have God's wrath with "man;" and instead of the deliverance of Israel by a hero or a Messiah, we have the redemption of the world by the incarnate Son of God. The history of Israel sinks into the position of a mere episode in this great drama; but it is an episode closely interwoven with the main development. And by the side of this transformed prophetic conception, the unexhausted strength of the apocalyptic view of history maintained its place, and served as the mould into which all post-Biblical history must be cast. The struggle of the Church militant against the powers of this world furnished the theme of profane history, whenever it rose into unity and cohesion of any kind; but as a rule profane history remained in the unorganic stage, and was no more than a collection of edifying (or unedifying) stories.

Thus the Hebrews have furnished the models upon which

the historical ideas of Europe have been founded ; for throughout the Middle Ages, and almost to our own day, the Fall and the Redemption, with the intervening preparation of the Patriarchs, preparation of the Law, and preparation of the Prophets, the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant, have been the only historical conceptions that have found their way to general acceptance. That is to say, they, and they alone, have served to give unity and cohesion to the course of human events, and have offered men the means of bringing their own lives into intelligible connection with the history of the world.

But in widening the scope of the Hebrew ideas, the Christian theologians have raised them completely out of the sphere of human motives. The succession of events, as conceived by the historian of the Judges, and even by the Prophets, was conditioned, partly by the nature of man, and a series of intelligible human motives came constantly into play, contributing to the result. But the Christian scheme represents the gradual unfolding of God's purpose, not through, but in spite of, corrupted human nature. After Adam's sin, human nature became incapable of good, and the preparation for the coming redemption could not be made by the gradual development of the powers or training of the affections of man. The chosen instruments of the divine will, therefore, must be taken out of their surroundings and inspired from without, so as to speak of things they had no human means of knowing, and to found institutions the significance of which could not appear for centuries. To show in any case that a law or a prophecy was the natural outcome of human conditions would be to show that it was not divine, for humanity, as such, was for the time abandoned by God, and his special grace flowed only through special channels, which produced nothing of themselves, and only conveyed what was poured by God into them.

"On ne détruit que ce qu'on remplace," said the late Emperor of the French ; and the saying was never more strikingly illustrated than on the field of Biblical criticism.

The theory of the Old Testament as an inspired preparation for the New Testament, containing divine and not human utterances, crumbles to dust at the first touch of criticism. It has been pulverised, but, to the minds of most men, it does not appear to have been replaced—and, consequently, it stands.

We read the Gospels and the Epistles, and we find that the words of the Prophets and Psalmists are so strangely distorted and perverted in order to force them into connection with the life of Jesus and the fates of the early Church, that the witnesses called in to confirm the message only introduce confusion and perplexity. We turn to the Prophets, and find that they do not anticipate or foretell what happened ; that they distinctly foretell, and obviously anticipate, what did not, and now cannot, happen. We turn to the Psalms that are supposed most clearly to foreshadow the advent of the Prince of Peace, and we find them burning with the fierce passions of war, or even ringing with the wild laugh of an exultant deity, mocking the impotent attempts of his foes ! We look to the laws, and find a half-digested mass of local and traditional customs, often inconsistent with each other ; we look to the histories and find flat contradictions ; and throughout the whole we find the absolutely unmistakable evidences and manifestations of human ignorance, passion, and delusion.

No doubt we also find many precious truths enshrined in language of unsurpassed sublimity or simplicity, but if we are to say that these are inspired and the others not, we must be told what is the test of inspiration. No objective test can be given, and if the test is subjective, then the whole ecclesiastical theory utterly collapses ; for if we have power to discern between the spiritually true and the spiritually

false when set before us, it can only be in virtue of capacities like in kind to those which discover spiritual truth, and the discovery itself accordingly is brought within the range of human nature. "Inspiration," if we still preserve the word, becomes normal, and ceases to be miraculous.

In short, as soon as we begin to examine the Biblical writings on literary and philological principles—and how else can we examine them rationally at all?—we begin to judge them on their own merits, and tacitly assume that we have the same means of estimating them which are open to us with respect to all other productions of human genius, aspiration, and devotion.

The result of such an application of the critical method to the form, and of the subjective estimate to the contents of the Biblical writings, is to dispel for ever the conception that God's revelation of himself flows in unalloyed purity through the history and literature of Israel and flows nowhere else at all.

So far the result of criticism is mainly negative, and, for that very reason, incapable of approving itself to many minds. But we must remember that the same process which discovers human error in the Bible permits us to recognise divine truth when we find it in so-called profane literature, and that as the pattern of the divine purpose, manifested in the history of Israel, becomes in some sense fainter and more confused before our eyes, the broader outlines of the divine purpose in the history of the world rise, however dimly, into view. As soon as we realise this, we perceive that the old conception of the Bible is, in truth, the great *obstacle* to the constructive treatment of history, and with this discovery it loses its last hold upon us.

To one from whose eyes the scales have fallen, the newer criticism, with the general conception of Israel's history to which it has given rise, possesses a fascination similar to that which was once exercised by the older views. It brings

the history of Israel into intelligible and organic connection with the whole life of man upon earth—that is to say, with the divine purpose as manifested in human history. As we find in Greece the nearest approach to a normal development and training of the æsthetic nature, as we find in Rome the nearest approach to the normal development and training of the practical, social, and political nature, so we find in Israel the nearest approach to the normal development and training of the religious nature of man. We follow this development with a living sympathy that is simply impossible except when we are studying human phenomena, and the growing life of Israel seems to throb in our own veins, as we press with the holy ones of old into ever closer communion with God, recognising at every step that the access they sought and found to the holy place, and at last to the holy of holies, is open to us likewise and to all the world, not in spite of our human nature, but because of it; not by the exceptional suspension, but by the normal exercise of the powers of the human soul.

We see a horde of semi-barbarous invaders establishing themselves in Palestine, and after a long and desperate struggle making good their position as the dominant race. We see the national and religious exaltation which nerved them for the struggle and was in its turn confirmed by it, emerging into ever higher forms with the advance of civilisation and culture. We see the noblest Israelites, by sheer force of loyalty to the highest that they knew, forced step by step through monolatry to monotheism; for Yahweh was their god, and in utter loyalty to him they refused to divide their worship between him and any other. And, thus, instead of supplementing their national worship by the adoration of other deities whose attributes were calculated to satisfy the changed and growing religious wants of changed and growing life, the spiritual leaders of Israel rejected with indignant scorn the worship of foreign gods,

and unconsciously took up into the conception of Yahweh himself all that approved itself as truly divine in the religions which they rejected. Thus when the beneficent, but lascivious Tyrian Baal was cast out of Israel, the conception of the stern Yahweh, the god of the desert, retained some of the gentler traits of the banished god of blessing and abundance,\* but the fact of the two conceptions of sternness and beneficence having to be confined in *one* deity saved the latter from the taint of licentiousness, and redeemed the former from cruelty.

Thus monolatry, the simple loyalty to the highest known, was advancing rapidly to monotheism. The conception of Yahweh was gathering into itself all the attributes of deity, and the people of Yahweh were becoming the people of God.

And yet this consummation was never reached while Israel was in truth a people. The passionate pleading of the prophets seems to fall upon deaf ears, and shows us beyond all dispute that the mass of the people lagged far behind their leaders. In the popular shrines the symbols or the images of other gods stood side by side with those of Yahweh, and even the worship of the national god himself was deeply tainted with idolatrous ideas and usages.

It was under these circumstances that enthusiasts for the prophetic religion, the nascent monotheism of the eighth century B.C., first began the attempt, not only to banish and suppress foreign religions, but forcibly to regulate the worship of Yahweh himself, in accordance with their loftier ideas. Hence the attack upon the local sanctuaries under Hezekiah, when, impatient of the long process of persuasion, driven to despair by the apparent futility of every appeal, the reforming enthusiasts sought to accomplish by legislation what they seemed unable to reach by pleading. Here was

\* Compare Tiele "Outlines of the History of Religion," English Translation, p. 87. Tübingen 1877.

the *fons et origo malorum*—(and yet in our blindness can we be sure that it was not a necessity?)—the ally in appearance, the deadly foe in reality, of the prophetic religion which went hand in hand with it for more than seven centuries till the unnatural alliance was smitten asunder by Jesus.

Henceforward, then, there are two streams of religious life in Israel. On the one hand, there is the prophetic ideal working from within, and leading men to an ever more and more spiritual conception of God, an ever closer communion with Him; and, on the other hand, there is the legislative attempt, working from without, to establish a perfectly regulated system of worship, which should absolutely exclude all possibility of contamination from idolatrous practices. Welded into glowing unity in the Book of Deuteronomy, these two conceptions reach their several expressions in Jeremiah's vision of the "New Covenant," under which the direct communion of every human heart with God shall supersede the necessity of all external ordinances; and in Ezekiel's vision of the "New Temple," in which an unimpeachable ceremonial shall remove all scandals from public worship!

At a first glance, the legal view seems to have overpowered the prophetic. The Prophet of the Return is the only great successor of Jeremiah, whereas Ezekiel's ideal sketch is the forerunner of the great body of ceremonial law preserved in the middle books of the Pentateuch, and put into force by Ezra and Nehemiah.

But, on closer inspection, we find abundant evidence of internal growth as well as external crystallisation in the religion of Israel, during the centuries intervening between Jeremiah and Jesus. If the problem of the relations between Israel and the surrounding peoples was attacked from without by Ezra and Nehemiah, it was approached from within, and in the true spirit of Jeremiah's "New

Covenant," by the authors of "Ruth" and "Jonah." And, above all, we find in the Book of Psalms, that "hymn book of the Second Temple" which reflects every shade of the belief and feeling of the centuries between Ezra and John Hyrcanus, the most striking evidence of the equal vitality of these two counter movements. On the one hand, the "Law of Yahweh" has become the object of a deep attachment—nay, of a passionate devotion—that bore its fruit in the rigid externality of pharisaic piety; but, on the other hand, the "New Covenant" is silently establishing itself in the hearts of Israel's saints, and preparing for the teaching of Jesus.

In the Psalms we see the harvest that has sprung from the seeds sown by the Prophets. The same conceptions which the Prophets put forth as neglected truths and proclaim in deaf ears, rise to the lips of the Psalmists in lyric utterances which presuppose the assent of a devout *community*, and instead of anticipating incredulity or opposition the poets make themselves the mouthpiece of their fellow-believers. Thus the indignant exhortations of the Prophets come back to us softened and glorified in the prayers and praises of the Psalmists. The Word of God has not returned to him empty. "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? I am full of the burnt-offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts," says the Prophet in the name of God; or "Rend your hearts and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God!" And in due time the answering cry rises from the heart of a repentant people to God—"Thou desirest not sacrifice; else would I give it: thou delightest not in burnt-offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise!" The Prophet cries in the name of God, "Come now and let us reason together. Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow; though they be red as crimson, they shall



be as wool." And the Psalmist gives back the cry of the conscience-smitten—"Purge me with hyssop and I shall be clean: wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." The indignant Prophet cries in the name of God—"Though they dig down into sheol, thence shall mine hand take them; though they climb up into heaven, thence will I bring them down." And after many centuries comes back the answer of peace—"If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in sheol, behold thou art there!" "I was like the husbandman, taking the yoke from the ox's neck and spreading the fodder before it," says the Prophet in the name of God. "The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want," answers the Psalmist in the name of Israel. "Can a woman forget her sucking child? Yea, she may forget, yet will I not forget you!" says the Prophet in the name of God. "When my father and mother forsake me, then the Lord takes me up," answers the Psalmist in the name of Israel.

In the Book of Psalms, then, we find not only the praise of Ezekiel's "new Temple," but the lyric expression of the emotions and aspirations that sprang up under Jeremiah's "New Covenant."

Growth from within and crystallisation from without cannot both go on for ever. Whether the external forms of piety were from the first a simple snare to the Jews, or whether they were for a time necessary for the protection of the tender life they enshrined, is one of the most absorbingly interesting problems which present themselves to the student of the Bible. But, however this may be, it is clear that at the time of Jesus the external form had ceased to protect the internal spirit of devotion, and was threatening to crush it to death. One or the other must give way. Jesus knew by the experience of his own heart that the "New Covenant" was not a covenant with *Israel*, but a covenant with *man*. It was not as an Israelite but as a

man that he felt and knew himself to be a child of God. The infinite love of God and the infinite worth of every human soul were the essence of his glad tidings, and in those glad tidings the "New Covenant" was at last realised, renouncing at the same time all alliance with Jewish exclusiveness and ceremonial.

And the world was ready. Greece had given the West and East a basis of common thought and made communion between them intellectually possible. Rome was still carrying on the mighty work of political assimilation and approximation which made communion physically and socially possible. The religion of Israel had ripened in Jesus into the religion of Humanity. It remained only to free it from its Jewish trammels. The world was crying out for the work of Jesus and of the Apostle of the Gentiles.

The account we have given of Israel's place in history, and the sketch we have attempted of the internal development of Israel's religion, may be true or false. But one thing, at least, is certain—viz., that when once we have admitted the right of philology and criticism to deal with the Biblical Records at all, we shall be driven step by step to remove all reservations, and to deal with the Israelites exactly as we should deal with any other people. If we find exceptional religious phenomena amongst them, we must no more think of having recourse to a theory of inspiration miraculously supplementing the human powers than we should think of any such expedient in the case of the exceptional intellectual phenomena that manifest themselves in Greece. History, philology, and psychology may own that a problem is insoluble, but they can never accept an unhistorical solution of an historical problem, an unphilological solution of a philological problem, or an unpsychological solution of a psychological problem; nor

can we admit that any region is to be reserved as beyond the jurisdiction of history and psychology, if we allow that religious emotion and spiritual discernment are natural to man ; and if we do not, we are thrown back at once upon the theory of a revelation which man must accept but cannot judge, and all criticism becomes impossible.

Man, however, is a compromising animal, and while some are bold enough to maintain the old theory of inspiration and defy history, philology, and science in its name, while others are bold enough to accept history, philology, and science, and to relinquish the old theory of inspiration at their bidding, we must expect to find a large number of persons who attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, and to accept both the old and the new conceptions. Now when such a compromise between two incompatible schemes is attempted, there must always be some straining on both sides ; but it is for the most part pretty clear which side has, on the whole, to give way to the other. It makes a great difference whether we attempt to reconcile science with the Bible, or the Bible with science. When apologists give up maintaining that the world was made in six days, and attempt to show that the first chapter of Genesis anticipated Lyell, the victory of geology is achieved. The apologists are, indeed, engaged in a hopeless task ; but the less they distort the facts of geology, and the more (in consequence) they distort the words of the Bible, the nearer they are to relinquishing the vain attempt.

From this point of view, the popular lectures on the Old Testament, recently published by Professor Robertson Smith, are of extreme interest. The work of a scholar at once profound, acute, and erudite, the book amply deserves and will richly repay study on its own account ; but we call special attention to it here as illustrating the attempt to maintain the old doctrine of inspiration in conjunction with the frankest possible acceptance of critical, historical, and

philological methods and results. The "opponents of progressive Biblical Science in Scotland" are unquestionably right in regarding Professor Robertson Smith as a most dangerous antagonist; but it is another question whether they have been wise in their generation in taking steps which have led to the delivery of these lectures before an audience of almost two thousand attentive hearers. In spite of the boldness of front with which Professor Smith maintains the reality of inspiration, his literary, scholarly, and historical instincts prevent his making any but very occasional and very slight sacrifices to it.

"When it is admitted that the Bible history is based upon written sources, oral testimony, and personal observation, no theory of inspiration can alter the principle that the knowledge of the writers was limited by their sources" (p. 419). "The Bible history, as paraphrased by a graphic modern preacher, is always coloured with the nationality of the speaker, and assimilated in greater or less degree to the life of his own time. What is innocent, and indeed, inevitable, in an uninspired preacher, may surely have happened in Bible times" (*ibid*). It appears, then, that an "inspired" writer's knowledge is necessarily limited by his human means of acquiring it, but that his statements are not necessarily limited by his knowledge. "All sound apologetic admits that the proof that a book is credible must precede belief that it is inspired" (p. 309). When we read such passages as these, and note the firmness with which Professor Smith pushes the hypothesis of interpolations, recognises the fact of contradictions, and extends almost indefinitely the limits of "the human side of the Bible," we ask, in some perplexity, what he means by inspiration, and what is the test by which we are to know it?

The nearest approach to an answer to these questions which we can find is contained on pp. 175 and 315. "These

books [the Apocrypha] have been delivered to us; they have their use and value, which are to be ascertained by a frank and reverent study of the texts themselves; but those who insist on placing them on the same footing of undisputed authority with the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms, to which our Lord bears direct testimony, and so make the whole doctrine of the Canon depend on its weakest part, sacrifice the true strength of the evidence on which the Old Testament is received by Christians." "You cannot prove a book to be God's Word by showing that it is of a certain age. The proof of God's Word is that it does His work in the world, and carries on His truth towards the final revelation in Christ Jesus. This proof the Pentateuch can adduce, but only for the time subsequent to Ezra." So far as these statements go beyond the suggestion that whatever is opportune is inspired, they simply refer us to the authority of Jesus. But surely, when we come to the criticism of the New Testament, and apply Professor Smith's principles there too, we shall find that the "direct testimony" of Jesus includes either too much or too little to serve the purpose for which it is cited here; that if we are to accept it absolutely, it contradicts the conclusions reached in these lectures as to the age, authorship, and origin of the Books of the Bible; whereas, if we are to accept it with qualifications, it simply shows that Jesus discerned spiritual truth in certain portions of the Old Testament.

But if Professor Smith's doctrine of inspiration is vague and unsatisfactory, his criticism is in the highest degree instructive. Even where he follows most closely in the steps of his predecessors we always feel that he is in immediate contact with the facts themselves, and his lectures abound with the happy expression of old truths and the clear enunciation of new ones.

Space forbids our even attempting to do justice to the

masterly manner in which he leads on his readers by arguments, or rather by the statement of facts, which it is absolutely impossible to resist, from the outskirts of the subject to its very heart ; or to cite even a selection of the many admirable passages we had marked for quotation.

One sentence, however, we cannot refrain from giving. "As the death and resurrection of our Lord are the supreme proof of the spiritual truths of Christianity, so the death of the old Hebrew state [at the time of the Babylonian captivity] and the resurrection of the religion of Jehovah in a form independent of the old national life, is the supreme proof that the religion of the Old Testament is no mere natural variety of Semitic monolatry, but a dispensation of the true and eternal religion of the spiritual God " (p. 273). This profoundly suggestive analogy will well bear translation from the language of supernaturalism in which Professor Smith has expressed it, and may serve to confirm our faith in that "survival of the fittest" against which ignorance and tyranny are alike powerless.

To many devout minds it seems as though Jerusalem were being sacked, nay, as though Jesus were being crucified afresh, by the critics and scholars of these latter days. But let them be of good heart. What is true cannot be disproved. What is divine cannot perish. If the new views of the Bible prevail and survive, it will be because they are fittest to survive ; fittest not only in relation to the intellect, but ultimately in relation to the heart also. Until they have shown themselves capable of supporting faith and giving a glow to devotion the victory will not be theirs. On ne détruit que ce qu'on remplace !

PHILIP H. WICKSTED.

## *WILLIAM BLAKE.\**

"**I** AM HID," is the indignant complaint of Blake in a note on Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses, in which he contrasts with inevitable jealousy the position of Sir Joshua and Gainsborough and that of himself and his friend Fuseli. Like many another neglected genius, could he but have looked ahead another generation or two, and been content to live in the present on the fame of the future, he might have abundantly consoled himself for neglect. To take but this one book, of which I propose to give a short account, and leave aside all else that has been done for Blake's memory by poet and publisher, this alone is a tribute such as few, if any, writers of the eighteenth century have had the like of. The author, who unfortunately did not live to see his work in print, has been fortunate in leaving behind him friends to complete and annotate it worthy of himself and his subject, and in finding a publisher who has spared no pains to make the book a real delight to eye and mind in type and paper and illustrations and binding. Nor has the public been remiss, considering at least how small a public it must always be to which such as Blake can appeal. The first edition was published not twenty years ago, and now we have a second, with many additional illustrations and letters, and so much new matter that it will be a difficulty for book collectors in time to come to choose between them, the one being the first but the other the best.

One disposed to believe in sportful deities, who find fun in

\* *Life of William Blake: with selections from his poems, and other writings.* By Alexander Gilchrist. A new and enlarged edition. Illustrated from Blake's own works, with additional letters, and a memoir of the author. In two volumes. London: Macmillan and Co. 1880.

mortal mishap and in ludicrous incompatibility of man and his surroundings, might confirm his faith almost to sight by a consideration of the early years, and, indeed, of the whole life of Blake. A poet—but ignorant of the laws of rhythm and grammar; a mystic and prophet—in the most prosaic of generations; an artist—who never learned to paint, nor even the refinements of his own lower craft of engraver; born, of all months, in November—in 1757, the very nadir of flat common sense; son of a “pious Dissenter”—a draper and hosier, in a “respectable” London suburb. No circumstance of life or birth but seems absurdly incongruous. Already at eight years of age he sees visions, bright-winged angels filling a tree, into which he looks up, with star-like glory, and narrowly escapes a whipping for telling the same, his father treating it as a lie. One wonders whether the blossom of may or apple may not have had something to do with it, and seen or noted for the first time, in its peerless beauty, whether the boy did not see, after all, pretty much what there really was to see.

Apprenticed in his fifteenth year to an engraver, the profits of the shop not sufficing for a painter's fees, the boy met with one, almost the only piece of luck of his life. Basire, his master, was employed by Gough to engrave for his “*Sepulchral Monuments*.” And partly, it would seem, to keep Blake out of harm's way—he being disposed to side with his fellow-apprentices against his master—he was employed to make the necessary drawings in Westminster Abbey and the old churches in and near London. Wonderful hours must the visionary lad have spent amid the famous dead and their works and monuments, a solitary enthusiast for Gothic art, in an age when Gothic meant barbarian, and the antiquarians were the only custodians of our ancient monuments. Something of his wild indignant musings we have left in the inscription below an engraving done by him about this time. It is “Joseph of Arimathea among the rocks of Albion,” and appended,



"This is one of the Gothic Artists who built the Cathedrals in what we call the Dark Ages, of whom the world was not worthy. Such were the Christians in all ages." That the world in which he lived was unworthy from an artistic point of view, one in which a Gothic architect would have found himself strangely out of place, cannot be questioned. It was doubtless a mighty consolation to Blake to number himself amongst the great artists of the past with whom his real life was spent, and feel himself neglected in their company.

It was during this time of apprenticeship that he wrote, yet in his teens, the "Poetical Sketches" not published till friends came to his help some ten years later. Judging from the selections given us in the second volume, there are qualities in these poems rarely if ever found in youthful work even of the best. An individuality, a maturity of mental experience, an independence of the tyranny of fashion. Take, for instance, the wonderful "Mad Song," of some Lear nursing his grief in dream and darkness, and disturbed by the hateful break of dawn in his companionship with congenial night. Here are two verses, the first and last :—

The wild winds weep,  
And the night is a-cold ;  
Come hither, Sleep,  
And my griefs unfold !  
But, lo ! the Morning peeps  
Over the eastern steeps,  
And rustling birds of dawn  
The earth do scorn.

Like a fiend in a cloud,  
With howling woe,  
After night I do crowd,  
And with night will go.  
I turn my back to the East  
Whence comforts have increas'd ;  
For light doth seize my brain  
With frantic pain.

But this, written before he was fourteen, must be given here again, though it appears twice in the volumes before us (in the *Life* and in the *Selections*). "Song" it is headed.

How sweet I roamed from field to field,  
And tasted all the summer's pride,  
Till I the Prince of Love beheld  
Who in the sunny beams did glide !

He showed me lilies for my hair,  
And blushing roses for my brow ;  
He led me through his gardens fair,  
Where all his golden pleasures grow.

With sweet May dews my wings were wet,  
And Phœbus fired my vocal rage ;  
He caught me in his silken net,  
And shut me in his golden cage.

He loves to sit and hear me sing ;  
Then, laughing, sports and plays with me ;  
Then stretches out my golden wing,  
And mocks my loss of liberty.

He was married in his twenty-fifth year to a maiden of his own class, and, it would seem, altogether happily, for though it was very pretty to sing about "loss of liberty," Blake was one who never could have endured it. The loss was apparently all on her side ; a partner as submissive as devoted, she was throughout life, believing all his visions, learning to help him in his business, and sharing all his eccentricities. Children there were none.

By Flaxman, his warm friend and admirer, he was about this time introduced to the "celebrated Mrs. Mathew," a lady who drew to her receptions all the rising talent of London. It was at the joint expense of her husband and Flaxman that the Poems just alluded to were published. At her assemblies it was that he read and *sang* the "Songs of Innocence." But Blake was one who could ill endure patronage, and the "youthful prodigy" was no doubt for-

gotten in that brilliant society of forgotten celebrities as soon as his visits ceased.

On his father's death in 1784, having probably come in for some small legacy, he set up shop next door to his brother, who had succeeded to the hosiery business, at 27, Broad Street, "Parker and Blake, Printsellers and Engravers," figuring no doubt over the windows, as it still does at the foot of some engravings published by the firm. Parker was a former fellow-apprentice, Mrs. Blake helped in the shop, and William, a younger brother, was a pupil and assistant. But the brother to whom his heart was knit in bands that death did not break, died; Parker could not get on with so extraordinary a partner, and in 1787 the business was given up.

Lavater's *Aphorisms*, translated and published in 1788, has a frontispiece engraved by Blake, who earned his bread by such work for the booksellers, his own peculiar work never bringing him in whereon to live. These Aphorisms remind one a good deal of a later *Proverbial Philosophy*, a book, perhaps, too much abused by a class to whom it does not and should not appeal; for what is merest commonplace to those who have had the advantages of much reading and wide culture may deservedly seem new and striking to those whose education has been spare and whose opportunities have been few. At any rate, Blake was taken with these Aphorisms, and has left behind a volume which his admirers will prize more for the manuscript notes than for the printed matter, were it never so rare a book. It is Lavater's own suggestion that the reader should mark his approval or otherwise of the maxims which struck him the most, and judge thereby of his own character. This Blake did, and accordingly to an eminent commonplace about sneers, we find appended the note "Damn sneerers" (to which we too devoutly say, Amen!); to some stupid maxim contrasting frequent laughing and scarce smiles, "I

hate scarce smiles, I love laughing." To this, "You enjoy with wisdom when the gratification of your appetite makes your powers more capable, not weary," is emphatically appended, "False! for weak is the joy which is never wearied." As, indeed, who that has tasted the highest delight of art, literature, or devotion does not know to his grief?

Blake was a Christian always, probably orthodox in his own strange way, but, nevertheless, a vehement Republican, so much so as to wear even in the streets the red bonnet and white cockade, till the Days of Terror came, which alienated him from France indeed, but not as did those September massacres too many then, from the cause of liberty and the people as against kings and kingcraft. The shape of his forehead made him a Republican he would urge in self-defence, jokingly, but withal no doubt truly enough. Paine, as he was himself wont to relate, he was the means of saving from the clutches of the law, perhaps from the gallows, getting him off for Calais just twenty minutes before the order for his arrest was received at Dover.

It was in 1789 that appeared the "Songs of Innocence," to be followed a few years later by the companion, "Songs of Experience." The poems, with their illustrative designs, had been lying by him for some months. Of their worth, or, indeed, of the worth of anything he wrote or designed of his own accord, he never had a doubt, but to publish them was beyond his means, and the goodwill of friends wanted faith, as did much more reasonably the publishing world. The problem was solved in a vision of the night, and his available capital of half-a-crown being laid out in the purchase of materials, he proceeded with his own hands, aided by his loving, trusting wife, to *engrave* his book, text and all. Between them they made the book, paper alone excepted; even the ink or colour, and the binding was the work of their own hands.

These poems are too well known to need quoting here. The text has been republished more than once of late years, and copies of the originals—a delight to eye and soul—are yet to be had, a limited number having been published.

What promised to be they happiest ears of the artist's life were spent at Felpham, on the coast of Sussex, whither Hayley, the friend and biographer of Cooper, whose estate was in the neighbourhood, had invited him. He was now in his forty-third year, but there is something delightfully childlike in the enthusiasm with which he looks forward to living for the first time in the country, and by the sea. "Felpham is a sweet place for study, because it is more spiritual than London. Heaven opens here on all sides her golden gates: her windows are not obstructed by vapours, voices of celestial inhabitants are more distinctly heard, and their forms more distinctly seen; and," he adds, significantly, "my cottage is also a shadow of their houses." Hayley, too, proved a kind friend and useful, giving him the run of his library, and getting him profitable employment as a painter of miniatures among the county families around. Nevertheless, Felpham proved but a disappointment; the cottage, "a perfect model for cottages" though it might still be from the artist's point of view, proved to be damp, and his wife's health, as well as his own, suffered. His friend must have sorely tried his temper, and no doubt the trial was mutual. A well-educated country gentleman, a versifier correct and conventional, benevolent but vain and fussy and self-important,—such a one, though he might make a most agreeable companion, was hardly one with whom a wilful, self-educated visionary independent was likely to be happy. Then the very miniature painting which promised him such means as he had never had before, was in his eyes but a temptation, a snare to beguile him from his life's real work. Somehow, through "the

open golden gates" the visions did not come readily as they were wont to do through London smoke and mist. "The visions were angry with me at Felpham," he would afterwards say. So in 1803 he returned to London, after a three years' absence, delighted to find himself once more in the familiar streets, where "everything" seems to him "elegant, clean, and neat;" even his wife "fancies she is better in health here." An experience this, unlike much other experience of his, by no means uncommon.

Blake's next would-be patron was one Cromeck, an engraver, turned printseller and publisher; who undertook the "task, an herculean one, to create and establish a reputation" for him. "I say," he adds in a letter of remonstrance addressed to Blake at a later period, "the labour was herculean, because I had not only to contend with, but I had to battle with, a man who had predetermined not to be served," which we can very well believe. This, at all events, Cromeck did for him—introduced him to the widest public he had till then, or, indeed, has since addressed, by publishing his illustrations of Blair's Grave. Wisely, though to Blake's intense disgust and disappointment, employing a less eccentric engraver, one Schiavonetti—a happy choice, says Mr. Gilchrist, and one which rendered Blake's wild austere designs acceptable, where otherwise they would have had no chance. Twenty guineas was paid by Cromeck, and, small as it was for twelve such truly original drawings, the sum must have been very welcome, for husband and wife had come to live on some half-guinea a week, originality not being the road to present success, far less to wealth.

For seventeen years after his return to London, Blake lived in South Molton Street; in 1821 he removed to 3, Fountain Court, Strand—a respectable house at the time, now let out in rooms. Here he spent the few remaining years of his life; neglected by blind connoisseurs and timid

publishers more even than in his earlier years, always on the verge of want, just kept above actual need by the help of artist friends—John Linnell, especially—little better off than himself. In return he worked steadily, through health and sickness, taking no recreation, or rather finding it in his work. A thoroughly happy man in his unworldliness, living “in God’s presence night and day,” pitying from his heart prosperous artists who had not his “visions and peace,” communicating to his disciples of his own serene joy, “whereat,” says his biographer, “they would often wonder and wish they had within themselves the faculty, unhelpt by him, to feel as he did.”

It was in the chambers of this dingy court that he designed and engraved his “Inventions to the Book of Job,” next to the “Grave,” his best known work, and superior to it in grandeur of conception and perfection of achievement; the engraving the best he ever did. The series of twenty-one engravings, reproduced line for line by the photointaglio process, though on a smaller scale, will be found in the second volume of the work under review, and are by themselves worth the price of the two volumes.

Here, too, was it that in his sixty-eighth year he set to work to learn Italian, enough at least to read and understand Dante, and then began in bed his last great work, to be left unfinished, a hundred folio illustrations to the prophet-poet, from one side of his character so nearly allied to himself. One cannot but regret that Blake’s attention was not earlier directed to so congenial a task. Possibly the influence of one who united in himself all the culture of his age with the very depths of intensest feeling and unrestrained imagination might have had a chastening effect, which at least was sorely needed.

He took to the work with enthusiasm. “I am too much attached to Dante to think much of anything else,” he writes, a few months before the end. He died a painless

death on the 12th of August, 1827, to the last true to his triple vocation of poet, artist, mystic, laying aside his pencil only to sing, to music of his own, pious songs composed on the inspiration of the moment. "I cannot think of death," he said to Mr. Crabb Robinson, "as more than the going out of one room into another," and as such a change he met it, with neither exultation nor reluctance. He was buried beside his kindred in Bunhill Fields, in a "common grave," marked by no stone, and now consequently lost, "used again, doubtless," says his biographer not without indignation.

I have left to the last all mention of the most extraordinary, and perhaps absolutely unique work of Blake's, that to which he attached supremest importance, of which the public then and even since have thought the least—I refer to his multitudinous prophetic or mystic works, so numerous indeed, that in the end he gave up engraving them, not being able to afford the copper-plates, far less to find a publisher; whence they have in great part perished. Enough, and most people will think more than enough, we have left to us.

Prophecy (in the large and true meaning of the word), by help of intermingled verse and figure, is their aim, but the effect produced on the sympathetic reader is rather that of some wild music played by a composer, whose commanding genius scarce atones for his little skill. Definite impression there is none, only a certain feeling of awe and inspiration, rather than understanding of the theme. The designs are at once decorative and illustrative, forming a margin for the page, and an accompaniment to the verse, not always rendered the more intelligible thereby. Take, for a fine example, the leaf from "Europe," to be found opposite page 126, Vol. I. A spider's web fills all the space the verse leaves on the right, and breaks in the middle, dividing the page in two; flies direct gaily their death-course



towards it, to share the fate of companions already fallen victims; below, at the foot of the page, almost as if fallen from the web all life-juices expressed, lies a miserable being, with countenance inexpressibly woe-begone, while breaks chaotic of light and shade, fill up the interstices; and amidst it all winds the weird chant—

Enitharmon laughed in her sleep to see (O woman's triumph!)  
Every house a den, every man bound; the shadows are filled  
With spectres, and the windows wove over with curses of iron.  
Over the doors "Thou shalt not" and over the chimneys

"Fear" is written;

With bands of iron round their necks fastened into the walls  
The citizens. In leaden gyves the inhabitants of suburbs  
Walk heavy; soft and bent are the bones of villagers.

\* \* \* \* \*

O mother Enitharmon, bring forth other sons.

Cause my name to vanish, that my place be no more found!

For I am faint with travel!

Like the dark cloud disburdened in the day of dismal thunder.

Is it the cry of a life-weary generation, galled by the heavy fetters of necessity and tired of the endless strife of law and passion within? Like music rather it must be interpreted, each one finding the meaning most to his mind.

"Persons and machinery entirely new to the inhabitants of earth," truly enough writes Blake; for whoever, before or since, has heard elsewhere of Los and Enitharmon, Orc Sotha, Palamabron, Rintrah, Urizen, Fuzon, Leutha? Yet he significantly adds, "some of the persons excepted," one of whom Mr. Gilchrist identifies. Skofeld immortalised in the "Jerusalem" in verse and full-page design, can certainly be no other than one Schofield, an insolent soldier, who, to revenge himself on Blake, for having pushed him outside the gate of his Felpham cottage, accused the artist before the magistrates of treasonable language. Blake was tried for the offence at Chichester at the Quarter Session, and happily got off; but had the

soldier's evidence been accepted, it would have fared ill with him in those "good old days." No doubt it was the thought of what might have been the consequences—not merely the loss of personal liberty, but, far more, the forced abandonment of his life-work, which made him elevate Schofield to the dignity of a devil, and make him the very type of "accuser." So, in the design to which we have referred, he is seen bound hand and foot with chains going into the flames forth from the presence of two figures, one of whom, "Vala," crowned and sceptred, sits on the ground, hiding his face as in grief; and the other, "Hyle," sits huddled hands, feet, and face together as a very personification of Despair. But who are Vala and Hyle?

To Blake there was nothing common, and, in very truth, nothing unclean. The visions which threatened to abandon him by the ocean were ever with him in London, and all its commonplace and sordidness emblems and foundations of prophecy—Pancras and Kentish Town, Islington and Primrose Hill, the "Jew's Harp House" and the "Green Man" find natural place in his vision and verse, beside "Albion and Babylon," "Satan and Og," "Jesus and Jerusalem." All the world, great and mean, good and evil, is to him but a clothing in time and space garments of spiritual realities,—among which realities he lived, and in which higher eternal world, ever present beneath all appearances, he seemed to himself conscious to have ever lived. It was from this world that he received his inspirations; in its language that he talked, and wrote, and designed; from the consciousness of its presence and sympathy that he bore up not only bravely, but cheerfully, against neglect and disappointment his life long. The question whether he was mad or not must resolve itself into the philosophical and theological problem of the true nature of time, space, and eternity. If there be no such world as he lived his better

life in, then must he, indeed, be set down as but a mad genius. But believers in it will not wonder that he is obscure, often altogether unintelligible, sometimes even seemingly outrageous. The language of eternity is not easily translated into the speech of every day, nor are its visions always descried aright by mortal eyes, even the keenest. These prophecies cannot be recommended, I think, for careful or prolonged study; they are, rather, to be listened to with the mind's ear in receptive moments; are full of suggestion, but assuredly destitute of instruction, commonly so called. The man and his books we must take for what he is and intended them to be. They will suit few, yet I believe an increasing number; but the many cannot refuse to recognise the sublimity of his genius, the wild grandeur, even of his madness.

CHARLES HARGROVE.

### THE MODERN UNITARIAN.\*

THIS book consists of a series of short studies on some of the leading features of Unitarian Christianity: They are contributed by ten of the most distinguished ministers of the English Unitarian pulpit, and, together, form an able and popular exposition of the bases of religion from the point of view of the free, liberal churches. It is a book of Affirmations which will be welcomed by many beside Unitarians as showing what ground there is in reason and nature for the things "most commonly believed" among us. And this gives some force to the objection that has been taken to the title of the book. These Affirmations are by no means peculiar to Unitarianism; they are the common property of the Christian Church, and while many would go much further in the direction of positive statement, including many more articles of faith in their creed than the ten here discussed, there will be no dissent from this group of connected and momentous beliefs. Some will complain of "a want;" others will object to a particular mode of treatment; but no one will contradict the statement of Dr. Martineau in his fine preface, that "these affirmations form the common standing-ground of all Christians." Why, then, call them *Unitarian* affirmations? They are, in fact, a defence of the common faith of Christendom, and three-fourths of the book might have been published by the S.P.C.K. or the Christian Evidence Society.

\* Unitarian Christianity. Ten Lectures on the Positive Aspects of Unitarian Thought and Doctrine, delivered by Various Ministers. With a Preface by the Rev. James Martineau, D.D. London. 1881.

A second objection may be taken to the plan adopted. While the presence of ten well-known divines adds something of personal interest and attractiveness to the book, something is lost to the unity and consecutiveness of the argument, and we are left with the impression of having listened to an arrangement of independent airs by musicians on different planes, rather than a complete symphony, thoroughly worked out, and all of a piece, from the beginning to the end. More than once there is a raid upon the ground of a previous lecture, or the note of affirmation is in a different key. There would have been a gain to consistency if the work had been entrusted to one hand. This is not to say that we have anything here but a book of much logical force and spiritual insight, and once given the conditions under which it came to birth, a powerful defence of the foundation truths of religion. Such lectures as Mr. Armstrong's "Affirmation of God," Mr. Crosskey's "Man the Offspring of God," Mr. Beard's "Jesus Christ," and Mr. Gordon's "Salvation," are full of persuasive excellence, and their perusal will be amply repaid. The line followed may not be that which we should have adopted; we may find fault with them for their omissions; but no one will deny that they are instructive and suggestive contributions towards religious conviction, or that the various authors have successfully shown that "the truths which they present have their living reality and abundant signs in the constitution of nature and the mind of man."

A popular American divine is reported to have described English Unitarianism as absorbed in proving that "this is not true, and that is not true, and nothing is very certain, and it doesn't greatly matter." It may be that this was only a good-humoured caricature, but as there would be no brass guineas if there were no golden ones, so there would be no caricature if there were no reality from which the unfair presentment could be made. Certainly our Trans-

atlantic cousin's not too flattering picture does represent what in many circles is the popular estimate of the work and methods of the Unitarian section of the Christian Church. It is supposed that Unitarian teaching is largely a negative quantity, and it is felt that the soul of man can no more feed on theological negations than it can on chemistry or mathematics. The element of power in any man's life is not that which he does not believe, but those things which he holds to with a passionate conviction; and the element of power in Christian teaching is not in the number of articles of faith that are thrown overboard as mere lumber, but in those, however few, that are retained. Just as all the negations of Sinai, uttered in thunder, are not so heavy and weighty upon the conscience as one single "Thou shalt" of Christ's whispered in the ear, so all the refutations of error from a thousand pulpits are not so efficacious in producing spiritual conviction as the one positive truth a man preaches out of the fulness of a heart which cries, "I know, and therefore I speak." To preach the negative is a poor, starved business, very effectually damping the fires of the soul; it is the affirmative which inspires energy, adds hope, and blows the coals into a useful flame. The one is corrective and antagonistic, the other creative and sympathetic. If I have called the bad bad, have I gained much? That which is bad will die of itself, and our work is to build, not to overthrow. Of course it often happens that before a man can build, he must pull down; before he can plant, he must drive a ploughshare through the weeds and briars that choke the ground; before he can set flowing the refreshing waters of truth, he must clear the channels of the rubbish of accumulated errors. But the only *raison d'être* for a ministry of negation is to prepare a way for the higher ministry of affirmation, the latchet of whose shoes it is not worthy to unloose.

But the charge that Unitarian teaching is only or chiefly

occupied with denials and negations is quite another matter, and not at all confirmed if Unitarianism is to be judged by its finest types and noblest voices. No one can say that in the works of Channing and Martineau there is any lack of positive teaching, or any weary insistence upon the points of doctrine that merely differentiate Unitarian from other Christian Churches. Nevertheless, as the impression widely prevails that the strength of Unitarianism is in the thunder of its denials, or nowhere, this book has been put forth as a rebutting argument to the accusation. It is very much more than that—it is an offering in the service of positive religion; but it is also a vindication.

There are some, indeed, and among them not a few who are deeply in sympathy with free liberal churches, to whom it appears that Unitarianism, at least in the past, has laid itself open to a charge from exactly the opposite pole, and that one of its weaknesses, and certainly one of the features that has held many aloof from its communion, has been a too confident conviction that it had solved the mystery of the universe, and adequately explained all the far-reaching, deep-sounding questions of the spiritual life. It has too often been forgotten that Unitarianism is only one among many imperfect endeavours after “a practical expression of man’s conscious relations to the Infinite.” It may be the unpardonable sin to say so; but the truth is that too often to outsiders Unitarians have had the air of intellectual superiors who had attained a certitude on all the problems of being, which was no more to be questioned than the conclusions of the multiplication table. But the intellectual attitude for which mysteries do not exist, is almost incompatible with the fervours of devotion. As Mr. Martineau somewhere says, “true reverence can breathe and see only on condition of some mingling and alternation of light and darkness,” of the ascertained veracities of the reasoner and the transcendental vision of the mystic. The writer knows

that he speaks for others as well as for himself, in saying that it has sometimes appeared as if Unitarianism had no solemn spaces where the soul might feel the awful breath, and know God to be all and itself nothing. The altar is securely built, but where is the sacred fire? Take an ordinary member of any one of the orthodox churches, and induce him to sit out the service and the sermon of the Unitarian meeting. In all probability he will complain that it was all so cold. The lack of warmth has been the one thing fatal to the progress of Unitarianism among the poor and the masses. The hard, intellectual distinctness of Locke and Paley, Priestley and Hartley, sooner or later quenches the flames of rapture. In his "Mystery of Matter," Mr. J. A. Picton, whom no one will judge to be deficient in sympathy with Unitarians, has a passage which may be quoted in confirmation of the above view:—"Whatever may have been the intellectual force and clearness, and, within certain limits, the logical consistency of system, characteristic of the sects that have departed from the Christian Church in the direction of Arius and his followers, it can scarcely be contended that they have been specially distinguished by spiritual fervour. It is certain, indeed, that there have been men amongst the English and American Unitarians, who have individually exhibited a keen and noble spiritual life. But it will generally be found that such men show a marked sympathy for more orthodox believers, precisely in regard to those mystical experiences which imply"—(the writer apologises to Mr. Picton for giving his sentence a new ending)—transcendental relations between the creature and the Creator.

It is the boast of Evangelicalism that one hundred years ago it rekindled the fires of religion grown so dim and ashy on the altars of the Church, and has from that time onward never ceased to keep alive the sacred flame. And the warmth of the Evangelic spirit, it is constantly said, is



inseparable from the Evangelic dogmas. But this is an illusion. Evangelic doctrine, even in the coldest days of the eighteenth century, never died out of the Church ; the Non-conformists retained their Puritan theology intact long after the fervours of Puritanism had disappeared. The revival of religion, which took place under Wesley and Whitfield, was not due to any discovery of a new theology or any revival of a forgotten doctrine. Dr. Doddridge and his contemporaries were every whit as Evangelical in creed as the leaders of the new movement. Their fatal weakness was a cold intellectualism, a too practical common-sense that frowned upon the enthusiasms of the mystic, a theological certitude that mapped out the Infinite with all the minute accuracy of an ordnance survey, and drew a sharp, impassable, ontological distinction between man and his Maker. The God worshipped in the " Bethels," " Salems," and " Zions " of the day was " the moral governor of the universe ; benevolent, but not excessively benevolent ; intelligent, but not an abyss of unsearchable wisdom ; energetic, but not interfering, save in an entirely constitutional manner, with the affairs of his subjects. The awful possibilities of election or of reprobation which filled Bunyan's life with violences of joy and terror were now set aside ; the excited visions of the sectaries were at an end. If William Law commenced with the Eternal One in solitude, he found his public in two female disciples."\* The relations of Creator and creature were clearly known and accurately defined, and were no more mysterious than the relations of a paternal George III. to the rebellious American colonists. But the outburst of Evangelic zeal which marked the last quarter of the eighteenth century was, from one point of view, an outburst of Transcendentalism. The new life which began to bud and blossom from the dry stem of the Church replaced the common-sense way of accounting for the Infinite which pre-

\* Professor Dowden on the *Transcendental Movement*.

vailed by an imaginative faith, by a feeling that the relations between God and man were far more awful, intimate, and pathetic than those of a mildly benevolent king to wilful subjects, by a consciousness that the spiritual life was infinitely more than a problem in mechanics to be illustrated by a diagram. No doubt the two Wesleys were dogmatic enough, and announced the Evangelical creed with all the positiveness of men who have never known that modern plague, the questioning spirit. That, however, was not the secret of their success; not by any barren abstraction of the brain did they win their victories, but by the passion, the tears, the zeal with which they preached the immeasurable mercy of God. But it is to be noted that the sacred fire they kindled was associated with a sense of the mystery of being which, if not a new doctrine, was a still more powerful agency, a new atmosphere. They were conscious of the illimitable depths of the human soul, of an awful commingling of the human with the Divine, of an indwelling Presence, the everlasting immanence of God in consecrating union with our humanity. Let any one who may question this consult the hymns which the two Wesleys gave their converts. Every one admits that these hymns played a large and conspicuous part in the Methodist revival. The lyrics of the great brothers are all aglow with a mystical element, and he who has seen a crowd of illiterate men and women chained in their daily life to monotonous and dispiriting tasks, singing with the utmost rapture of devotion such transcendental hymns as "Thou hidden love of God," or "Thee will I love, my strength and tower"\*—hymns that might befit a Tauler or an Eckhart,

\* Well known as these hymns are, it may not be out of place to quote a verse of each in confirmation of the view here taken:—

"Each moment draw from earth away  
My heart, that lowly waits Thy call;  
Speak to my inmost soul, and say,  
'I am thy Love, thy God, thy All;

a Madame Guyon or a George Macdonald, will know, at any rate, *one* of the reasons why Unitarians have as yet failed to make their movement popular. They sound a note as foreign to the Unitarianism of Locke and Priestley as to the Evangelicalism of "Salem" and "Bethel" in the first half of last century. The "Opifex Deus" of eighteenth-century theology, which Unitarians have until lately retained, does not swell the heart with rapture. There is no "lifting power," no glad surprise, no mystic vision of a better life in the hard distinctness with which English Unitarians, until James Martineau appeared among them, have been in the habit of solving the mystery and the burden of life. In opposing the doctrine of the Incarnation they have too often forgotten that truth of undying power of which it is the symbol, the perennial indwelling of God in man; in their Paleyan argument for God—man the watch, God the maker—they have failed to appreciate that mystic element in life which arises from the conviction of the immanence of God in the soul and in nature; and, finally, in the noble work of rescuing reason from the oblivion into which it had been banished, and placing it on its rightful throne, they did not sufficiently remember that, after all, the finer growths of spiritual life depend on direct and immediate vision, upon the going-out of a soul to a God who is felt and known, not argued about—felt and known as the boundless All in all, as one with the mysterious voice of conscience within, and one with "the blowing clover and the fallen rain" without.

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"To feel Thy power, to hear Thy voice,  
To taste Thy love, be all my choice."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Uphold me in the doubtful race,  
Nor suffer me again to stray;  
Strengthen my feet with steady pace  
Still to press forward in the way;  
My soul and flesh, O Lord of might,  
Fill, satiate, with Thy heavenly light."

While the book before us is a sufficient answer to the charge that Unitarianism is mainly concerned with negations, it is still more valuable as marking the change which has come over the spirit and atmosphere of Unitarian teaching. The old intellectual self-sufficiency is gone, and there is a fervour which every now and then breaks out into language a Wesley might have uttered. Take, for instance, Mr. Beard's lecture on Jesus Christ. Mr. Beard is far enough from accepting the orthodox doctrine of the person of Christ—further, it would appear, than Mr. Martineau; but no one can deny that, with an adequate conception of the enormous place filled by Christ, both in the religious development of the world and the life of the individual soul, he combines a passionate personal devotion to the "pale Galilean," which is really the essence of worship. It is difficult to make extracts illustrating what, after all, is more a glowing atmosphere and an inner warmth than a definite conception; but there is one passage we may quote which, perhaps more than any other, conveys the spirit of the whole. Speaking of the doctrine of Christ's sinlessness, which the author neither affirms nor denies, he says:—

It will be evident from all that I have said that I find no fault in Jesus. To criticise his words, to subject his actions to keen, dissolvent analysis—to form another estimate of his character than that which lies on the surface of the record—are things which would never have suggested themselves to me. I am content to abide in the admiring love of a disciple. But I have read many criticisms, I have formed a judgment upon many cavils, and they do not touch me. I am ready to believe that, even in the words of Christ, which I only half understand, there are unexplored depths of wisdom. I do not wish any speech of Christ's unspoken, or any deed of his undone. To me, words, character, life, are blended into full harmony, and unite to form "one entire and perfect chrysolite." I do not ask what untrodden heights of holiness still towered above the Jesus whom I love. I do not anticipate a Christ that is to be, in whose glories the Christ to whom so many ages have looked up, shall be hidden.

When new religions ask my allegiance, or philosophy assures me that in the light of fresh knowledge it is time to have done with religion, I am content to say with Peter, "Lord, to whom shall I go? Thou hast the words of eternal life."

In Mr. Beard's view, Jesus is the sacred blossoming of Humanity. He sees in Him—

Large elements in order brought,  
A tract of calm from tempest made,  
And world-wide fluctuations sway'd,  
The vassal tides that follow thought.

Christ is God's revelation to man and in man of the God-like. God was present in him, not partially, as in us, but "without measure," expressing through a true human soul his own spiritual nature.

When we look at Christ, what are we to think of patriarchs and prophets of old, of all sweet singers in Israel, of the strength of the hero, and the whiteness of the saint, and the wisdom of the Rabbi? Still more can we bring into relation to him the old Greek sages, with their earnest, childlike search into the mysteries of the universe: of Socrates, with his homely human wisdom; and the reverent, yet pitiful, awe of Æschylus and Sophocles before the mysterious sadness of human destiny; of the sweetness of him—the Buddha—who, more than any other, preceded Christ in the path of self-sacrifice for man? The latest Evangelist supplies the answer. All wisdom, all goodness, all strength, are but manifestations of that Word of God, that Divine Reason, which is His Essence. The true light is known by its universality; it is the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. It shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not; it cometh to its own, and its own receiveth it not; but not the less is it the source of all truth, the inspirer of all goodness, the light of all our seeing, the life of all our strength. No human soul but is warmed and illumined by some spark of the Divine fire—a fire that, however neglected and quenched, can never be wholly extinguished while there are those whom it kindles into heroism, or moulds, after long discipline, into saintliness, or inspires with thoughts that breathe and words that burn. And Christ is the finished manifestation of what God can and will do for a faithful human soul. He is

the perfected type of a process which is begun in every man, yet complete in none. He is the most signal proof of the fact that God is not only about us and above us, but in us. Humanity finds its highest realisation, not in stoical self-reliance, but in childlike trust: *he* is most truly man who stands in closest union with God. Christ is the firstborn of many brethren: humanity claims him as its own; his strength is our strength, his victory our victory, his God our God; the help which was his waits for us also, and he leads us into the presence of the universal Father.

Now the reader's attention is called to these passages not for the sake of the intellectual conception of the Divinity of Christ they express, but for the Evangelic zeal that breathes through them. They are not cold and lifeless, but glowing and warm, with a fervour of attachment to Christ which many a Trinitarian might envy. There is a story told of a good woman who was much shocked at finding Robertson, of Brighton, reading Channing's sermons. She objected, "But Dr. Channing could not be a good man, because he did not believe in Christ." "Pardon me," said Robertson, "he did—he loved Christ. I wish I adored him half as much as Dr. Channing did!" "But he denied that he adored him." "I cannot help that. If the lowliest reverence and the most enthusiastic love constitute adoration, Dr. Channing worshipped Christ. I care not what a man says. His homage was more adoring than that of nine out of ten who call him God." So Mr. Beard is representative of many in these days who, while they cannot accept the Orthodox doctrine of the Deity of Christ, have for him a fervour of love and a devoted attachment which makes him their Lord and Master. For what is it to be a disciple of Christ? Is it to call him God; to say, Lord, Lord? No; but it is to have the mind which dwelt in Christ, the ineffable sense of oneness with the Father.

The same sacred fire may be found burning equally bright in other pages of this volume. It is often asserted by Evangelical preachers that Unitarianism has no message for the

fallen, the degraded, the impure, because it has no keen sense of sin, and very imperfectly appreciates the dislocation wrought by sin and the sinner's guilt. We commend to such people Mr. Gordon's lecture on "Salvation," or the conclusion of Mr. Crosskey's lecture on "Man, the Offspring of God." One quotation must suffice :

Let no one imagine that too strong a conviction of the dignity of life will bring in its train too feeble a sense of the horror of sin. Sin becomes more terrible in proportion to the depth of our faith that we are God's children. When we know what we might have been—how pure and just, how loving and true, how unselfish and brave—the shame of being *what we are* is the more bitter. What is the first cry and bitter grief on the loss of a dear friend but this : "O God, that I had better proved my love !" As we feel the reality of a heavenly Father's claims upon us, we are warned to take care betimes lest when we are passing into the silent land the cry of the same anguish should be forced from our lips. Those who have the highest sense of the sacredness of life, feel its degradation most keenly. Those who cherish the loftiest ideals of character, sorrow the most sadly over their own shortcomings. Paul was in sober and solemn earnest when he cried, "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am the chief." The glory of the Christ, whose stainless spirit might have been his, shone so brightly upon him, that the slightest imperfection of which he was conscious, became dark and black as a deadly sin.

"When I was a monk," said Luther, "I frequently corresponded with Dr. Staupitz. Once I wrote to him, 'Oh, my sins ! my sins ! my sins !' whereto he replied, 'You fain would be without sin ; you have no right sin—such as murdering of parents, blaspheming, adultery, and the like. Thou hadst better keep a register of right and true sins, that so thou mayst not afflict thyself about small matters.'" Luther, like Paul, struggled towards so noble a height of holiness that none of his actions were of "small" account ; and, although he had committed no "right sins," he could only cry, "Oh, my sins ! my sins ! my sins !" Spiritual experiences such as these prove that to convince men of their childhood to God, will not cherish an ecstatic and sentimental boastfulness, but render iniquity more iniquitous to their souls.

Now it is not fanciful or far-fetched to say that this outbreak of fervour in free Liberal Churches is largely due to the engrafting of a transcendental element upon a dogmatic stock in much the same way that Evangelicalism was made fervent under the Wesleys. Both Evangelicalism and Unitarianism were comparatively barren so long as they believed that they could frame a tolerably adequate scheme of the universe and search out the Almighty to perfection. To the finer spirits in Unitarian Churches God has come to be much more than the Wise Creator, the Benevolent Ruler, the Wonderful Contriver, or even the condescending King of the Paley-Priestley School. He might be all these, and yet separated from men by an impassable gulf, having no intimate, indissoluble relations with suffering, struggling humanity. But there is much in this book, especially in Mr. Armstrong's lecture on the "Affirmation of God," which goes to show that Unitarians have felt the utter inadequacy of the "Opifex Deus" theory, and have been caught and drawn on by irresistible, viewless hands towards a more spiritual conception. God is not simply Creator, Contriver, Ruler, King. He is the All in all; the Fire of love in the Soul; the Light of reason; the Yearning of hope; the voice of conscience is the very same voice at whose sound Sinai trembled to its roots; the glory of the midnight stars, the splendour of the noon-day sun, the ineffable sweetness of a mother's face bent over her first-born, are the light of God's countenance lifted upon us.

Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

When Mr. Armstrong speaks of "the fulness of a Divine Presence flooding the soul," he is using the language of Wesley's hymns and Eckhart's meditations. The old method clings to Mr. Armstrong still, but the wine of a new life runs through it.

If God be Love, then Love is potent everywhere and always, thrills through the summer air, vibrates in the molecules of



matter, penetrates the being of the creatures who are sustained by the ever active energy of God. Love is nearer to us than the air, and closer to us than the warmth. But air we feel about our brow, and the kind warmth permeates our frames. How then should it be that love alone should have no direct mode of declaring itself to our consciousness?

How, indeed?

Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and spirit with Spirit can meet.

It is along this line that there may be discerned a certain tendency to *rapprochement* between Evangelicals and Unitarians. Those who are most fervent in feeling in either camp, for whom God is everything—light and love and glowing imagination within, glory, wonder, and beauty without—these will be drawn nearer to each other. Those whom an intellectual system satisfies will keep the farthest apart. So the apparently strange spectacle has been seen of a Unitarian minister finding himself at home in a Primitive Methodist pulpit, and the regular frequenters discovering in him no jarring note, but a warmth of devotion which made him one of themselves. It was once said of a well-known heresiarch among the Congregationalists, "He preaches like a Comtist, and prays like a Methodist;" and this fine, cultured, burning spirit, cast out by the "Union," might have been heard any Sunday last summer preaching in a little old-fashioned Independent meeting-house in an agricultural village, to a crowd of horny-handed labourers, shepherds, hedgers, ditchers, ploughmen, and their children and wives. They, good souls, knew nothing of heresy; but they knew that he who talked to them was all aglow with a sympathy, a fellow-feeling, a message of peace and goodwill, that made the dingy meeting-house none other than the House of God and the gate of heaven. It is one of the most hopeful features of the Liberal movement of our day that it is often accompanied

by an apostolic zeal, and is much more concerned to touch the heart with a sense of God as near, than to *explain* the Being of God to the mind. And while Unitarians have of late years, in the utterances of Mr. Martineau, and men of a like temper, advanced nearer to the Evangelic spirit, there has been a movement among Evangelicals away from the ancient strictness of Evangelic dogmas towards a more rational and Liberal faith. Not one Evangelical in ten thousand is to-day where the Evangelicals were thirty years ago. Mr. Dale tells us that "Mr. Spurgeon stands alone among the modern leaders of Evangelical Nonconformists in his fidelity to the older Calvinistic creed." Mr. Dale himself is a brilliant dogmatist, and, as Mr. Matthew Arnold tells us, makes "wonderful sword-play" with his hard, polished intellectualism; but even Mr. Dale admits that the Evangelical theology is passing through a period of transition. His book on the "Evangelical Revival" contains some remarkable confessions. "The Evangelical movement has produced no original theologian of the first or even the second rank;" "the power of the theological tradition is decaying;" "the authority of the theological tradition is lost." In the preface he says, "The position of those who are now entering upon ministerial work with a perfect faith in Christ, and with an earnest desire to be loyal to Him, is, on many accounts, difficult and perplexing. They have the strongest claim to generous sympathy. If my judgment on the present position of theological thought in Evangelical Churches is sound, they are breaking into new oceans, whose shores and rocks and currents have never been laid in human charts; they must steer by the sun and the stars." Mr. Dale's witness is unimpeachable. Of course, he will not for one moment assent to the view that is here taken of the probable issues of the movement of Evangelicals away from the Evangelic tradition. His hopes are fixed in a re-

constructed theology. With many others, he is on the look-out for the advent of some modern Butler, or John Howe, or Calvin, the coming theologian, who shall furnish the world with a new intellectual system of the universe, and map out the Infinite afresh. There are others who think that the days of such "masters in Israel" are for ever gone. Meanwhile, there is a growing conviction, shared as largely by Evangelicals as by Unitarians, that the saving element in religion is not in opinions and definitions at all, but in mercy, pity, peace, and love, and that men may find a common basis for worship and work in the sphere of the spiritual sympathies, and that there is often a drawing of heart to heart where there are the widest theological differences. Nothing can be said on this subject half so well as that which has been already said by Mr. Baldwin Brown in a lecture on "The Theological Revolution," and with that passage this article may fitly conclude:—"No thoughtful observer of the progress of opinion can have failed to note that, during the last generation, ecclesiastical and theological ideas have steadily declined as a basis of fellowship and co-operation, while spiritual ideas have taken their place. Men are increasingly drawn together by that which belongs to the sphere of the sympathies, and those beliefs which mould the life; while they attach less and less importance to merely intellectual agreement with regard to the propositions in which they express their judgment about the forms of truth. The old mediæval conception of unity, the unity of the faith, which stood visibly in assent to dogmas propounded as the Catholic faith by the Catholic Church, and which has lasted far on into the Protestant ages, shows at length that it is wearing out as the basis of the spiritual confederation of men. It is felt now that there may be a true spiritual oneness—oneness of interior conviction, aim, hope, and work—beneath very diverse intellectual conceptions of the deep things of God; while, on the other hand

there may be much spiritual separation, and even intense repulsion, between those who repeat the same creed, recognise the same teachers, use the same offices of devotion, and belong by profession to the same Church. It is not so very long since a distinguished member of the Church of England said publicly, in the 'leading journal,' of another yet more distinguished member of the same Church,—a man who, perhaps, of all living men, has rendered the noblest service to Christianity and his country,—that they did not believe in the same God. Unity of theological belief or confession—I by no means confound the two, but the principle in a measure holds good of both—is no sort of guarantee of that central oneness out of which alone true heart-fellowship and co-operation can spring."

JOSEPH WOOD.

## *MARRIED WOMEN'S DEBTS.*

**T**HE theoretical position of an English wife, as expounded by recent legal decisions, is, to say the least, a curious one. The current opinion is that, socially, she has increased the importance of her position by marriage. She has become the head of a household in its domestic department; she generally regulates all its internal arrangements, engages and dismisses the servants, purchases all the provisions for the family, orders their clothing, buys what new furniture the increasing requirements of the establishment demand, and sees that the old furniture is kept in repair.

All this is done in most households, as a matter of course, by the mistress. It awakens no suspicion in the minds of the milliner, the butcher, or the greengrocer when a lady walks into his establishment to order goods for herself, her children, or her family; it would, on the contrary, excite his astonishment if the master, the legal head of the household, came in her place to purchase the bonnets, the legs of mutton, or the potatoes. And yet, in supplying goods to this apparently important person, these tradesmen are serving one who has no responsibility of her own in the matter, and who has not, necessarily, any responsible person behind her to take the consequences of her actions. The law has, by a unique exercise of ingenuity, chosen to set her free to obtain what credit she can without causing any inconvenient consequences to herself or her friends.

There was a remarkable decision given some time ago against an unfortunate butcher, who had supplied meat to

an apparently affluent family at a cost which would have completely supported a curate's household for the period of time represented on the account. In this case the husband was insane, and the wife had an ample sum allowed to her annually for the maintenance of her establishment and the support of her children. She spent all the sum in one year *without* paying the butcher's bill; and the legal comment on the fact was that the bill need not be paid at all. *She* could not be made responsible, and nobody else could. So the butcher, a comparatively poor man, had the pleasure of paying for his cows and his sheep, and of handing them over for the sustenance of a luxurious household without receiving a penny in return. The household could go on as before, with undiminished servants; the lady could live as before, with an uncurtailed number of dresses; and the butcher, if necessary, must go into the Bankruptcy Court, it being nobody's business to see that he was paid.

The recent decision against Messrs. Debenham and Freebody, which was confirmed by the House of Lords, affords, perhaps, a still more serious example of the position in which the law places married women.

It appears, from this decision, that a husband may make a private allowance to his wife, and, if she exceeds it by the purchase of dresses which need be in no way unsuited to the requirements of her position, neither he nor she is obliged to pay the tradesman who has supplied the dresses. The tradesman has no means of knowing that the husband makes his wife an allowance. The style of dress ordered affords no hint that he is providing an article which the husband would disapprove of, or could not afford to pay for. The County Court backs him up in the recovery of other debts incurred in a similar way, and the lady is apparently a responsible person, living in harmony with her husband, and acting undoubtedly as his agent in the purchase of some household goods.

It seems, therefore—at least, so far as a feminine brain can follow these intricate decisions of masculine justice—that married women are the only sane adult persons in England who can contract debts without making themselves or any one else responsible for their payment.

Probably the majority of middle-class women have allowances made to them by their husbands for dress and other personal expenses, because this is found to be the most convenient arrangement for both husband and wife. And it is, doubtless, the case of many a wife, that she must, at times, find her allowance inconveniently small; and yet, because of her sympathy with her husband's desires for economy, she may not wish to demand from him a larger sum. She now understands, for the first time, that it is possible (on any future occasion, when an important invitation, or some other particular temptation, causes her to wish for an unusually expensive dress) to go and order such a dress at one of the shops where she is accustomed to make her purchases, and where credit would certainly not be refused to her, and afterwards to decline payment, on the plea that she has already spent the yearly sum allowed to her by her husband. No one would suffer except the shopkeeper. She could, with a tranquil mind, watch him taking his case from one Court to another, and know that he was only wasting his money, and could not touch her husband's pocket or her own.

The anomaly of the position seems to lie in the fact that the law has chosen for many generations to consider a woman's personality sunk in that of her husband as soon as she marries. What rights belonged to her in days long past, when the early Saxon idea of partnership in marriage still survived, passed away long ago. The feeling of the judges has been what it still is, that "the husband must be protected." They cannot any of them be in the remotest danger of becoming either shopkeepers or wives; it is too

much, therefore, perhaps to expect that the necessity of protecting these two classes should present itself as strongly to the judicial mind. The judges of the past gradually decided away all a wife's ancient rights of dower and rights to her own property, until she had no claim on her husband beyond the barest maintenance while he lived, and might be made a beggar at his death, even if she had brought him a fortune in money. The unfairness became so iniquitous that direct legislation had to be brought to bear on the subject, and a new law made to correct the partial leanings of individual judgments.

Other upright men, besides judges, look at the matter in the same way; they answer indignantly, "The husband must be protected," when it is a question of the difficulties an extravagant wife may bring upon his head; and they reply, on the other hand (with the same complete sense of justice and unanswerable logic), "Well, well, she must take the consequences of marrying him," when it is a question of the difficulties an extravagant husband may bring upon the head of his wife.

This existing right of a wife to incur debt without responsibility is a curious survival, when so many of her ancient wrongs are already dying and some are actually dead. The old problem of the law with regard to marriage seemed to be, How was a man to be enabled to marry a woman with the greatest possible advantage, and the least possible inconvenience to himself. The first idea to be carried out was, of course, that everything she had should become his; the second was, that nothing he had should become hers. Some security had to be left to her for a decent maintenance while he lived, or else it was to be doubted whether even the meek woman of the past could be tempted into matrimony. Property questions being disposed of satisfactorily, to his complete gain and her total loss (except when family interests,



more imperative than individual rights, interfered), there remained the difficulty of her character. It was natural and right that he should profit by her fortune, if she had any ; it was, however, as a learned judge has told us, "monstrous" that he should lose by her extravagance. The partnership must be without risk—at least to himself, however his wife or the world outside might suffer. The woman had sunk her own individuality when she married ; it now appears that she had not sunk it into that of her husband, but into nothing : it did not exist any more. As she had no property rights, she could not be responsible for debt ; and her husband, although he had her property rights, need not be responsible either.

The position does not seem, strictly speaking, a reasonable one. If a woman is a man's housekeeper, or his servant, she can make her own debts ; if she orders things for which he is not responsible, she becomes so herself : the tradesman has therefore some sort of protection. But it is not so with a wife ; and it is surely an anomaly in the present day that the law which has deprived a married woman of the responsibility of every other adult person should declare that the responsibility is not transferred, but annulled. The fact that her husband is excused from paying the bills she incurs because he makes her a sufficient personal allowance should, in all equity, carry the conclusion that the tradesman has a claim on that allowance, just as he would have on the wages of a housemaid or a housekeeper. It seems to us what a learned judge might call "monstrous" that the wife should not suffer even a slight contraction of her next year's expenditure for past extravagance, while the tradesman must pay for his ignorance of her family arrangements by total loss.

It is possible that the much-to-be-considered husband may object to his wife's liability to be sued separately ; he

may even dislike to see her wearing shabby dresses one year in her effort to pay for the extravagance of the year before. If, however, he desires the luxury of a wife who is not a legally responsible person, and wishes to avoid the unpleasant consequences of her being considered one, he should be willing to become responsible in her place. He has the choice of two positions, even after rejecting the theory of partnership and equality. He may allow his wife to have as definite a claim upon him as a servant receiving wages, which would put her into a position to be sued separately ; or he may consider her a piece of living domestic property. The latter is, perhaps, the nearer to the position he has so far preferred to accept ; but if he so chooses, he must in all reason be willing to be as responsible for the actions of his wife as he is for any other domestic creature whose owner he has thought fit to become. If she has about the same claim upon him as his horse or his dog (that is to say, for sufficient maintenance and decent usage), and if the law puts her as much out of the pale of independent civil action as these animals, he ought to be as responsible for her misdoings as he is for theirs. If his dog worries his neighbour's poultry, he must pay damages ; if his horse puts its heel through his neighbour's window, he must settle the consequent glazier's bill. He has to suffer for the misdoings of the domestic creatures he chooses to adopt, and he should suffer in the same way for his wife's.

It appears, however, that he may reject all these alternatives ; he may make his wife an exception to every rule, even while he is clothing her with apparent authority, and letting her act as his ostensible (convenient word to be taken up or thrown aside as required) agent ; even although he would, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, be insulted if he were called upon by a tradesman for confirmation of his wife's authority. Courtesy to *him* requires that her re-

sponsible position should be received without question by outsiders; justice to *him* demands that he should not be involved in the results.

We are told that the result of these decisions, though they are "severe" to the tradesmen, will, on the whole, be beneficial. They will discourage the credit system. We cannot, however, consider this a satisfactory plea for any injustice, however small. If the credit system is to be attacked, let it be attacked openly and directly, and let not the line of attack be conducted through one class of customers only. But even supposing that the side-blow given to the credit system by these decisions may have a favourable moral influence, the indirect encouragement given to men to irresponsibility concerning the conduct of their wives must have an unfavourable one to balance it. It is not good for society in general that a man should be able to choose the mistress of his household and the mother of his children entirely according to the money or position she possesses, and without regard to the inconvenient points of her character. It may be supposed that the most selfish men consider a little before marrying a foolish wife, when they know that they will have to bear the consequences of her folly; and such a controlling thought is needed by many selfish men. The importance of *character* in matrimonial choice, and the wrongfulness of entering into a partnership with levity or faultiness, when it will put such levity or faultiness into a position pregnant with consequences to society, are by no means too deeply impressed on the present generation. Therefore, for the sake of society in general, it is not advisable that a man should know that he may marry a thriftless, self-indulgent woman, who is obviously unfit to direct servants, or to educate children, with little loss or inconvenience to himself.

In conclusion, we would ask if there is no immediate

protection for the shopkeeper ; for, in many cases, he will not be able to accomplish at once the change to the no-credit system. If a woman cannot be sued civilly, may she not be sued criminally, and charged with obtaining goods on false pretences, whenever she has allowed the shopkeeper to believe that her husband will hold himself responsible for the debts she incurs ?

A. ARMITT.

### SOME NOTES ON THE REVISED VERSION.

I CANNOT better introduce these Notes on the Revised Version of the New Testament than by recording my emphatic dissent from Archdeacon Denison in his refusal even to thank, or to be a party to thanking, the Revisers for their ten or eleven years' self-sacrificing and arduous toil. For my part, I think we ought to be devoutly thankful that we have got a New Version at all. I do not know that any of the subscribers to the *Modern Review* are likely to feel quite so deep an interest in getting the best rendering of the best text as the Archdeacon himself ought to feel. I suppose that most of them believe that the true credentials of religion lie deeper than Authorised Versions or Revised Translations, or Greek MSS. either; that they are written not with pen and ink, not inscribed on paper or parchment, nor even engraved on stone, but rather stamped indelibly on the fleshy tablets of the heart. Our religion, I imagine, would survive not only the corruption of texts but the destruction of Bibles, and recreate itself with every new-born soul—for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven. But the history of religion is a matter only next in importance to the essence of religion; and we like to read that history in reliable records. We do not want the theology of the tenth, the seventeenth, or the nineteenth century to be obtruded upon us when we are trying to study that of the first or second. Therefore, though in an inferior degree to Archdeacon Denison, we are interested, and deeply interested, in a faithful Version of the

New Testament, and ought to be thankful even for a very partially successful attempt to give it us. But if I am opposed to Archdeacon Denison on the general question of gratitude, I am still more at issue with him in respect of the reasons, or rather the unreasons, on which his gratitude is withheld. His chief objection to the Revision is the presence among the Revisers of the Rev. Dr. Vance Smith. I wonder whether it would be as easy to substantiate the even comparative orthodoxy of some of the copyists and interpolators—Arians, Nestorians, Monophysites, Gnostics, Donatists, Manichees—through whose hands the Greek text must have passed, as it would that of the respected and much maligned Professor at the Carmarthen College. My sentiments with regard to that gentleman are of a very different kind. I wish that there had been ten men on the Company, combining Dr. Vance Smith's candour and erudition with Archdeacon Denison's sturdiness of stubborn determination. Then, indeed, we might have had a Revision which needed not to be revised again—at least for some time to come. As it is, this is not the case. Revision alike of text and of translation is first only half done; secondly, done with a sublime inconsistency; thirdly, in some notorious cases, is of a positively retrograde and reactionary character. In too many instances the Revisers, like the Pharisees of old, have tithed mint and anise and cummin, and left out of sight the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and faith; nay, in one instance, at least, the most elementary canons of fairness and veracity.

On a general survey of the Revised Version, I am sorely tempted to cry with Dicæopolis, in the "Acharnians" of Aristophanes:

While many a thing has cut me to the heart,  
Few, very few, have pleased me—three or four;  
My woes are thousand-sandfold shingle stones.

But let me begin with praise. *Mein erst Gesang sei Preis*

*und Dank.* In Matthew v. 22, instead of "Every one who is angry with his brother without a cause," we read, "Every one who is angry with his brother," making the prohibition absolute. This emendation rests on the authority of the Sinaitic and Vatican Codices. It is abundantly substantiated by Scholia, and citations from the Fathers. The *εἰκῇ* (without cause) is a mere gloss. It totally subverts the intention of the passage; for where was ever the angry man who would allow that he had no cause for his anger? See, on this head, Tischendorf's "Editio Octava Critica Major." We could have spared the marginal note, "Many ancient authorities insert *without cause*"; or, at least, we would improve it into "Many ancient authorities, without cause, add *without cause*." A still more important emendation is that of Matthew vi. 4, 6, 18, where in all three places the word "openly" is left out. This, too, is an undoubted gloss, absent from all the best MSS., and it utterly ruins the unworldliness of the promise, "Thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee," by the introduction of an other-worldliness, the notion of a big display at the Day of Judgment, wholly foreign, as I believe, to the spirituality of the mind of Christ, a corruption of Christianity far more pernicious than any metaphysical dogma, because it cuts at the very foundation of Christian ethics, and, moreover, is "understanded of the people," and appeals to the vulgarest and most selfish instincts. Here, too, we have the benefit unmixed. We have no marginal reading, invoking ancient authorities to neutralise the value of the emended text. If the Revisers had done nothing else than restore this passage to its pristine purity, they would have deserved well of their country.

With regard to the "Evil One," in the Lord's Prayer, it is literally a choice of evils. There is no doubt that Jesus believed, or, at least, did not disbelieve, in a personal devil. The real evil in the matter is that our

English language cannot imitate the undoubted ambiguity of the Greek original, as the Germans do when they improve upon Luther, by rendering "*Erlöse uns von dem Bösen*," instead of "*von dem Uebel*." That is the ideal translation, and, like the Greek, would be understood by the superstitious infallibly of a Person, by the cultured of abstract Evil.

As for the Hell of Fire, I agree with Dr. Vance Smith, that Gehenna would be much better, because a proper name should be rendered as a proper name: and I will only add with regard to "hell" that it is an interesting and curious fact that the same root should be employed in Latin for the vault above, and in the Teutonic tongues for the vault beneath. *Cælum* and *Hölle*, *ciel* and *hell* are etymologically identical in everything but gender, termination, and meaning. The notion common to both is *hollowness*, *κοῖλον* in Greek: And it is a fair question which is the more hollow—the popular heaven or the popular hell. In one of Swedenborg's visions he met with a number of people who were perfectly comfortable in hell, being under the pleasing hallucination that they were in heaven all the time. There is much profundity of insight in this vision of Swedenborg's.

The inconsistency of the Revisers is often extraordinary. They have mistranslated Gehenna, which is a proper name, and they have refused to translate *Raca*, which is not a proper name. As for *μωπέ*, which they still call "fool," they may be right or they may be wrong. If they are right, I am afraid S. Paul must fall under the condemnation; if they are wrong, and "O vain man!" is nearer the true meaning (and this, at all events, is the sense of *Raca*), it bears equally hard upon the author of the Epistle ascribed to James. But it comes to much the same thing whether we regard the word as Greek or Hebrew. Probably it was one of those expressions in which Greeks were accustomed to indulge in a sort of popular etymology, half unconsciously



identifying the Greek *μωρέ* with the Hebrew *Moreh*. The word *μωρέ* has had a curious history since then. In many parts of Greece, especially in the Peloponnese, which is popularly supposed thence to have derived its name—though others say it is from its resemblance to a mulberry leaf—*μωρέ* has become a simple vocative interjection, generally coupled with *ἀδελφέ*, so that you may any day hear the Greek peasant shouting to his compeers across the fields, *Μωρὲ ἀδελφέ*, literally “brother fool!” merely to attract his attention, or to emphasize a remark. But he does not mean to call his brother a fool. The phrase has degenerated to a mere exclamation, pretty nearly equivalent to “Halloa, there,” or “I say!” In all these matters a slavish literalism is abhorrent to common sense and the spirit of the Gospel.

To pass to another point. Dr. Vance Smith has dwelt at some length, and with great justice, on the insufficient attention paid by the Revisers to the idioms of Hellenistic Greek. I fully endorse all he has said, and I have something to add to it. What is called Hellenistic Greek is partly Hebraistic, but to a still larger extent it is simply Modern Greek in the making. Is it too much to expect among a score of Revisers that some one or more of them should have some acquaintance with Greek in a later stage than that of classical times?

’Twill save us from a thousand snares  
To mind Romaic young.

Never was this so brought home to me as by reading the Revised Version. In every passage where the words *ὁ μικρότερος*, *ὁ μέζων* occur, the Revisers have rendered either in text or margin “the less” or “the greater,” making next to nonsense of the English. Now, as a matter of fact in modern Greek,—that is, in good idiomatic modern Greek, uncorrupted by pedants,—*ὁ μικρότερος*, κ.τ.λ., is the only possible way of saying “the

least;” ὁ μικρότατος would mean not “the least,” but the “very little one.” And I am not aware that the article is ever in the New Testament joined with the superlative degree, in the sense of “the greatest,” “the least,” and the like. The same kind of ignorant worship of classical antiquity has caused the Revisers to translate Matthew xxiii. 25, γέμουσιν ἐξ ἀρπαγῆς καὶ ἀκρασίας, “are full from extortion and excess;” and worst of all Mark xi. 19, ὅταν ὀψὲ ἐγένετο ἐξεπορεύετο ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, “every evening he went forth out of the city,” with the marginal note, “Greek: Whenever evening came,”—in spite of the Alexandrian, which actually reads ὅτε, and the Vulgate and Itala, which translate *quum vespera facta esset*, and *quum serum factum esset* respectively; as if every post-classical writer from Polybius onwards did not use ὅταν with the aorist indicative for ὅτε, and it were not obvious to the meanest intelligence that if the writer had wished to say “whenever evening came,” he would have written ὅσάκις ὀψὲ ἐγένετο. One feels tempted to adapt the celebrated sarcasm of Lord Westbury, and observe to the Revisers that if they had only known a little later Greek, they would have known a little of everything. The same fallacious literalism, in a milder form, gives us, “Leave the dead to bury their dead,” instead of “Let the dead bury their dead”; and retains the Authorised rendering, “Let be,” “let us see,” ἄφες, ἴδωμεν, in apparent ignorance of the fact that ἄφες, ἴδωμεν and the like, are the beginnings of the Romaic ἄς, ἴδωμεν, &c., the subjunctive, by itself, no longer in New Testament Greek having sufficient hortatory force to stand alone. In the marginal notes to the Apocalypse we have “one voice,” “one” angel, and so forth, where the numeral, as in English and modern Greek, is simply the indefinite article.

So, too, the goats at the day of judgment, ἐρίφια, become “kids” in the margin, as though all the saints were

adults and all the sinners children. Thus, again, *πλοῖα* are "little boats," and so on, the modern employment of diminutives without any force, though it dates back to Aristophanes, being left altogether out of sight. The servile adherence to supposed classical usage in some places, is only to be equalled by the utter disregard of all Greek usage in others. For instance, in Mark x. 32, as an optional rendering for "they that followed were afraid," itself a very doubtful translation, we read in the margin, "but some as they followed were afraid." Now *οἱ δὲ* cannot mean "but some," unless only in the sense of "but others," when preceded by *οἱ μὲν*. *Οἱ δὲ* in the sense of "but some," as though it were *ἀλλὰ τινες*, or *τινὲς ὁμῶς*, is neither Classical, Alexandrian, Hellenistic, Byzantine, Mediæval, nor Modern Greek. It is not Greek at all. What is gained by giving in the margin as an alternative for "depart from me, ye cursed," "Depart from me under a curse"? No one who is familiar with the vocative *κατηραμένοι* in Modern Greek will doubt that the plural is also vocative here. Or if there be a doubt, why not render simply "Depart from me, accursed," leaving the reader to take his choice how he understands it? What authority is there, again, for the marginal and mild euphemism, "scourge severely," as a translation of *δειχομένησει*? Why should *κῆτος* be rendered sea-monster, except to enable some persons of rather feeble faith to accept the story of the whale swallowing Jonah, as if an old legend of this kind demanded scientific plausibility in all its details. Perhaps a whale was meant; perhaps it was not.

We pass on to Luke ii. 2, and here we find an alteration of considerable importance, which, all things considered, is one of the most audacious proceedings it has ever been my fortune to come across.

In place of the Authorised Version, "This taxing was first made when Cyrenius was Governor of Syria," an un-

doubtedly correct rendering of the reading which King James' translators had before them, viz., *Αὕτη ἡ ἀπογραφὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο ἡγεμονεύοντος τῆς Συρίας Κυρηναίου*, the Revisers have substituted without a marginal note or a word of comment, "This was the first enrolment made when Quirinius was Governor of Syria."

Now, had it been the practice of the Revisers to follow a text which they considered the best, and take no notice of one for which they thought the evidence was not so good, we might have dissented from their conclusions, as in this case I most emphatically do, but we should have no cause to complain. But such is not their practice, still less is it their profession. On the contrary, in their Preface they state expressly—"Many places still remain in which, for the present, it would not be safe to accept one reading to the absolute exclusion of others. In these cases we have given alternative readings wherever they seem to be of sufficient importance or interest to deserve notice. In the introductory formula, the phrases "many ancient authorities," "some ancient authorities," are used with some latitude to denote a greater or lesser proportion of those authorities which have a distinctive right to be called ancient. These authorities comprise not only Greek manuscripts, some of which were written in the fourth and fifth centuries, but versions of a still earlier date in different languages, and also quotations by Christian writers of the second and following centuries." So much for their profession, and now what of their practice? Why, so far as I can discover, whenever there is anything whatever to be said for a reading which has long been a favourite for dogmatic reasons, although the balance of evidence may be overwhelmingly against it, that time-hallowed reading is put in the margin, and bolstered up by the somewhat vague declaration that it is supported by many ancient authorities. And here, by the way, I may remark on the most unfortunate

and misleading system of reference adopted in the foot-notes of the continuous Greek text, which the Oxford Press has issued under the editorship of one of the Revisers, my old tutor, Archdeacon Palmer, as a companion volume to the Revised New Testament. Here these various readings given in the margin of the Revised Version as supported by ancient authorities, are found with the capital letters A., A.S., or A.S.M., or some one or more of these, appended. Now, in Tischendorf's English New Testament, 1869, A. is the accepted symbol for the Alexandrine, S. for the Sinaitic Manuscript, while M. is used by Tischendorf and others to represent another uncial MS. The natural consequence is, that the half-instructed reader will be led to suppose that the letters A.S.M. in the continuous Greek text define and interpret the vague expression "many ancient authorities" in the margin of the Revised New Testament to mean the Alexandrine, the Sinaitic, and the Parisian Codex 48 respectively. If he be a discreet man, he will read the Preface to the Greek Text, where he will learn, possibly to his dismay, that A. means simply the reading supposed to have been followed by the Translators of the Authorised Version, S. means the third edition of Stephanus, and M. means margin of Revised New Testament. So that, so far as any positive information on the part of the Revisers goes, the many ancient authorities reduce themselves to one Greek Text, and two English Versions, dating 1550, 1611, and 1881 respectively; all of them venerable, no doubt, but not one of them of very high antiquity, and the last decidedly late. However, it will be said that if any one is foolish enough, or ignorant enough, to be misled in this way, he deserves to be misled. Yet it seemed worth while to put in a plea for the weaker brethren amongst us, such as that excellent Methodist minister, who is reported to have said, in a sermon on the dangers of carnal learning, "What do we want, brethren, with Latin, and Hebrew,

and Greek? Is not Paul's fine old Saxon English good enough for us?"

To return, however, to the subject immediately before us. As a rule, whenever Stephanus and the Authorised Translation are supported by any evidence at all worth naming in their divergence from the reading adopted in the text, a translation of their reading is given in the margin as supported by ancient authority. This is both the profession and the almost universal practice of the Revisers; and, therefore, the uninstructed reader, when he comes to Luke ii. 2, relying on the pledged word of the Revisers that they have always inserted a various reading in the margin, whenever it was at all deserving of consideration, a pledge twice repeated in the Preface, will at once conclude that our Authorised Version, "This taxing was first made when Cyrenius was governor of Syria," is a simple error, and that the reading on which it was founded—*αὐτῇ ἡ ἀπογραφὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο*—rests upon no ancient authority whatever. This he is justified in inferring—nay, this he is bound to infer. What are the facts of the case? I am almost ashamed to state them. The reading, *αὐτῇ ἡ ἀπογραφὴ* is, in the first place, the commonest reading; it is supported by nine uncial MSS., among them the Alexandrian, and by the Sahidic and Coptic versions. It was adopted by Tischendorf in 1859, retained by him till Christmas, 1868, and only abandoned by him between Christmas, 1868, and Ascension Day, 1869. And why? The only two ancient authorities that simply omit the article are the Vatican and the Codex Bezae, one of them earlier, and the other later, than the Alexandrian. And now we naturally ask on which side is the Codex Sinaiticus? Well, in the first place, the article appears there, but Tischendorf decides that it was inserted at the beginning of the seventh century. The original reading, however, of the Sinaitic MS. is not *αὐτῇ ἀπογραφῇ*, but

*αὐτὴν ἀπογραφὴν*—a later hand, still in the fourth century, or, possibly, as Tischendorf thinks, the writer himself, afterwards corrected, or thought to correct, *αὐτὴν ἀπογραφὴν* into *αὐτὴ ἀπογραφὴ*. This is the reading that Tischendorf adopts in his “Editio Octava Critica Major,” and this is the reading the Revisionists have followed without so much as a hint that any other is for a moment to be thought of. Tischendorf seems never to have asked himself the question, How are we to explain so ungrammatical a reading as *αὐτὴν ἀπογραφὴν* ? Now, I think I can undertake to explain it; and if my explanation is correct, it is fatal to the reading of the Revisionists. I have very serious doubts whether, if the truth were known, ΑΤΤΗΝΑΠΟΓΡΑΦΗΝ is the reading of the Sinaitic MS. at all. It never could be meant to be the reading by any sane scribe who wrote it. If he wrote it, he wrote it in absence of mind, not attending to the meaning, and he copied it from something else. What did he copy it from? Any one who will look at an uncial MS. like the Sinaitic, and observe how the middle line of the N sometimes begins a little below the tip of the first line, and ends a little above the tip of the second; any one who will then inspect the H, and remark how the cross-line sometimes slants, will see how easily the two letters might be confused in writing and confounded in reading; and, for my own part, I feel strongly inclined to the opinion that ΑΤΤΗΝΑΠΟΓΡΑΦΗΝ ΠΡΩΤΗ (observe, not ΠΡΩΤΗΝ) is simply either a misreading of Tischendorf’s, or a miswriting of the original scribe for ΑΤΤΗΗΑΠΟΓΡΑΦΗΗ ΠΡΩΤΗ. Thus I believe that in the Sinaitic, or the text on which it was based, so far from there being no article, the article occurred twice over, and if we are to follow the Sinaitic, we should translate neither with the Authorised, “This taxing was first made when Cyrenius was Governor of Syria,” nor with the Revisers, “This was the first enrol-

ment made when Cyrenius was Governor of Syria;" but "This, the first taxing, was made when Cyrenius was Governor of Syria." But what, then, in the face of this conflicting evidence, induced two-thirds of the Revisers, at the least, to vote for this alteration of the received text and the received version, and its total suppression in the margin? Was it simply Tischendorf's authority? Certainly not; for when it is a question of correcting the grammar of the Apocalypse, where possible, they have boldly done so, in defiance alike of Tischendorf and the best MSS., to the no small imperilling of their souls, if we may believe the concluding words of the Seer of Patmos' Isle. And surely it was not MSS., and it was not Tischendorf, that caused them so carefully to suppress all indications of any other reading in the margin, or the accompanying Greek Text. It was quite another consideration.

Man merkt die Absicht, und man wird verstimmt.

"One marks the object, and one gets annoyed," as Goethe says in *Faust*. It was to save the historical credit of the Evangelist. It was in order to suggest that this was the first enrolment (not taxation) under a previous governorship of Quirinius, of which enrolment history elsewhere contains no record, whereas ten or fourteen years afterwards, when Quirinius was for the second time Governor of Syria (though it is more than doubtful whether he ever was so before), the *taxation* which history does record did take place.

It is needless to say that the credit of the Evangelist, if it is worth saving, is not to be saved by such miserable expedients as this. It is much better, as Keim says, to acknowledge a simple error of the writer, which one may well pardon him if one has regard to the absence of his data for chronological calculation on the one hand, and on the other to the ideal beauty and truth of the thought that



Jesus was born at the time of the complete enslavement of his people, which, however, was also the time of their enrolment into the empire of the world. The error itself, however, we may all the more readily concede, in that a series of demonstrable historical errors have befallen him, and that in connection with the very same historical problem. Thus he designates the taxing as a taxing of the whole Roman world, whereas it was confined to Syria. Moreover, Luke (supposing him as Keim, and the Revisers, doubtless, do, the author of Acts v. 37), has spoken of the taxing in such a manner as (1) to place it after the rise of Theudas (this time too late instead of too early), which, however, took place many years later under the Emperor Claudius; (2) so as to make the orator Gamaliel, at the time of the Emperor Tiberius, speak of the rise of Theudas as a thing of the past, whereas it was still in the future.

To substitute "enrolment" for "taxing" is also a feeble expedient. "Taxing" means, literally and etymologically, registration, census, or enrolment, taking stock of population, property, and effects, with a view to levying imposts. The Latin words *descriptio*, *professio*, with which the various Latin versions and the citations of the Latin fathers translate the Greek ἀπογραφή, have the same technical sense. The ἀπογραφή of Luke vii. 2 is the ἀπογραφή of Acts v. 37, which the Revisionists, consistently enough, also translate "enrolment." This was the "enrolment" for purposes of taxation that occasioned the insurrection under Judas Galilæus. It was the first enrolment. Had there been a previous one, there would have also been a previous insurrection; and we should certainly have heard of it. No previous one was possible, for the simple reason that until the time of the taxation, Judæa had not been annexed.

I now come to something more agreeable, but I have to go back to Mark for it. Before, however, I advert to this

pleasing feature, I must remark on one that is not quite so pleasing, because it places in the strongest relief the utter inconsistency and vacillation of the Revisers. They introduce *υἱοῦ θεοῦ*, in Mark i. 1, into the text, against Tischendorf's quite unanswerable arguments, and only remark in the margin: "Some ancient authorities omit *the Son of God*." I should think so. The interpolation of the words in the Sinaitic MS., and their omission in numerous Fathers from Irenæus onwards, who make a point of the brevity with which the Evangelist passes from "the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ" to the following words "as it is written," leave no doubt as to their being a later addition. Besides, as Tischendorf well points out, a *pietas male sedula* would be likely enough to introduce them, and even a *modica fides* unlikely to leave them out. In verse 2, however, the Revisers bow to the authority of Tischendorf and the best MSS. and versions, and substitute "the prophet Isaiah" for the plural "prophets" of the authorities. This redounds in the highest degree to their credit, in a lower to their consistency; while it involves Mark in the mistake of ascribing a quotation from Malachi to Isaiah.

To return to Luke. It is hard to surrender "Peace on earth, goodwill toward men" for "Peace on earth to men of good pleasure." Nor can I believe, in spite of the manuscripts, that *ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας* is correct. At least, if it be, it must be, I think, accusative plural, not genitive singular; and in the preposition *ἐν* after *δόξα* and *εἰρήνη*—the latter of which fluctuates in the MSS.—we have possibly the traces of an accusative for this word also. Either the nominative or the accusative would in itself be good Greek, only all the members of the clause should be alike. Origen has three times written *εὐδοκία* (according to the MSS.), nominative singular, in his comment on this passage, and only appears to sanction *εὐδοκίας* in the Latin form of his

writing, where, after all, the first *bonæ voluntatis* may stand for *bonæ voluntates*, and be meant for plural nominative. Anyhow, *ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας*, in the sense of *hominibus bonæ voluntatis*, cannot possibly stand unchallenged. No doubt it has been altered by a later hand in the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS., but altered, I imagine, for a very good reason, because it was not understood in the way that the Itala and Vulgate understood it. It was altered because the Greek copyists regarded it as meant for an accusative plural, and as in their copies the other members were in the nominative, they cut the knot by striking out the *Σ*. But that *ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας* can mean "men of good pleasure," or that it would have entered the mind of any Greek ancient or modern to suppose it could, is more than I can believe. *Ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας* in that sense is just as little Greek as *hominibus benevolentia* would have been Latin for the same. The Latin translators mask the badness of their rendering by dexterously substituting the adjective *bonæ* for the adverb-in-composition *εὖ*, thus making good Latin out of bad Greek. But it will not do for all that.

In Luke vi. 35 *μηδὲν ἀπελπίζοντες* is rendered by the Revisers "never-despairing." This is certainly the most natural meaning of the Greek, for I am not aware that *ἀπελπίζω* can ever elsewhere be shown to mean anything but "despair" or "drive to despair." Yet I cannot help thinking when I compare *ἀπολαβεῖν* in the context, that Luke meant the word to have this sense for this occasion only—in fact, that it was fresh compounded for the purpose. Many versions read *μηδένα ἀπελπίζοντες*, and render "driving no one to despair;" that is, I presume, by dunning him for debts; but I cannot find any authority for the Revisers' marginal rendering of the same reading, "despairing of no man."

An important and painful omission is marginally noted in

Luke xxiii. 34, viz., "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," which some good MSS. and ancient versions omit altogether, and others bracket or mark with an asterisk. It is plain that the prayer which our modern Christians regard as among the most precious of all recorded words of Jesus, and which even Strauss was struck by, was a stone of stumbling to the early believers. This is easily explained. That Jesus should pray for his enemies and theirs, and even absolve them from wilful sin, was by no means according to their mind. Moreover, its acceptance as a genuine word of their Master's involved them in a serious dilemma. For either the prayer of Jesus was answered, or it was not answered. The one alternative their zeal recoiled from, the other their reverence could not brook.

In the fourth Gospel (ii. 9) the solicitude of the Revisers for the character and respectability of the associates with whom Jesus—the friend of publicans and sinners, whom his enemies even charged with himself being a gluttonous man a wine-bibber—consorted, is so overstrung, that, far from giving the words *δραν μεθυσθῶσιν* their only honest rendering, "when men have got drunk," they even weaken the Authorised Version, "when men have *well* drunk," into "when men have drunk freely." This is pitiable weakness. Much to be commended are they, upon the other hand, for restoring the natural historical force of the aorist in John xviii. 24, "Annas sent" for "Annas had sent," which seems only to have been so given in the Authorised Version with a view to an approximate reconciliation between the fourth evangelist and the synoptics.

In Acts ii. 3 the marginal rendering, tongues "distributing themselves," should certainly have been introduced into the text, for the connexion, as well as the force, of the word *διαμεριζόμεναι*, shows plainly that the author meant, not "cloven tongues," but "one tongue to each person."

We cannot equally congratulate the Revisers on their marginal note on Acts ix. 7, where they suggest "sound" as an alternative for "voice;" the Greek being *φωνῆς*. This is a miserable subterfuge for bringing the account given by the author of Acts into seeming accord with that attributed to Paul himself in Acts xxii. 9, where he is made to say, "They that were with me beheld indeed the light, but they heard not the voice of him that spake to me." The English reader will, of course, suppose that there is a difference in the Greek word in the two cases, and be thus needlessly misled.

In Galatians and elsewhere the Revisers obstinately refuse to acknowledge the personality of the *στοιχεῖα* or "elements," "genii" of St. Paul. They might at least have recognised this to me and many others quite obvious translation in the margin. Just as little can they concede to writers of the Tübingen School that *ψεύστης ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ*, John viii. 45, means "he is a liar, and his father before him," or perhaps "his father, too, is a liar," although one of these two alternatives is the only possible meaning of the Greek. They have done well in Philip-  
pians iii. 9, to give the right rendering in the margin, but wrong to retain an indubitably false one in the text: *μὴ ἔχων ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου*, must mean, "Not having for my righteousness that which is of the law." It cannot mean, "Not having my own righteousness." One good thing the Revisers have done; they have not admitted the ingenious suggestion of Mr. Samuel Sharpe, as to Galatians ii. 1, into the text, but they would have done better, as the American Committee tell them, to "strike it out of the margin." It is singular that with the very various meanings which *διὰ* with a genitive has, Mr. Sharpe should have pitched upon just the one which it never has or could have. *Διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν* might mean

"throughout fourteen years;" it might mean "*at intervals of fourteen years*;" it might mean "*at an interval of fourteen years*," or "*after fourteen years*," which it plainly does mean here; but that it should mean "*at intervals during fourteen years*" has never even suggested itself to any human being but Mr. Sharpe, to any translator or commentator of the Scriptures Ancient or Modern, Syriac, Coptic, Gothic, Armenian, Latin, Modern Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Flemish, Swedish or Danish, Welsh, Erse or Gaelic, so far as I have been able to find out, and would assuredly never have entered the mind of Mr. Sharpe himself had he not been thereunto provoked and determined by a desire to harmonize Galatians with Acts. Mr. Sharpe points out, indeed, that if Paul had wished to say *after*, he could have said *after*, and did say *after*, in i. 18. Just so; but he wished to say more than after. "After three" years would not so absolutely have excluded any visit of less importance during those three years, as "*at an interval of fourteen*" years does absolutely exclude any visit, great or small, during the course of those fourteen years. Surely, had Mr. Sharpe's translation been even thought remotely possible by any person really familiar with Greek, Chrysostom would never have been reduced to the desperate expedient of dating Paul's fourteen years from the Ascension instead of from the Apostle's conversion.

What a godsend would Mr. Sharpe's suggestion have been to Chrysostom if only he could have accepted it! But then Greek was Chrysostom's mother-tongue.

I think it is only fair to conclude this paper as I began it, by a few words of defence.

The "hare-brained chatter of irresponsible frivolity" has seen busy in the pages of *Public Opinion*. Men who do not even profess to be acquainted with Greek, or to have

the faintest knowledge of the canons of textual criticism—and it is well for their reputation that they do not—have not hesitated to sit in judgment on the work of the Revisionists, whose aims they fail to appreciate and whose difficulties they cannot understand. A gentleman, calling himself “Fleur-de-Lis,” quarrels with the Revisionists for rejecting the Latin Fathers’ translation of *ἄρτον ἐπιούσιον*, *panem super-substantialem*, apparently oblivious of the fact that, with one or two exceptions that go to prove the rule, the *ι* in *ἐν* is always cut off in composition before a vowel. The same writer, commenting on “As we also have forgiven,” asks—“Is not this too great an assumption on our part?” It may be so, but it is an assumption not only of the best MSS., but also of Christ himself, who warns us not to come and offer our gift until we have been reconciled to our brother. “Fleur-de-Lis” says, further on—“To Catholics alone you are indebted for your MSS.” Is not this too great an assumption on his part? Tischendorf and Beza might possibly protest.

The author of “The Dean’s English” is especially severe on the Revisionists, because they repeat the conjunction “and” as often as it occurs in the original. This is surely a matter of taste. Dr. Johnson held that Shakespeare “had enough Latin to grammaticize his English.” Mr. G. Washington Moon, F.R.S.L., thinks the Revisers had enough Greek to ungrammaticize theirs. “Out of the same mouth cometh forth blessing and cursing” is an abomination in his eyes. Had the order been reversed, thus: “Out of the same mouth blessing and cursing cometh forth,” I could have understood the objection. As it is, I quote it as a typical instance of the sort of criticism which some persons think it worth while to pass who apparently can pass no other. Let it pass—for the moonshine it is. Fault is found by a host of such *soi-disant* critics with the micro-

scopical would-be accuracy of the Revisionists ; but what is this to the infinitesimal minuteness alike of these censors and their censures ? No man who had an eye for the graver defects of the Version, a very few of which it has been my duty to point out, would have time or patience for such paltry details as these. Such persons may here and there succeed in straining out a gnat, but the number of camels they have been swallowing meanwhile says more for their powers of literary digestion than for the discrimination of their palates.

E. M. GELDART.



## *A RATIONALIST OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.*

**I**N the records of the fifth Parliament of Henry VIII., Cobbett's "Parliamentary History" has a speech which, considering the times and the audience, is not a little startling. The union of rational breadth of opinion with a sympathetic respect for devoutness is not common in any age, and was certainly not familiar in a reign under which men were burned or even boiled for presuming to differ from royal theology. But the speech to which I refer is so far in advance of those days that even yet the catholicity it describes appears only a dream of the future. Nor does it deal in sentiment only. On the contrary, it lays down clear and intelligible principles by which boldness and breadth of faith may be distinguished from bloodless indifference. Indeed, if the speech had been pronounced in the Free Church Assembly the other day, when Professor Robertson Smith was under discussion, it could hardly have been condemned for impiety; but it would have contributed more argument to the purpose in ten minutes than was afforded by hours of modern oratory.

The alleged occasion of its delivery was the following:—The Commons in 1529-30, with the approval of the King, brought in a Bill for reforming abuses of the clergy, specially their extortions, pluralities, and other gainful practices. On this, John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, protested in the House of Lords that the cry of the Commons was nothing but "down with the Church," and that if the true causes were searched into they would be found all to arise

from want of faith. The Commons took offence at his language, and complained to the King; whereupon Henry forced the Bishop to explain that he was not referring to the Commons at all, but to the Bohemians and Germans, who might be safely abused. But the Commons were not entirely satisfied, and in the course of further debate on the insult offered them, the speech in question is supposed to have been delivered.

The name of the speaker, however, is not given. The "Parliamentary History" informs us that according to the chronicler Hall (or Halle) he was a "gentleman of Gray's Inn." This is not accurate. In the only apparent reference I can find to these debates in his history (1548), what Hall says is that when the "Spiritualtie," at a conference of both Houses, pleaded that the practices of the clergy were ancient customs, a gentleman of Gray's Inn answered them that the practices of thieves on Shooter's Hill were also an ancient custom, but it did not follow that they should be protected. The only authority, in fact, for the speech is Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who, in his "Life of Henry VIII.," gives it in full. But as that knightly and mystical rationalist gives no name at all, and does not indicate the source from which he obtained it, the natural suspicion is that he composed it out of his own head. Yet, on the other hand, the gratuitous insertion of a forged oration into a narrative of events occurring only in the preceding generation is scarcely what we should expect from the author of "De Veritate." I shall not pretend to decide this question. If the speech is Lord Herbert's own composition, his notions of an historian's duty certainly differed from ours. But the speech itself is not the less a noble exposition of true catholicity. On the other hand, if we may believe that these words, or anything like them, were uttered in the English House of Commons in the year 1529, it is sad to

think that after more than 350 years such a decision as that of the Free Church Assembly should still be possible. At any rate, as it is quite clear we have yet to learn the lesson it teaches, I am sure that the full text of the speech will not be unwelcome to the readers of the *Modern Review*. The style has that classical continuity, each sentence running into the next, which smells much of the lamp, and, one may fear, of Lord Herbert's lamp in particular; for even in writing English he seemed to put his thoughts into Latin first and then translate them. Still, with the substitution once or twice of more modern connective phrases, the thoughts are intelligible enough; nay, more, they are luminous and kindling. The question of the religious character of the Commons having been raised by the aspersion of the Bishop on their want of faith, the anonymous member rises and says:—

Mr. Speaker,—If none else but the Bishop of Rochester or his adherents did hold this language, it would less trouble me. But since so many religious and different sects, now conspicuous in the whole world, do not only vindicate unto themselves the name of the true Church, but labour betwixt invitations and threats for nothing more than to make us resign our faith to a simple obedience, I shall crave leave to propose what I think fit in this case for us laicks and secular persons to do.

Not that I will make my opinion any rule to others when any better expedient shall be offered; but that I would be glad we considered hereof as the greatest affair that doth or may concern us. For if in all human actions it be hard to find that medium or even temper which may keep us from declining into extremes, it will be much more difficult in religious worship; both as the path is supposed narrower, and the precipices more dangerous on every side. And because each man is created by God a free citizen of the world, and obliged to nothing so much as the inquiry of those means by which he may attain his everlasting happiness, it will be fit to examine to whose tuition and conduct he commit himself. For as several teachers, not only differing in language, habit, and ceremony,—or at least in some of these,—but peremptory and opposite in their

doctrines, present themselves, much circumspection must be used.

Here then taking his prospect, he shall find these guides directing him to several ways ; whereof the first yet extends no further than to the laws and religions of each man's native soil or diocese, without passing those bounds. The second, reaching much further, branches itself into that diversity of religions and philosophies that not only are, but have been, extant in former times, until he be able to determine which is best. But in either of these, no little difficulties will occur. For if each man ought to be secure of all that is taught at home, without inquiring further, how can he answer his conscience when, looking abroad, the terrors of everlasting damnation shall be denounced on him by the several hierarchies and visible churches of the world, if he believe any doctrine but theirs ? And amongst these [churches] again, such able and understanding persons may be found, as in all other affairs will equal his teachers. Will it be fit that he believe God hath inspired his own church and religion only, and deserted the rest ; when yet mankind is so much of one offspring, that it hath not only the same " Pater Communis " in God, but is come all from the same carnal ancestors ? Shall each man, without more examination, believe his priests in what religion soever ; and when he hath done, call their doctrine his faith ?

On the other side, if he must agree [reconcile] controversies before he can be satisfied, how much leisure must he obtain ? How much wealth and substance must he consume ? How many languages must he learn, and how many authors must he read ? How many ages must he look into ? How many faiths must he examine ? How many expositions must he compare, and how many contradictions reconcile ? How many countries must he wander into, and how many dangers must he run ? Briefly, would not our life on these terms be a perpetual peregrination ; while each man posted into the other's country to learn the way to heaven, without yet that he could say at last that he had known or tried all ? What remains then to be done ? Must he take all that each priest, upon pretence of inspiration, would teach him, because it *might* be so ? Or, may he leave all because it might be otherwise ? Certainly, to embrace all religions, according to their various and repugnant rites, tenets, traditions, and faiths is impossible, since in the time of one generation it were not possible, even after incredible pains and expenses, to learn out

and number them. On the other side, to reject all religions indifferently is as impious, there being no nation that in some kind or other doth not worship God; so that there will be a necessity to distinguish. Yet [it is] not [meant] that any man will be able, upon comparison, to discern which is the perfectest [religion] among the many professed in the whole world; each of them being of that large extent, that no man's understanding will serve to comprehend it in its uttermost latitude and signification. But, at least, every man might vindicate and sever in his particular religion, the more essential and demonstrative parts from the rest, without being moved so much at the threats and promises of any other religion that would make him obnoxious, as to depart from this way. For there is no ordinary method so intelligible, ready, and compendious, for conducting each man to his desired end.

Having thus therefore recollected himself, and also implored the assistance of that supreme God whom all nations acknowledge, he must labour in the next place to find out what inward means His Providence hath delivered, to discern the true, not only from the false, but even from the likely and possible; \* each of them requiring a peculiar scrutiny and consideration. Neither shall he fly thus to particular reason, which may soon lead him to heresy; but after a due separation of the more doubtful and controverted parts, shall hold himself to common, authentic, and universal truths, and consequently inform himself what in the several articles proposed to him is so taught, as it is first written in the heart, and together delivered in all the laws and religions he can hear of in the whole world. This certainly can never deceive him, since therein he shall find out how far the impression of God's wisdom and goodness are extant in all mankind, and to what degrees his universal Providence hath dilated itself. While thus ascending to God by the same steps which He descends to us, he cannot fail to encounter the divine Majesty.

Neither ought it to trouble him if he find these truths variously complicated with difficulties or errors, since, without insisting on more points than what are clearly agreed on by every side, it will be his part to reduce them into method and order; which also is not hard, they being but few, and apt for connection, so that it will concern our several teachers to ini-

\* These words are repeated almost *verbatim* in the title of Lord Herbert's *De Veritate*.

tiate us in this doctrine, before they come to any particular direction ; lest otherwise they do like those who would persuade us to renounce daylight to study only by their candle. It will be worth the labour, assuredly, to inquire how far these universal notions will guide us, before we commit ourselves to any of their abstruse and scholastic mysteries, or supernatural and private revelations. Not yet but that *they* also may challenge a just place in our belief, when they are delivered upon warrantable testimony ; but that they cannot be understood as indifferent and infallible principles for the instruction of all mankind.

Thus, among many supposed inferior and questionable deities, worshipped in the four quarters of the world, we shall find one chief, so taught us as above others to be highly revered. Among many rites, ceremonies, volumes, &c., delivered us as instruments or parts of His worship, the inquirer shall find virtue so eminent that it alone concludes and sums up the rest. In so much as there is no sacrament which is not finally resolved into it ; good life, charity, faith in and love of God, being such necessary and essential parts of religion, that all the rest are finally closed and determined in them. Among the many expiations, lustrations, and propitiations for our sins, taught in the several quarters of the world in sundry times, we shall find that none doth avail without hearty sorrow for our sins, and a true repentance towards God whom we have offended. And lastly, amidst the divers places and manners of reward and punishment which former ages have delivered, we shall find God's justice and mercy not so limited, but that He can extend either of them even beyond death, and consequently recompense or chastise eternally.

These, therefore, as universal and undoubted truths, should in my opinion, be first received. They will at least keep us from impiety and atheism, and together lay a foundation for God's service and the hope of a better life. Besides, it will reduce men's minds from uncertain and controverted points to a solid practice of virtue ; or when we fall from it, to an unfeigned repentance and purpose through God's grace to amend our sinful life ; without making pardon so easy, cheap, or mercenary, as some of them do.

Lastly, it will dispose us to a general concord and peace ; for when we are agreed concerning these eternal causes and means of our salvation, why should we so much differ for [on account

of] the rest? Since, as these principles exclude nothing of faith or tradition, in what age or manner soever it intervened, each nation may be permitted the belief of any pious miracle that conduceth to God's glory, without creating any necessity on this account to scandalise or offend each other. The common truths in religion, formerly mentioned, are firmer bonds of unity than that anything emergent out of traditions, whether written or unwritten, should dissolve them.

Let us therefore establish and fix these catholic or universal notions; they will not hinder us to believe whatsoever else is faithfully taught upon the authority of the church. So that whether the eastern, western, northern, or southern teachers, &c., and particularly whether my Lord Rochester, Luther, Eccius, Zwinglius, Erasmus, Melancthon, &c., be in the right, we laicks may so build upon these catholic and infallible grounds of religion, that whatsoever superstructures of faith be raised, these foundations yet may support them.

Whether the above was or was not uttered *verbatim et literatim* in the Parliament that disestablished and dis-endowed the monasteries, at any rate it is a proof of Lord Herbert's large-hearted rationalism that he should have given it so conspicuous a place in his story of the times. It teaches that true catholicism will look beyond all bounds of ecclesiastical Christianity for universal religious truth. It hints that self-surrender to the Eternal is the secret of spiritual life. It shows that a virtuous practice is the highest worship, and deliverance from sin the true redemption. Finally, it reminds us that revelations, miracles, dogmas, ceremonies, even fetichisms, may have their part in a real religious training, and deserve reverence, respect, or, at the least, charity. And perhaps those, who still insist on exaggerating such matters of form into motives of persecution or religious warfare, might feel some touch of shame as they mark the divine simplicity and breadth of the principles so boldly declared.

J. ALLANSON PICTON.

## NOTES AND NOTICES.

MR. EVANS'S elaborate and profusely-illustrated monograph on the "Ancient Stone Implements of Great Britain," in which an account was furnished of the various kinds of stone tools, weapons, and ornaments of remote antiquity discovered in this island, and of the mode of their manufacture, as also of the particular uses to which they were put, is now followed by an equally luxurious volume on the Ancient Bronze Implements of Great Britain,\* and, since Sir William Wilde is no longer alive to deal with the bronze antiquities of Ireland, of that island also. The woodcuts with which it is adorned, exceeding 500 in number, are admirable examples of the engraver's skill, and the objects which they depict possess a variety, both from their tractable material and more recent date, which is lacking in implements and ornaments fashioned chiefly of stone of the hardest kind. The volume is the outcome of enormous labour. Mr. Evans appears to have left no public or private collection in these islands unvisited, and scarcely a bronze implement unearthed from our tumuli unclassified, so that while his book may hereafter be increased in bulk as new types of instruments come to light, it cannot be superseded as the standard treatise on the subject so far as the United Kingdom is concerned. It may be remarked, in passing, that in the references which Mr. Evans occasionally makes to the foreign literature of the subject, we find no allusion to a work of the highest interest on the pre-historic antiquities of Finland and Northern Russia now in course of publication at Helsingfors.† The bronze objects appear to be related to those of Scandinavia and Northern Germany, and with the reference made by Mr. Evans to the socketed celts found in the cemetery at Hallstadt, in Austria, by himself and Herr Ramsauer, may be compared the illustrated account of specimens from the cemetery of Ananino, on the River Kama, in Viatka, which, as yet, has been only partially explored. (See II. *Livraison*, p. 105.)

By far the larger part of Mr. Evans's book is devoted to matters for which only antiquaries will care, but he has made the passage of the general student of pre-historic times easy by printing in smaller type the

\*The Ancient Bronze Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain and Ireland. By John Evans, D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S., &c., &c. Longmans, Green, and Co. 1881.

† Antiquités du Nord Finno-Ougrien, publiées à l'aide d'une subvention de l'Etat. Par J. R. Aspelin. Helsingfors: G. W. Edlund. Paris: C. Klincksieck, Rue de Lille, 11.



matter which can be skipped, save by the expert. Moreover, when the student has run through the intermediate chapters and enjoyed first the pictures of celts, flat, winged, and socketed ("celt" being the name given to the most common and earliest hatchets or axes, whether of stone or metal), then of weapons, from spear-heads to swords, and lastly of personal ornaments which abide yet as persistent "survivals," torques or neck-rings, bracelets, earrings, &c., he may turn with profit to the earlier and later chapters of the book for information as to the chronology and origin of the bronze civilisation. In these the author's skilful and careful handling are apparent; opposing theories concerning the sources from which the use of bronze in this country are derived are fairly set forth, and his own conclusions on the subject given with brevity and caution.

Everybody knows that the successive stages of civilisation are divided by antiquaries into the Ages of Stone, Bronze, and Iron. The division is, however, in reality twofold, not fourfold. That is to say, the Palæolithic, or Ancient Stone Age, stands altogether apart, separated from the following periods by epochs long enough to have altered the configuration of Western Europe, and to have introduced a new fauna and flora on the scene. The Neolithic, or Newer Stone Age, is in intimate connection with the Ages of Bronze and Iron, the transition being gradual, although momentous in the ultimate displacement of stone by the metals. Mr. Evans is of course alive to the confusion occasioned by speaking of the Stone Age as if it included the Palæolithic and Neolithic together, and it is therefore the more to be regretted that the necessity of sub-division has compelled him to separate the Neolithic from the Bronze Period. At first sight it may seem strange that the use of a compound metal should have preceded that of a simple metal, but the explanation appears to lie in the comparative abundance of copper in a native state, and the ease with which it is beaten into shape, even when cold. Mr. Evans argues somewhat in favour of a Copper Age, the use of that metal continuing "for a lengthened period before it was discovered that the addition of a small proportion of tin not only rendered it more readily fusible, but added to its elasticity and hardness, and thus made it more serviceable for tools and weapons." Of this Copper Age, he remarks, there are in Europe but extremely feeble traces—if indeed any can be said to exist—its home being in Asia and in certain districts of North America. Both archaeological discoveries and historical evidence support the succession of iron to bronze. The "much-wrought iron," as Homer calls it, is not only less obvious to the untrained observer than copper, but its smelting and working involves considerable advance in skill. Indeed, the references to it which occur in classic writings indicate that the iron first used was of meteoric origin, and this is confirmed by the name given to it—*σίδηρος*. Hesiod distinctly says that iron was discovered after copper and tin, and it is noticeable that in the Pentateuch bronze or copper, mis-translated "brass," is mentioned forty-four times, while iron is mentioned but thirteen times.

The reader will find an excellent summary of the evidence concerning the use of bronze among the nations of antiquity in Mr. Evans's introduction, and in the final chapter a discussion upon the approximate date and duration of the Bronze Age in Great Britain. He estimates that this lasted from 800 to 1,000 years, which would place the beginning of it about 1,200 or 1,400 years B.C., since the Romans, when they invaded Northern Europe, found iron in use among the tribes. Concerning the origin of bronze, Mr. Evans cites four principal theories; one being that it arose in a common centre, spreading thence by conquest or migration of races; another that it was discovered independently in different centres; a third that the distribution from one spot took place along the trade-routes from East to West; and, lastly, that the art "was diffused from a common centre, the implements being constructed in the countries in which they are found." Mr. Evans finds "a certain amount of truth in each of these theories," the second excepted, save perhaps so far as the New World is concerned. The conclusion to which the evidence at hand leads us is that the discovery of bronze was first made in Asia, whence knowledge of it spread along commercial channels, perhaps opened by a conquering race. Where the required metals existed, manufacturing centres arose to meet local demands, until iron gradually displaced bronze for tools and weapons, bronze being used for handles and personal ornaments.

The abundant relics of the lake-dwelling peoples of the Bronze Period in Central Europe have enabled Keller and others to sketch in some detail their mode of life and customs; but no such insight is vouchsafed us in regard to the "Britons" of that period. Mr. Evans, however, makes the best use of the scanty materials at command for constructing a picture of their external condition, their dwellings, their dress, their occupations, and place in general culture. "Their tools and weapons contrast with the arms and instruments of the preceding Neolithic Age more by their greater degree of perfection than by their absolute number and variety. The material progress from one stage of civilisation to the other was, no doubt, great, but the interval between the two does not approach that which exists between Palæolithic man of the Old River Drift and Neolithic man of the present configuration of the surface of Western Europe."

Although there is yet ample room for special monographs, such as "Ancient Bronze Implements," on limited divisions of the far-reaching science of culture, the time is ripe for the presentment in a compendious form of the materials collected by anthropologists, and of the conclusions based thereupon, at which they have arrived concerning the general lines along which man has advanced from lower to higher stages of material, intellectual, and moral progress. We therefore give hearty welcome to the manual of Anthropology, which, promised long ago, is now put forth by its ablest expositor.\* Dealing with a science which connects into a

\* Anthropology: an Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilisation. By Edward B. Tylor, D.C.L., F.R.S. London: Macmillan and Co. 1881.

more manageable whole the scattered subjects of an ordinary education, and the "multifarious departments of which, ranging from body to mind, from language to music, from fire-making to morals, are all matters to whose nature and history every well-informed person ought to give some thought," this book cannot fail to win attention, and to induce many, hitherto unacquainted with them, to study Dr. Tylor's larger volumes on the "Early History of Mankind" and "Primitive Culture."

A glance at the chapter-headings and the index will give some idea of the mass and variety of subjects which demand reference in an introductory work on the Science of Man and Civilisation. The best tribute to the charm and value of this book is that, while it is perforce but a summary defying further condensation, its several parts are so related, and its facts so skilfully interwoven, that one glides on from page to page without sense of weariness, only realising on re-perusal what a volume of information has been quietly absorbed.

Starting with a general survey of man's tenancy of the earth down to the Historic Period, the author, with M. de Quatrefages and other writers, but with better reasons than they adduce, accepts the theory of the common ancestry of the races of mankind, "as best agreeing with ordinary experience and scientific research." He adds—"If we are to go back in thought to a time when the ancestors of the African, the Australian, the Mongol, and the Scandinavian, were as yet one undivided stock, the theory of their common descent, must be so framed as to allow causes strong enough, and time long enough, to bring about changes far beyond any known to have taken place during historical ages." In keeping with this, a chapter on the races of mankind, illustrated with striking woodcuts of the leading types, deals with the primary variations in peoples, touching lightly, as the scanty evidence requires, on the causes of these differences of skull and stature, feature, hair, and colour. Now and again, as on the *quæstio vexata* of the submerged "Lemuria," and on the descent of the Eskimos from Palæolithic men, Mr. Tylor treads on debatable ground, but here, as throughout the book, he throws no gauntlet down. Even where the temptation to controversy is strong, as in the chapters on language, we find him the skilful expositor of its probable origin and mode of growth, although we are glad to note that he lends no support to the theories of modern metaphysical philologists that there is an indissoluble connection between language and thought, the latter not existing without the former. In a book that sins so little against proportion, we could wish that the chapter treating of the comparative anatomy of man and the lower animals had been compressed, and the space thus gained allotted to the section on man's religious development. The application of the historic method to clear the haze as to the rise and growth of "Animism," or the doctrine of the soul and of spirits generally, might then have had enlarged illustration from savage philosophy and its continuity in modern psychology. Following the chapters on language is a history of the art of writing, which is traced from the picture-signs of rude races to the

alphabetic writing of the Phœnicians, which, passing from them to the Greeks and Romans, at last came down to us. A general sketch of the rise of the arts of life and of pleasure, of the sciences, and of the growth and organisation of the several stages of society from the patriarchal to the national form, completes an informing and fascinating book. Of the practical value, apart from the abiding charm, of the study of man and civilisation, the author says, in conclusion, that "we have in it the means of understanding our own lives and our place in the world, vaguely and imperfectly, it is true, but at any rate more clearly than any former generation. The knowledge of man's course of life, from the remote past to the present, will not only help us to forecast the future, but may guide us in our duty of leaving the world better than we found it."

EDWARD CLODD.

"IN the present work it is the course of one great contributory stream to the world-river of poetry that we are invited to follow. We are here invited to trace the stream of English poetry." Our guides left us\* at the close of the second of these four volumes at a point in which the stream was distributing its waters over a large area, not deepening its channel, nor increasing its speed. Like a river that

Strains along

Through beds of sand and matted rushy isles,

was the course of English poetry during the greater portion of the eighteenth century. From the publication of Pope's translation of the "Iliad," to the production of Cowper's "Task," in 1785, the chief contributions to our poetical literature were imitative in form and didactic in aim. The contrast between this and the preceding period was great indeed, except that it contained a few of the least poetical elements of its predecessor: moral maxims in place of religious fervour, philosophical reflections in place of religious faith, and, speaking generally, belief in place of intuitions. Of the writers during this period, some, like Addison, have too slight a claim to the name of poet to detain our attention; others, like Pope, are too well known to need more than a reference. But there are names between Pope and Cowper, once greatly distinguished, now grown too obscure for their worth, almost unknown to the present generation, but whose merit may be measured by the eminence of the writers who introduce them to the readers of this work. James Thomson and Dr. Young are introduced by Mr. George Saintsbury; the Wesleys by the Dean of Westminster; Collins by Mr. Swinburne; and Gray by Mr. Matthew Arnold.

Mr. Saintsbury accounts for the popularity of Thomson, which is, however, geographical or tribal, rather than literary, by a certain ex-

\* The English Poets. Selections, with Critical Introductions by Various Writers, and a General Introduction by Matthew Arnold. Edited by Thomas Humphrey Ward, M.A. Vols. III. and IV. London: Macmillan and Co. [For Notice of Vols. I. and II., see *Modern Review*, Vol. I., pp. 647-651.]

cellence of form which belongs to his best writing. "The Seasons," he admits,

Are not perhaps in any single point possessed of the qualities of the highest poetry. But such poetry as they do possess is perfectly genuine, and singularly suitable for its purpose. Literal accuracy and poetical truth are blended in Thomson's descriptions in a way rarely to be found. Every one feels that he has seen what Thomson has put into words for him; every one also feels that Thomson has added a charm for him to the scene when he shall happen to see it again.

In Dr. Young's works, taken generally, there is too much that is artificial. The late Lord Bulwer Lytton used to profess a sincere admiration for the "Night Thoughts," but it has been rare during the last five-and-twenty years to meet with any one who has actually read them. Young was mournful less because he had suffered than because he could write; he was moral because he lived at a time "which, whatever its practice might be, was, in theory, nothing if not moralist." Dr. Johnson considered that "there is a pleasure sure in sadness which mourners only know," and that to this sadness "religion and morality are indebted for the 'Night Thoughts.'" The notice of the Wesleys is interesting from the fact that it is written by Dr. Stanley, and that it raises the question discussed by Dr. Johnson in his "Life of Isaac Watts," as to the cause of the unsatisfactoriness of devotional poetry.

A distinguished critic of our time (we are told by Dean Stanley) in his professorial chair, is reported one day to have held out in one hand "The Golden Treasury of English Lyrics," collected by Francis Palgrave, and in the other "The Book of Praise," collected from all English hymnody by Lord Selborne, and to have asked, "Why is it that the 'Golden Treasury' contains almost nothing that is bad, and why is it that the 'Book of Praise' contains almost nothing that is good?"

To this question the Dean gives three answers, too long for quotation in this short notice, but which should be carefully considered by all interested in the "Service of Song." Substantially, however, the Dean agrees with the Professor of Poetry, and shows that in subject most hymns are essentially prosaic, and in form the employed metaphors lose their beauty by the detailed treatment they receive. The "Life of Gray," by Dr. Johnson, was one of the six selected by Mr. Matthew Arnold for publication as a text-book of English poetry from the beginning of the seventeenth to the third quarter of the eighteenth century. It was selected, not because it was one of the best of the "Lives," but because it formed an epoch, closing one period of literary history and introducing another. The introduction to the selections from Gray in these volumes is written by Mr. Arnold, and is, we venture to think, one of the most admirable of the series. We have read it in connection with Dr. Johnson's life of the poet, to which it is supplementary and corrective. Johnson is said to have lacked sympathy with Gray, and to have been too severe on his work. Mr. Arnold has a generous admiration for the poet's character, the foundation of which, he says, was seriousness. And his poetry he does not so much criticise as interpret and explain. Gray's reputation is much greater than the amount of work he did. To show

why he did so little, and why that little was what it was, Mr. Arnold describes for us the literary character of the age, which, opening with Dryden, closed with Pope, an age of prose; and the age of poetry, of which Gray is the first in order. This second period extends, as we have said, to the publication of Cowper's "Task" in 1785, of whom and his works a pleasing account is given by the Editor, Mr. Ward. Dr. Service writes the life of Burns, and introduces selections from his works with appreciative, but marked critical skill. The volume closes with William Blake, by T. Comyns Carr, who has wisely reprinted a few of the charming, simple poems from "Songs of Innocence." The last volume extends from Wordsworth to Dobell—in all thirty-five poets—some of them bearing the greatest names in English poetry. The Dean of St. Paul's introduces Wordsworth in an essay which is remarkable for its freshness and originality. Coleridge's work is represented by nine examples, the whole of the "Ancient Mariner" being one; the critical essay is by Walter H. Pater. Byron and Shelley find sympathetic treatment in the hands of Mr. J. A. Symonds and Mr. Frederick W. H. Myers. The selections are judiciously made, and cover the whole scope of each writer's work. Students of English literature will find these volumes the best introduction they can have to the subject they desire to know, and will do well to follow the course pursued by the Editor; but the more mature reader naturally pauses at criticisms such as that on John Keats, by Mr. M. Arnold. Too much depreciated by contemporary reviewers, the works of this poet have now become subjects of exaggerated praise. Shelley's "Adonais" has given a personal charm to Keats himself, so that he is spoken of by some as the "lovely and beloved Keats." The essay in this volume will do something to steady the judgments of readers of the little that poor Keats had time to leave behind him. Mr. Arnold takes the few anecdotes of the poet's grossness and sensuousness told by Haydon, and the indications of his emotional nature as shown in the "Letters to Fanny Browne," and on this side condemns him. Quoting one of these love-letters, he says:—"It has in its relaxed self-abandonment something underbred and ignoble, as of a youth ill brought-up, without the training which teaches us that we must put some constraint upon our feelings and upon the expression of them." Combined with this lower passion, however, was that "yearning passion for the Beautiful," which was an "intellectual and spiritual passion." It is that which ennobled him in spite of all disadvantages of birth and health. He said of himself that he loved the principle of beauty in all things. Quoting the lines—

Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all  
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know,

Mr. Arnold remarks:—

No, it is not all; but it is true, deeply true, and we have deep need to know it. And with beauty goes not only truth, joy goes with her also; and this, too, Keats saw and said, as in the famous first line of his "Endymion" it stands written: "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever." It is no small thing to have so loved the principle of beauty as to perceive the

necessary relation of beauty with truth, and of both with joy. Keats was a great spirit, and counts for far more than many of his admirers suppose, because this just and high perception made itself clear to him. Therefore, a dignity and a glory shed gleams over his life, and happiness, too, was not a stranger to it.

Here we must pause, though we would fain linger over criticisms that give so much pleasure, and enrich the mind with purer conceptions of poetic beauty and truth than solitary thought can yield. We conclude with recommending them to all lovers of English literature, and especially to those who would interest young persons in its study. To open to them these pages is like introducing them to the most cultivated and intelligent society.

MARK WILKS.

IN Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics" Mr. Mahaffy's "Descartes" has been followed by similar treatises on Butler and Berkeley. Of these the former strikes us as a careful and respectable performance, while the latter is conspicuously able and interesting, and will, no doubt, hold a permanent place in philosophical literature. Many writers could have sketched Butler's life and thought as well as, or better than Mr. Collins has done, but, probably, no other pen could equal Dr. Fraser's in expressing the form and spirit of Berkeley's philosophy. Berkeley's life, too, has many engaging and romantic features, and his present biographer has brought them vividly before us, and enhanced their interest by pleasant glimpses of those of Berkeley's eminent contemporaries with whom he was in any way brought into relation. Dr. Fraser's treatise derives additional value and charm from his having had access to about eighty letters from Berkeley to Sir John Percival, afterwards Earl of Egmont, from 1709 to 1780, not hitherto published. These letters do much to complete and enrich our insight into Berkeley's sweet and disinterested character. In his preface Dr. Fraser tells us: "This volume is an attempt to present for the first time Berkeley's philosophic thought in its organic unity. The thought is unfolded in connection with his personal history, and it is compared with the results of later philosophical endeavours, including those of chief scientific and theological interest at the present day." That the attempt thus made has been, on the whole, a very successful one will, we think, be the general verdict of its readers. Taking, as this treatise does, an instructive backward glance at the philosophy of Locke, and an onward look into the systems of Hume, Reid, Kant, and Hegel, it furnishes, perhaps, the best introduction to a course of reading in modern philosophy. Among the chief merits of Dr. Fraser's treatment may be mentioned, in addition to the fact of its clearly depicting the process of development in Berkeley's own thinking, that it distinctly marks out the main differences between the Berkleian philosophy and two philosophical

\* Butler. By the Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M.A. Blackwood and Sons. 1881.

Berkeley. By A. Campbell Fraser, LL.D. Blackwood and Sons. 1881.

schools which exercise at present considerable influence in this country namely, the Sensational Idealism represented by J. S. Mill and Prof. Bain, on the one hand, and the modified Hegelianism of which Prof. Green, of Oxford, and Principal Caird are the most eminent exponents.

In Berkeley's mental history (says Dr. Fraser), revealed as a whole in the writings of its three stages, one seems to hear a sort of prelude or rehearsal of each of the three acts in which European philosophy has since presented itself. The subtle argumentative analysis and negative phenomenalism, so prominent in the Trinity College treatises, was the Berkeley to whom Hume and afterwards John Stuart Mill avowed allegiance. The appeals to the common faith or common sense, in our consciousness of self, and in connection with the favourite thought of significant and interpretable sense phenomena, of all which "Alciphron" and the "Vindication" are so full, forecast Reid, while they recall the *cogito* of Descartes. Lastly, the philosophical rationalism of "Siris," which sees in the phenomenal things of sense the creative working of that *intellectus ipse* in which each separate conscious spirit shares, in its way anticipates Kant and Hegel. What corresponds to the association and evolution philosophy—in his phenomenalism; to the philosophy of common sense—in his appeals to common conviction; and to transcendental philosophy—in the recognition of universal constitutive reason—may all, I think, be found in Berkeley—although he himself had only an obscure consciousness of this (p. 217).

Such writers as Professor Huxley are apt to assume that in the first of the three stages alluded to above Berkeley was much more at one with Hume and the recent English Sensationalists than is really the case. The resemblance between them and him fails in the most vital points. Those who identify J. S. Mill's "permanent possibilities of sensation," and his so-called "psychological idealism," with Berkeley's view, forget that "it is Berkeley with his eyes put out." They forget that Berkeley never dreamed of denying the substantial existence of that which is not phenomenal. The spirit, or Ego, is with him no mere aggregate of phenomenal states of consciousness. It is a real existence, an uncaused cause. In seeking to explain away the assumed unspiritual substance called matter, he does but relegate the substantiality and causality, which other philosophers find in matter, to that present activity of God, which he regards as the cause of our phenomenal ideas. He knows but of one kind of substance and one kind of cause, and finds them both in spirit alone, whether it be the Spirit of the Eternal, or those human spirits to whom is delegated in some measure the uncaused causality of God. And not only has Berkeley not the slightest affinity with Mill and Bain in reference to the fundamental distinction between the real and the phenomenal, but as a necessary consequence of his position here he entertains a view of Causation diametrically opposed to theirs. He agrees, it is true, with our English Associationists in maintaining with Hume that all that science can say of the phenomena of nature is that they co-exist and succeed each other according to certain constant laws, and this constant relation of co-existence and sequence Hume and his followers call Causation. Berkeley, however, maintained, as Maine de Biran, Dr. Martineau, and other philosophers have more recently done, that this time relation between phenomena is not causation at all, that one pheno



menon does not cause another phenomenon, but simply serves as a sign that the other has been, or will be. Science interprets the order of causation, but has no access to the causality itself; for the causality ever resides in Spirit, and from Spirit therefore all phenomena derive both their existence and their constant time relations to each other. It has been said that Bain's philosophy is Berkeley *minus* God, but it should be added that it is also *minus* the substantiality and free causality of the human spirit, and therefore, in Berkeley's view, *minus* the foundations of moral responsibility and of the faith in immortality.

In the third stage of his mental history Berkeley's philosophy presents, as Dr. Fraser points out, some affinity with the Hegelianism which has recently somewhat vigorously asserted itself at Oxford and at Glasgow. But here again there is a vital difference, and Berkeley's position seems to us the only one compatible with a fair reading of the facts of our moral consciousness. He agrees, indeed, with the Hegelians that nature should be regarded as the development of Divine thought, but he will not have it that the human spirit and the volitions of that spirit are merely phases in this all-embracing and necessary logical evolution. He still clings to the doctrine of his earlier works that man's spirit is an uncaused cause, and that therefore no study of the antecedents of a moral choice will avail to show that it must have been so, and not otherwise. From the following passage we infer that Dr. Fraser adheres to Berkeley's view on this most fundamental matter, and we rejoice that the Libertarian doctrine, which Glasgow most unwisely, as we think, abandons, is still dominant in the class-rooms of the sister University.

The Hegelian seems to claim as attainable philosophy, an intuition of the rational articulation of the universe of things and persons in the unity of the creative thought. This, if really attained, would eliminate mystery from our physical and moral experience, and convert philosophy into absolute science. If it has fulfilled its promise, it has translated all faith into rationalised thought. But I cannot find that this all-comprehensive system really tallies with the experience which it is bound to formulate adequately and also to explain; or that it has yet got so far as to solve even so clamant a difficulty as the existence within the universe of immoral agents and moral evil. We ask for intellectual relief for moral difficulties, and we are offered the "organisation of thought." We look for bread and we find a stone.

In a note Dr. Fraser pertinently adds:—The distinction between phenomenal things and acting persons—between nature and individual moral agency—which this Gnosticism fails, as far as I see, to explain, or even to provide for, is touched, for example, in Wordsworth's well-known noon-day hymn:—

"Look up to heaven! the industrious sun  
Already half his race hath run;  
He cannot halt nor go astray,  
But our immortal Spirits may."

We hope that these earnest words, coming from so high an authority, will elicit a reply from Principal Caird or from Professor Green. Surely these writers must be aware that their doctrines utterly fail to account for or to justify the ineradicable tendency to believe that our past conduct could in some cases have been other than it was, and that therefore we rightly blame ourselves for our wilful wrong-doing.

Of the three phases of Berkeley's mental development Dr. Fraser appears to have most sympathy with the second, in which what he terms "the Philosophy of Faith" was most prominent in Berkeley's mind. He says :—

I find no reason to doubt that human thought cannot be sublimated philosophically into Divine Thought, that a human philosophy of what must appear to men under relations of time is necessarily "broken," and that it has to be cemented by beliefs which refuse to be fully resolved into pure thought, though the reasonableness of their office may be vindicated.

And, again :—

Although a purely intellectual solution of the mystery of existence, a Divine science of the Infinite may be unattainable, we can still be told by Butler, and at the end of a more subtle course of reasoning by Kant, that we ought to live the absolutely good, even while we cannot realise, in thought, the perfect rational unity of the actual universe, that is revealed to man only under relations of time.

As we pursue Berkeley's life-long philosophic development, we reach—thanks to Dr. Fraser—a sublime intuition of the phenomenal realities of sense as media for the intellectual education of finite spirits, for intercourse between individual moral agents, and for a revelation of the Eternal Spirit, in whom the merely phenomenal things of sense, and moral agents, too, have their being. According to this conception, the Government of Nature, with the physical and biological sciences in which it has been partially interpreted, is subordinate and ancillary to Moral Government :—

The universe consists of persons or conscious moral agents, and also of phenomenal things which are in a process of constant creation ; and the things seem to be made for, and regulated by, the persons. The one of Kant's two great objects of admiration and awe is only the minister of the other. The "starry heavens" pass away ; space, under whose relations phenomenal things are presented, becomes lost in the unimaginable Infinite of Boundlessness ; time, which the heavenly bodies measure, becomes lost in the unimaginable Infinite of Endlessness. But Moral Government and moral agents cannot thus be lost, or pass away.

We can only glance at the account of Butler. It appears to contain a tolerably accurate description of Butler's position as an ethical teacher, but it helps us little towards understanding the organic connection between his thought and that of previous writers on moral philosophy. The account of "Modern Ethical Theories" is meagre and unsatisfactory. The important distinction between Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism is not dwelt on, and no reference is made to the bearing of theories of evolution and heredity on ethical doctrine. The writer gives a careful analysis of the Analogy, but he appears unable to realise the essentially unphilosophical and mischievous character of the line of thought on which that treatise proceeds. It would seem that he has not altogether emancipated himself from that false notion of Biblical inspiration which misled Butler, and hence he is not, we think, very well qualified to criticise the Bishop's position from the present standpoint of liberal religious thought.

C. B. U.

MR. BOULGER has done good service in presenting the English reader with a systematic History of China.\* Within certain limits, no other nation on the face of the globe offers so much authentic material to the historian. From the remotest antiquity official annalists have been attached to the Chinese Court, and the records of these contemporary writers, or great national histories compiled at intervals from their journals, form the sources from which the modern historian may draw his information. Histories so constructed have, indeed, inevitable defects. The evolution of the national character, the life and thought of the people, can be but scantily educed from the records of the literates. But these records are wonderfully free from the falsifying adulations which too often mar the literary productions of the palace. It is true, they are mainly concerned with the doings of the Emperor and his ministers and generals. But it is not always a flattering tale that they tell. The reigning Emperor himself has never been allowed to read what his historians have related of him or what judgment concerning him they have entered for the information of posterity. When curiosity has prompted a monarch to seek access to the books of the contemporary annalists, his request has been peremptorily refused. The warning or example which he affords will be faithfully held up to his successors, but for his own edification it is the story of his predecessors that he must study.

Mr. Boulger's first volume descends from the earliest ages to the fourteenth century of our era. Chinese chronology first becomes reliable with the great Emperors Yao, Chun, and Yu, in the twenty-third century before Christ. Previously to that period we see, as in a dream, the movement of vast masses of men, and the slow consolidation of that great empire which remains to this day unbroken. But the semi-mythical emperors of the remoter centuries average 69 years each upon the throne, according to the accepted dates, and if 89 years each roused Niebuhr's suspicion with regard to the Kings of Rome, much more must Fohi, Chinnong, and even the first Hoangti, be treated as little else than "venerable names."

The perusal of such a volume as Mr. Boulger's reveals the grand sweep of history for nearly forty centuries. We see the Chinese Empire swelling out into stately proportions under the great founders of the leading dynasties and their immediate successors; shrinking again to a mere handful of provinces, or cut up into two or three or four under the ignoble descendants of those great founders or the petty dynasties that ran their inglorious courses between the Hans and the Tangs or the Tangs and the Sung. We see the armies of the Empire now victorious, now defeated, in successive conflicts with the hosts of Tibet, and with hordes of Turks and Tartars flowing in ceaseless stream from that remote north-east which has flooded all the fields of Asia and of Europe. We see a grander power than that of Khitan or Hia rising in the early days of the thirteenth

\* History of China. By Demetrius Charles Boulger. Vol. I. London: W. H. Allen and Co. 1881.

Christian century, and presently Genghis with his Mongol multitudes (having swallowed up the barrier tribes) sweeps down upon the wealthy cities and farms of China and rears the hugest Empire which the Eastern world has ever seen.

But while China has ever had a vast frontier to defend against the invader, in spite of her long periods of internal peace and unity, no nation has been more often torn by internal feud. The sudden death of the Eastern Empress within the palace of Pekin, on the 8th of April last, reminds one of a hundred similar casualties at Court within the scope of Chinese history. Emperors incompetent, or too competent, have always been liable to sudden death; and that not always by mere murder, but often by the deliberately awarded verdict of responsible persons representing the patriotism of the nation. Mr. Boulger speaks of one of the numerous Wentis (or great kings) as seeing in the deponents and executors of his predecessors "the ever-present wardens of the people's rights," And that expression represents a permanent factor in Chinese history which Mr. Boulger seems not quite adequately to appreciate. Rebellion against bad rulers—including their deposition and execution—is in China strictly constitutional. It is the will of Great Heaven; and though doubtless personal ambition and intrigue have seldom failed to mingle with Chinese revolutions, the revolutions themselves have often been more than justified in the eyes of the people and of their legal and religious instructors.

Mr. Boulger hopes that he has supplied "what has appeared to be a want in literature." His book, useful and welcome as it is, scarcely deserves that high name. His style is poor and monotonous; and his narrative often seems to fall into little more than a reproduction of his French authorities. We have again and again seemed to be reading a mere imitation of Pauthier's thin and wearisome history. There is no evidence that Mr. Boulger has himself consulted records in any more abstruse tongue than French; and while we cordially re-echo his acknowledgments of the indebtedness of Europe to French Sinologues, we cannot help thinking that an English Sinologue might produce a history of China, if not much more rich in matter, yet at any rate more nervous and vivacious in manner. Nevertheless, we heartily thank Mr. Boulger for his industry, and warmly appreciate his desire to make the extraordinary story of the Nestor among nations better known to his own countrymen. No Englishman will henceforth be excusable for thinking that Chinamen can do nothing but grow tea, smoke opium, and paint in bad perspective. Mr. Boulger's pages should reveal to him that the placid, pig-tailed, olive stranger who wends his quiet way through London is of a race which can boast a history not only counting more centuries than those of Israel, of Athens, of Rome, and of England together, but rich in heroes of the camp and the cabinet.

THE charge often made against the liberal school of theology, that it is unable to construct, and can only destroy, has received of late, in Germany, at all events, the refutation of facts. The treatises on dogmatic theology by Schweizer, Biedermann, Lipsius, and Pfeiderer are ample proof to the contrary. Far as the theological systems of these leading liberals are from being either in complete accord, or the final embodiment of Christian thought, they are positive statements on a truly imposing scale of the rich philosophical, religious, and critical results of the labours of this school. And far as more orthodox thinkers may be from agreeing with some of the fundamental positions of these theologians, they ought in all fairness to acquit them of the charge of presenting simply negations. For it is a peculiarity of the works of these men to which reference has been made, that they supply not only enlightenment for the intellect, but also a fire to warm the heart.

The work before us, by the distinguished author of the "*Alttestamentliche Theologie*,"\* is likely to take its place beside those valuable products of the liberal school. As will appear further on in this notice, we are by no means satisfied with many of the positions which Professor Schultz seeks to establish, but that cannot stand in the way of the recognition of the value of this addition to the best literature of the modern school. Professor Schultz belongs, in philosophy, to the Kantian school, and in theology, his master has been Schleiermacher, and on two fundamental principles of these thinkers, modified and expanded in important respects, he works out his doctrine of the Deity of Christ. With Kant, he declines the hopeless task of acquiring certain *knowledge* of God and divine things, and with Schleiermacher, he looks to the moral and religious effects of Christ's work as the basis of our estimate of his dignity and relation to God. He thus starts from a position cleared of all metaphysical and critical nets and snares as to the nature of God and the precise historical value of the Gospel narratives. He has to deal with purely moral and religious experiences and relations. On the experience of the Church of the divine character and value of the Christian life, he bases the dogma to which his book is devoted. Members of the Church live in the indestructible conviction that the Christian life of love is the life of God, and the realisation of that life universally the aim and will of God. The whole Church will some time realise that divine purpose, and be perfectly one with that divine will. Then Deity will belong to the Church. As far as individuals become entirely obedient to love, and wholly absorbed in the divine work, they share in Deity. But hitherto Christ has been the only man whose entire life has been wholly and absolutely one with the divine life, and lost in the divine work. He is the only man who is perfectly one with God. The Church recognises that perfect revelation

\* Die Lehre von der Gottheit Christi. Communicatio idiomatum. Dargestellt von Dr. Hermann Schultz in Göttingen. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes. 1881.

which he accordingly gave of the heart and life of God, as the source of her own life. Christ has to her the authority of God; he is to her in the place of God; he is God.

Now, up to this point in Professor Schultz's exposition we find much that is extremely valuable. Only we must make what he would deem two wholly inadmissible changes. We must substitute, if his line of argument is to be completely followed, for "Christ" Christianity, and for "Deity" divinity. It seems to us an unwarrantable leap to infer the divinity of Christ from the divinity of the life which the Church enjoys. Apart from the historic records of the derivation of that life from Jesus of Nazareth, the mere fact of the enjoyment of it, as a member of the Church, does not warrant the ascription of its ideal divinity to him as his actual possession. It seems to us, that Professor Schultz must either admit history as well as experience into the foundation of his argument, or substitute Christianity for Christ. The second change appears to us no less necessary. It is surely a violent misuse of language to speak of the Church as God, or of a man as God. Unintelligible as the orthodox use of the terms Godhead and Deity may be, it is not a violent abuse of them such as we meet with in this work.

This brings us to the point where we must part company with our author altogether. Towards the end of his book he goes so far as to adopt the Lutheran *communicatio idiomatum*, and to ascribe the divine attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and infinity to Christ. Of course, this is done only by the aid of a previous definition of these terms such as none but a hard-pressed theologian would invent. Morally and religiously one as Christ was with God, perfectly as his life represented the divine life of love, victorious as in the end love will be, certain as it is that love is the key to the mysteries of life,—it appears to us a serious mistake on the part of the representatives of liberal theology, to take these old theological terms which had to their inventors quite a different meaning, and impose upon them another meaning, which will neither represent these great facts nor win the thoughtful lay-mind to Christianity. Professor Schultz's book is a new and valuable proof of the greatness and richness of Christianity. We believe that substantially he describes correctly its meaning and glory, and also the position towards men and God of its founder. At the same time, we are strongly convinced that for this age and in the simple service of the truth, the history of Christianity must be taken as well as the experience of the Church as the foundation of an estimate of the value of either Christ or the Church, and that a vastly larger amount of purely scholastic accretion will have to be deducted from the dogmatic utterances of the Church of the past than Schleiermacher and his followers seem to think.

In our brief notice of this important work we have necessarily limited ourselves to the most compressed statement and criticism of the main position which it labours to establish. In conclusion, suffice it to say, that the theoretically dogmatic half of the work is preceded by an historical

half, in which the history of Christology is traced from its prophetic germs in the Old Testament to the present time.

The exceedingly interesting and suggestive instalment of what promises to be an important addition to the best kind of apologetic literature, the full title of which appears below,\* is deserving of attention in England, both for its intrinsic merits and the significant approval it has met with in Germany. It is not a frequent occurrence in Germany that such a book should reach a second edition a few months after the appearance of the first. It is a mark of the more decidedly Christian attitude which the mind of the nation has of late been assuming, that a book of this kind should receive as its preface such a long letter as we have here from a political friend of the distinguished leader of the National Liberals, Herr von Bennigsen. Moreover, the author himself, though exceedingly well read in recent philosophical and theological literature, appears to be not a professional theologian, but a member of one of the professions more closely connected with politics and secular affairs. Hitherto, he has maintained his *incognito* with great success, though there are shrewd guesses that he is a prominent member of the National Liberal party in the German Parliament.

The author belongs philosophically to the Kantian school, and in his letter to Herr von Bennigsen expresses himself under great obligations to F. A. Lange's "History of Materialism" and Herbert Spencer's works. He had himself belonged, at one time, to the Materialistic school which rejects Christianity. But now his position is rather that of a member of the right wing of the Free School of Christian Theologians. The process by which he came to accept historical Christianity as his faith, is no doubt described in this preliminary volume, though that is not expressly said. The earlier chapters of the volume show that metaphysics and physical science leave us at a position far removed from certainty. The supposed certainty of the materialistic theories in particular is exposed at length as a baseless assumption. The author then approaches the characteristic point of his argument. He discusses and illustrates forcibly the decisive influence which the feelings and the will have upon the formation of opinion. This is the psychological foundation of his line of thought. The next point is to establish philosophically that freedom of choice is the *sine quid non* of all moral action and character. A remarkable passage from Kant's "Critique of the Pure Reason" is then made the introduction to the application of this position to the main conclusion which the work has to expound and justify; namely, that the evidences of the existence of God, of the immortality of the soul, and of the peculiar truths of Christianity could not be stronger than they are without infringing on human freedom, and thus destroying the basis of all true morality. The second part of the work will have to deal with this wide subject of the relations of Christian Faith to Moral Freedom.

\* Der christliche Glaube und die menschliche Freiheit. Erster Theil: Präliminarien. Mit einem offenen Brief an Herrn R. von Bennigsen als Vorwort. Zweite Auflage. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes. 1881.

It will be seen that the main idea of the book is not new. At the same time, we do not know an existing work in which this argument has been worked out in all its aspects by a writer who is master of the whole of its scientific, philosophical and religious bearings. Moreover, our author is very happy in his use of the recent literature of his country as it throws light upon his subject, and has also the gift of apt and telling illustration, and his style is often striking and forcible. The general result and value of his whole argument cannot of course be estimated until the second part of his work has appeared. Its early publication is promised.

J. F. S.

TWO works by the same author, Doctor Daniel Sanders, of Altstrelitz, are, each in their way, calculated to be of the greatest use both to the scholar in general, and to the student of theology in particular.\* The first is a German adaptation of Messrs. Vincent and Dixon's Handbook to Modern Greek, and though we cannot but regret that Doctor Sanders has not found leisure to give us an independent and original book on this subject, yet we cordially acknowledge the very considerable improvements, both by way of addition and correction, which he has introduced into his German version. His translations of modern Greek poetry are singularly felicitous. The very great importance of a competent acquaintance with the idioms of the living Greek language, as illustrative of the language both of classical authors, and still more of the New Testament, is becoming daily more widely recognised, and we must be thankful for any competent effort to increase this acquaintance among the learned of Western Europe.

Next to Greek, no language is of more consequence to the theological student than German. To know, and not merely to think one knows, German, to be sure what is right and what is wrong, and why it is right or wrong, in that language, to understand the principles not only of German grammar, but also of German versification, so as to be able at once to appreciate and to criticise the standard writers of the Fatherland, and to gain at the same time a compendious and yet all but exhaustive knowledge of the main epochs and names in the history of German literature, together with an intelligent view of the relation of the lesser to the greater lights, and of all to the political and social condition of their country, are certainly objects towards the attainment of which Doctor Sanders' "Deutsche Sprachbriefe" are, if not a royal road, at all events a direct, a safe, and a delightful thoroughfare.

E. M. G.

\* *Neugriechische Grammatik nebst Sprachproben für die Fortbildung und Umgestaltung des Griechischen von Homer bis auf die Gegenwart*: von Professor Dr. Daniel Sanders. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.

*Deutsche Sprachbriefe*. Zweite Auflage (von demselben). Langenscheidt'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Berlin: Möckernstrasse, 133.



TO the English reader who had followed with interest the course of these lectures on the great subject of Comparative Mythology, in which Prof. Max Müller (in his Oxford Essay, 1858) had taken the lead among us, Sir G. W. Cox's "Mythology of the Aryan Nations," published eleven years ago, assumed at once the position of a standard work. Of this, the "Introduction" before us\* is, in a certain sense, an abridgment. It contains, in less than half the compass of the larger book, perhaps all of its contents that are essential, and nearly all that we should have been sorry to miss; and, unlike most abridgments, it is easy and delightful reading. But here the order in which two stages in the life of *mythus*, Mythology and Folklore, are treated, is different; here the great factors of primitive story, The Heavens, Light, Fire, Clouds, &c., precede "the Epical Traditions and Poems of the Aryan World"; and we note with pleasure that these latter are by no means ruthlessly abbreviated—in some cases indeed, as in that of the Arthurian legends, the relation is fuller and the treatment more systematic than in the larger work. But perhaps the gain of space to Arthur has been secured by the sad omission (almost the only one we have to deplore) of the beautiful stories of Rama and Luxman and Faithful John.

In the "Introduction" our author spends no time in discussing theories of the origin of myths. Antecedent probabilities in favour of what its opponents usually call the Solar Hypothesis must be sought elsewhere. Here Sir G. W. Cox takes his reader at once by the hand, and shows him sun and wind, cloud and darkness, playing their parts in early thought under such a thin veil of personality, or with names so unmistakably significant, that his assent cannot be withheld: he then artfully introduces complications and variations in non-essential features, from the vast stores of kindred myth, in which the essentials remain the same, till the learner feels a growing conviction, first, that all myth must be explicable, and next, that he is likely to become hopelessly involved if he lets go the clue given him at the outset. Thus the theory which our author calls the "Key of all Aryan Mythology," is assumed, at first, to be proved by accumulation of instances. This was expressed in the larger work in such terms as these:—"When . . . . Kephalos, Prokris, Hermes, Daphnê, Zeus, Ouranos, stand forth as simple names for the sun, the dew, the wind, the dawn, the heaven, and the sky, each recognised as such, yet each endowed with the most perfect consciousness, we feel that the great riddle of mythology is solved." (Myth. Ar. Na. I. p. 103.) "The groundwork of Greek mythology was the ordinary speech which told of the interchange of day and night, of summer and winter: but into the superstructure there may have been introduced any amount of local or personal detail, any number of ideas and notions

\* An Introduction to the Science of Comparative Mythology and Folklore. By the Rev. Sir G. W. Cox, Bart., M.A. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co., 1881.

imported from foreign philosophical or religious systems." (*Ibid.* pp. 106-7. Cf. *Intro.* pp. 29, 81.)

It may be hard to believe that we are to find here a basis of meaning, and a common ground of relationship, at once for the great themes of the Epic cycles, the worships of India and Greece, the Sagas of Teutonic and Scandanavian Europe, the romances of chivalry, the nursery-tales alike of the Deccan and the Scottish Highlands. But when these are unrolled one after another, as they are in the volume before us, the cumulative evidence gathers weight every moment, and the startling persistence with which the same features recur, giving to legends gathered from the most distant lands a likeness which only common kindred and origin can explain, must strike the most sceptical. For instance, in the last story-book from America, "Uncle Remus," where it is related how the Rabbit stole the Fox's fish, we find a negro reproduction of the world-pervading tale of the Master-Thief, in form most akin to the Norse version. But however prepared we may be for the various play of imagination around objects of daily observation, there remains to us still a problem with which as yet even Sir G. W. Cox cannot exhaustively deal. It is one which perhaps only a further development of the new science of "The Psychology of Races" can elucidate; viz.: the turning of nature-myth not merely into a story of human personality, but into human tragedy, by the introduction of inexorable fate, inevitable crime, and expiatory suffering. It may be that the creation of personages like the Fates, belongs no less than the hypostasis of Themis or Fides, to "An ethical or theological rather than to a mythical age"; but long before this, the pathos of human experience had projected itself into the life of the divinest beings. In the legends of Hercules, of Balder, of Œdipus, of Arthur, of a hundred more, we hear the same undertone of foreboding drawn out at the close into the wail of mortal grief, and appealing at once to the religious emotions to add some redeeming touch of peace and hope. We gladly, but with some reservation of judgment, welcome such suggestions as meet us here and there in the "Introduction": *e.g.*—"The thought which colours these myths gave shape to a doctrine of necessity more powerful than the will of Zeus himself. All things are within its grasp. The sun must rise in the heavens, and must be hurled down from his lofty place. He must be united again in the evening to the mother from whom he was parted in the morning; and hence the awful marriage of Œdipus with Iokasté, which filled his house with woe, and brought his lineage to an end in blood. Iphigeneia must die that Helen may be brought back, for the evening twilight must vanish away if the dawn is to return. But Iphigeneia has done no wrong; and there must be condign vengeance for the shedding of her innocent blood," (pp. 60—61).

We wish our space would allow us to quote the whole passage (pp. 121—127), in which our author deals with the story of Œdipus, drawing out more fully than in any other instance the moral aspect of the legend.

We think it would have been well if a separate section had been devoted to what may be called the philological side of mythology, or, at least, if

the scattered remarks on the power of words to gather new mythical elements around them had been drawn to a focus. We meet, however, with some excellent illustrations of the creation and germination of myths by the attribution of wrong meanings to names. This process of false etymology (of which we have monuments in English words like *cray-fish* and *sweet-heart*) is going on all over England and Scotland, wherever the "oldest inhabitant" is asked for the forgotten meaning of a local name, or a stranger wholly ignorant of the dialect of the district undertakes to set the inhabitants right.\* There is a striking case of double etymology and consequent development of twin myths in the root *Lyk*—"brightness" (seen in the Arcadian Mount Lykaion and Lykosoura, and Phoebus's Lykian realm), which was interpreted also to mean "wolf," whence Lykaon and his sons are turned into wolves. (Intro. pp. 40—42. Cf. Myth. Ar. Na. I., 47.) Similarly we have the name of the Teutonic fire-god Loki, originally from *liukan*, to shine, read into connection with *lukan*, to lock, whence Loki becomes the keeper of the prison-house. So Pramantha (meaning in Sanskrit, as Kuhn has proved, the primitive "firestick"), while kept in legend as the Fire-giver, is bent into Prometheus, the Foreseeing, and fitted with a counterpart in Epimetheus, Wise after the event. "In the same way it is possible that the name Kyklops may simply represent the Semitic Kouk-lobb or Khouk-labbh, 'Rulers of the flame or fire-worshippers,' these Kouk-lobb being builders of those gigantic works which we still associate with their names." (Intro. p. 278.) Yet everybody knows that the Greeks thought of a Kyklops as a giant with one "round eye." It was, by a like process, we cannot doubt, that the San-greal, the Holy Dish, became connected with the Sang-rael, the Real Blood.

Into the dim regions of Semitic myth our author does not allow himself to be enticed, even by the startling speculations of Goldziher. But what there was on Semitic religion in the larger work is reproduced concisely, and, we fancy, with more assurance and completeness. (Pp. 142, 211.) That Semitic influence was felt in Greece, and especially in Boeotia, the names Kadmos (from *Kedem*, the East), Melikertes Melkarth), Athamas (Tammuz), Adonis, and probably Poseidon, afford sufficient indication. "Without going further we have a sufficient warrant for the assertion that the influence of the Assyrian or Semitic religion or mythology, on that of the Greek world was far more direct and important than any that came from Egypt. In the traditions associated with the names of Dionysos and Poseidon, we have clear evidence of a determined but unsuccessful resistance made to the introduction of a Semitic ritual, which seemed to the Greek mind both unseemly and extravagant; and the whole of this evidence tends to prove

\* A case in point:—here is a daily paper with an account of a dreadful occurrence at King Edward, Banffshire. The name of the place is Kin-edart; but a railway sub-contractor, we believe, made the profound discovery that this was only an ignorant Scotch way of saying "King Edward," and from the board at the Railway station the distortion has spread to the village itself. It is still, perhaps, a moot point which King Edward is to be popularly credited in the next century with having been born or having died there.

that the stream of Assyrian or Phœnician trade or enterprise set steadily in the direction of Bœetia."

Our string of interesting quotations might be indefinitely prolonged, and bids fair, even now, to outrun the limits of a modest "Notice." But Sir G. W. Cox cannot only tell a story, as most readers know, just exactly as it should be told; he can lend the same charm to that analysis of stories which, in some hands, might seem to be a pitiless desecration.

J. E. O.

BOSTON has long been the centre of all that is great in the literature of America, and a little book that has just reached us\* shows that the great Transcendental movement of forty years ago is still kept alive with its old fire and energy. This book is the record of a Radical club meeting regularly in Boston (without any attractions in the way of Kettle-drum or other refreshments), in the drawing-room of a house in Chesnut Street, where the late Mr. J. T. Sargent and his wife, the present editress, acted as host and hostess. The members, male and female, consisting of some of the most famous literary people of Boston and the neighbourhood, meet to hear a paper, or lecture, or poem, on any subject, which is followed by a discussion or conversation by any of those present. The fame of these gatherings has travelled far and wide, and the proceedings of the club have been reported, not only in the American papers, but in those of Germany and France. The subjects discussed include not only politics and social questions, but literature, science, art, religion, and all the burning questions of the day; and as the essays and discussions are conducted by some of the most learned and able men in America—including many of those so familiar to English readers, viz., Emerson, Longfellow and his brother (Samuel Longfellow), J. G. Whittier, C. P. Cranch, F. H. Hedge, O. W. Holmes, D. A. Watson, John Weiss, O. B. Frothingham, and other distinguished writers and professors—it may easily be imagined that the essays are of the most various and interesting kind, and the after-discussions most lively and brilliant. Of course the club and its members have been roundly abused, and its place of meeting is denounced as "the jumping-off place of all belief into negation"! But in spite of all abuse, the club has thriven, and the readers of these sketches will find the most sacred subjects treated with a reverence and originality of thought that will well repay perusal. The volume contains more than fifty essays, or reports of them, on all sorts of subjects, so that it is impossible in so short a notice even to enumerate them. The first essay, delivered in 1867, is a very characteristic one by Emerson, on "Religion." There are others on Prayer, the Unseen, Pantheism, Evolution, Buckle and Carlyle, Philosophy, &c., all full of beautiful and original ideas; and not less interesting are the "*after-talks*," as they called them, some of which are also highly amusing. We read of a

\* Sketches and Reminiscences of "The Radical Club" of Chesnut Street, Boston. Edited by Mrs. John T. Sargent. Boston: Jas. R. Osgood and Co.

New York clergyman who announced that "science must stop, or religion could not go on"! One of the papers is an interesting account of a visit to Boston by Professor Tyndall, who gave a series of lectures there in 1878, and who relates "that when he was a young man he picked up at a stall a copy of Emerson's essay on 'Nature,' which he read with such delight that he had never ceased to read it; and if any one can be said to have given an impulse to his mind, it is Emerson." "Whatever I have done," he said, "the world owes to him."

At some of the meetings original poems were read by members of the club. Amongst those given in this volume the one on "The Deaf Beethoven," by Julia R. Anagnos, seems to us the best, but it is too long to quote. We hope we have said enough to recommend this book, which is full of high and holy thoughts, that are well worth the reading.

R. C. H.

LIKE a good many other people, Mr. Henry George has been much struck with the way in which poverty and wealth increase side by side; and in an ably-written book\* he seeks to discover the cause and urge a remedy. To do this, he traverses almost the whole field of political economy, and would reverse many of the popular doctrines about wages and capital, population and subsistence, as well as the current laws regarding the distribution of wealth into interest, wages, and rent. The conclusion arrived at is that landowners get a great deal too much, and that as long as private property in land is allowed, the increased wealth of a progressive country will all be absorbed by the monopolists of the soil, and a more and more poverty-stricken and degraded population will occupy the other end of the social scale. Every reader of J. S. Mill's "Political Economy" will remember the force and earnestness with which he dwells on the same subject, and insists that, in all justice, what he calls "the unearned increment of rent" should belong to the State, not to private individuals. Mr. George would have had a much better chance of influencing the opinion of thinking men if he had followed out this line of argument, instead of deeming it necessary to reconstruct all the main positions of economic science. He is very hard on the Malthusian theory, but the thing chiefly needed to complete his own theory is the moral principle which has successfully survived the whole controversy, and which may be thus stated: *moral means alone can permanently benefit a people; material prosperity will be but temporary, unless accompanied by moral advance.* As it is, the chief value of his book seems to be twofold: he has drawn a good deal of attention to the fact that industrial progress will never, of itself, abolish or even permanently diminish poverty; and he has illustrated the great land-problem with facts which came under his own observation in the United States, particularly in California. The interest which new countries like the

\* Progress and Poverty. By Henry George. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1881.

Western States have in the best solution of this problem is even greater than we have here; at present the possible advantages which might be secured by new methods are all forfeited by blind clinging to old custom; and as civilisation spreads westward, it brings with it the familiar evils of the Old World. It is a worthy ambition for an American citizen to try to bring about a reform in the land laws, while the question is still how to secure greater good rather than how to get rid of intolerable evil.

Dr. Bruce has published some lectures on Revelation\* which profess to deal with the question in its very latest stage. He is profoundly dissatisfied with the hard, doctrinaire view which has been maintained in former apologetics, and with which Mr. Matthew Arnold and the author of "Supernatural Religion," as well as other critics, have made such havoc, and thinks that by introducing a certain amount of cautious change, effacing some sharply defined lines and investing the whole subject with a somewhat ethereal garb, all the positions generally deemed essential to orthodox Christianity may still be maintained. With much that he says in the beginning we are in cordial agreement. He distinguishes between Revelation and the Scriptures, and declares that the former term "signifies God manifesting Himself in the history of the world in a supernatural manner and for a special purpose." In the Bible "we have the record of such a special revelation," which "is before all things a self-manifestation of God as the God of *grace*." Sin exists, whatever theory we may adopt respecting its origin; "what more worthy of God, and therefore what more likely, than that He, looking down on a race enveloped in moral darkness and corruption, should be moved with compassion, and resolve to do all that is possible to dispel the darkness by communicating a knowledge of Himself, and to remove the corruption by measures fitted to elevate and purify?" From this basis Dr. Bruce skilfully extends his positions till miracle and prophecy find themselves in their accustomed quarters, and "the doctrinal significance of Revelation" comes to be much what it has been for a very long time. The only criticism we care to make is that for there to be much real value in a work which, while modifying the ancient premises and arguments, still reaches all the familiar conclusions, the writer of it ought to be a free man. How much freedom a Scotch theologian practically has, the recent case of Professor Robertson Smith may help us to judge.

Two more books demolishing Darwin!† That by Dr. Wainwright will be immensely chuckled over by those who admired the author's "Christian Certainty" and "The Modern Avernus," for the amount of folly now discovered in the "current theories concerning atoms, apes, and men," is, to say the least, remarkable. Mr. Denton's book propounds a theory about types which reminds one of Plato's Ideas, and may be

\* The Chief End of Revelation. By Alexander B. Bruce, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1881.

† Scientific Sophisms. By Samuel Wainwright, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1881.

Is Darwin Right? By William Denton. Massachusetts. 1881.

nearer the truth than any doctrine of differentiation by natural selection pure and simple. But where is the evidence? Cannot these dilettante critics see that Darwin has made his impression on the thought of the age by colossal industry and massive accumulation of facts, and that those who would enter the lists with him must be similarly equipped? One is very tired of all these little anti-Darwinites. They are more effective talking than writing. "Didn't he give it them Huxley and Tyndal chaps!" said an admirer, after hearing his parson on a favourite subject; but an interminable series of books devoted to the same end is great weariness to the flesh.

H. S. S.

THOSE who read the fine historical drama of "Hannibal" which Professor Nichol published a few years ago, will certainly turn with interest to the volume in which he gives us a picture of another of the great historic personages of heroic times.\* In his new "dramatic fragment" the author has worked out, in a briefer form, but with no less care and finish, a very interesting study of motive and character, and has summed up the leading features in a strange, eventful career. The man who rose from obscurity to the highest place in the State, his sheer strength of will, audacity, and astuteness, making everything bend to his purposes, the man to whose daring, not to say reckless, strategy the Athenians owed their victory at Salamis, yet who fell from his high estate, and spent the concluding seventeen years of his life as a fugitive from his country, and a pensioner on the splendid liberality of his country's deadliest enemy, had at last, when war had again broken out between Persia and Greece, to face a tragic dilemma from which he could not escape with honour; and he put an end to the life which had become too difficult for him. Such a subject is of a kind to attract those who delight in attempting to unravel a tangle of complex motives, and in trying over again a notable case of conscience. The moral verdict of the historian has been, generally, a more or less unfavourable one, and Dr. Nichol's ingeniously charitable interpretation will hardly be accepted without demur. But the poet is free to select the features of the story which best suit his purpose, and, if he is careful, as our author has been, "to adhere to a position which is historically defensible," he may legitimately exercise his imagination in representing what was, or might have been, the real life below the surface of actions and events. The character of Themistocles is one which Mr. Browning would enjoy dealing with in his own way, probing and searching into recondite springs of action, forcing the man into unexpected self-revealings, and throwing pitiless strong lights upon the secret things of his life. It must be admitted, however, that Mr. Browning's solutions of the moral problems he takes in hand are sometimes about as hard a study (though it is a very bracing one)

\*The Death of Themistocles, and other Poems. By John Nichol, M.A., Balliol, Oxon., LL.D., Regius Professor of English Language and Literature in the University of Glasgow. Glasgow: James Maclehose. 1881.

as the original problems themselves; while Dr. Nichol is willing to give his rendering of the story in verse, which, perhaps, would bear the infusion of a little more passion and energy, but which is excellently clear and melodious. The general character of the poem is narrative, descriptive, and reflective, rather than dramatic. Themistocles is led to recount the chief incidents of his career, and to explain and justify his motives, in conversation with his son, and with two of his daughters, one a Greek, the other a Persian. Then the summons comes to him to take his part in the struggle between his native country and his adopted one, and, in the last scene, he sends his farewell to both, and makes his exit. On these lines, and with the limitations implied in the title, "a Dramatic Fragment," the author has constructed his poem, giving us in it a careful and scholarly study, which we have read with no little interest and enjoyment. The leading poem occupies hardly more than a quarter of the whole volume, the rest consisting of shorter pieces, which will, we think, be still more generally appreciated than the one we have characterised above. There is a series of "Pictures by the Way," which may pleasantly recall to some scenes and incidents of their own travel. The "In Memoriam" sonnets embalm some great and good memories in worthy verse; and in the verses, "Miscellaneous and Political," we have the wise and thoughtful utterance of opinions and feelings, and a sensitive and earnest faith, with which we find ourselves generally in entire sympathy. We have marked not a few passages, which we should be tempted to quote if we had space enough at our disposal. To justify our warm commendation we would refer our readers to the poems, amongst others, entitled "The Strahleck," "St. Enogat," "A Character," "A Revelation," and the sonnets, "Sydney Dobell," "W. Lloyd Garrison," "Madonna Mia," and "The Teacher," and we will give ourselves the pleasure of quoting the following utterance of that spirit of sweet reasonableness in religion which is, happily, so deeply modifying the harsher creed once deemed the only legitimate outcome of Scotch theology:—

*Ave Maria.*

"Of all names, that of Saint Mary was the most offensive. In Spain and Continental countries the name of Mary was looked upon as being connected with idolatry, and was fitted to fill the heart with sorrow."—*Free Church Debate.*

Ave Maria! on a thousand thrones  
 Raised by the weary hearts that beat to thee,  
 As 'neath the softer Light, the throbbing sea,  
 Thy name, a spell of peace, in lingering tones  
 Is whispered through the world: thy ruth condones  
 The feebler faith of worshippers that flee,  
 Lost in the Sovereign Awe, to bend the knee  
 By pictured holiness or breathing stones.  
 Mother of Christ! whom ages old adorn,  
 And hundred climes, by gentle thought and deed,  
 Forgive the sacrilege, the brandished scorn  
 Of the grim guardians of a narrow creed,  
 Who fence their folds from Love's serener law,  
 And "grate on scranell pipes of wretched straw."

R. C. J.



THERE has been nothing more thoroughly unchristian in Christianity than the spirit it has shown towards the Jews, and we are grateful to Mrs. Magnus for having told their story from the time of the Captivity in a way that must touch the heart of every reader and remove some of the prejudice that still remains. The little volume before us \* gives just that portion of their history which is almost entirely unknown to those who are not of their own race. Most people have some notions (however erroneous) of the history of Israel as told in the Old Testament. Then follows an interval of which they know nothing, then a short period in which the nation is represented as a furious mob exulting in the crucifixion of Jesus, and then a great blank. But through all this period of more than twenty-three centuries the people that Moses led out of Egypt, Saul delivered from servitude, and David and Solomon raised to power, the nation of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, of the great prophet of the Return, and of the sweet singers whose hymns of praise are still sung in our churches, had a history, and a very remarkable and touching history it is, Mrs. Magnus describes very simply, and yet at times very powerfully, the glory of the return from captivity, the corruptions of subsequent heathen customs and the misery of heathen rule, the heroic struggle under the Maccabees, the miserable internal strife that ruined the nation again, and the final desolation. And then she continues the history of the nation scattered and persecuted, but one people still, bound together by its religion, and its devotion to *God*, however scattered abroad in his world. The volume before us only extends to the exodus from England under Edward I., but Mrs. Magnus in her preface tells us that she hopes at some future date to carry on the History to the present time, and we hope she may. It is an ungrateful task to point out the defects of a book like this, but it is not fair to the public to allow slovenly writing to pass unnoticed, nor to the author to give no hint of the corrections which ought to be made for a subsequent edition. Mixed metaphors and ungrammatical sentences ought to be an annoyance to every reader, and they are by no means a necessary evil. In her account of Jesus and the foundation of Christianity Mrs. Magnus is fairer than most Christian writers, but some of this should be carefully re-written. We cannot believe that she means to say that Jesus or even his immediate followers led men to forget that "God is one" or that he is "merciful and gracious" or anything of the kind, and yet she says it was the national horror of such teachings which quenched all natural pity for his sad fate (p. 78). Nor do we suppose that she regards baptism as a Mohammedan rite, and yet she speaks of an edict of the Al-Mohad dynasty as forcing "baptism or banishment upon the Jews." Such defects as these seriously detract from the value of this little work. In spite of them, however, we recommend it strongly to our readers. They will find nothing better available. If they take it up they will not readily lay it down again, and

\* About the Jews since Bible Times. By Mrs. Magnus. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1881.

they must surely rise from it feeling that they have become more intimately acquainted with a great race, and are themselves the gainers thereby. The work is written in what is called "popular style," and was originally intended for Jewish boys and girls. Christian boys and girls, or Christian men and women, may be assured that it is as interesting as a book of adventures or a novel, and much more profitable.

F. H. J.

IN noticing the first volume of the Rev. E. Johnson's translation of Ewald's "Commentary on the Psalms" (*Modern Review*, Vol. II., pp. 200, 201), we were glad to find an excuse for the limited success of the English book in the prodigious difficulties involved in any attempt to reproduce the writings of the German scholar so as to be intelligible (we will not say attractive) to foreign readers. At the same time, the importance, even the necessity, of Ewald, for any really thorough study of the Bible makes us welcome a new volume of his commentaries in English; since his scholarly genius stands, and will stand, over and above the temporary accidents of his intensely personal attitude as a critic. Mr. Johnson's second and finishing volume\* seems, like the first, to be an honest and accurate piece of work; and the translator has done well to complete the book by an extract from a distinct section of the "Dichter des Alten Bundes," of which this commentary is but a part, "On the Singing and Music of the Songs." Those who have been used to the German book will also be thankful for the excellent printing of the English, though the paper might be improved both in colour and in texture.

R. L. P.

THE secession of Mr. Stopford Brooke from the Church of England is understood rather to have augmented than to have diminished the numbers who flock to his ministry. Nor is it likely that his printed words will reach a smaller constituency than formerly. Indeed, his secession marks rather the removal of a burden from his own conscience than any sharp change in the nature of his teachings. The sermons which he has just published† were written while he was still a Priest. They are published when he is no more than a voluntary minister.

Mr. Brooke's preaching is of the highest order. He assumes the spiritual culture of his people, and addresses himself to rendering practical help to them in the spiritual difficulties of the time. As these difficulties largely arise from the prevalence of a more or less morbid self-consciousness, it is inevitable that spiritual introspection should be encouraged by Mr. Brooke to a degree perhaps not always conducive to spiritual health.

\* Theological Translation Fund Library, Vol. XXIV. Ewald's "Commentary on the Psalms." Translated by the Rev. E. Johnson. Vol. II. Williams and Norgate. 1881.

† The Spirit of the Christian Life. Sermons preached on various occasions by the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, M.A. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1881.

Valetudinarianism is as unsatisfactory a condition, and a temper as little to be admired, in the things of the soul as in those of the body. Normal religion no more involves constant watching of its own processes than breathing or eating and drinking. There is, therefore, a certain unnaturalness in the perpetual investigation of symptoms in the soul-life which the intellectual revolution of our times has brought as its accompaniment. Such reflections, accordingly, as those indulged in in the sermon on "Spiritual Exhaustion" have their danger. But this being said, it is to be added that the advice given for the treatment of the symptoms is thoroughly wise and wholesome. Again, such a sermon as that on "Sunshine" breathes a spiritual health which is truly refreshing and invigorating. That Mr. Brooke's sermons are a gain to English literature need hardly be said. Only those who know how difficult it is to set forth a spiritual truth in a brief, bright, natural image, will appreciate as highly as it deserves the singular dexterity of the minister of Bedford Chapel in the choice and arrangement of word and phrase. But the highest quality of these discourses lies in their large and noble faith, their breadth of sympathy, and their breezy, bracing strength.

THE readers of the present number of the *Modern Review* will need no further introduction to Mr. M. J. Savage. It must, indeed, be a thoughtful congregation that can appreciate as they are delivered such discourses as these on the Belief in God\*—discourses which, collected in a book, do not read like sermons at all, but like a connected and systematic work. Mr. Savage seems to us, with his enthusiastic adoption of the Evolution philosophy, to be doing the like work in reconciling the most advanced thought among his countrymen with theistic religion, to that which Theodore Parker did a generation ago. The dedication of the volume runs thus: "Believing that the true way of escape from the 'Slough of Despond' is by *going straight through it* to the other side, like 'Christian,' and not by *crawling back to the starting-point*, abject and mud-bespattered, like 'Pliable,' the author dedicates this book to those who agree with him in this opinion."

OUR notice of Dr. Barry's Boyle Lectures† has been somewhat delayed. Dr. Barry remains on the old lines, but probably the student who desires to understand the manner in which an enlightened scholar of the present day maintains the high view of the nature and

\* Belief in God. An Examination of some Fundamental Theistic Problems. By M. J. Savage. To which is added an Address on the Intellectual Basis of Faith. By W. H. Savage. London: Trübner and Co. 1881.

† The Manifold Witness for Christ. Part I. Christianity and Natural Theology. Part II. The Positive Evidences of Christianity. The Boyle Lectures for 1877 and 1878. By Alfred Barry, D.D., D.C.L. London: Murray. 1880.

functions of Christ could go to no better exponent than the Principal of King's College. Dr. Barry justly observes that Christianity is probably the only representative of "Supernatural Religion" that has any chance of a hearing. He contends, however, that the supernatural need not be preternatural, and maintains that Christianity simply confirms and endows with higher certitude the principles and inductions of Natural Religion and Theology. But this confirmatory attitude of Christian revelation towards the natural promptings of the mind is itself a confirmation of the claims of that revelation, in its full scope, upon our credence. Here, then, comes in the examination of those special evidences of Christianity which establish its particular parts and points; and these special evidences divide themselves chiefly between the unique combination of philosophical, moral, and spiritual effectiveness in Christianity, and the contemplation of the person and life of Christ, as challenging for him an absolute faith. When all these lines have been successively followed to their issue, then will the inquirer be in a position to accept, without misgiving, every teaching of the Christ himself, as of absolute and plenary authority.

Dr. Barry uses almost every theological term in a different sense from that which we attach to it. For him the great terms Revelation, Inspiration, Authority, Faith, and Christianity itself connote sets of ideas other than those which they connote for us. But his book is a serious and large-minded book. He ranges his forces in order of battle with the eye of a true general for the real exigencies of the time; and while we diverge from him at almost every page, at none does he fail to command our sincere respect.

**S**HAKERISM, which claims to be a lineal representative of the French Prophets of 1689, was carried from Manchester to the United States, where it continues to hold its own. Its theology is chiefly remarkable for the combination of a doctrine of prayer, even for material good, with a denial of the personality of God. It recognises a progressive element in the Bible, and resolves all miracle into metaphor. Of Jesus it takes a purely humanitarian view, holding that "he had been dead to that spiritual life into which he rose." As Jesus, after becoming Christ, exhibited the Father in Deity, so Ann Lee, whose spiritual history was akin to that of Jesus, manifested the Mother in Deity. To this doctrine of a female Christ, there are many historical parallels. Ethically, Shakerism presents this curious feature, that it treats marriage as a survival of concupiscence, valuable only as an advance upon polygamy, as that again is an advance upon animal promiscuity. Bishop Eads\* is not a very refined orator, but he has shrewd mother-wit at command. His literature may be fairly judged from the statement that of the New Testament, "the oldest Greek copy now extant is in the English Museum

\* Shaker Sermons: Scripto-rational. Containing the substance of Shaker Theology. By H. L. Eads, Bishop of South Union, Ky. Trübner and Co.

in London," and "in this copy the four gospels all begin alike at the baptism of John." He is at his best in his negro stories—*e.g.*, "Sah, you need not tell dis niggah dar is no debbil. Kase, if dah was no debbil, how does da make de picters so zackly like him?" On the same principle, we presume, there must be a Bishop Eads, for his "pictier" adorns this book.

GEORGE HOPE, of Fenton Barns,\* was a very ardent Radical. As a young man he expressed delight in the writings of Channing, for this among other reasons, because "he stripped the robe of glory from the back of the First Napoleon, and made us thankful that the ocean had a rock on which to chain such tyrants." In matters ecclesiastical he was as dauntless an outcomer as in matters political. On these two kindred habits hangs most of the interest of the Biography which his daughter has compiled. Early in life George Hope distinguished himself highly in the Anti-Corn Law agitation, and became the friend of Bright and Cobden. That which made his action remarkable was his position as a tenant-farmer. Rising clear above the prejudices of his class, he saw and proclaimed the benefits which agriculturists themselves would derive from the emancipation of trade, and his influence was not small in the education of Scotch opinion. In 1865 George Hope was induced to become a candidate for the Parliamentary representation of Haddingtonshire, and ten years later he stood for East Aberdeenshire. In the first case he was defeated by the influence of the landlords, and in the second by that of the Kirk. The price of Mr. Hope's independence and political energy was the forfeiture of the old family homestead, and in 1878 Fenton Barns, which, under his skilful culture, had become "a place of pilgrimage for men of all nations who desired to see the best practice of modern agriculture," passed into other hands. Its owner could not brook his tenant's audacity in not only holding Liberal opinions, but even carrying them to the poll, and his "eviction" followed as a necessary consequence.

This volume contains much interesting matter, and there is a fine individuality and a noble sincerity about its hero which cannot fail to win the reader's sympathy and respect. But it bears traces of having been "originally printed for private circulation," as was indeed the case. It is encumbered with many letters of a purely family interest which there was no reason for offering to the public, however welcome their perusal may have been to private friends. It is a much graver mistake, however, to have put into "permanent form" the newspaper reports of the electioneering speeches of Mr. Hope's opponents, and preserved all the foolish and indefensible things said in the heat of political contests by Lord Elcho and Sir Alexander Gordon. Such talk is unfortunately common at almost all elections, but a daughter's devotion should be

\* George Hope, of Fenton Barns. A Sketch of his Life. Compiled by his Daughter. Edinburgh: David Douglas. 1881.

sufficiently checked by her discretion to prevent her from publishing in a book after her father's death all the offensive utterances which fell from his antagonists amid the din of battle. Should these defects be eliminated in a future edition, the Memoir of George Hope, of Fenton Barns, will be worthy to take its place among the lives of the best and truest of British patriots.

GIBBON was neither the first nor the last to appreciate the marvel of the spread of Christianity, or to attempt an explanation of its extraordinary success in penetrating and revolutionising whole systems of civilisation. Mr. Allen, in his *Fragments of Christian History*,\* puts forward a somewhat novel solution of the problem, which, however, should command a respectful consideration, and is at any rate highly contributive.

In whatever way we regard the origin and early growth of Christianity, whether as special revelation or as historic evolution, it appears to me that the key to it is to be found, not in its speculative dogma, not in its ecclesiastical organisation, not even in what strictly constitutes its religious life, but in its fundamentally ethical character. In either way of understanding it, it is first of all a gospel for the salvation of human life. And to this primary notion of it everything else has been subordinated to a degree that astonishes me more and more as I look into its original documents. A motive so intense and so profound—however crude and misinformed—as to dominate the reason and imagination for more than a thousand years, and to create a civilisation which had (we may say) every great quality except that of a voice for its own interpretation, which stifled thought in the interest of morality, which reduced art, after its rich classic development, to a bald symbolism, and made a free science or literature impossible,—whatever else we may think of it, is certainly an amazing and unique phenomenon in human history (pp. iii. iv.).

It is to be regretted that these striking sentences, exhibiting at once so lively a sense of the organic unity of Christian history and an adherence so decided to an ethical interpretation of its vast network of phenomena, is introductory only to a volume of "Fragments." We would fain translate some other prefatory words into a promise of a more systematic and consecutive work by-and-by. Meanwhile, we can cordially commend the series of sketches here collected. The sense of law and social evolution is present throughout, and the reader is not allowed to forget the philosophy of history in the discussion of its incidents. Mr. Allen, beginning with "the Messiah and the Christ" and "Saint Paul" (which chapters follow naturally on his preceding "Hebrew Men and Times"), leads us on to the Arian Controversy, Saint Augustine and Leo, and finally traces the consolidation of the Holy Roman Empire, the divorce of the Church and the Empire, and the influence of Bede, Alcuin, Scotus Erigena, and Gottschalk.

\* *Fragments of Christian History to the Foundation of the Holy Roman Empire*. By Joseph Henry Allen, Lecturer on Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1880.

# THE MODERN REVIEW.

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OCTOBER, 1881.

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## *JAMES HINTON AS A RELIGIOUS THINKER.*

### HIS UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS.

JAMES HINTON left a small but precious legacy of thought to his generation. "Man and His Dwelling-place," in which the phenomenal is regarded as the appearance of the spiritual; the "Mystery of Pain"; "Life in Nature," an eloquent attempt to show that Nature is truly living, and that the laws we usually look upon as so cold and hard can be seen to answer the demands of the emotions—these were the chief published results of his thought. And when the admirable "Life and Letters," by Miss Ellice Hopkins, appeared, there came to many the revelation—if an incomplete revelation—of a new thinker. It was a revelation that had something of sadness in it. For this man, who appeared to have such a wonderful and satisfying vision of a unity existing in varying form through all things, who had so delicate and profound a moral perception, and with whom had seemed to lie a solution to some great intellectual and social problems as they are presented to the modern consciousness, had passed away, and left only fragments behind. It is some consolation to those who consider his methods of thought not unfruitful, that among these fragments are large quantities of MSS.

still unpublished. These MSS. contain the writer's thoughts on many subjects, put to paper as they grew out of his mind, and with no effort after style. Unfortunately, Hinton underrated his literary ability, and cared little to work his thoughts into books. As it is, they must always remain fragments, original in form, often profound, always full of vital force, but still fragments which the master mind will never endow with complete organic life. Many of these MSS., especially those of an early date, were privately printed during his lifetime, and from this series a volume of selections is now in course of preparation. In the present paper I propose to give some extracts from the same series, which may indicate Hinton's position in regard to a few of the great religious questions of the present day. Whatever difference of opinion may exist concerning the positions here taken up—few could care less for mere difference of opinion than Hinton himself—they will yet, I believe, be found in a high degree suggestive.

Hinton was by no means a religious thinker in the narrowest sense of the term only. Metaphysics, mental science, biology, ethics, all came within the range of his thought. Science, and the unification of scientific laws, occupied much of his attention. One of his generalisations in morphology, that motion takes the direction of least resistance in the organic world, was embodied with modification by Mr. Herbert Spencer in "First Principles." Perhaps few thinkers have written more about the phenomena of genius; certainly none have written more originally. He wrote much also on Art and the relations which he considered the art-method to bear to ethics. It was to ethics, indeed, to the solution of the problems of human life, that Hinton's later thinking, in whatever field, always had reference.

I said that Hinton cared little for mere difference of



opinion. His views on this point find frequent expression in the MSS. They throw considerable light on his whole method of thought, and it may be well, before proceeding to more distinctively religious questions, to illustrate them by a few extracts.

Differences of opinion are like differences of constitution, of which, indeed, they are but parts; and as we can see the use and beauty of differences of constitution and adaptation, so we ought to enlarge our hearts to see the use and beauty of differences of opinion. It is not an evil to be put up with, but a felicity to be enjoyed: for example, the doctrines of necessity and chance as the origin of the world, what are they but the two halves of the Law of Liberty? And so is not the truth of all things thus twofold, consisting of two almost opposites, of which our extreme opinions take up each one side, and which our poor intelligence cannot join? Law and Liberty are the two poles of creation, physical and moral—who shall unite them for us in the moral world as is done in the physical? Truth is too great to be cribbed in our views, too living to be entombed in our formulas. She speaks in each spontaneous thought, she dwells with each earnest heart; none ever sought her and found her not.

The essential point in thinking is to be willing to give up anything directly it becomes logically right to do so; to hold all opinions, however valuable and hardly-earned, as just so much chaff. So there arises a higher consistency; for the old opinions are sure to come back in a higher form. This is the nature of life—unifying opposites: but only by admitting the opposite as soon as ever its right appears. Thinking is like commerce; we let go opinions to get them back again better, as a merchant does his money. Holding to our opinions is like the man who hid his talent in the earth: opinions are to be “traded with,” not to be held fast.

An opinion answers to an institution; it is the embodiment and expression of some fact or condition of us, some necessity in the life of man. An opinion is only good while it is this; that is, while it is according to the other conditions of knowledge, which make it a true expression of the “fact” or life. Like institutions, opinions must change in order to maintain their value and to preserve the fact. The power is in the fact, not in the form. So we should be ready to change opinions which have done so

much good, proved so valuable, so necessary, under which, and dependent on which, so blessed a life has been diffused. That a thing is evil or wrong does not mean that it ought never to have been done or thought, but that it ought to be left off.

The intellectual differences which separate men are of form alone, and are trifles. There are no actual differences but differences of actual love, of whether that Love, which is God, be in us or not. And this depends not at all upon the strength of our intellect or the correctness of our opinions.

It must be noted that this view of opinion was not isolated in Hinton's conception. It was only the particular application of general laws. Opinion must be fluent because it is the nature of all phenomena to be fluent. That opinion must be the union of opposites followed from a law of polarity, which Hinton delighted in applying most variously. The latest form it took in his mind was that of three stages, which he termed "anticipation," "theory," "interpretation." For instance, licence, law, liberty might be such a sequence; licence, followed by law without liberty, in its turn succeeded by a liberty which embraces law. Or, as he put it in another way, it was a *reductio ad absurdum*. The "anticipation," corrected by the "theory," resulted in the "interpretation."

Turning over the leaves of the MSS., we find one thought constantly recurring, and always with insistence, the thought that the Eternal is in the Present. This lay at the foundation of much of Hinton's religious thinking. It is here also that he is affined to the mystics. It will be seen by-and-by, however, that Hinton cannot well be classed among the mystics. He has important relationships in quite other directions.

Future enjoyment cannot repay present sorrow; we know it cannot. Convince a man that vice is against enjoyment in the long run, and you are as far as ever from making him virtuous. The present asserts its rightful supremacy in spite of all such barriers. Man's business, man's life, is in the present, because

it is in the eternal, of which the present is to him the only representative. And that men have preferred, and do prefer, the future to the present—that martyrs for the sake of the world to come have endured and will endure again—this is not to the point. If it be supposed that there was a balance of present against future suffering or joy, it is a great mistake; *that* may well account for our seeming so little like martyrs now. It was for love, for present love, that they endured. And that future enjoyment cannot console for present suffering we see—it is a clear fact of all our daily life. Do we not firmly believe in a future and everlasting happiness, unutterable and overwhelming? Yet, does it console us for our sorrows? Do we not know that in darkest ages, amidst least believing nations, there never was a time or place when sorrow was so ill-borne, and suffering so feared? It is right that it is so, it helps us, or should and will help us, to a truer consolation. Enjoyment is not the consolation for sorrow—least of all, future enjoyment—but Love, which waits no lapse of time, which flies no wretchedness, which alights with its soft pinions there first where anguish has worn the deepest scars.

Religion cannot and ought not to compete with the world in its appeal to the selfish passions. Men are right in preferring this world to the next; this is not wickedness, but mere common-sense and scripturalness. It is a perversion to seek to make out that the Bible persuades men to give the preference to the future over the present; it seeks to make them give preference to the *eternal*, the actual, the fact which is necessarily present over the form which alone can be future. This is the very spirit of the Bible, to seek not the future, but the present. Do not *get* (future), but *be* (now). “Now is the . . . day of salvation.” This is its doctrine, this its precept, this its suasion of love; attend to the present, do not sacrifice it for the future; live now, do not seek to get. So men in refusing to attend to the future, and preferring the present (or that which is nearest to it), carry out the spirit of the Bible.

See how wise our instincts are; we dare not speak of damnation; we are almost afraid to use the word, or mention hell-fire above our breath. While putting them far off into the future, we put the facts away from us into a remote and unimaginable distance, and of course find them awful and mysterious; but

bring them once into the present, and then see how they live and burn, how true they are to the facts. Of course, to be wicked is to be damned; to love darkness rather than light; by what other word so good could it be called? To be wicked is simply damnation; no exaggeration is possible in the expression. And there is no "ceasing" in it; it is eternal damnation—nothing can remain but that blessed destruction in hell-fire which must consume all not being. The words have a meaning, plain, precise, intelligible, necessary.

Our notion of damnation makes it the very worst sort of punishment, that which all jurists deprecate—very severe and very uncertain. We darken the whole earth with it, and yet are afraid to pronounce it upon any individual. It is a mockery, this "eternal misery;" it prevents our saying of any one boldly, "He is damned;" and of course no one believes he will be damned. Infinitely better, even on lowest grounds, is the other view.

It may be said that these views take away the fear that should be the deterrent from sin. I say, No; they will more powerfully deter from sin than any fear—by love, and by the true and genuine fear of damnation—a damnation that is present and eternal. Moreover, fear cannot deter from *sin*, but only from outward acts; and this is not redeeming the world, but rather a hindrance to it. We aim at wrong objects and use wrong means. Love, not fear, is the only power that can avail for any good. We *are* afraid—that is the evil. Not loving, we do not know the power of love, and cannot trust it; we do not know what it is, or we should have no mistrust. God—the Love—can trust love; *He* has no fear of its failure; *He* knows it; *He* has proved it. We want Love to put us right in all things.

Hinton felt that the divine process was constant and ever present, and he protested with passionate energy against that doctrine of the divine which makes it to consist in certain special interferences, or, as by the theory of "design," in a process of contrivance. Hear him on the doctrine of creation:—

To affirm special creations is a step towards atheism. The certain effect of introducing God specially into the past is to

exclude Him just so much from the present. A reality is exchanged for an hypothesis; a seen and felt reality for an inconceivable hypothesis. The universe in truth is *full* of God; so full that nothing can be added thereto. No possible mode of regarding Him can bring Him closer than He is. Only those whose God is afar off can ever conceive of Him as brought nearer. It is our privilege, and a privilege full of exquisite joy it is, to see that God does all things so directly, that it is impossible He can do anything more directly. No cause, or chain of causes, has intervened. God did it, God does it, just as directly, just in the same sense, as He is supposed to "create a species." If any one says this makes no difference, I repeat that he cannot know till he has tried, how much he loses by referring God's *immediate* agency to the past. If that idea has any excellence or virtue, if it is glorious or delightful, if it is true, let us have it now. It sanctifies the world, makes it holy; a sacred, awful, joyous thing is that which God is doing.

But the chief evil of the doctrine of special creation is that pious people are thus committed to an essentially irreligious theory, and engage themselves, with the purest motives, in the work of misrepresenting the ways of God to man. Truly, it was not only morally but even logically better than the atheistic theory, which it was designed to oppose. It is certainly a truer supposition that God directly does some things, and indirectly others, than that He does nothing in any way. But this was only the refutation of one error by another; both ideas rested on the fancy of real efficient second causes. And it has done its work. Because it was better to see a little of God than nothing, let us not by mere effect of habit persist in asserting that it is better to see that little of Him than much.

And, worst of all, the best of people, with the best of motives, are committing Christianity to a scientific hypothesis. It must not be. Christianity is too precious to be, not indeed imperilled, but impeded so. It matters not whether the hypothesis is false, as we think it, or true, as so many hold; the point is, that the oak shall not cling to the ivy. The remedy for apparently irreligious scientific dogmas is not to affirm a contrary scientific dogma, but to show that Nature is so full of God that no scientific doctrine, rightly stated, can be irreligious. True science teaches the same thing as the heart dictates; puts only into definite expression the indefinable emotion.

And on "design" :—

This is what strikes me in Mozart's music : there is nothing in it, and yet how wonderful an effect. Now Mozart made music as God made the world. This is just what we have to see in Nature : that there is nothing in it, and yet how wonderful an effect. The more we can see that there is nothing in it, the more truly do we appreciate it. We misconceive "the glory of God in creation." We look at the means, dwell upon the complication of mechanism, and so on. But the marvel of creation is the simplicity, nay, the absence of means. There is no contrivance, no adaptation, no ingenuity, no complication. In the mere fact of Being (that is, of living) is all this that so fills our hearts with joy, and overcomes our imaginations with wonder. In all life we find just nothing—one axiom—that is all. God's wisdom and glory in the results is shown by the simplicity of the means. This is the idea of Science. All laws are just showing simplicity of means : one thing instead of many. To show only one law is to perfect Science.

Thus to Hinton the world was no place of probation ; this life was not "the suburb of the life elysian." Rather, this world was the very manifestation of the spiritual, or, as he called it, the actual world. Such vast and divine processes were carried on in the present that no grander spiritual world was conceivable. He was aided to this result by the doctrine of the phenomenal nature of the material. He refused the conception of "dead matter." We must not lose sight of this philosophic basis of his thought.

What we call Nature, or the Universe, begins as spiritual in God, and ends as spiritual in us. It is as absurd to suppose it material between, as it would be to say of a chain, of which we saw the two ends to be material, that it was spiritual in the middle.

Here come a group of vibrations sweeping through the air, mere matter and motion ; and lo ! they fall upon a human eye, a human ear, and straightway are become thought and emotion, an overwhelming passion of love, or joy, or grief ; virtue, or

penitence, or heroism. If those vibrations were truly matter and motion, here is a miracle. But what if those vibrations, as we thought them, were in very truth God's spiritual act; His thought, emotion, passion surging against another spirit's bosom? What, then, more natural and just? The miracle resolves itself into sympathy. How can we so stultify ourselves as to think that what originates and ends in love and gladness, becomes matter on the way? Poet nor madman ever feigned such a metamorphosis. I adhere to common sense. That which is once spiritual is spiritual for ever.

Man's thought cannot surpass, nay for ever shall fall infinitely short of, God's act. Higher thoughts, more glorious conceptions, a more perfect beauty, a diviner truth, a purer and profounder holiness, *exist* here in the facts of actual nature than our most elevated imaginations could ever approach. Nature is perfect and infinite in beauty and in every form of rightness. That we find her not so is because we see her wrongly; in parts and not in whole, in time and not in eternity. Yet this also is right. Our proper mental discipline consists in not seeing all things beautiful; this perception of the beautiful mingled with the ugly was needful for us. But it was not needful that God should deform His work and really mingle bad with good. It was enough to place us with our littleness in a world of perfect good too large for us.

Now I know what the "ideal" is. It is to us what Nature is to God: that is, a fact perfectly beautiful. We cannot see the true and perfect beauty of Nature, because it is too large. Because it is only a part, it has innumerable connections with other things which we do not perceive, and so it appears to us defective. Therefore we conceive for ourselves something smaller, something that shall be a whole and yet not too large for us, a single fact that shall represent to us the universe, isolated and without any connection with any other fact, and that we may conceive of as perfect and complete in beauty by itself. This is creative art, the work of genius; but this to us is just what creation is to God. The universe is God's ideal perfectly acted out. Our effort to attain the ideal is an attempt to do what God did in creation.

Now our ideal is to Nature as if some one unable to comprehend a musical strain as a whole should take the single chords,

and seek to make each one complete and perfectly beautiful. He would add more notes, or alter their arrangement, or leave out the discordant ones, or cause the chord to be played by more instruments. He would make each chord an "ideal." But this could not really be done without spoiling the music, and we should say to him, "The whole strain, just as it is, with what you call these imperfections, is to us just so perfect, just such an 'ideal' as you seek to realise in the separate parts." The ordinary view of the ideal, regarding it as above Nature, has inflicted on us woful injury. It has misrepresented to us alike God and Nature. It has made Nature teach us false lessons; it has closed our eyes to the holiness that is in Nature, so that we have not in truth really seen her. And, pitiful loss indeed, it has taught us to look for our Best, not to God's conception, but to our own. What can our own ideal express or contain but ourselves? That was not what we were endowed with the ideal faculty for, but that we might by its means be emancipated from the tyranny of our senses, and see Nature with our hearts as she really is. So, knowing in our inmost souls, taught by our hearts, that Nature is really perfect, we shall be led to explore and study her; we shall seek how we may see mortality swallowed up in life; pain, evil, and defect absorbed and lost in perfect rectitude. And thus studying Nature, our heart and thought will be itself expanded.

Our troubles *are* important to us; we are right to be grieved. But let us open our eyes too; let us see what God is doing. It is a bad world, true; yet it is good enough for God. We do not see it yet; let us go on, and we shall see in time. Yes, let us rejoice that God uses us, and our troubles and resentment and intolerance of the evil, to bring about the good. Also He does the best for us, for each one; our trials are the only best for us. What a wonder it is! the best for the world, the best for each one also. And yet not a wonder; for only by being best for each one could it be best for the whole. We think individual welfare is sacrificed for the welfare of the whole; it is a mean, mistaken thought. The good of the whole comprises and consists in the good of each part. We think God does like us, who are obliged to manage and contrive and choose, and sacrifice some objects for others. God attains the perfect good of the Universe by, and with, and not without, my perfect good.



Let us thank God that it has not been left for us to impart the spirit to His creation ; that He has not mocked us with a dead image to clasp to our warm embrace, and vivify, if we can, with our own life. Let us thank God that the solemn friendship of seas and forests, the sympathising looks of flowers and stars, the glad greeting or sorrowful rebuke, alike full of love, wherewith the earth and skies ever meet us, are not cold reflections of ourselves. It is true, indeed, that Nature is two things—that which God makes it, and that which we make it ; it is true. But which Nature does God make, and which man ? Question answered in the asking, which to answer further were profane. The love, the joy, the sympathy, the glad encouragement, the strong tender monition, the still small voice which the soul hears through and above all other sounds, these, O Father, are Thy Nature ; the dull, material clod in which they are enwrapped, too often crushed and stifled, this *we* add.

If I have any power of investigating Nature, it is because the world is a work of genius, and I love it ; God's heart is in it, and I know it as a friend. The solemn throbs and pulses of its vast vibrations are not merely mechanical events to my eye ; I feel them as the beatings of a heart pressed close to mine. I throw myself on Nature, and press myself upon her bosom in the passionate embrace of a friend ; our thoughts are one, because we love.

Seeing the world perfectly good and right is the true basis of all earnest and energetic action ; for it is as a *means* it is right, because of what is to be by it. A man who sees and approves a means as such, does not rest in it ; he acts and uses it. Seeing the world thus right and good, necessarily we throw ourselves heart and soul into the great life ; God's (Nature's) action absorbs and carries us away too. If *He* works in us, there is a necessarily unfailing source of activity and zeal that casts the self out of us, and makes us one with the course of Nature. All other action must be laborious and lifeless in comparison. So we see the meaning of the apostles' contentment with the world ; their finding it full of God's glory ; and at the same time their earnest, intense zeal to alter it. It is as God finds it, as He sees the world. His seeing the evil right and good, as not being a thing He cannot tolerate (or however we may like to say it), does not paralyse *His* activity, does not prevent His curing the evil.

Hinton felt that the material and mechanical world of our experience was the phenomenon of a spiritual existence. Nature was to him a large, throbbing life, from which only man had the power of disuniting himself, and to refuse to share in that vast, eternal life, to choose "deadness" rather, was the awful fact of sin. "Metaphysicians," it has been said, "are poets who aim at a new synthesis of the world." In his intense *personal* love for Nature, in his vivid belief in her life, Hinton was with the poets, with Blake, with Wordsworth, with Shelley; and, like them, he, too, aimed "at a new synthesis of the world." Before passing on, I will give a few more passages in illustration of Hinton's conception of Nature as spirit—the Holy Spirit, as, with quaint and characteristic fondness for theological dogma, he called Nature. They will also explain his view of sin.

I love this idea of sin as not an act (or reality), but as inaction, a refusal to share in life. The mystery of the existence of moral evil is thus solved. I see something of the infinite wisdom with which this system of things is formed, and the deep reality from which it flows. God has shown it to me. There is no blot on His creation that needs to be washed out or compensated for. The idea has arisen from confounding the phenomenal with the real, thinking evil was really evil. So excellent is life, that not to live is that foul and fearful fact of sin. What does the hatefulness of death prove to us but the loveliness of life? It is so simple. First, to see that Nature is God's act, that all God's act is perfectly good. This shows it all. It removes quite away that black pall that overlies the universe. It is God's hand wiping away our tears. The universe is a scene of absolute life, and beauty, and good. Nothing is there that is not so. Only this sad fact which stains not its glory, that some spirits refuse to share in it, is the great mystery of sin.

How sad is that view of evil: that it is "essentially a narrow, finite thing, thrown into remotest obscurity by any comprehensive view of the infinite!" What fatal indifference, yet what miserable consolation! Evil is "real," yet it is not much. No need to make account of that. Alas for the poor sufferer, whose

longing ear is mocked by such words. I thank Thee, O God, that Thy deed and Thy word alike teach me a different lesson ; that evil *is not*, but that all is absolute and perfect good, being all Thy act. Yet that sin is awful, being refusal of Thee ; therefore hateful, therefore exceeding sinful, and beyond expression full of shame and sorrow, because it is that when Thou offerest Thyself men will not have Thee.

One easily sees that these views are by no means at one with Christianity as commonly accepted. At the same time, Hinton seems never to have reconciled himself to an entire break with that Christianity. His sympathies were too large, his intellectual outlook was too clear, for that, and he preferred to exercise what he called "interpretation" in respect to Christian dogma. He could, however, speak out plainly and vigorously on points in regard to which he thought orthodox Christian doctrine in error.

The two great objections to Christianity in its moral aspect in these days are (1) the arbitrariness ascribed to God ; (2) the selfishness of Christian morals in relation both to God and man. We have to substitute for these false representations, holiness and love—*i.e.*, one love in two forms.

Men will cling to the form, let what will come of the fact. We will have the believing in Christ, though there be nothing in it, and nothing come out of it. It must be that form, though it be nonentity. The fact, the life, or what is nearest to it, may exist elsewhere, but this we utterly abjure if there is not the Christian form. It is thus : Once there was connected with Christ the very fact of man's being ; He gave life to man ; now we have forgotten all about the life, and we use Him, more or less worthily, merely as a means for getting something. And yet now, more than ever, we will have Him accepted and sworn by, though there be no longer any life connected with Him : this is our orthodoxy. But this is not the end ; the stream does not flow through the channels when His name is named, but it flows still, and none the less, from Him. Christ is the sole life of this our modern world, the sole though unacknowledged source of its love and self-sacrifice. In those ages when the Church was darkest, where were the saved ? Why, out of the Church ; among those who denied *that*

Christ. Men are bound to deny our Christ, but that does not make them less Christians. If God be in them, and they true men, Christ is in them, they live by Him. It is monstrous to make believing in Christ the acceptance of a name. We retain the name, but have given up the fact. Never shall the world have true life until men see the fact of Christ again.

How we misuse those passages in the Bible which appear irreconcilable with any new view. It is one thing in Nature and in the Bible. If we see some new view in science, granting it is essentially true, does there not almost certainly rise up some fact that does not agree? Is it, then, to be given up? Not at all. Our view must be made larger to include that seeming opposite fact. The lesson we have to learn is to unite opposites. To this end we must hold firmly that which we do see, and at the same time have faith that there is more. It was right for men to hold what seemed true to them, but not right to say there was nothing more. There may be so much more that we may have wholly to give up this.

It is curious the way in which our divines speak of the "imperfect" theology of the early centuries. In the second century the Christian writers had not a full appreciation of the Pauline doctrine. Men speaking the same language, partaking the same modes of thought, whose immediate predecessors had themselves conversed with him—these men did not apprehend the true Pauline doctrine. And they confounded justification with being made holy. Strange, when we consider that the word means being made holy. Is it not rather possible *we* do not quite comprehend Paul? Christianity was a power in the world then. May not the reason be that they knew better than we what it was? Perhaps they did confound justification with being made holy; but might it not be some compensation if they really were made holy; perhaps they did not see Christ's death as a price, an expiation, as we do; but what if they were made "conformable" to it? Which is the important thing—the understanding or the being?

There may be opinions which it is quite right and necessary for us to hold to-day, but which we ought not to hold to-morrow. The demand ever is to give up—not that which we may have thought doubtful or bad—but that which is founded on the best evidence, confirmed by vigorous inquiry, sanctified by devoutest

feelings. Because a new view runs counter to the best-established and most valuable views, it is not, therefore, to be rejected. But this may be demanded—that it be inclusive, not exclusive. All advances have been thus inclusive, yet they have been at first rejected. So Christ superseded Judaism because He included it: it could not otherwise have been set aside. Long ago I felt a parallel between our Christianity and Judaism, but I did not then recognise the true relation of the Bible. I did not know that our Christianity was not the Scriptural Christianity, and that the interpretation was to come from the Bible. Is it wonderful that religion should not all at once have purified itself, should want another elevation, yea, innumerable others, before it reaches God's height? Observe the good of this test of new truths and errors—*i.e.*, whether the new doctrine is inclusive or exclusive. In other words, always we are to affirm, never to deny. The only right denial is one which forms part of a larger affirmation; the only denial must be denial of the negative.

Surely the desire of personal immortality is not truly a noble or worthy attitude of humanity. At least it is not the highest. Granted it was an advance in humanity to attain to it, may it not be a greater to give it up? Man rose to it from less, from indifference; he should give it up for more, for self-sacrifice. We should lose this feeling of good and evil to ourselves apart from others. And is not this an instance of a law? Perhaps the "self-consciousness" is a rise from unconsciousness; but it is a greater rise to altruistic consciousness. From ignorance to error first; then to knowledge. And is not the *self* ever first, self-desire, self-consciousness, self-knowing, *i.e.*, the not-divine, and then afterwards the Divine, the altruistic? I would wish to have no joy or sorrow of my own apart from that of others, to escape from that isolation and limit and to be like God, whose joy and sorrow are in others, who *creates*. Is this creation to be in others? So in our poor way we say of the creator, the artist, that he *is* in his work. This I mean by being Divine; it is being infinite, unlimited.

Hinton was born and bred a Hebrew of the Hebrews. His whole soul was on fire with the ardour and intensity of the Hebrew spirit. That which Mr. Hutton points out as characteristic of Hebrew poetry, that it is heliocentric in

distinction from geocentric, is profoundly true of Hinton's thinking. And yet—and it is here that his unique charm as a thinker lies—he was, too, singularly impressionable to the Hellenic spirit. The two meet in him, the fervour, the deep, spiritual *heliocentric* insight of the one, and the breadth, the feeling for Nature, the sweetness and light of the other. I proceed to quote a few passages which will indicate some of Hinton's more obvious spiritual affinities. And first as to his attitude towards what is commonly called "Positivism." I should mention that by "Actualism" Hinton denoted a conception of being as acting. He denied any validity to the notion of being that merely existed.

Actualism is in Positivism, as the butterfly is in the chrysalis. We see this in Comte, in his subordination of all to the moral, in his great design of social regeneration. And how he embraces the entire doctrine of Actualism, that the idea of duties must be substituted for that of rights, giving for getting. His also is the doctrine of self-sacrifice. Any one who sees Nature truly, in however limited a way, sees that this is the fact. "Non sibi." It is not what we can get, but what we can *do*. He sees how all individual elements are subordinate to the whole. That life and development of humanity are present to him.

How beautiful it is that Comte says, all our concern, in respect to Nature, is with the law, that we have nothing to do with the absolute. It is most wise and right, so far as it goes. The Law is the fact; there is no absolute in Nature. Those have utterly erred who fancied that a true absolute existence was to be found, or sought, in the physical: the Being is moral. See the value of Comte's confession that all inquiries after the absolute necessarily led us to the arbitrary, the spontaneous, in a word, the spiritual. How clearly Comte's work is a preparation: how great and necessary a work it is: how directly tending to a most beautiful interpretation. How strong a tendency it produces to find another absolute, if it is not in the physical, or that which is subject to law. He has suppressed the spiritual, giving us law; now the spiritual will come back as one with law. Here is development: the history of humanity is here.

Positivism aims at putting us at one with the fact of the world around us; and this it does by saying, "Sacrifice yourselves: live for others." Then this must be the fact of the world around us, not passive, not getting, but giving, *acting*. This is Actualism: Positivism is unconscious Actualism. The Positivist says, "I speak of the *Law* only, and that is self-sacrifice, live for others; but as for the *fact*, I will not even think what that may be." But none the less is it involved in this Law that the fact is Love: is that which in relation to us is self-sacrifice.

The following passages concerning the question of the personality of God are connected with the views on design to which allusion has already been made:—

With regard to the necessity of God's being personal to the heart, consider this. Setting aside love towards God (as the question *sub judice*), the very strongest of man's non-religious natural passions, *loves*, have been and are for that which is not personal—nay, even for abstractions. See man's love of truth, of justice, honour, courage, and loyalty. These are the strongest passions of man, as has been often proved. But I do not put an abstraction for God, proved though it be that an abstraction will do for the heart. My God is the farthest possible from an abstraction. He is *the* Being, the only true actual Being, and all of it. He *is*, so intensely, so actually, that personality detracts from Him. That is why He can be loved, not temporally, not physically, but eternally and actually, with such an infinite and all-absorbing intensity. Love of the Infinite, of Jehovah, may be so infinite as to exclude all not-love, all consciousness, which love of a person could scarcely do. Is it not the triumph of the love of God above all other loves, that it alone is perfect, and destroys consciousness even of self? Is not this why even Christ shall deliver up the kingdom, and God be all, and in all? No "person" shall interpose between that love made perfect and its God.

Instead of personality being the thing needful to maintain in respect to God, it is the thing most needful to deny. We have gone back to Judaism. If to deny *body* to assert more emphatic, intense Being—if we can see this—how much more to deny *mind*. Both alike are deny-

ing that which is alone the only known Being *to us*. But we have faith. We see that our Being involves negations, and that to Him who truly *is*, such Being as ours in any form cannot be rightly attributed, whatever our weakness may demand. We see that God must be personal to us only until we are better capable of understanding Him. In truth, personality involves body. An irrational idea is that of a mind without a body—or even the good of one. Without a body to act on and be affected by the matter it “perceives,” mind would be very forlorn. So the instincts of men have always made ghosts poor, miserable creatures, much inferior to embodied men. He that perceives matter is necessarily material.

The present stage of Christianity is its *death*. But now there comes quite a new and glad conception of Science. Only Science can raise Christianity out of this death (even as Christ redeems man from death), that is by manifesting and making us know God. This is the attitude of Science, the revealer, the *redeemer*. This manifestation of God, which Science is, redeems Christianity from death. Science is a taking of God’s ideal instead of ours; it has been the work of the love of God; and *this* is its reward. Now we do justice to it. It is not Science has suppressed Christianity, but philosophy, self-regarding questions of good and evil. What we want to deliver us from evil is something to make evil not evil to us. To make evil not evil is to give *life*. And this Christ does.

These remarkable words point to the source of much in Hinton’s methods of thought. All his life long he was possessed and fascinated by Science. Many years after the passages just quoted were written (in 1874), he says, after reperusing them :—

To me, Nature means God’s action towards man; and it is so much, and grows to me perpetually so much more, and so joins itself with Revelation, and becomes one with all that I have most prized in that, that all seems to come into it, and I cannot draw a line, nor can I even try. But I know this is no end—my eyes are dazzled; others will judge for me.

This was the root of the element of mysticism in his thinking. He himself points out the connection between Mysticism and Science.



It is amusing how, with all our Science and triumph of common-sense, mysticism is not put down, but appears again in its extreme forms. The cure to it has not been found yet. It is clear that Science cannot put a stop to it; Science only feeds it. For see how these mystics have been the very men who have had the largest grasp of Science. Not to speak of Moses, passing by Plato also, let us come to modern times—look at Swedenborg and Newton. It is clear that we must look elsewhere than to the prosecution of Science for the cure of this disorder of the intellect, if it is such. As Science grows, so does that tendency, that conviction, gain increasing power. Nay, it allies itself to Science, rests upon it, turns to its own use the means brought for its destruction. It urges on to perfect fulfilment all those discoveries and tendencies which are announced as its destruction.

In this connection, too, should be noted the attraction which Buddhism and its allied doctrines had for Hinton. He participated in the longing which our modern feverish Western thought has towards the grandeur and calm of the great Eastern faiths. He loved to make what he called “a unification” of them, to point out the conditions under which they became true. It is interesting to find, let me observe in passing, that the Buddhistic Nirvana has been recently interpreted, not as the merging of the individual in the general soul at death, but as the casting out of the *self* from the soul—precisely that which Hinton, in common with all true mystics, insisted on as the one thing needed to place the soul in harmony with the great not-self.

Is not here a unification of Pantheism? All that is is in the strict sense God. It is that which God, by His own act (or self-sacrifice, for we only see power or efficient cause, even physically, in self-sacrifice), it is that which God, by His self-sacrifice, *becomes*. But the creature is not, therefore, God: indeed, it is for this very reason that the creature is emphatically not God. Of all doctrines none so emphatically as Pantheism, when it is truly seen, affirms the non-identity of the creator and the creature. For this becoming another involves, and consists in, the ceasing to be itself. Pantheism is the true mode of

affirming the creature's distinct and individual personality; the only mode, indeed, in which it can be affirmed intelligently, or be understood, because so only does the physical—or image—show us the fact.

Because I assert all Being to be Divine I do not, therefore, assert that we are Divine, or that matter is; any more than in asserting all motion, or light, to be vibration, I assert darkness to be vibration. I assert (relative) not-being also; *i.e.*, not-being affecting us, or appearing to us as Being. Here is the great error: Men having assumed the negation which affected them to be Divine, were compelled to suppose some Being not Divine. Hence all the mystification, past and present, from which no system has escaped; not even Pantheism, though it has altered the form of it, and asserts the negation to be Divine. For clearly here is the error of Pantheism: it asserts that to be God which is not-God; *i.e.*, it asserts that to be Being which is not-Being. We may assert all Being to be God, if we only recognise negation or not-Being. The main error of philosophy is this of not recognising negation.

The dispute concerning "absorption into God" may be easily disposed of by the Scriptural statement that we are one with God, even as Christ is. The perplexity arises altogether from our introducing physical (inert or negative) conceptions into our relations to God. There is certainly no absorption, because there is Being and life. It is not losing, but having; not ceasing to be, but being. We, having put the negation for fact, find the *giving* life a destruction. We *are* one with God, now. These physical relations to which alone the idea of absorption applies, these negations which put us in time, have no bearing. Get to think rightly on the subject, and we see that the question of "absorption in God" (regarded as a ceasing to be—or, indeed, in any way) has no meaning. It is self, *death*, that we are delivered from; will it not content us to have God's Being? Must we stipulate for a sense of personal enjoyment? No, thank God; we shall *love*. There shall be no pleasure for us in heaven, save in infinite abandonment; no possession, save in giving.

Brinvilliers, when led to the rack, asked what that great pail of water was for, and was told it was for her to drink. Is there not in this a light on our physical life? Is it not *by torture*,

as it were, that we have such intense need and desire for what otherwise we should neither desire nor enjoy? The things which give us pleasure, and the withholding of which we cannot tolerate, are in no way to be accounted for according to our normal life; even as the intense thirst produced by torture was not. Christ says, "Shall never *thirst*;" He gives relief from torture. Not so much that we, being physical, are surrounded by physical suffering, as that the being physical is the very receiving this unnatural pleasure, implies the "tortured" state, as making possible such enjoyment. And so the feeling that the physical existence is a matter of pleasure—a "filling the heart with joy and gladness"—is included also. The feeling of gratitude in respect to it has its place. The two opposite feelings are justified and united so.

Do we not feel there the spirit of him who showed the Noble Threefold Path? "The conditions of individuality are the conditions of sorrow."

At some period of our lives we have all echoed in minor keys, more or less despairing, the Laureate's cry over the prodigality and waste of Nature,

Finding that of fifty seeds,  
She often brings but one to bear.

Hinton observes:—"Is there not an inversion of our view here, arising from our perception of the *organic* as the highest in Nature? Do not those seeds which are restored to the inorganic reach the highest place?" To few of us probably has that thought occurred. And there, too, is an echo of the Buddha's voice.

We have seen what Hinton thought concerning the personality of God. Here is another passage bearing on the same point. It may interest us to see how it is possible to regard that, for most of us, cold, well-nigh meaningless abstraction, a non-personal God.

Is not this, in part, why love to God is so much a true passion, an all-absorbing joy? It is not only a love of some unseen person hard to conceive, from which love to creatures flows

merely as corollary ; it is a love of the universal, the absolute, the infinite Being, that includes, is the love of all. It is being united to the source of all delight, the very height and consummation of all beauty. It is to be one with Nature, to love, to know God ; what man longs for, has longed for in all ages. We need not wait to be dead for that ; we may be it now. This is the bridal union of Nature and the soul ;—to see in all Nature that one fact of God Himself, and to be joined with it in love. Nothing is now unloved, nothing unloving. Now we know her, know why she has stood before us so long with deep, sad meaning in those gentle eyes. She has wished us to know and to love her ; but our blindness would not let us. We have felt, indeed, what she must be, but we could not truly know her. When we sought to clasp her to our hearts—oh, horror !—it was a corpse, cold and dead, a painted image with no heart within. But now we know her, and know that it was our own death alone that made her dead. This is the love of God—the being one with Nature, the being holy ; no more enslaved, no more doing as we like. It is the glorious liberty of the sons of God. *Words* cannot tell it ; words which have been poured forth in vain to paint the joy of human love, how shall they tell of the Divine ? Yet words must be used, for when was joy silent ?

Hinton loved to play around an idea, to set it in all lights, with a careless and almost fanciful opulence of thought. The passage next to be quoted is a characteristic example of his method in this respect, although it is only a fragment from a longer passage. And in this case the idea is peculiarly felicitous, notwithstanding the negligent manner in which it is clothed.

God is light : what a new meaning is in this now ! God is one, and yet a trinity. A trinity by the “not ;” a trinity to our perception at first. The trinity is from the unity, not the union made up by the trinity. Yes ; God is light, and He exists in His creatures as colours. As colours are to light, so are all creatures to the one Being ; various “nots,” yet all determined by one law, all love.

So from all this phenomenal or physical we get at the fact by excluding the “not,” by adding. Yet then the physical will not remain as such, any more than the colours, as such, in light.

Take away the "not," and the physical is gone. "Not that I would be unclothed, but clothed upon." To be freed from the physical, it only needs that *more* Being should be given us.

For the existence of colour a peculiar "not" is necessary; not less light, but a "not" of that which is essential to the being of light. All the variety and relations of things are in the conception of colour. And see the good and rightness. Would we have all white light and no colour? We are in such a relation to light that we can see the "not" aright, can see how it is essential to the good. What were light without colour, without this interference, this self-sacrifice which produces colour? Light would be no longer light if there were no not-light. God would be no longer God if there were no not-God, no creature. In colour nothing is but light; it is all light: so the creatures are nothing but God. Colour is from light by interference, by itself causing itself not to be. So the creature is from God by His self-sacrifice; and it is essential to the very being of God that it should be so, even as colour is essential to light. The interference of light from which colours are is as the self-sacrifice of God from which the creature is. From interference of the various coloured rays come inexhaustible combinations and variety. So by self-sacrifice of creatures other creatures are. Also darkness too, sometimes—*sin*. All creatures are imperfect, coloured, have a "not" in them, in reference to the true actual.

God is not said to be sound. Sound is not *one* as light is. It is one out of many; light, colour, is many out of one. A kind of inversion is here, the same fact seen oppositely. Sound is most parallel to the physical, light to the spiritual. Is it thus, indeed, that, as physical, sound is most to us? The ear is the most perfect. And are the less developed senses still more related to the spiritual? We do not see light as we hear sound; we only see *things* by it. And only that which is from the "not," only colour do we perceive. Light itself, like darkness, is nothing to us. When the light is not present we cannot see; but we do not perceive the light itself. "Whom no man can see, yet in whom we live." Is there something in the conditions under which light forms colours illustrating God and the creature? God, who sees all as one, sees love alone. The evil is not in the universe as the colour is not in the light.

Hinton's views regarding Christianity have already been

incidentally brought out. A few more extracts will make them still clearer.

The difficulty about inspiration comes from men thinking that religion has to do with opinions, that they must have intellectual views right. No matter what you believe, this book can give you life, for it will make you "believe in Christ," see God to be self-sacrifice, know Him, that is love Him, be one with Him, sacrificing your own self, too.

It is no matter about inspiration in any other sense. Inspired men, that is, living, *breathing* men, wrote it, and it gives us life; and that is enough. That these men were "living" is clear enough; that needs no proof when we see what they did and said. Now, how were they made alive? Surely they tell us truly when they say it was by Christ. Christ made them alive, and us through their words. Thus was Christ the life of the world. It was simple matter of fact when He said He gave His life for the life of men. And so Being, God, was necessarily in Him, and in us, in all who partake of this life, this Being. There is no question of evidences; it is fact.

Seeing it aright, I do think Christ stands as the revealer of man; for He did what every man will most gladly do. So He stands as pattern, as fact of man. There is no man that shall not be one with Him in that, consciously as now unconsciously, willingly as now inertly.

We cannot see that the world is redeemed because we do not see what redemption is; that it is being made one with Christ, the self-sacrificer. We persist in thinking of Christ as glorified (*i.e.*, self-exalted), and of our destiny to be glorified with Him. It is the same error as the Jews had; we cannot be content with a suffering, sacrificed Messiah any more than they. We have the same lesson to learn: That *this* is the glory. Surely this is what Christ did for the disciples when He walked with them to Emmaus: He showed them how the glory of Christ and the salvation was the self-sacrifice; that is how they came to preach the gospel they did. We repudiate all sacrifice from God; and from Christ when He shall come *in glory*. The Jews were no worse than we. And what a redemption this is! There is no true dominion in power; that affects only the phenomenon. All true power belongs to Love. We put our perverted view, our

death, into the Bible. When it speaks of dominion and glory we cannot think it means love and self-abandonment.

The doctrine of our being brought so near God by that which is beautiful and pleasant is heathenism. That was the best thing men could do before Christ had revealed Life and Being to them, so that they could know the *fact* of the world. They divided things into two portions—a good and a bad; then they dressed up the good in all the splendours their imaginations could devise, and kept the bad (the *Hell*) out of sight. *They* were right enough, but it is pitiful for Christians. The root of it is the idea that the physical being is the Life; that flesh and blood can enter into the kingdom of heaven. It is natural enough, beautiful enough, but it is a gilded lie. History shows it. Where has there been most splendour, most beauty of Art and Nature, but where sin and lust and cruelty have attained their utmost intensity? There is no need to say another word. Except this: that when *God* shows us the Divine, He shows It “hanging on a tree.” How that must have startled the old luxurious, beauty-loving, heathen world! And us it would startle hardly less, if we could see what it truly means.

Such utterances as these bring out clearly the Hebraic element in Hinton. He accepted Christianity with a passionate and all-embracing fervour which could make no reservations. Every dogma must be interpreted, filled with new meaning. And, consequently, the Christianity which he accepted so ardently was not the Christianity of the orthodox. He felt the distinction, as Lessing puts it, between Christianity and Christ's religion, and he sought to disentangle these two elements in that wonderful modern outgrowth with which the springs of our spiritual life are so intimately connected. He distinguished the imperfect and evanescent form from that underlying fact of it which he felt to be unchanging and eternal.

Surely it may be that there is a sense in which even Christianity is to be surpassed. Not, certainly, in the revelation of God to the heart and sight; not in the doctrine which shows Him as the Giver of Life. In this, all thought apart from it

has fallen infinitely short; nor can any advance do more than restore it, and place it in its true light. But in this sense such an advance may be destined: in the leaving behind the miraculous element—"greater works than these shall ye do"—which shall come through the perception of the spirituality of all our experience, truly *through Science*. This is simply a corollary from the idea that miracle is by a negative. That *less*, that revelation by a minus, was needed then. The time will come when it will be thus understood and no longer needed.

Science faintly whispers about it now in the doctrines which reveal God as "law." Let us only see that this "law" is one with the revelation of self-sacrifice in Christ, and then the higher point is attained.

Here, for the present, we must stay. We have yet but reached the threshold of Hinton's thoughts on religion. The MSS. from which these passages are taken were written nearly a quarter of a century ago. Remarkable for vigour and originality as they often are, notwithstanding carelessness of expression and occasional evidences of immaturity, many of these thoughts are no longer the property of a few isolated thinkers. It is in the passage last quoted that we touch on Hinton's greatest service to religious thought. He long since recognised that which we are now perhaps gradually beginning to see, that every advance in religious thought must henceforth come "*truly through Science*." It was that which prompted him to say that only Science can redeem Christianity from its death. He felt that it is Science, in the broadest sense of the word, which will bring fresh revelations of the infinite by manifesting a spiritual world always and everywhere present; and that so it is to Science we must henceforth look to show us adequate satisfaction for the religious emotions. Hinton was, above all, a man of imagination and intuition and strong ethical passion; but because he saw this, because he made profound and varied though fragmentary efforts to realise it, he has such significance for us as a religious thinker.



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He concluded the series of MSS. from which these passages have, for the most part, been selected, with the words below. Not the knowledge of the phenomena of the divine, not Science, but the narrow and self-formed conceptions of the intellect, are the real enemies of religion.

"Mere reason" cannot be tolerated in religion, even as it cannot in the sanctities of home. For religion is truly the home-feeling of the universe. The Church is the Home. Here comes feeble, weary, jaded humanity to seek its rest. Here, called back from the toil and glare and coldness of the outer life, it is gathered into a family. Can mere cold reason intrude here and not find itself on a foreign shore, not be seen hateful? A higher faculty, a better and more human insight, the insight of a truer sympathy, reign there, and give the whole tone to the place.

H. H. ELLIS.

### *SOME EARLY HERETICS.*

**H**ERESY is "free thought," hardly ever "free thinking" in the modern sense. It is oftener simply "dissent." It implies a body of established opinion, against which it maintains its own independence. It follows the main course of the stream of thought in a separate channel of its own, sometimes underground. In proportion as the dominant belief shapes itself to a creed claiming authority, heresy becomes more sharply defined against it. Free thought then bears an ill name. It invites controversy. It provokes persecution. It is often crushed and silent; it is never quite killed. It disappears, like water spilt on the ground, but only to bubble out in some new place. In the era of its greatest pride, and at the moment of its proudest triumph, the Church found itself confronted all afresh by this sleepless, tireless, deathless enemy. The era was the golden era of the Papacy, which, as a spiritual power among men, culminated about the middle of the twelfth century. The moment was the victory of the first Crusade, and the visible founding, as men thought, of the kingdom of the New Jerusalem under Godfrey; and again, the enthusiasm of the second, when it might seem as if monk and priest held the popular heart in the hollow of their hand. The "heretics of the twelfth century" make a chapter of themselves, obscure, but of great significance, in the history of this period. Their story is but an episode. It begins in a passionate fervour of homely piety; it goes out, a century later, in the awful tragedy of the Albigensian war. The

Church easily triumphed over this untimely birth of a religion more free than she dared to tolerate. But there was a moment of great terror, when it might seem as if the foundations of her power were shaken; and the conflict she entered into was felt to be a conflict for her life.

To us the chief interest is not the ecclesiastical, it is the moral issue. With what arms should the Church, believing itself the Divine Protector of truth, contend against heretical error? How should it meet a spiritual adversary, who only attacked it in the field of thought and faith? Would the weapons of its logic, the mystery and miracle of its sacraments, its supernatural authority and spells—would these be enough? So Hildebrand had thought, when he fearlessly faced the Emperor with excommunication, but gave his safe-conduct to Berengar, saying that error must be fought only by arms of charity and truth.\* So St. Bernard had thought that “heretics are to be caught, not shunned; caught (I say) not by weapons, but by proofs to convict their errors; to be charitably reconciled, if it may be, and called back to the true faith.” “I approve the faith,” said he, “but not the act [of the persecutor]; since faith is of persuasion, and not of force.”† But the battle might prove too obstinate and formidable. The alternative of failure and ruin might come too near. The whole fabric of Christianity itself, as men understood it then, was at stake. Not only civil order and justice, the interests of human society upon earth, but the existence of that divine society which began with the Creation, and will subsist after the Judgment, and was then in keeping of the Church, might seem involved. At least, it was so, if the theory of the Church was sincerely held. And we must give men in responsible places the credit of holding their own theory sincerely, if we will understand, I do not say the merit, but at least the logic of their acts.

\* See Epist. vii. 28.

† Serm. 64, 66.

The form of heresy which we meet at this period is very radical. It deals not with surface opinions, or with points of detail. It strikes—knowingly and boldly—at the very root of the sacerdotal theory itself, to which the Church was so thoroughly committed by its Decretals. Its five points touch with fatal logic the very essentials of ecclesiastical faith: the baptism of infants, the Lord's body in the Eucharist, sanctity of the priestly order, worship of the cross, and invocations for the dead. No mystic rite, said these daring heretics, could do away the original curse, unless there were penitence, conversion, and faith. No priest not of holy life could give the sacrament effect to the saving of the soul. The font was but a bowl of water; the bread nothing but a baker's loaf; the mass a form of idle words; the temple a convenient enclosure; the cross an idolatrous sign, a memorial only of torment and horror; the priesthood a class of sinful men, more arrogant and corrupt (probably) than other men, with no miraculous virtue in their word or touch. To us these are, very likely, quite harmless propositions. It hardly occurs to us, even, that they may give offence. But that is because of five centuries of rationalism behind us, preceded by two centuries of battle, that separate us from the passion and terror of the controversy they stirred. It is only by a distinct effort that we can—not reproduce the passion and terror now, but so much as conceive that they were possible, nay real, then.

To see this a little more clearly, we must attend for a moment to the dark side of the Catholic theology, which begins to be more prominent a little before this time, though it did not come into full relief till after the time of persecutions that followed. I have had occasion to speak elsewhere of the mild tone we find in the appeals of the early Church to its converts, as contrasted with the grimness of its theory.\* But the logic of the theory would have its

\* See "*Fragments of Christian History*," p. 257. London: Trübner, 1880.

way. Hell as the absolute and unescapable doom of the vast majority of mankind must be taken for granted, perhaps, and appealed to now and then to magnify that salvation of which the Church had the only key.

It is, in fact, just at this time that the vivid conception of the horrors of hell finds its way into religious expression, so as to awe and oppress the imagination.\* But it seems to have been too vast and terrifying a thing, in that day, for the familiar uses of daily exhortation; in fact, until the tremendous conflicts following the Reformation; and some mitigation of its horror must be had. So, at least as far back as Augustine, it began to be surmised that the pains of the eternal world must be for healing and purification, where any room is left for a possible penitence hereafter. And there had grown up—just by what steps is not easy to trace—the developed theory of purgatory, “that little ecclesiastical hell” in keeping of the priesthood, familiar to us in the later Catholic theology. The pains of this mitigated hell are not absolutely hopeless; but they are held (as explained by Thomas Aquinas) to be far more searching and terrible than any torment that can possibly be endured in this life.

But, what is more to the point, this doctrine brought, or seemed to bring, the penalties of the future world within the compass of men’s imagination, and make them more real to their fear. It was possible, then, to draw some com-

\* The first distinct expression of this sort that I have noticed is in the line of Hildebert:—

Tu intrare me non sinas  
Infernales officinas  
Ubi mæror, ubi metus,  
Ubi fëtor, ubi fletus,  
Ubi probra deteguntur,  
Ubi rei confunduntur,  
Ubi tortor semper cædens,  
Ubi vermis semper edens,  
Ubi totum hoc perenne,  
Quia perpes mos Gehennæ.

What follows is more familiar—

Me receptet Sion illa, &c. (“Mine be Zion’s habitation.”)

The “Dies Iræ” is about a century later.

parison between them and the torments of hunger, fire, sickness, want, and torture in the dungeon, which were but too terribly familiar in men's experience. Above all, it brought the future world, so to speak, into direct contact with this; lighted a dim ray of hope to relieve its horror; made the priest an immediate minister of help; gave inestimable value to his prayers and spells; deepened and made more vivid the feeling of the penitent that only in the offices of the Church could he find hope or mercy.

The doctrine of purgatory could, accordingly, be appealed to and turned to daily use, where threats of hell might invite only defiance, despair, or a deadlier unbelief. In its practical effect, therefore, it rather darkened than softened the tone of religious appeal; it made Church authority more despotic and harsh; it disposed the priesthood rather to enhance and exact the terms of the salvation in their keeping than to make itself simply the ministry of mercy and help. These, I say, are the consequences that seem actually to have followed; not those we might at first expect.

I do not say, either, that the terrors of judgment are much more prominent than before in the religious writings of the day. We are rather struck by the amplifying and speculation that appear in the treatment of theological matters than with anything threatening in its tone. We detect the effect in other directions: in the more frequent use of the Church's curses; in the harsher tone and sharper measures of its councils; in the darkening temper of its conflict with the powers of the world; in the superstitious tales that abound in the writings of Peter the Venerable, toward the middle of this century, and the austere gloom of that view of life which appears in Pope Innocent's "Contempt of the World," at its close; most of all in the bitterness, degenerating to malignity, shown by a superior and noble mind like St. Bernard, when he deals with the rising heresies that assail his creed.

Again, the devil is, as it were, visibly nearer to men, and sorcery is more the terror of their daily life.\* The rude, but vivid, symbolism of religious art brings its wealth of decoration to illustrate the darker superstitions of the Church mythology. All these things are more or less characteristic of the time, which, we must remember, is that just before the system of persecution for heresy on a great scale, and the horror of religious wars within the confines of Catholic States. In these things we cannot draw the line very sharply. But we shall not be far out of the way if we take the latter part of the twelfth century as the date when the terrors of the Church begin to predominate in its appeals; when fear, instead of reverence or conviction, becomes the real foundation of its authority; when from spiritual it has recourse to carnal weapons; when the great monastic age is past, and the motive of the conflict is more purely political.

Thus we find a certain degeneracy of moral tone—along with the most heroic courage, the severest self-denial, and the most fervent devotion—in the later exponents of that monastic piety which now rules the Church. It is no injustice to associate that degeneracy of moral tone with the exaggerated ambition of the Church on one hand, and with this special development of its doctrine on the other. Both, at any rate, are characteristic of the time I speak of. A truce had come in the conflict with the Empire—with a sharper struggle impending on that side, and not far off. For the moment, the Church was victorious in the Crusade, and might seem safe at home. But even then came the challenge of a new protest against the very theory on which its power was built; a challenge the more formidable, because it was not an attack on an outwork, but the proclamation of a positive, fearless, 'zealous, radically hostile order of religious faith.

\* The first tale of the popular diabolism that I have found in ecclesiastical literature is of date 1148 (*Mansi* xxi. 722).

Moreover, it was the revival of an old, we may say a quite forgotten, gospel. It claimed to be simple primitive Christianity—pure religion and undefiled, without priest, without ritual, such as we find it in the New Testament. A legend has come down, which tells how it was transmitted—like a watercourse running underground—from the primitive and apostolic time.

According to this story, when Constantine became Emperor of Rome, and made that evil gift to Pope Sylvester of temporal sovereignty in the West, whence came the tradition of a carnal, worldly, and domineering Church, a holy man named Leo withdrew in voluntary exile into a secluded valley of the Alps, where, for more than four centuries, had subsisted a fragment of one of those German tribes routed and driven back by Marius in the great Cimbrian invasion. They had received the gospel in its purest form from St. Paul himself; \* and they now received Leo to dwell among them as a sort of patriarch and apostle of the true faith.

That faith did not want its witnesses. The names of Vigilantius and of Jovinian—violently assailed by that “surly mastiff” St. Jerome for their attack on relic-worship, pilgrimage, and priestly celibacy—meet us in some dim connection with the Alpine legend; and we are reminded that the south-east of France, where the streams of that secluded valley run toward the Rhone, has been, from time to time, the home, or school, of a faith comparatively independent of Rome, and often hostile to its hierarchy.

This primitive gospel of Leonism† (so-called) was strengthened by certain sympathies, or affiliations, which

\* That is, probably, the gospel of Paul as opposed to the Romish gospel according to Peter. See Peyrat: *Les Réformateurs au Douzième Siècle*.

† This name, in the legend cited, is derived from the probably mythical Leo, of the age of Constantine. De Thou says that, by a manifest error, it was commonly referred to the iconoclastic Emperor Leo (726). Another derivation takes it from the city of Lyons, long the home of this Gospel, and of Waldo, its real or imaginary propagandist, founder of the Waldenses.



it found among the converted German tribes, especially the "Arian" Burgundians and Goths, persecuted by the "orthodox" Franks, and taking flight, some of them, to the safe refuge of the Alps. Here, at any rate, lived a secluded and pious population of the Valley \*—the same essentially, no doubt, with those of whom the French Protestant, De Thou, gives a very striking picture some centuries later, when they were victims of a still crueller persecution: their retreat, caves and dens of the earth; their wealth, cattle; their food, such hazardous and scanty harvests as they could add to their milk and flesh; their raiment, sheepskins with the wool on, the fore-feet tied about the throat and the hind-feet about the loins, eked out by under-garments of coarse hempen cloth; of rude but genuine fervour in their devotion; their children taught with pious fidelity to read, sing, and pray; their way of life poor, pitiful, and unsavoury to the last degree, yet filled with a certain quiet and religious content. Such is the earliest picture, drawn from the life, which we find of the Waldenses, those steadfast and long-enduring Protestants of the Alps.

Now it came to pass, in the first years of the new century, when the echo of the victory at Jerusalem may be supposed to have reached the deep recesses of their retreat, that one Peter of Bruys† (*Petrobrusius*, as he is known to us in the polemics of the day) went forth like another John the Baptist, full of the Spirit and of power, and lived for twenty years as an evangelist in the South of France, which he seems to have filled completely with his doctrine, till he was overtaken by the wrath of the priesthood he had challenged, and burned alive by a mob of monastics (1120). But, meanwhile, he had had one day of popular triumph at

\* *Vallenses* or *Vaudois*.

† The name of a cold and sombre gorge on the west slope of the Savoyard Alps.

Toulouse, where, at a great bonfire of blazing crosses—the great wooden crosses torn from church and cloister—he prepared the feast for a religious holiday, and proclaimed the new resurrection of Christ in the Spirit, the sanctification of men's common life, the abolition of monks and clergy. "He roams among you," says St. Bernard, "a ravening wolf in sheep's clothing. The churches are without people, the people without priests, priests without their due reverence—in fine, Christians without Christ."

Thus was the seed planted of what widened afterwards into the famous and greatly-dreaded heresy of the Waldenses and Albigenses. Distinctly, at its start, it was the proclamation of a new gospel. "The end of all things is at hand," it proclaimed; "repent, watch, pray; confess—but not to the priest; he is greedy and impure; he seeks not pasture for the sheep, but their fleece. A priest who is a sinner cannot pardon; forgiveness of sin is with God alone." \* A gospel very simple and very old, as old, at least, as the prophet Ezekiel; but always vivid and fresh in its appeal to the hate and terror of the sacerdotal order.

So far it is simply a moral revolt, a protest of the conscience, such as always makes the motive and the strength of a genuine reformation. But for its symbol it needs a specific doctrine, one which emphasises sharply the contrast of the new and old in their essential principle. Now, ever since the middle of the third century the Church has been committed more and more to the theory of sacerdotalism. Its priesthood was a consecrated body. Its offices were miracles and spells. Its rite of Baptism had the mysterious and awful power of removing the birth-curse of inherited

\* These phrases are taken from "*La Noble Leyczon*," a poem ascribed to the Waldenses of this period, and possibly composed (it has been suggested) by the fiery preacher and bard himself. It will be found, with an English translation, in Gilly's "*Narrative of an Excursion to the Mountains of Piedmont and Researches among the Vaudois or Waldenses*" London 1824.

guilt. The elements of its Eucharist were literally the Lord's body, the physical germ of the immortal body. Its excommunication banished the unfaithful or unbelieving to the horror of outer darkness for ever. And ever since that time, reappearing in various forms of heresy and schism, there had been a Puritan protest. The exciting cause had always been some laxity of morals, some corruption of life, covered up under the claims of official sanctity. The symbol of it had always been the one point of the Sacramental efficacy of Baptism. Is that the efficient cause of regeneration, and of itself a passport to eternal life? And shall we say it is just as valid, no matter how impious or unclean the hands that perform the rite? Can an unholy man do a holy thing like that?

Or, on the other hand, is baptism a sign of faith, and a mark of regeneration? Then how can it be received by an infant that knows nothing of guilt, and cannot possibly repent? To this the ritualist must reply—as Bernard replies in the gloomiest of imagery—by speaking of the organic life of humanity: not, as we understand it, developed from a wholesome germ, and working towards a higher and broader life; but, like a diseased tree, corrupt at the core, capable of yielding only the fruit of death, under a curse from which the mystic rite is the only rescue. To withhold it from the new-born babe is a horrible thing; it is to risk for the young life an eternity of desolation and horror.\* The reformer may or may not hold that sin is a birth-curse, dooming every human creature to eternal death unless miraculously rescued; at any rate, he will insist that personal penitence and faith are the only way of salvation, and that baptism is but the sign of these—a mockery and blasphemy, unless it is their sign.

Again, admitting, as the established dogma teaches, that

\* Among the theological speculations of the time occur discussions of the duty or possibility, in certain cases, of baptising the infant *before* its birth.

sacrifice is the appointed way of ransom, the reformer knows but the one offering made once for all. If sacrifice is not only the method of salvation but the law of life, at least he will say with Paul that the daily offering required is the living sacrifice of right conduct and self-denial. Now the Church, with fatal persistency of logic, had turned all ethics into ritual and symbol. That gracious figure of the "living sacrifice" it had turned into the hardest literalism: an altar must be set up everywhere, and a priest's hand must lay upon it every day the flesh and blood of the living God, or else the very way to heaven would be closed. The philosophical basis of this doctrine, expressed by the term "transubstantiation,"\* demands for its understanding some study of the theology of the great schoolmen. What strikes us at this period is the crude and childlike stories of miracles—such as the broken bread being shown in the form of bleeding flesh, or of an infant whom an angel is seen to divide into fragments with a sharp knife, which we find in writers so eminent as Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, friend and host of the skeptic Abelard—the blind struggle of sacerdotalism to stamp itself in images that startle and appal the popular mind.

Side by side with the creed that has worked itself out into such shapes as these, has come down the primitive, obstinate, heroic, anti-sacerdotal tradition, which has made the starting-place of many a radical protest, from the Puritan Novatians of the third century down to the English Independents of the seventeenth.

That tradition, in its most logical form, is not only Protestant, but Baptist. The early reformers of the twelfth century were at once a Protestant and a Baptist sect, appearing at a point of time when the Church had staked

\* This philosophical basis of the doctrine, the change of the metaphysical "substance," is first found clearly stated by Hildebert of Mans (*"De Sacramento Altaris"*) about this time, but, as yet, without the technical term "transubstantiation."

its existence and its domination more thoroughly than ever on the divine authority of its priesthood; when that theory seemed most completely triumphant in its conflict with the Empire at home and the Infidel abroad. To the Church's claim that heresy was fatal. The one function of the Church was to rescue human life from the universal curse by its mystic rite and its perpetual sacrifice—that is, by physical acts which none other than she could do. All else turned on that. And her very ability to do that rested on men's absolute, distinct, unquestioning faith that she had the authority and the power.

And again, it was not a conflict that ranged in the abstract region of ideas alone. It had to do with every act, with every rank, with every situation, of human life. The Church was not merely the teacher of a system of belief, however essential to salvation. Its empire took in every thought of men's hearts, and every action of their lives. Its theory could not tolerate a divided empire, any more than a nation can tolerate a divided sovereignty. Heresy was treason. The conversion of a province was organised rebellion. The heresy of Peter de Bruys had spread throughout the South of France. Theoretically, that was a province in rebellion. The weapons to subdue it, by the same theory, must be not carnal but spiritual. How to find them and how to apply them was the very difficult question the Church had now to meet.

The death of the reformer at the hands of an irresponsible mob did not settle this question; it only made the question imminent and palpable. The flame of heresy had spread through a whole broad province, from the Alps to the Pyrenees. It was not only that the new gospel touched those who were naturally eager and quick to welcome some new thing; not only that the buoyant and restless temper of that population responded to the passionate appeal against priestly arrogance and corruption. The South of France,

where Greek, Gaul, Goth, and Saracen had, one after the other, fought against the stronger force of Roman or Frank, was the natural home of revolt against spiritual authority. It was ruled by the most brilliant sovereigns of the time, the Counts of Toulouse; just now by Alphonso, surnamed Jordan, the very mirror of chivalry. The flowering out of romantic verse, the tournament, and song, and adventure that gave a brief lustre to their court, do not exactly belong to our present subject, but they must be thought of as the bright background in a landscape that was presently to be dark with the storm of religious war. Nothing could be more alien to the temper of monk or the pride of priest than the easy tolerance which heresy found in that sunny and indulgent atmosphere. The influence of the Crusades, too, in stimulating intellectual revolt, both by what they did and by what they failed to do, well deserves to be considered. But, for the present, we have only to follow out a line or two, bearing on the point we have already reached.

Toward the end of his reforming career Peter de Bruys had been joined by an ardent younger disciple of the same faith, known to us only by the name of Henry, "the Deacon," and as giving the name to a sect, or popular religious party, of Henricians. He appears to have come from the Italian side of the Alps, a passionate pilgrim into the north of France, and thence to Tours, where the famous heretic, Berengar, had left a memory curiously mingled of horror and veneration. St. Bernard speaks of him as a renegade monk, and tells shocking stories of the immoralities he was charged with, as he roamed at random, followed by an eager and admiring crowd. These scandals are told, in still greater detail, by the biographer of Hildebert,\* the learned and kindly Bishop of Mans, whose mild temper turned to gall at the rude effronteries he had to meet. The same accounts, however, show us not exactly a fanatic or an

\* See Migne, clxxi. 94—98.

impostor, but rather a religious enthusiast, a preacher of righteousness, a man abstemious and ascetic to the verge of maceration, an orator of marvellous power. Tall, of striking presence, his mass of hair and full beard contrasting strangely with the priest's tonsure, to the common people he seemed a prophet. "Go your ways!" they cried, when Hildebert approached with his benediction. "To the mud and mire with your blessing; we will none of you; we have our own priest and pope, holier than yours." Money poured out freely to be spent in gifts of charity. Men and women of loose life came forward, with passionate contrition, to be comforted, and united in holy matrimony. Such zeal reacted (so runs the account) in worse immoralities than before. It was short-lived, no doubt, and, at any rate, very offensive to the priesthood, who called the new prophet "the devil's own snare and the right-hand man (*armiger*) of Antichrist."

Silenced here, he turned to the South and joined Peter de Bruys in Languedoc (1117). After this reformer's death, Henry continued his career for some thirty years; once confined, for a time, in a monastery, but escaping; at length, condemned of heresy, he was imprisoned again, and soon after died (1147).

But the heresy, which had been so formidable in the South of France that Bernard, in the infirmity of years, had been forced into a painful and laborious pilgrimage to confute it on the spot, now reappeared, more formidable than ever, in Italy—in Rome itself, where for nine years Arnold of Brescia maintained a republic in open defiance of Emperor and Pope. The populace of Rome had broken out in rebellion against Pope Lucius (1145), who was stoned to death, and kept his successor, Eugenius, a monk of Bernard's own training, in perpetual exile. Arnold had been a disciple of Abelard; and his defiance of authority took the same general turn with the other reformers of the

times ; that is, a free gospel, anti-ritualistic, anti-sacerdotal, fervid and hot in its denunciation of priestly vice. But with him it became, besides, a political enthusiasm, which kindled town after town of his native Lombardy, and carried him on a wave of popular triumph to his brief rule in Rome. Here the old forms of the Republic were revived, with consuls and senators, under the presiding genius and eloquence of Arnold, and here he ruled in manifestation of spirit and power for some nine years. Then a new force came to the papal throne in the person of an Englishman, Nicholas Breakspear, a peasant born, rude and bluff, who by sheer ability and pluck fought his way to that supreme eminence, where he sat for five years as Adrian IV. He straightway, to the amazement of Christendom, laid the rebellious city under an interdict. The spell broke the courage of the Romans. Under that "terror of the Lord" Arnold was forsaken, and forced to fly. The next year (1155) he was betrayed into the hands of Frederick Barbarossa, delivered over to the Pope as part of the new compact of alliance, and by him first strangled as a rebel, then burned as a heretic, and his ashes cast into the Tiber, lest anything that had been his should be kept as a sacred relic among the people.

We are now just past the middle of the century, and on the verge of that most vigorous assertion of papal claims by Alexander III. against Frederick Barbarossa, which makes the stormy and heroic history of the next twenty years. We have just seen how the Church, for the first time, had carried its theory of secular sovereignty so far as deliberately to put a man to death by its own hand as a rebel to its power. The death of Arnold of Brescia was the first blot of this kind on the Church's conscience. It gave a certain shock to men's minds, and a sense of guilt, which the papal government softened as best it might, by disclaiming its own direct agency in the act. The famous symbol of the



two swords begins to demand explanation. The spiritual sword alone may be handled directly by the spiritual power; the sword temporal must be wielded through the carnal hand of magistrate or ruler. The point in casuistry—as just seen in the case of Arnold—is sometimes a very fine one; and, just as things are now, it is quite imperative that the Church's policy, in the face of rising and extending heresy, shall be carefully determined.

A few years back (1139) it had seemed enough to decree respecting "rejecters of the sacraments"—that is, the Petrobrusians and Henricians of the day—that "we condemn them, and enjoin that they must be repressed by outside powers"—that is, by the State.\* But it might happen that the State would do no such thing. The Count of Toulouse, an independent prince and a good crusader, had almost openly patronised and protected the arch heretic. And again, it might happen that heresy would not down at the State's bidding; that something in the spirit of the time, in the very nature of free thought, would prove too strong for that shadowy authority. And on that issue might depend the very existence of the spiritual power itself—of what its defenders would uphold as indeed the kingdom of God on earth, and the only hope of perishing humanity.

All the more, because the whole sunny South of France, opening broadly on the bright Mediterranean—the highway of the Crusade, before all the rest of Europe in enlightenment, alive all over with the budding germs of a fresh civilisation—was infected to the core with the poison of a deadlier heresy.

\* The same Council reinforces the "Truce of God" (Art. 12), denounces Tournaments—"detestabiles illas nundinas vel ferias" (Art. 14), and conflagrations—"horrendam incendiarum malitiam" (Art. 18). It also forbids heredity of church benefices (Art. 16), and enjoins security of person to non-combatants, travellers, and others (Art. 11). These services to the higher civilisation should not be overlooked in this connection.

At least, it is plausible to connect the eager and passionate fervour of the Albigensian faith with the adventure of the Crusade which laid that sunny coast so easily open to the invasion of strange doctrines and practices from the East—Something, it is likely, in the young glow of chivalry and romance was well disposed to receive anything that might seem a golden dawn of free thought. The more hostile to monastic and ecclesiastic rule, the better welcome that new life must find. Abundant seed of it came over from the Levant in the same fleets that brought back the baffled, doubting, despairing troop that had sailed out for conquest of the Holy Land. Its rank growth came thickest at the very time the reaction set in, after the disastrous enterprise that had been urged with fatal promises by St. Bernard.

There is some obscurity about the origin and nature of this heresy. Its sacred books were destroyed; its records were carefully blotted out. All but its name would appear to have perished in that awful devastation which befell under Innocent III. and his successors on the soil of Languedoc. It seems clear, however, that it was not merely the growth of the seed planted by Peter de Bruys and his disciples, and not merely a contagion or importation brought in from the Levant by the returning fleets. And, instead of the easy-going free religion which we might have looked for in the land of chivalry and romance, its tone appears to have been ascetic, even harsh; its ritual one of extreme, even gaunt, simplicity; its disciples not voluptuous knights and ladies, but a grave, frugal, and temperate population, with a simplicity of life and a mutual devotion like the devout communion of the early church at Jerusalem. It is likely, indeed, that the new rites had to do with the Oriental notion of the corruption of matter; with ascetic practices, to get free from evils of the flesh—whence the name “Cathari” or Purists, by which the sect was most broadly known; with forms of symbolism shocking and

profane merely because they were unauthorised and new ; with rejection of the Old Testament, also, and an urging of the contrasts of natural Good and Evil, which seemed a revival of the old Manichæan dualism—nay, the worship of Satan and Antichrist.

From the beginning, down, we meet at intervals that Dualism which—under the names Gnostic, Manichee, Paulician, Catharist—has made the incessantly-recurring terror of the Church. To the Christian conscience it has always seemed a lapse toward the peril and mischief of Paganism. It did often include practices which were pagan in origin and savoured (possibly) of pagan licence. What is Paganism, after all, but a worship of the blind mystery of Nature—and more often of the dark side than of the bright side in Nature? The forms of natural evil that constantly assail us, before which we are as utterly ignorant as we are utterly helpless in the last resort—storm, violence, pain, death—press closest on the imagination and terror of men, and have their symbol in the names that stand out strongest in popular mythologies—Typhon, Moloch, and Apollyon. Life itself seems not an orderly development, as the philosophers would persuade us, or the work of a wise and kind Providence, as the pious heart believes. To the common eye it is rather a conflict of Good and Evil, light and darkness, gladness and pain ; a conflict obstinate and unreconciled ; a conflict in which the hero may hold his ground for a while, but must fall at last ; in which the coward is struck down at once, ignominiously. Ignorant, abject, and helpless, the natural man stands in awe before a pitiless, blind Force, which seems to him absolutely indifferent to our pain or gladness, right or wrong.

We may say that this is at bottom the same conflict that is seen and reconciled in Christianity ; the same that the Church has always recognised in its doctrine of salvation, and its symbol of Christ and Antichrist. But we also see

how, in the better Christian thought of Augustine, in his rejection of his own early Manichæism, the ground of conflict is shifted from the outward world to the conscience, from the realm of natural fatalism to that of spiritual freedom. And to this solution—however illogical its creed or unworthy its practice—the mind of Christendom has always given its assent.

Now the Catharist doctrine had in it a strong dose of the old nature-worship of force and fear. It may even be regarded as, in a sense, a race-religion—a Slavic rendering of Christianity, just as we have the recognised Greek, Latin, Arian-Gothic, and Protestant-Teutonic forms. For the Slavs had, in their barbaric mythology, their divinity of Evil, their Black God (Tzernebog) suggested, naturally enough, by their long northern winter of darkness and cold; and their Christianity was deeply coloured by their primitive dualism from the start. Stimulated, it is said, by some Paulician exiles from the East, their form of faith became aggressive and propagandist, strongly organised, and very much in earnest. It invaded Italy in the eleventh century, after a steady advance through what is now Northern Turkey; it established its headquarters in Bosnia, which it held for several centuries, and whence it may have done something to feed the flame of that furious war of races which we know as the Hussite war. In Southern France it fell in with the hostility to priesthood and sacrament which was already a part of the popular religion. And here it proved itself no mere speculative fancy, but a creed eagerly, devoutly, passionately held, as was seen later in the wild scenes of self-immolation so common in the Albigensian war.

A word of its interior nature and constitution. The motive of its discipline—which was strict and very severe—was to be free from the domination of matter, the evil principle. Hence it demanded austerities of its professed

holy men (the "Cathari," or Pure),\* which, when emulated on the sick-bed by those who aspired to be saints, were sometimes carried to the point of deliberate starvation. In particular, it forbade the taking of life or the eating of flesh. Its most characteristic ritual consisted in the gift of the Spirit by laying on of hands, and a peculiar rite of absolution for the dying (*consolamentum*). Its only devotional forms were the Lord's Prayer and the Apostolic Benediction. Its subjects seem to have been a people peace-loving, industrious, and frugal; generous and devoted to one another, especially to their religious chiefs; and, like those of all time whose pietistic is touched with communistic fervour, capable of the intensest enthusiasm and self-devotion. The strength and coherence of their organisation, and their profound repugnance to the Roman hierarchy, quite as much as their heresies of creed, were what brought them into such deadly collision with the powers of the day. Their fervour ran often, doubtless, to passion and excess; and it may possibly have had (as religious passion so often has) a weak side toward the plainer moralities, common enough when men begin to fancy that the life of faith has emancipated them from the law of righteousness.†

Albi, not far from Toulouse, became the religious capital of the new heresy; and those who embraced its crudities and protests, above all, those who shared the enmity and hate it bore from Rome, were known by the common name of Albigenses. Their "damnable heresy," declares the Council of Tours (1163), "has crept like a serpent into the Lord's vineyard." True believers are summoned to watch and guard. As yet, however, the Church does not strike with carnal weapons. Anathema, excommunication, non-

\* These made a recognised sacred class, in number about four thousand.

† In the account here given I have chiefly followed Schmidt, "*Histoire et Doctrine de la Secte des Cathares ou Albigeois*" (2 vols., Paris, 1849).

intercourse—these are still her methods. There must be no dealings of trade with the misbelievers: they must be fenced off like an infected district. Their conventicles are to be hunted out, their worship forbidden. And in the “inquest” or search-warrant which this policy implies, we have the germ of what grew afterwards into the gigantic tribunal of the Inquisition.

Along with the Albigenses a kindred sect under another name comes upon the field. The Waldenses are held to be so called from Peter Waldo, a merchant of Lyons, who, about 1160, gave all his wealth to religious uses, and became not so much the founder of a sect, as the representative of the cause for which Henry had lived and Arnold died—the austere, fervent, anti-priestly gospel of the Alpine valley. So that we have, in the first half of the century, a reform known to us by the name of its three brave, eloquent, and ill-fated pioneers—each a great religious enthusiast, proclaiming his gospel of free salvation. After the middle of the century, we have a broad popular movement, in two great sects more or less allied—the Albigenses and Waldenses, inseparable in destiny and fame as the earliest champions and martyrs of our modern liberty of thought.

Comparing them, one would appear more speculative, vigorously organised, and intellectually bold; the other more simple, genuine, and practically in earnest. Peter Waldo, so it is said, might easily have made his peace with Rome, and been recognised, perhaps, as founder of a new religious order of poverty, like St. Francis. But his method went deeper. He caused the Gospels to be translated and diffused in the popular tongue; and so started an independent religious culture, fundamentally hostile to the Church. The names by which the sect was known all denote a very simple and humble community. They are “Poor Men of Lyons”—for brevity, “Leonists;” or

*Sabotati*, from the wooden clogs they wore; or *Humilitati*, "the Downtrodden." So they appear in history as the pioneers of the "Forerunners of the Reformation;" like the Wickliffites and Lollards of England, the Hussites of Bohemia, they represent a faith that had its home and temple in the hearts of the people; that cared nothing for sanctity of official priesthood, for splendour of altar or ritual; too direct and straightforward to pardon, too simple to understand, the compromises and policies inseparable from a vast institution laden with a multitude of tasks and open to innumerable assaults; too humble-minded to comprehend the great sweep of events which only begin to be intelligible to us at the end of seven hundred years. True prophets, as we see them now, of a better time and creed, it was not possible, then, but that they should be victims and martyrs of the hierarchy they defied.

The time came when that hierarchy must either surrender its ground as the one divine institution among men, or determine on some more effectual method to maintain its power. Alexander III. had been pope for twenty years. Partly by policy and craft, as in the case of Henry II. of England, and his impracticable primate, Thomas Becket; partly by indomitable resolution, as in his hard-won victory over Barbarossa, he had carried the Papacy through the stormiest crisis of its long struggle. He had guided the Council at Tours to the declaration of policy against the Albigenses, already described. And, for the last great act of his administration, he now (1179) summoned the Third Lateran Council for more deliberate adoption of a course to meet the peril in the proportions it had already grown to.

The acts of this Council are deserving of special attention, because they first clearly announce the policy of persecution for opinion's sake to which the Church has been slowly—and, as we may believe, with deep misgiving and reluctance—committed by its inexorable theory. The initial measure

is not essentially different from what we have found before,—non-intercourse with heretics, who are to be further deprived of Christian burial. But there is a certain deliberate malignity in what immediately follows. A long list is recited of bandits and marauders—probably the ruff-scuff of the returned crusaders, who are craftily mixed up with heretics in faith. The allies of the Church are thus hounded on against them as enemies of society, with what justice it is not hard to see. Their goods are to be confiscated; their persons are to be reduced to slavery. And, as if all the secular hates and passions of the time were not enough, two years' "indulgence" is promised to their assailants, and all the privileges of the Soldiers of the Cross.\*

To these counsels of deep iniquity the Church has at length been led. The process, we may well believe, was slow, and followed reluctantly. Like all the great crimes of history, it was extenuated—perhaps sanctified—in the eyes of its perpetrators by a seeming necessity. The logic of history is inexorable, and to this pass had been brought at length that which called itself the Church of Christ, indivisible and one. Those which I have recounted are the first definite steps of persecution deliberately initiated by Church authority. They are interesting as showing the cautious and hesitating steps, taken at long intervals, before that policy ripened—as it did some thirty years later, in the time of Innocent III.—into the horrors of the Albigensian War,† and the Office of Inquisition, which we find

\* See Act 27 of the Third Lateran Council (1179).

† The official report of the indiscriminate massacre at Béziers (1209) of 20,000 men, women, and children, heretic and Catholic alike, and the reply of Innocent, applauding and urging on the work, may be found in Migne cxxvi. 189—151. This horror was all in vain. In 1243, at the Council of Padua, the complaint is still that heresy is on the increase; and to the same place and date belong the atrocious code of Frederick II., which enjoins that heretics "be burned alive in the sight of men" (Mansi xxiii. 586). How the Waldenses were hunted, literally like wild beasts, for a course of centuries, is told in Gilly's "Narrative," before cited.



fully adopted in the next great Council (1215), the same at which the doctrine of Transubstantiation was formally recognised as part of the authoritative creed. So the finest subtleties of metaphysical theology went hand in hand with unforgiving cruelty in the final act by which the Church exchanged the voice of appeal for the policy of terror and the hand of violence. As Witness of the Truth and Defender of Righteousness, its history will not interest us any more.

Yet there is an interest besides—special, tragic—in the acts which have been now described. In all this dreadful business the Church was not quite forgetful of *other* duties to humanity, beside the vindication of purity in belief. The same decrees include—along with assertions of its independent sovereignty, and the stereotype manifesto of monastic reform—declarations against wanton conflagrations and the plundering of peasants, those two great curses of the feudal wars; against tournaments, also, “those detestable games and holidays,” and in favour of the truce of God. They contain merciful provisions, too, for lepers, who, we may suppose, had appeared in the wake of the returning Crusade; and they enjoin that the Church shall provide schools “for the poor, as a tender mother.” Certainly, the Church’s right hand did not know what its left hand did.

The illustrations of ecclesiastical policy which we have now seen are not open to the discreditable evasions by which modern defenders of Rome have attempted to cover up her guilt in the vaster horrors of St. Bartholomew and the Spanish Inquisition. They show that the policy of persecution was adopted by that Church deliberately and with open eyes. But it was under pressure of a false theory honestly held, and of a real terror at imaginary danger. It was also with strong compunction and humane recoil.

If, on one hand, we make this admission of a more merciful spirit in the Church, then, on the other hand, there is nothing that so damages her pretensions to celestial wisdom or supernatural guidance; nothing that so completely disproves that Infallibility to which she asserts so many fantastic, sentimental, and rotten claims.

J. H. ALLEN.

## THE EXAMPLE OF JESUS.—II.

### THE ETHICS OF JESUS.

IN the July number of this Review (pp. 441—467) we criticised some of Professor F. W. Newman's well-known opinions with regard to the character and example of Jesus. The remarks then made had special reference to the author's recent essay entitled "What is Christianity without Christ?" in which he directs his attack specifically against the acceptance of the Jesus of the Gospels as a model of human conduct. It is his expressed wish, however, that any controversy raised by his essay should be made to include the little work published some years ago, under the title of "Religion, not History," in which he discusses the "Ethics of Jesus" more fully and expressly than in his more recent pamphlet.

Turning then to this aspect of the subject in hand, and reminding our readers that the present article is continuous with the previous one, and must be regarded as included in the preliminary remarks with which it opens, we may plunge without further preface, *in medias res*.

Professor Newman grants that the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel must be put aside, in this connection, as wholly unhistorical. He admits also that historical criticism must sift the Synoptical Gospels themselves; and not only so, but he himself sets boldly to the task. Further, he once more admits the abstract possibility that there may have been a real historical Jesus of an entirely different character, and of far purer and more exalted moral principles, than we find in

the Gospels. Against such a hypothetical teacher, Professor Newman has nothing to urge. He deals only with the Jesus of the Gospels. Now, on the one hand, such an "unknown quantity"—unknowable as well as unknown—as Professor Newman's hypothesis admits to be possible must be entirely bereft of interest to us, to say nothing of its intrinsic improbability; \* and, on the other hand, the moral conceptions and demands of Jesus as put forward in Matthew and Luke are made the subject of a most unfavourable judgment. At one time Jesus keeps too low, at another he mounts too high; sometimes he gives unnecessary offence and pain; sometimes he demands impossibilities, and he is always unpractical. But his use of the immoral motives of fear of punishment and hope of reward is what Professor Newman condemns most strongly. In a word, he describes his system of ethics as base and selfish, standing far below that of the Apostolic writers, especially Paul, and equally far below that of Aristotle and the Stoics.

I must begin by admitting that the impartial study of the Gospels gives abundant cause for difficulties of this class, and that several of the objections raised are of so serious a nature as to demand a fuller and better discussion than can be given them by the present writer or on the present occasion. Soon may they obtain it! To take an instance. It will not do to assert that the Ebionite elements of the third Gospel,† representing poverty as meritorious and wealth as a crime, are in no case derived from the historical Jesus. When we have simply put aside everything that there is sufficient reason to suppose was produced in the Apostolic age and put upon the lips of the Master by this or that school or party amongst his disciples, much still remains for consideration: and with respect to this remainder, I must content myself at present with a few

\* Previous Article, p. 465.

† For example, Luke xvi. 1—13, 19—31 (Lazarus and the rich man); xii. 33 sq. xiv. 12—14; vi. 20—25 etc.

remarks, which may serve as a contribution to a juster estimate of the point.

In the first place, Jesus never taught, and never had, any *system* of ethics at all. I do not shrink from asserting that he never felt the necessity of such a system, and that the thought of it never entered his mind. He was not a man of method and scholarship. There is nothing of the philosopher about him. He did, indeed, give utterance to ethical *principles* which have only to be separated from the casual form of expression, the temporal and national garment that enfolds them, and seized in their central signification and fundamental drift, in order to be recognised in their unsurpassed and imperishable power. But the elaboration and application of these principles are almost invariably provoked by, and confined to, special occasions. We must, therefore, endeavour to listen with the ears of those who actually heard him, and to place ourselves in the Palestine of eighteen and a-half centuries ago. We shall certainly miss the mark again and again unless we constantly bear in mind that Jesus had to use the Jewish language, which bore the impress of the Jewish spirit deeply stamped upon it, and that he must often have been almost or completely unaware of the shortcomings of this tongue as an instrument for embodying the moral truths which he proclaimed. To this we must add, as of still greater weight, the consideration of the very definite and peculiar circle of ideas which surrounded Jesus, absolutely dominating men's hearts with the hope of the kingdom of God, making them live for it, bring everything into connection with it in their thoughts, and force everything into its service. If this was narrowness it was likewise strength. The much-lauded many-sidedness of our own age is not always pre-eminently favourable to the manifestation of moral strength. To be ruled by one thought, inspired by one love, irresistibly drawn to one ideal, is, in itself, a

guarantee of far-reaching influence,—and what may we not look for when that “*one*” is the Kingdom of God?

In a word, our first determination must be not to isolate Jesus, and not to modernise him.

The weakest point in the moral requirements of the Gospels appears to me to be their deficient appreciation of the things of the world. The sacredness of work, our duty of contributing to the best of our power to the material prosperity of mankind and of providing for the future, as well as other such truths and duties, receive no recognition. But, remembering the very extraordinary times and their very extraordinary demands, directing all thoughts and affections upon one point and taking possession of the whole nature, we shall not wonder that the scale was turned by the heaviest weight. There must be no divided service, no qualified adhesion! The settled conviction that the then existing order of society was on the point of disappearing, and the Kingdom of God on the point of being established, explains the facts we are considering. All that was connected with the Kingdom of God, and that hastened its advent, must take the first place in every heart. The parable of the talents is a noble illustration and counterpart of the warning against “heathenish” anxiety, and that reference to flowers and birds, which was intended only as a rebuke, is misunderstood and misused when cited as a word of consolation and encouragement. Jesus is enforcing his own life-choice upon others, for he had found it a blessed one.\*

Jesus wields the threat of the last judgment. Is it not mean and cowardly to desert an evil course through fear? Let us distinguish carefully in this matter, and avoid exaggeration even of spirituality. It certainly appears that Jesus, especially in the last period of his public ministry, when his first fair hopes for his people had been bitterly

\* I may be excused for referring to the fuller treatment of Matthew vi. 19—34, in the “Bible [for Young People],” vol. v., pp. 214—220.

disappointed, emphatically warned Israel as a whole of the threatening future (*e.g.*, Luke xiii. 1—9) ; and not only so, but he also made use of these denunciations of punishment in addressing individuals, perhaps even early in his ministry. But if it was really his fixed belief—a belief which it never occurred to him to question, which all the prophets had shared, which all his contemporaries held, which had formed the chief subject of John's preaching,—that before the kingdom of God was founded, the great sifting must take place, how could he, how should he, look upon his people persisting in obstinate disbelief when the decisive moment was close at hand, and yet refrain from uttering the cry, "You are rushing to destruction"? This is not using Hell as a place of arbitrary punishment to scare mankind. It is a warning of disastrous moral ruin. Remember that Jesus is speaking in popular fashion, with no abstract and scholastic definitions, but in graphic, concrete images. Moreover, if any one in our own day firmly *believes* in hell, is he in any way to blame for warning men against it? Is he bound to say to the sinner, "If you do not repent of course you will go to hell; but that is of little or no consequence; you must on no account allow such a consideration to weigh with you in quitting your sins. You must quit them only because they are sinful"? Is not this exaggerated and unnatural? It is easy for us to talk in this way because we do not believe in hell; but ought we, too, to blush for the immoral character of the motives to which we appeal if we cry out, "Do not rush into misery"? It would be a very different thing if Jesus had urged men to flee from evil *only* for the sake of escaping punishment, or had ever appeared to be content with such a motive. But this is far, indeed, from being the case. The child of God, he teaches us, must beware, above all things, of sinning against his Father and of staining himself. How great is the difference in this respect, in spite of the partial coincidence, between Jesus

and his great predecessor, John the Baptist! Nay, you may search all the Gospels with whatever microscope you will, and you will not find a syllable to match that unguarded exclamation which slipped, in an evil moment, from the pen of Paul, though in direct contradiction with all his life and all his principles: "If the dead rise not again, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die!" (1 Cor. xv. 32.)

The expression which has given most offence in this connection is the oft-repeated "reward."\* This is extremely natural. The word produces a most painful impression. We reject the Israelitish morals as eudæmonistic. Serving for wages is not devotion,† and he who does good that a god may reward him degrades goodness itself into beggarly commerce, robs it of its glory, and soils it with his very touch. All true! But let us look a little closer into the passages of our Gospels that are attacked. Properly speaking, there are but two: ‡ that in which the reward of those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake is spoken of, and that which mentions the reward of the piety hidden from the eyes of men in contrast with the theatrical piety § of the devout Jews. How unfair, then, to call "reward" the "key-note" of Jesus! And even in these two passages the meaning is not quite what the sound of the word suggests. It is a great question, at any rate, whether the word *μισθός* has the same degrading associations as "wages" or "pay" ||—degrading, that is to say, in connection with the moral life and the relation of man to God, but not degrading surely in connection with social life and the relations of men to each other. Paul, a consistent thinker, whose system absolutely excluded the idea of "re-

\* Matthew v. 12, 46; vi. 1, 2, 6, 18; x. 41, 42.

† See Job i. 9—12; ii. 3—6.

‡ Matthew v. 46 is supplemented by the parallel in v. 47, *τί περιμένετε*; x. 41 evidently refers to the fellowship with prophets and righteous men.

§ Formality—*εὐσεβεία*.

|| "Religion, not History," p. 38.



ward,"\* uses the word *μισθός* not only in similes (1 Cor. iii. 8—14), but in reference to himself, and in a connection that excludes the idea of "pay" or "wages," and makes it obvious that the word is equivalent to *καπτός*, fruit. In other words, "wage" or "pay" is something external (foreign to the thing itself) and arbitrary (not necessarily involved in the action), whereas *μισθός* in the New Testament is also used for the necessary moral fruits of our work (compare Rom. vi. 21, 22, 23). Paul's "reward" for his voluntary (*ἐκών*) preaching of the Gospel is his own ever-increasing share in it (*ἵνα συγκοινωνῶς αὐτοῦ γένωμαι*, 1 Cor. ix. 17, 18, 23). Now, it is true that Jesus did not speak Greek but the Jewish patois of the time (Aramaic), and we cannot tell what was the word he used. But in any case he had to make himself understood by his hearers, and could not create a new language for the new moral conceptions and truths he preached. And yet, after all, when he used a word redolent of the spirit of Judaism, did it not acquire a purer meaning on his lips, just because he could not fail to pour into it better and nobler thoughts and feelings than were reflected in the language of the genuine Jew? However this may be, it is undeniable that all mercenary service is excluded by the Gospel at the threshold. "Even so, when you have done all that is commanded you, you ought to say, We are unworthy servants; we have but done what we were bound to do" (Luke xvii. 10). No one, not Jesus himself any more than another, can think of the All-good and then claim or allow for himself the title of *good* (Mark x. 18). And is it not the great offence of the irreproachably virtuous Jew who has never left his father's house or transgressed his commandment, that he says: "Think how many years I have been *serving* you" (*δουλεύω σοι*)? (Luke xv. 29.)

\* Compare, e.g., the *χάρις* of Luke vi. 32 with Matthew v. 46. This is a urism of the Pauline writer.

It is quite true that the reward or treasure spoken of is "in heaven," and that this expression seems at first to favour the mercenary interpretation (Matt. v. 12; vi. 20; xix. 21). But the meaning of the words is far removed from what we should understand by them now. Jesus had no more idea than any of his contemporaries had that the pious dead would "go to heaven." Such a conception was wholly foreign to the cosmology of the time. The seat of the kingdom of God was to be no other than this earth. But just as all the other best and highest gifts which God should give to man existed in heaven (Hebrews viii. 5; ix. 23) before they came to earth, so this state of salvation and all that each several man should enjoy therein was as it were prepared and laid up in heaven, ready to be sent down to earth at the appointed time. There above was the glorified body which the redeemed should wear (2 Cor. v. 1, 2), there were all the gifts and blessings which should fall to their lot (Matt. xxv. 34). Thus every good deed done in this life contributed something, every great act of self-sacrifice, every mighty testimony of faith contributed much, to this treasure which would enrich the citizens of the kingdom in the near future (Rom. viii. 18, 19, 21, &c.; Col. i. 5). It is, indeed, a strange circle of ideas, a world into which we have difficulty in transporting ourselves. But if we care to estimate it fairly, to find out what there really is in it and what there lies behind it, we must remember in the first place that "in heaven" or "with God" is equivalent to "absolutely" or "eternally,"\* and in the second place that "the kingdom of God" means almost the same as "the realisation of our personal and social destiny." Separated, then, from the childlike conceptions of the Jewish piety of the age, does not the real meaning of the promise of "reward" and "treasure in heaven" come pretty much to

\* See for example Matt. vi. 20; xviii. 10; xvi. 19; xviii. 18; xix. 21 Luke i. 6, 15; xii. 38; xv. 7. Acts iv. 19. Galatians i. 20, &c.

this: "Nothing is ever lost, not even the smallest act of kindness. Every noble deed, and every sacrifice in the cause of faith, bears eternal fruit. If your efforts and affections are not bent to earthly and temporal things, but to the highest and best, then all will help to the realisation of your destiny as a child of God"? Matthew v. 12 is exactly parallel to 2 Cor. iv. 16, 17, and there can be no room to doubt that what Jesus meant by the reward granted by God was something spiritual, some imperishable moral fruit. The *ὑποκριταί* have already received their reward in the applause of men, and the reputation for liberality, piety, and earnestness, which is what they really seek. He whose *δικαιοσύνη* does not meet the eye of man has, as his far better reward, a closer relationship to God. To him well-doing becomes a second nature, prayer becomes a fountain of trust and strength, and earnestness the characteristic of his life.\* He who deliberately and consciously puts himself into the communion of prophet or righteous man, or even the humblest of the disciples, shall experience without fail and without stint the blessed influences in which they rejoice (Matt. x. 41).

But all this was expressed in popular and picturesque language. To call the ethics of Jesus "eudæmonistic" on that account, is to follow the sound without inquiring into the sense, is to be guilty of the extreme of superficiality, to be a victim of the most fatal misconception. Surely, when we hear such words as "low and self-seeking" (p. 24), we should at the very least expect the constant mention of outward reward, with here and there a seductive description of sensuous enjoyment, such as we find in the Koran. Where is there anything of the kind in the Gospels? We cannot find so much as a trace of it unless we choose utterly to misun-

\* "Religion, not History," p. 41. On the strength of the certainly spurious *ἐν τῇ φανερόν*, the author uses the phrase "in public"!

derstand and pervert the symbolic expressions of feast and bridal in the parables. Then let not these reproaches be hurled at Jesus! Truly his moral precepts will issue resplendent from the test of comparison in any respect with those of the apostles, Aristotle, or the Stoics! As for the apostles, they owe everything to Jesus himself, but they did not understand everything rightly or preserve everything uninjured, or reproduce it unalloyed. The philosophers chose more abstract and more intellectual expressions—we may question whether, at the end of the reckoning, they are really more *accurate*;—but their purpose and meaning could not be more pure. The Stoics, who deserve such profound respect, truly seem “to us too unemotional” (p. 3), inasmuch they regarded all emotion as a kind of disease, and “too purely intellectual” likewise. Was it not inevitable that under their system sympathy should fade away, or assume an almost haughty tone of superiority; that delicacy and fineness of feeling, the very flower of human character, should suffer; that the gentle and tender strings of the heart should be too seldom touched? And what of their fatalism? What of their doctrine of suicide? Then for Aristotle, what value has each several man as an individual in his eyes? Does he not consider the duties of the Greek to the barbarian and to the brute identical? Is not slavery to him a law of nature? \*

I do not say this in any way to detract from the great deserts of these philosophers and moralists, but simply to bring out in some degree the lofty, the unique character of the moral principles and truths of Jesus. For the misfortune—not always free from blame—is this: that men narrowly inspect some unessential point, catch at the sound of certain expressions, and criticise all manner of details, while they utterly lose sight of the great central fact. It is nothing to admit that Matthew v. 8 is “a noble utterance,”

\* Compare Lecky's *Hist. of European Morals*.

and Matthew v. 44 "an excellent precept, if somewhat overstated."\* This is no approach to an appreciation. Who can deny that we ought to begin by asking what was the central thought in the soul of Jesus? What was the meaning of this new life-truth? How did he come by it? How did he apply it? The circumference must be lighted from the centre, even where it does not seem to be perfectly rounded, or where it appears to break.

Now, there can be no hesitation in answering this fundamental question. Every one admits that the essence of the Gospel is the love of God to man, stretching over all, infinitely great, inexhaustibly rich even to the most sinful,† a redeeming love that goes forth to seek and save, that cannot rest till it has brought back the wandering (*ὥς οὐ εὔρη*) that will not suffer one, not even the least, to be lost (Matt. xviii. 12—14), the love of a father that cannot and will not suffer the loss of one single child! The expression, "kingdom of God," which Jesus found, and adopted without ever considering its partial incongruity with his own witness of faith, its inferiority to the far higher and more glorious revelation of his own religious consciousness, ought to be superseded by the expression, "household of the heavenly Father," and then it should be taken as literally as any figure of speech can ever be. The members of this family, from which not one must be wanting, are brothers and sisters, who honour and love, uphold, support, and strengthen one another. Mutual respect reigns amongst them, for they are all objects of the Divine love—not merely "grace," as Paul had it, for grace is the arbitrary and reversible favour of a condescending Deity, whereas love is no longer free, and cannot be withdrawn or checked, for it is rooted in natural relationship. As a

\* Religion, not History, p. 40.

† Of a truth no "Huge Power, reckless of moral considerations, careless of the difference between the just and the unjust" (p 41). This of Him, the Holy One!

recipient of this love, each man has priceless worth, and each must respect himself and others as men. "Self-esteem" there doubtless is. The noblest and most majestic of the Stoics could not respect himself more highly than the child of God, who knows and feels himself to be the son or daughter of the Holy One, with no sonship of adoption (Paul's *υιοθεσία*), but the genuine sonship of nature. What higher title of honour than this is conceivable in the world? But this "self-esteem" does not exclude humility, as its Stoic counterpart did. May we not formulate the difference thus: The Stoic believes that *he* has made the *ideal*, and exalts himself for what he is; whereas the Christian knows, and finds his joy in humbly confessing, that the *Ideal* has made *him*, that all he is or is becoming is the work of Love? Hence the Christian humility, born of the deep sense of the immeasurable distance that parts us from the height to which we are called, from the ideal to which we feel ourselves allied in our inmost nature, and for which we are framed. Who does not feel that here "humility" and "self-esteem" unite together as the two aspects of one self-same thing? (Mark x. 18). And what is that one thing but the *worth of man*, the infinite significance of each several man as a child of Holy Love, called and destined to perfection after the likeness of God?

Professor Newman\* can find nothing in Matt. v. 48. "It shoots too high;" but what can be too high for the hallowed ambition of the sons of God? "It commands a simple impossibility;" but if the ideal by its very nature is beyond our reach, is that any reason why we should cease to love it and strive after it with our whole heart? "It propounds nothing tangible and intelligible," and Jesus himself gives as a sample "peacemaking" and "love of enemies." "Most of our wishes belong only to a being who is finite, frail, and the member of a community;" an assertion untrue of

\* Religion, not History, pp. 39, 40.

the principles, true only of the application. "We do not praise God for his bravery, for his charity, &c.;" but "praise" has nothing to do with the matter; and may we not find in God "our pattern for imitation" in *approval* of bravery, in *disapproval* of in chastity, and so forth? Whence is this amazing misconception on Professor Newman's part? Is it that he has not understood or has not reflected who God was to Jesus, what Jesus found in Him, whence he drew his conception of Him? Was it not from the life of his own soul? "Yet higher!" cried the voice within him. "Never rest! Press forward unwearied!" An unquenchable thirst for love, an insatiable hunger for holiness, the elasticity and endurance of the loftiest aspiration, urged him onwards and upwards. Is it not most natural that he should have appealed, even by preference, to his hearers' sense of honour (Matt. v. 9, 45, 46, 47)? Never does he crush man down; even though he points emphatically to the distance, of which he himself was so profoundly conscious (Mark x. 18), that separates even the noblest human love from the love of God (Matt. vii. 11), yet his constant effort is to raise mankind. He restores his self-respect to the most deeply sunken by his unrestrained intercourse with him, and cries aloud to all, "Respect yourselves too highly to fling yourselves away. The greatest treasures cannot weigh against the smallest untruth or meanness, against the injury they inflict upon *your-selves*" (Luke ix. 25).

And this principle finds varied and special application. We have, for instance, the celebrated antitheses of Matthew v. 21—48, which turn the attention and character from the external to the internal, from the appearance to the reality, from the surface to the inner depth. What a misconception, then, to say "the precepts are simply extravagant, and thereby pernicious" (p. 41)! Not the evil deed alone—which depends less upon the man than the circumstances, and is always the product of more factors than one

—but the evil inclination is criminal, and must be held by each one as equivalent to the deed. Thus the sixth commandment is elaborated in popular fashion (and with a *crescendo*, which was anything but “a most obscure triplet” to those who heard it) into a condemnation of the anger, the passion, the fury that lie behind the murderous stroke. So, too, the seventh commandment is raised into a condemnation of the impure desire, which is only restrained by want of opportunity, or fear of punishment or shame. And dare any one reply, “It is extravagant and false to say that a lustful look is equivalent to adultery; for out of twenty men who wrongfully indulge the eye, *which does not hurt one’s neighbour*, there might not be so much as one who would guiltily wrong a woman or her husband”? But why so? I ask. It is not the abstinence from outward act of evil, but the motive of that abstinence, that is here in question. Who shall say at what point a lustful look becomes a sin, or when, with favouring circumstances, it may bear its evil fruit? Is it not the beginning of every sin of in chastity? And if one “does not hurt one’s neighbour,” but does hurt himself, by soiling his imagination, corrupting his heart, and paralysing his will—is that little or nothing? Is it not degrading the child of God, and violating the image of the Holy One? It is true that “overstrained doctrine can only have morbid results.” But in keeping guard in the first place over the imagination, and in maintaining even there the sternest self-restraint, man cannot well exercise himself too strictly (Prov. iv. 23). And so, too, Jesus rightly finds the deepest ground and drift of the third and ninth commandments in the demand for stern, unconditional, unshaken love of truth; he forbids an oath as incompatible with his central principle of respect for humanity, as inconceivable in a society where perfect uprightness, and therefore mutual confidence, reigns undisputed, and as rest-



ing on the supposition that men are liars. "But let your 'yea!' be yea and your 'nay!' nay, for whatever you say more comes from the Evil One." Is this "wholly unsatisfactory," because "no definition of swearing is given, nor any explanation whether he means to forbid an oath taken at the command of a magistrate and an oath in sanction of international treaties"?\* Was Jesus, then, a Professor of casuistry, or is the Gospel a law-book? We further read, "Surely he overstrains hurtfully in commanding us, if struck on the cheek, to court a second blow" (p. 41). As if this popular and picturesque expression were to be taken literally! Not so. But the principle of retaliation as a means of restraining evil, the foundation upon which Jewish society rested, was to be superseded, first in the circle of his own followers, and then in all the world, by the bold application of the rival principle of overcoming evil with good (Rom. xii. 21).

"Be ye perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect!" Before he uttered this command in the ears of all the world he had uttered it to himself, for he had received it in his inmost soul from God, and he persevered to the end in exacting it of himself. He knew all these things of his own knowledge, and with the never dimmed perception that they were not of his own production, that they were not imagined or invented by himself, that they were the word of God in his soul; nor did he ever lay upon others what he had not taken upon himself. And just because it was *as a man* that he had made this glorious discovery he persevered in the conviction that every *man* must come by the same means to see and hear the same things. He would not have men repeat his words or ape his deeds, but he would have every man turn into himself as he had done, and, under his influence and guidance, "follow his own highest convictions, the promptings of God's spirit in him,

\* Religion, not History, p. 40.

each man aiming at his own highest ideal of perfection." He had learnt by experience to know the infinite love of the Father, and had found in it his light, his power, his comfort, his peace, his blessedness. But he knew it was not for him alone, nor more accessible or available for him than for others. He was no exception, and had no exclusive privilege in God's love. Every human creature must enjoy it. He had learned in the experience of his soul, in the fight of faith and life, to know that Power which enables man to perform the impossible—or what, but for that Power, would be the impossible; but any man who would, could, and must and should share the same blessed experience. No one need remain bereft of it. Nay, he was assured that at last it should manifest itself irresistibly in every heart. In him, the friend of sinners, God had made himself known as the tender Father of the prodigal son. His going after that which was lost was inspired—and he knew it—from above. No child of God must be suffered to perish. It was not the Father's will. He knew it with immediate and absolute certainty by the passion of love that burned in his own bosom. In one word, mankind came in him to self-consciousness—and to the consciousness of God; and this, in the first instance, not for the benefit of the noble and the wise, but of the weak, the guilt-laden, the despised.

"Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." Does all that I have said imply that Jesus himself completely fulfilled this demand? He himself decisively rejects such a homage (Mark x. 18). We can understand his doing so. Commonplace spirits are easily and completely satisfied with themselves, but, the loftier any man's position is, the less can he rest satisfied with his own imperfection, and the higher are the demands he makes upon himself. Of what we call sins in our ordinary life we can find no trace in Jesus. He had not sullied his imagination, or dulled his powers by sloth, or maimed his resolution by self-seeking,

or hardened his conscience against the claims of love. But when we find him losing patience, as in the cry to his dull disciples, "O faithless and perverse generation! how long shall I be with you? How long shall I suffer you?" when we see him in the hour of temptation, in fear of becoming faithless to himself and God, repelling Peter with such vehemence, "Get thee out of my sight, Satan! Thou wouldst tempt me! For thou considerest not the things of God, but the things of men;" when we see him, in cleansing the temple, so carried away by his indignation as to raise his hand to drive out its desecraters; when we hear him hurl against scribes and Pharisees that terrific "Woe to you! hypocrites, blind leaders of the blind, whited sepulchres!" when we hear him in the last weeks of his life repeat those threatening announcements of the final judgment, sometimes almost in the manner of the Baptist; when we see him overwhelmed in Gethsemane by agony of soul, and shrinking from suffering and death: then, though he is no less dear to our hearts—nay, all the dearer; for those are no blemishes, truly so called: they are but the tokens of humanity—yet we see that his is humanity struggling and expanding, not humanity in God-like rest and repose. This draws Jesus all the nearer to us. We understand him. We feel with him. However high he stands above us, he is, nevertheless, one of us. In true human fashion he struggled, was tempted—with no vain appearance but the reality of temptation—stumbled as he went onward, learned obedience, and was sanctified—or rather sanctified himself. And all the while, never relinquishing the thought, he was saying to himself, "Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect!"

Now this personality, in connection with the life-purpose and the life-task that moulded it to what it was, in connection with the great thought of God's kingdom, of God's love, of the family of the heavenly Father upon earth, pro-

duced an indelible impression. How Professor Newman, from his point of view, has any chance of explaining the rise of the Christian community, and the whole mighty religious movement of Christianity, I cannot understand! The apostolic community, already seeing in Jesus the uplifting of fallen man and the guarantee of his future, expressed its thought in various concrete forms. In him was man reconciled to God and therefore to himself. The divine human life was the deepest foundation of the doctrine of the deity of Christ. And even in the time of the Church's deepest degeneration this impression was never effaced. The infinite worth of the individual—of the *human soul*, be it even in an unborn babe—was still recognised. The love of God for the weak, the ill-treated, the guilty, the lost, the ever-repeated story of the sinner's friend, remained in their eternal beauty; and still, even in our day, in spite of misconceptions and contradictions, the impulse given by him is working on as mightily as ever. His principle is forcing its way into public opinion and into legislation; his life-thought is being applied and realised in ever wider circles.

But I will not dwell on this, fascinating as the subject is. Only one word: if Professor Newman seriously reflects upon the contents of the Christian ideal, he must look for some truer and more satisfactory answer than he has given to the question—"Whence has this ideal come?" It is not from Paul. He was a great man, and in the Apostolic age he is *facile primus*. But the best he had—according to the utterance of his own consciousness, *all* that he was and *all* that he was to be—he owed to Jesus. And he never fathomed the depth of the thoughts of Jesus, he never exhausted the true contents of the gospel of the love of God. His doctrine of grace is a woful retrogression from the preaching of Jesus, not to mention any other shortcomings. Nor was this

ideal from the Greeks and the classic world. It was not from the modern civilisation of later times. Both have contributed much to the forms of the ideal, to its manifold application, to its ever completer realisation. But the beginning, the principle, the ideal that lays hold of all, regenerates all, and appropriates all to itself, that penetrates into every recess of human life to cleanse and ennoble it (Matthew xiii. 33)—that ideal is due to him who first saw the Father with clear consciousness. The writer of the Fourth Gospel saw and declared with fullest justice that the spirit of truth, succeeding Jesus in the community, has never ceased to draw from his treasures (*ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήμψεται*), and thereby teaches us to understand him ever more fully, and to give him his true place in our hearts (*ἐκεῖνος ἐμὲ δοξάσει*).

But may not the true appreciation of his principles be occupied with a misconception of his person? May it not be separated from our views of Jesus himself? Yes! if need be. "Christianity without Jesus" is by no means an absurdity. But the "Christianity without Christ" which is here offered us is meagre in the extreme. The whole purpose of the formula, "all that is best in *Judæo-Christian* sentiment, &c." (p. 23), would lead us to suspect what the foregoing examination has abundantly confirmed, viz., that the specifically *Christian* element is overlooked. For the words and deeds of Jesus which best embody Christianity are put aside or ignored.

It is with pleasure that we hear Professor Newman "most sincerely profess" that "the discovery would give him personal relief" (p. 24) if it could be shown that in the true history (for we must substitute this for "the earliest narrative") "no blame whatever could be attached to Jesus by the severest moral criticism." We can only hope that by continued and impartial study,—unprejudiced by the assertions of a dogmatic orthodoxy, not forgetful of the fact that Jesus was not a law-giver, and that the gospel is not a law-book,

undisturbed by a confusion of times and circumstances,—he may really come to this discovery and enjoy this relief. And I cherish this hope especially for the sake of those with whom his words carry weight and who are ready to be convinced by him. For I will not conceal my impression that this essay of his and the book that preceded it are calculated to do harm. In our practical and realistic age it is a dangerous phenomenon when revered forms are dragged down from their pedestals, for the small amount of enthusiasm we can still command is thereby made smaller yet. I fear that this want of appreciation of Jesus may in many cases lead to a declining zeal for the Christian ideal: that is to say, to moral deterioration, to loss of what is noblest in us—self-respect and respect for mankind,—to a decline of true humanity.

It is this, and no dogmatic sympathies or antipathies, it is the defence of the moral ideal that has called me to protest against what I regard as an historically untrue conception. I am aware that I have performed my task in an imperfect and defective manner, and I never proposed anything more to myself than to introduce the discussion. Nevertheless, I cannot but cherish a quiet hope that I may not have written altogether in vain. Still less can I refrain from expressing my fervent desire that others may bring out far more powerfully than I have done the glory, the exaltation, the over-mastering beauty of the Christian ideal, so that Professor Newman's attack may ultimately contribute not only to securing for *Jesus* all that belongs to him by right, but still more to giving to *Christianity* its uncontrolled dominion over the heart of man.

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## THE ENGLISH OF THE REVISED VERSION.

THE Editor of the *Modern Review* being of opinion that Mr. Geldart's valuable Notes on the Revised Version \* need not stand in the way of some further remarks on a subject of such wide interest, by another writer, and from a different point of view, I propose, in the following pages, to offer a few criticisms on the new translation, especially with regard to its English and such minor deviations from the authorised text as involve no important difference of meaning; and if, in so doing, I shall fall under the censure of my predecessor as a microscopical critic, may I not plead that in such a matter no point is of small importance, and least of all those which concern the honour of our English tongue? Let me begin, however, by saying how cordially I join with Mr. Geldart in his thankfulness "that we have got a New Version at all." I think I must even go beyond him and say that I consider the revised text a thing to be especially grateful for. For it is surely a matter of no small consequence that we have got the right New Testament at last; and therewith, moreover, an implied admission that until now we have had the wrong one. Those who have hitherto fondly believed that the Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants, will at least have their eyes opened to the fact that something more than the Bible has been placed before them as the pure Word of God—and from this point it will be strange if they do not draw inferences; while those whose interest in the Bible is literary and historical rather than

\* *Modern Review*. July, 1881.

dogmatic, will be able to congratulate themselves on now having the true text of the New Testament, so far as it has been yet ascertained, faithfully represented in English. This, indeed, is a feature of the New Version which has hardly been sufficiently emphasised. It is true, the Revised Version has at present only a *quasi* authority; if, indeed, it has even that. Still, looking at it as the probable or possible successor of King James's Bible, England may claim to be the first Protestant country to have given her people the New Testament in its unadulterated form.

But in saying this I would not be understood as implying that I accept in every case the revised readings as final. For some reasons, indeed, it may be regretted that the Revisers took upon themselves the labour and responsibility of correcting the text, instead of simply following some one or other of the great critical authorities. Had they, for example, adopted Tischendorf's text, they must have placed a full stop at "concerning the flesh," in Rom. ix. 5, and read, "God, who is over all, be blessed for ever," as a doxology, and in so doing I have no doubt they would have done right. They would have read "Church of the Lord" instead of "Church of God," "which He hath purchased with His own blood," in Acts xx. 28. But then, on the other hand, if they had followed the readings of Drs. Westcott and Hort, which, it is understood, were before them, and which, as the fruits of the most searching investigations of English scholarship, it would have been natural for them to follow, not only would the results in these two cases have been as they are, but in John i. 18, we should have had in the text the reading, "God only begotten," which is now found in the margin as the reading of "many very ancient authorities." On the whole, perhaps, it is well that the Revisers preferred in all cases to exercise their own independent judgment. Nor can the value of their labours on the text be truly appreciated until we take into consideration the



marginal notes. In these the Revisers have given us, in the great majority of instances in which the variations are of any importance (I believe I should have said all, had not Mr. Geldart pointed out one important exception), the means of correcting or questioning their text. In fact, in text and margin they give us alternate readings, one or other of which must be the true one, and if we are inclined to think that sometimes they have chosen wrong, they have certainly given us no grounds for suspecting that they made their choice on any but what seemed to themselves the most sufficient evidence. The longest passage affected by textual criticism is that which contains the touching story of the woman taken in adultery (John vii. 53—viii. 11); and though the editors have relegated this to the margin, I must think that the Revisers have done well to give it—of course, properly bracketed and guarded by a marginal note—the place to which it is entitled at least by prescriptive, if by no other, right. The most important passages doctrinally are certainly 1 John v. 7, and 1 Timothy iii. 16, and it is satisfactory to note that, while the notorious Trinitarian interpolation in the former passage is silently dropped from the New Version, in the latter the reading, “He who” is adopted in the text, the margin informing us that “The word *God* in place of *He who* rests on no sufficient ancient evidence.” Besides these and a large number of other really important alterations, which are all carefully noted, the margin supplying the alternate reading, as that of “some” or of “many,” “ancient” or “very ancient” authorities, there are doubtless almost innumerable lesser changes which it has not been found possible to note; but about these no question is likely to be raised, and for my own part, as regards the new text, I am only inclined to say, *O si sic omnia!*

In short, the impression made on the careful student of the Revised Version—I am speaking now of the thoughtful

reader who, with only the smallest smattering of Greek, or even without it, makes a study of his English Testament—will be the undoubtedly true one, that the original text is somewhat uncertain, but that, so far as it can be ascertained, it is here correctly placed before him.

And now, as regards the translation. Here, too, the Revisers are assuredly deserving of our gratitude for the great care and pains which they have evidently taken to give us in English, with the utmost possible accuracy, just what they had before them in the Greek. Here, however, the question arises whether they have done all that was necessary to bring the Revised Version into conformity with the original, and whether *they have done no more than was necessary*. For the duty of the Revisers, be it remembered, was simply to revise. They were to do nothing, and they have done nothing, without constant reference to the Authorised Version no less than to the original Greek. The two rules laid down for their guidance on this point were these:—"1. To introduce as few alterations as possible into the text of the Authorised Version consistently with faithfulness;" and "2. To limit, as far as possible, the expression of such alterations to the language of the Authorised and earlier English Versions." Thus, the Authorised Version was to be the standard. Faithfulness to the original was to be the rule. Except in the case of obsolete expressions, in which, perhaps, it has been only too closely adhered to, it is not probable that any one will quarrel with the standard. It is for criticism to determine how far the rule has been properly applied.

But all intelligent criticism must, of course, keep the Greek text constantly in view. There may be many changes which will at first offend the ear, but which a simple reference to the Greek will show were absolutely unavoidable. We all know how irritating it is to hear a favourite line of poetry misquoted, and every reader of the

Revised Version has doubtless experienced quite a series of similar shocks. The difference, however, is that in the one case the irritation is reasonable, in the other it is not necessarily so. An example may be found in 1 Cor. xi. 26, where we now read, "For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come," instead of "ye do show." However much we may resent this change at first, no sooner do we turn to the Greek and find that the original word is *καταγγέλλετε*, than we are ready to confess that the Revisers could not have done otherwise than make the alteration. And yet, again, when I find that this same word is translated "I set forth" in Acts xvii. 23—evidently what the Preface to the Revised Version calls an alteration rendered necessary *by consequence*, to answer to "a setter forth" in verse 18—I am half inclined to take back what I have just said, and to call this a needless change. But granting, as it may well be granted, that many, or even most, of the Revisers' alterations are required by accuracy, there still remains an ample margin for criticism. The New Testament is a volume of considerable extent, and the work of revision seems to have been carried out with a degree of minuteness which almost assured unnecessary changes. That such changes there are, I have no doubt at all. Indeed, I must go further. I venture to say that there are changes which, serving no useful purpose, can be regarded only as marring the beauty of the authorised text—nay, that there are some which absolutely amount to violations of English idiom.

I certainly think that the Revisers have also committed some sins of omission, and have left things standing which they ought to have altered. And I will now proceed to give examples of both kinds of fault.

It is well known that the old translators made no conscience of always rendering the same Greek by the same English word—did not tie themselves down, as they

quaintly expressed it, "to an uniformity of phrasing, or to an identity of words," thinking that "thus to mince the matter" "savoured more of curiosity than wisdom;" but rather prided themselves on their variety of expression. That they went to an extreme in this direction cannot be denied; and in nothing is the new version more to be commended than in the care it takes to let the reader see where the same word recurs. There are innumerable cases in which this knowledge is important. But there are others in which it is of little or no consequence, and it may at least be a question whether the Revisers have not just gone into the opposite extreme. In his noble panegyric on charity, for example, if Paul repeats the same word three times, it does not seem an unwarrantable liberty to represent it by three nearly synonymous terms—especially in the case of a word so difficult to reproduce exactly as *καταργηθήσεται* (shall be done away). Perhaps a translator in the present day would hesitate to do so; but for a Reviser it would at least have been pardonable to leave the passage as it stood, and it cannot be denied that the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians loses something of its charm in the more strictly accurate version. Nor can I see that it was at all necessary to alter the word "immortality" to "incorruption" in 2 Tim. i. 10,—to the great injury, it will be allowed, of the euphony of the sentence—or "immortal" to "incorruptible" in 1 Tim. i. 17. Some, indeed, will think it enough to answer to such strictures: "But *αφθαρσία* means incorruption." Quite true, and it is rightly so translated in 1 Cor. xv. 53; but no word carries with it its primary signification through all its varieties of use, and it is easy to suppose that *αφθαρσία* (incorruption) would often pass on the lips of the early believers into the higher meaning of *αθανασία* (immortality). It is the same word which the Authorised Version happily renders "sincerity" in Eph. vi. 24; where the Revisers give us the singularly

harsh expression "them that love our Lord Jesus Christ in uncorruptness." Absolute uniformity, it need scarcely be said, is out of the question, as nothing could prove more effectually than the very verb *καταργέω*, which in the Authorised Version is rendered "cumber" (Luke xiii. 7), "make without effect" (Rom. iii. 3), "make void" (Rom. iii. 31), "destroy" (Rom. vi. 6; 1 Cor. vi. 13, and xv. 26; 2 Thess. ii. 8; and Heb. ii. 14), "loose" (Rom. vii. 2), "deliver" (Rom. vii. 6), "bring to nought" (1 Cor. i. 28), and in the passive "come to nought" (1 Cor. ii. 6), "fail" (1 Cor. xiii. 8), "vanish away" (*ib.*), "be done away" (*ib.* 10; 2 Cor. iii. 7, 11, 14), "put away" (1 Cor. xiii. 11), "put down" (1 Cor. xv. 24), "make of none effect" (Gal. iii. 17), and in the passive "become of no effect" (Gal. v. 4), "cease" (Gal. v. 11), and "abolish" (2 Cor. iii. 13; Eph. ii. 15; 2 Tim. i. 10), and for which the Revisers, while reducing considerably the total number (they retain "cumber," "make of none effect," "be done away," "bring to nought," and "abolish"), have been obliged to find three new substitutes in "discharge," "sever," and "pass away." But there is at least one important case in which the rule of uniformity might have been advantageously applied, but where there can be no doubt it has been purposely neglected. How is it that the Revisers, while sometimes correcting "Holy Ghost" to "Holy Spirit," have, in the majority of instances, left the old reading unchanged? The answer to this question is not, perhaps, very far to seek. It has been surmised, indeed, that they set out with the valiant intention of making the required alteration throughout; but eventually, becoming alarmed at their own boldness, gave up the idea. But this does not seem to be the true account of the matter. The fact is that wherever the word "spirit" occurs in the near context, whether it be the Spirit of God, or, as in Mark iii. 29, an evil spirit, they have changed "Holy Ghost" to "Holy

Spirit," and that these instances all occur in the earlier books of the New Testament, but elsewhere they have left the authorised text as it stood. Nor, indeed, could it be expected that the Revisers would give up "Holy Ghost" in the Testament as long as the Prayer Book is unreformed; for the anomaly would surely be altogether too great if the Christian people were taught to pray every Sunday to "God, the Holy Ghost," and yet found no mention of any such being in their Bibles. It is less easy to say why they did not adopt "demon" instead of "devil," as the translation of *δαιμόνιον*, here committing the opposite fault of refusing to distinguish things that differ. It is true, the word "devil" is popularly used in a secondary sense in English, and where it occurs in the plural there is no risk of confusion. Still this is a case in which a clear gain in point of accuracy might have been secured. It is right to remember, however, that both these corrections are made in the margin.

The uniformity which the Revisers refuse to the important word *πνεῦμα* they have insisted on applying, and very improperly applying, to the word *οὐρανός*. *Οὐρανός* means "heaven" and "sky," and is rendered in the Authorised Version by both these terms. But since it is generally "heaven," our Revisers will have it so always, and accordingly, for the familiar and natural phrase, "It will be fair weather, for the sky is red" (Matt. xvi. 2), we are henceforth to read, "the heaven is red." And in the same way Jesus must no longer discourse to us about the "birds of the air" (Matt. vi. 26), which is surely the most appropriate way of translating *τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*, but about "the birds of the heaven." At any rate, the Revisers gained the applause of the *Saturday Review* by refusing to substitute Teacher for Master, as the translation of *διδάσκαλος*. Probably it was thought that there was something undignified about the former title, but for all

that there can be no doubt that Teacher is right, and Master wrong. I shall not find fault with the Revisers for rendering Δεσπότης, which is the proper word for Master, "Lord," in Luke ii. 29; but, seeing that they did so, it would have been only consistent to preserve the same rendering in Rev. vi. 10, where, however, we now read, "How long, O Master, the holy and the true," &c. A link which does not really exist is thus established between the gentle *Teacher* of Nazareth and the avenging Judge of the Apocalypse.

The Revisers may justly claim to have made many important corrections by attention to the presence or absence of the definite article, a point on which the Authorised Version often blunders. It would be easy to give examples of this, but it is more to my purpose to remark that in this respect they are sometimes too minute, and that they are by no means entirely consistent. A curious instance of the former error occurs in Matthew v. 22, where for the old-fashioned "hell fire" we have now the altogether novel rendering "the hell of fire." My objection to this phrase is simply that it is not English, or, if it be, it implies, as Dr. Vance Smith pointed out in his *Nineteenth Century* article, that there are other hells which are not of fire. This is certainly an inference which the Revisers did not contemplate; but I cannot agree with my learned predecessor in these pages in thinking that "Gehenna" would be much better than "hell." At least, if Gehenna in the first century was the popular name for the place of future punishment, I should say that the more intelligible expression is properly placed in the text, the explanation being reserved for the margin. Other examples are "Is not the life more than *the* food?" (Matt. vi. 25); "the birds of *the* heaven" (*ib.* 26, &c.); "*the* publicans and sinners" (*ib.* ix. 11); "*the* weeping and gnashing of teeth" (*ib.* xiii. 42, &c.); "they continued in . . . the breaking of bread and

*the prayers* " (Acts ii. 42); "Can any man forbid *the* water" (*ib.* x. 47)? "the foolishness of *the* preaching" (1 Cor. i. 21); "the spirit of *the* man" (*ib.* ii. 11); "the city which hath *the* foundations" (Heb. xi. 10), &c. In the last passage the substitution of the definite for the indefinite article before "city" is, of course, a valuable correction. Neither can I agree with the Revisers that *ἡ ἐπιθυμία* means "*the* lust," in James i. 15, or *ἡ ἀμαρτία* "*the* sin," though this, no doubt, is a question of interpretation rather than of grammar; but if this was their opinion, they ought certainly to have rendered the preceding *ἀμαρτίαν* "*a* sin," in order to bring out a perfectly consistent sense. Seeing that Paul (Rom. vii. 8) makes lust the work of sin, while James, if the Authorised Rendering be correct, makes sin the offspring of lust, one cannot help suspecting here an ingenious attempt to reconcile James with Paul; and this suspicion is not weakened when we find James asking, in regard to the man who says he has faith, but has not works, whether *that* faith can save him (James ii. 14). The margin does not inform us that here the demonstrative pronoun stands for the definite article, nor is there anything to show that "faith" in verse 17 represents the same Greek as "that faith" in verse 14. It is unnecessary to say that there are innumerable cases in which the Revisers have not insisted on the insertion of the article, because to have done so would be altogether too great a violation of English idiom; but 2 Thess. ii. 11 is not one of them; and here the reading of the Authorised Version, "*a* lie," as the translation of *τῷ ψεύδει* might advantageously have been corrected. Sometimes, again, the article is required in English, where it is not expressed, but still seems to be implied, in the Greek; and in these cases the Revisers have, of course, made no change. Thus they have done well in leaving "*the* Son of God" as the translation *υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* in Matt. iv. 3, and Luke iv. 3; but they have done equally



well in correcting "the Son of man" into "a son of man" in Rev. i. 13. One other remark under this head. I find it very difficult to believe that any one telling a story in English would begin, "Once the sower went forth to sow;" and I must therefore venture to think that *ὁ σαρπων*, equivalent to "one sowing," is rightly rendered in the Authorised Version "a sower." The generic use of the article seems to be possible only with the present or the future tense. Thus, if we say, "the good shepherd layeth down his life for his sheep," it is at once understood that the statement is made of every shepherd who deserves to be called good; but as soon as you put this into past time, you at once suggest some particular shepherd. In another instance, the Revisers have been more observant of English idiom. In 2 Cor. xii. 12 they still read, as in the Authorised Version, "the signs of *an* apostle," though the Greek has the definite article. Yet "*the* apostle" would not here be altogether intolerable.

The old translators (for it is not necessary that I should here distinguish between successive labourers) would seem to have been endowed with an exquisite taste in the choice and collocation of words, as well as in the invention of happy phrases; and they have accordingly produced a composition which, in virtue of these qualities, no less than for the sacred character it derives from its original, has endeared itself to the heart of the English-speaking race. It was right that it should be touched with a sparing and careful hand, and yet right also that wherever it was really in need of correction every other consideration should yield to the rule of faithfulness. It may well be believed that the Revisers had every wish to adhere to their own rule of making no alterations that were not required by fidelity to the original; and yet there are certainly instances in which, by their deviations from the old text, they have only succeeded in marring its beauties, either with no gain to

accuracy, or so small a gain as not to be worth the sacrifice. As an example in which the change is limited to the mere arrangement of the words, take Luke ii. 8. I will put down the two readings, in parallel columns, and I am much mistaken if the reader of taste will have any difficulty in determining at once which side of the page belongs to the Revisers.—

And there were shepherds in  
the same country abiding in  
the field, and keeping watch by  
night over their flock.

And there were in the same  
country shepherds abiding in  
the field, keeping watch over  
their flock by night.

Again, in Luke ii. 29, the Revisers have thought fit to follow the order of the Greek words, reading

“ Now, lettest thou thy servant depart, O Lord,  
According to thy word, in peace,”

for, “ Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, according to thy word,” where the attempt to preserve, by the addition of a syllable, the exquisite cadence of the Authorised Rendering, is, to my ear, only partially successful.

But, not to be too hard on the Revisers in this matter, let it be owned that sometimes they even surpass their predecessors in that in which the latter most excelled—the harmony of words and sentences—as in this same Gospel, xiv. 28, where now we are told to read, “ For which of you, desiring to build a tower, doth not first sit down and count the cost, whether he hath wherewith to complete it ? ” where also in another respect (verses 28—30) the case is reversed as between the translators and the revisers, the former having thrice repeated the word “ finish,” to represent two different words in the Greek. Nor should I have any objection to the reading, “ Is it I, Lord ? ” in Matt. xxvi. 22, except that it is a change which the rule of faithfulness did not demand, the order of the Greek words being no rule for our tongue. But to give a few more examples of changes which are either gratuitous or

positively injurious, in John i. 15 and 30, we have the very harsh and scarcely grammatical expression, "After me cometh a man which is become before me" as the translation of Ὁπίσω μου ἔρχεται ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἔμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν. Is there any solid objection to the Authorised Rendering, "After me cometh a man which is preferred before me"? The objection, I suppose, is the passive meaning given to the word γέγονεν. But in Luke xiv. 22, γέγονεν is translated "is done," and the Revisers have not changed it. In Gal. ii. 20, where the old translators seem to have caught exactly the rhythm of the apostle's words, reading "who loved me and gave himself for me," the Revisers have spoiled all by the introduction of the single syllable "up." No doubt the dictionary meaning of παραδίδομι is "I give up;" but is there really any appreciable difference between *giving* oneself and *giving* oneself *up* for another? In this case, certainly, the gain in accuracy is far less likely to be esteemed than the interruption to the flow and harmony of the sentence to be resented. In 2 Thess. ii. 11, we have the very feeble expression "a working of error" substituted for "a strong delusion" as the translation of ἐνέργειαν πλάνης. Considering, however, that the word rendered "working" is a repetition of the same word in verse 9, this is perhaps an unavoidable change. "Strong delusion" was clearly a stroke of genius, the responsibility of which could not easily be divided, and unless it be thought that accuracy might have been secured at some smaller cost, this is not to be put down as a fault. It is not, however, easy to see what quarrel the Revisers could have had with "before the world began," as the translation of πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων in 2 Tim. i. 9 and Tit. i. 2. If it was that they have generally used the word "world" to represent the Greek noun αἰών, they might have said, "Before time began," which would have answered equally well. But it really

seems hardly credible that so many learned men should have conspired together to give us, as the result of their united wisdom, such a wholly unmeaning phrase as "Before times eternal."

I will notice only one other example of such injurious alterations. The English language does not often rise to a greater height of dignity and impressiveness than it has done in the opening verses of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." Now the Greek here runs—Πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως πάλαι ὁ Θεὸς λαλήσας κ.τ.λ., and it might have been supposed that the Revisers would have said to themselves, "Here is a unique and emphatic expression for which an equally unique and emphatic equivalent has been found, and one which, without being pedantically exact, conveys the meaning of the original with remarkable accuracy; by all means let this expression be retained." But unfortunately they did not say this. They seem rather to have argued that as the adverb *πολύ* occurs twice over in the original, whatever syllables be chosen to represent it in English must also be twice repeated, and that, inasmuch as *μέρος* not *χρόνος* is the noun compounded with *πολύ* to make the adverb *πολυμερῶς*, the reference to diversity of times is inadmissible. And so they give us for the grave and elevated language of the Authorised Version this extremely prosaic and badly expressed sentence, "God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in *his* Son," &c.

But enough of fault-finding. After all, and taking it all in all, notwithstanding the numerous "blemishes and imperfections"—the phrase is that of the Revisers themselves in their Preface—that may be found or imagined in it, the

Revised Version must be allowed to be a great work, greatly and worthily accomplished. Indeed, it may be said of it, in many cases at least, that "even its failings lean to virtue's side," for they are frequently the result simply of an over-minute attention to small points of grammar and the exact meaning of words; and it would be unfortunate if those failings were to have the effect of obscuring its great merits, or preventing its general reception. For, after all, we have in it a marvellously exact transcript of the Greek Testament, while by no means all the charms of the old version have been lost in the revision. Nor can it be denied that sometimes, when it has been necessary to invent an entirely new phrase, the Revisers have been tolerably happy in their corrections. A good example of this will be found at Gal. ii. 11, where we now read, "because he stood condemned," instead of "because he was to be blamed." Some change was absolutely required here, and though that actually adopted involves the substitution of "resisted" for "withstood" in the preceding clause, it would not perhaps be easy to suggest a better. So, in Matthew xxi. 44, the new translation of *λικμήσει* "it will scatter him as dust," is a very good exchange for the old "will grind him to powder." Nor would it be possible to find a happier amendment of the incorrect "shadow of turning" in James i. 17 than this, "with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning." In retaining the archaisms of the old version where they are not likely to mislead, the Revisers have only been faithful to their own rule; but they might at least have corrected the now ungrammatical phrase, "for to see," in Matthew xi. 8, as, indeed, they have in Luke vii. 24, 25, and 26. It is satisfactory to observe that they have avoided the pedantry of introducing Greek or Latin words into the text, and that the names of coins, offices, &c., continue to be replaced by what, to the old translators, seemed the

nearest English equivalents, Only in Acts xix. 38, they have changed "deputies" to "proconsuls"; and there is, no doubt, the objection to "penny," as a translation of *δηνάριον*, that it suggests a coin of much smaller value. Probably "shilling," which was the proposal of the American Committee, was thought to be too violent an innovation. One other exception to this rule there is in the case of Hades, which now replaces "hell" wherever *αἵδης* stands in the original. Here the Revisers had a real difficulty to overcome, and it is just a question whether they have met it in the best way. If "hell" means properly "the hollow place"—the vast cavity underneath the earth which the Hebrews called *Sheól*, and which was often represented as including the abodes of the pious no less than the place of torment—much might be said for the retention of the word, and in such a passage as Matthew xi. 23, where the new reading loses the natural antithesis of heaven and hell, it seems to be almost required. But then, of course, another word must have been found for *γέεννα*, and we must either have fallen back on the proper name, or adopted Mr. M'Clellan's proposal of "The Burning Valley," which, however, would not answer for those passages in which *γέεννα* occurs without the addition of *τοῦ πυρός*. On the other hand, it is not easy to suggest a substitute for Hades which would answer equally well in all cases. "The unseen world," or "the world below," would serve admirably in Luke xvi. 23, but not so well, or not at all, in Rev. vi. 8. On the whole, this is a case in which one would be inclined to advocate a little licence, and, at any rate, the Revisers should hardly have given us Hades without some marginal explanation. In regard to their vocabulary generally, they deserve great credit for the pains they have taken to preserve the colour and flavour of the old translation by using only such words and phrases as could be found, if not in the Authorised

Version, in the earlier Versions, or in standard writers of the same date. In a few cases, they say, they have found themselves obliged to use words of later date, but they have not done so without being satisfied that "they are to be found in the writings of the best authors of the period to which they belong." Nevertheless, some considerable additions will have to be made to the Concordance, and the Revisers, comparing their work with the Authorised Version alone, can claim, with the old translators, to have "promoted" to a place in the Bible a "number of good English words," while they have "banished for ever" at least three—viz., "damned," "damnation," and "atonement."

And now the question comes—it is a question, however, which no one can answer—how long it will be before the Revised Version comes into general use as the standard English Testament, superseding that which has filled this place during two hundred and seventy years, or whether it will ever do so? It is, indeed, impossible that the Authorised Version, now that its imperfections have been so amply acknowledged and made so widely known, should continue to be the only one appointed, or permitted, to be publicly used; but it does not follow that the present Revised Version is the one that shall succeed to its honours. The Version of 1611, partly on account of its extraordinary merits and partly from the natural objections to change in a matter of such universal importance, has kept its place for a very long period; but during the half century preceding that epoch there were many revisions. Is it not possible that we have now once more entered on an age of revision, and that we may not have to wait very long before we shall obtain a translation which, while correcting all the errors of the Authorised Version, shall retain all its perfections?

ROBERT B. DRUMMOND.

## MEDICINE AND MORALITY.

A SENSE of injustice will always be aroused by an indiscriminate attack upon any necessary portion of society. The Medical Profession is an essential part of the social state. Birth, sickness, and death are serious epochs of human life, when weakness and sorrow imperatively demand experienced care. If those who meet this essential want of human nature—Englishmen sharing the influences of English civilisation—could be justly accused as a class of corruption, treachery, or cruelty, it would, indeed, be a fact of direful import to our country. Having had the honour of belonging for thirty years to the Profession, I must protest against any wholesale denunciation of that Profession.

Its defence, however, has been undertaken on the various counts of the indictment by able physicians, and no words of mine are needed for the purpose. It is a principle, however, which should always be adopted in seeking truth—to consider carefully and dispassionately the arguments and views of opponents. It is not only wise, but necessary, to inquire into the grounds of that charge of “dangerous tendencies” in the Profession, not only made in the attack of a contributor to the April number of this *Review*, but held, to some extent, by a very large body of the general public.

Such an inquiry is not in any way derogatory to the dignity of the Profession, or likely to lessen the confidence of the community. Quite the contrary effect would be produced by impartial discussion. Every profession has certain



tendencies which it is well to guard against. Is there no truth in the charge made against the Legal Profession of a dangerous tendency "to make the worse appear the better cause"? Is there no danger in the Clerical Profession of an undue assumption of authority, or of making church-going the test of Christianity? It is not by placing the Medical Profession apart from all other occupations, and claiming an unnatural and impossible exemption from injurious tendencies that the true interests of the Profession will be served. It is by bravely considering the difficulties which the Profession has to contend with, and earnestly endeavouring to meet them, that public confidence will be fortified, and the Profession will rise into increasingly honourable position.

The great importance to the nation of the prevalence of a high standard of morality in the body of the Medical Profession is evident from the confidential character of the services they are everywhere called on to perform. Very few are investigators or experimenters. The great majority become the trusted friends of the family in its time of greatest weakness and need. They are brought intimately into the innermost recesses of the home, trusted unreservedly by the father to guard wife and children, trusted by the mother to give care and counsel to her boys and girls which may influence their whole future lives, trusted by the whole family with a degree of reliance given to no other person outside the home circle. This exceptional position occupied by the great body of the Profession in relation to every family in the kingdom, high and low, is an immense responsibility of which the importance cannot be exaggerated. It makes of the Medical Profession not only the care-takers, but educators of a nation. It is therefore in the largest interests of the Profession itself, in relation to the fulfilment of this great trust laid upon them in the family and in the community, that some of the

special difficulties which stand in the way of its fulfilment are now noted.

The first danger to be noticed is the character of medical study itself in relation to those who are called on to undertake it. Medical study deals chiefly with certain classes of physical facts, and with every variety of diseased humanity. At the early age (19) when it is most desirable that a youth should enter upon these studies, the passions are strong, the judgment is unformed, and the discipline of self-control, gained through the later experiences of life, is unattained. This eager, unbalanced life, removed generally from the special influences of home, is set down in the midst of the temptations of a large city, to occupy itself exclusively with the study of one class of facts—material facts—and with the constant observation of all kinds of disease. The indispensable foundation of all medical study—*anatomy*—when it fails to create reverence for the instrument of life, tends to destroy reverence. The pitiful weaknesses and diseases of human nature are brought to the student's notice through the coarse, degraded, and unromantic sufferings of the poor. These are the people with whom he has to deal—broken-down sufferers, oppressed by the unavoidable evils of their state, irritable, often unreasonable, or brutal, vicious, and reckless.

These two unavoidable conditions of the medical student's career—viz., the exclusive attention given to certain classes of physical fact, and the constant observation of diseased human beings under the most degraded and repellent forms, inevitably tend to give disproportionate importance to physical facts, and to convert the sick poor into mere subjects for medical study. No one who has gone through the drill of college and hospital can fail to recognise the danger which exists in these two directions. As the character is largely formed during the period of college life, and as these youths are being prepared for the respon-

sible position of intimate family advisers, it is especially necessary that elevating influences be brought to bear upon the period of medical study. The medical student, above all others, should be guarded against a narrow materialism, and against the feeling of impatience or contempt for the sufferings of the poor, and he should be imperatively required to bring the self-control and pure associations of true manhood into his confidential post of adviser of women and of youth.

To recognise a danger is the first step towards overcoming it. All that is here noted is the danger that may attend medical study itself, making the necessity therefore imperative that any injurious tendency in studies, or in the conditions under which they are pursued, be guarded against by the inculcation of a high morality in medical education. Some of the principles of this morality will be referred to below.

Another feature of professional life that must be noted concerns the later portion of the medical career when the engrossing cares of practical life have begun. This feature is the tendency which must always exist amongst the hard-working members of a very arduous profession, to accept without due examination the opinions of some distinguished authority on all matters which have not come under their own immediate notice. This is a very natural course arising from inability to give the time, thought, and observation necessary to the formation of independent opinion. Where any individual has proved his ability in one direction, and come to be regarded as an authority, there is an inevitable disposition to trust him in other directions. This disposition is strengthened by the influence which the Press exerts in our day. Every one is inclined to believe the statements of his newspaper; and any clever writer enthusiastically interested in upholding some particular doctrine or practice, and setting himself resolutely to "write it up"

in a number of journals, may be very sure of exercising wide influence, even if his views will not bear the scrutiny of wide and impartial investigation. Now, the great body of the Profession, often overburdened with the engrossing responsibilities of their daily occupation, although they may have little time to glance at a daily paper, necessarily make time to go through their medical journal, which is conveniently at hand in a corner of the carriage or in a coat-pocket. It is true that, in all questions which involve no moral issues—questions such as the qualities of a drug, or the symptoms of a disease, our proper course is to accept the testimony of competent observers. But whenever a question has a distinctly moral as well as material aspect, and when this distinction, clearly marked, has caused division of opinion, the case is altogether changed. There is then great danger in being guided by any advocate, however distinguished. The careful and impartial examination of all sides of a question, each one for himself is then absolutely necessary. Every physician knows the numerous sources of error which may lead an able advocate to wrong conclusions. The difficult art of statistics, which is no simple arrangement of numbers, but often requires very elaborate calculations, may lend itself to error; the neglect of some facts, or the undue prominence of others, the comparison of dissimilar conditions, or observations made on too small a scale or for too short a period—all these various conditions must be considered as sources of possible error. In every question which involves a moral problem, no man who is Christian as well as physician dare accept the conclusion of another mind. No matter how distinguished the position of individuals may be who advocate measures of disputable morality, the responsible, trusted family physician is bound to make an entirely impartial and independent investigation before sanctioning the disputed theory or the practical measure.

In forming this necessary independent judgment, the guidance of fixed moral principles is of the utmost moment. Facts may be collected to support any theory, however absurd, or forced into the service of unwise practical measures. A war of details is interminable, for each side can draw upon endless sources of contrary facts to support the warfare. But a sound principle at once reduces confusion to order and leads to the victory of truth. The ethical principles, for example, Do to others as you would have others do to you ; or, Never do a conscious wrong to attain a desirable end, are guiding principles of practical action, which will reduce innumerable perplexing facts to order.

There are certain guiding principles which it especially concerns the Medical Profession to recognise clearly. The first principle is this, that "there are just limits to scientific investigation." The assertion that knowledge is its own independent justification, regardless of its uses or influence, and that consequently there are no limitations to the means that may be employed in acquiring it, cannot be accepted by the moral physician. Conscience, the recognition of the duties as well as rights of superior intelligence—in short, the broadest principles which our present civilisation has reached, pronounce a clear and positive judgment on this point. The religious investigator necessarily places limits on the justifiable methods of scientific investigation ; the materialist investigator need place none.

The second principle, which it is essential for our Profession to recognise, is the distinction which must always exist between individual and social rights. In the necessary compact which individuals make with each other when they consent to avail themselves of the advantages of society, certain restraints are willingly accepted as essential to the structure of society itself, restraints without which it could not exist. In this compact, however, individual rights are also guarded with justifiable care, the growth of

society equally demanding the free development of the individual. One fundamental right never yielded by the individual is the possession and use of his own personal faculties. This self-possession is so clearly seen to be essential to human growth, that every species of personal slavery is inevitably abolished with the advance of truth. The line is clearly marked between the preservation of society and respect for the individual. If a man injures his neighbour, he may be restrained from committing injury ; but the necessary restraint exercised by society must be limited to the restraint necessary to secure his neighbour's safety. Society has no right to take away the independent possession of the man's own personal faculties.

Again, the recognition of equal justice—that grand triumph of the Common Law, that indispensable foundation of every high and progressive society—is the most precious sanctuary of English liberty. The dispensation of even-handed justice, without regard to riches or poverty, to station, sex, or colour, is our most sacred inheritance, appealing to all that is noble in the English heart. Of this triumph of law over ignorance, passion, and brute force, our advisers in sickness and suffering, our family counsellors—the Medical Profession—should be the powerful and faithful guardians. It is the crowning glory of law, that it especially defends the poor, lowly, and helpless. It recognises the divine element in the most obscure phase of humanity. It is the privilege of the possessors of the healing art, whose especial business calls them to sustain humanity in its most helpless condition, to be the chosen knights of equal justice to those who most need such championship.

The three principles now referred to are of especial value as guiding the morality of the Medical Profession, and ensuring its highest influence in the lecture-room, the hospital, and the community generally. Their authoritative character will at once be seen by applying them to various

important questions of the present day—problems which can only be solved by the guidance of true principles.

The great object proposed by the Medical Profession is a most noble one, viz., to raise the standard of national health. No praise is too high to give to this great and beneficent work, which is the especial medical glory of our day, and in which the Profession in Great Britain have proved themselves leaders. This work, so well begun by the pioneers of preventive medicine—Southwood Smith, Sutherland, Nightingale, and many others whose names stand high in the list of human benefactors—is carried on with increasing zeal by a younger generation. It is essential that the light of sound principle guide this zeal. In carrying on the grand work of improving national health, extirpating loathsome disease, discovering and removing the causes of disease, the distinction must be carefully drawn between the object to be accomplished and the means by which it shall be attained. The object is a grand one; the method of accomplishing it must be equally so, *i.e.*, it must be guided by moral principle. It is impossible to dodge physical or moral law. A great end cannot be gained by ignoble or immoral means. Unforeseen obstacles arise in such an attempt, and the object is perverted by the vicious methods employed to gain it.

Thus, observation and experiment on the lower animals entrusted to our care, by those who are thoroughly qualified to conduct experiments, constitute, within certain limits, a justifiable method of gaining truth. Observation and experiment on human beings are equally justifiable, within certain limits. In the former case the limit is torture. In the latter it is the welfare of the individual observed. The power of life and death over the lower animals is entrusted to our higher intelligence—intelligence which is human, because guided by conscience. But the conscience of human beings will always lead them

to inflict the most painless possible death. Torture under no circumstances, for no purpose whatsoever, should be voluntarily inflicted on the animals made subject to our higher responsibility. This ethical limitation of scientific investigation in regard to experiments on animals has been emphatically recognised by your able writer, who indignantly condemns the unjustifiable practices resorted to at Alfort—practices resulting from the false doctrine that there are no limits to be placed on scientific investigation.

Again, the present system of vaccination can only be regarded as a temporary method of meeting grave evils. That it is a preservative from the most fearful ravages of small-pox is well proved. But it is also an undoubted fact that other forms of disease have sometimes been communicated by vaccination. The conscientious physician who has to look at both sides of the question decides unhesitatingly in favour of the practice, and recommends it to his patients. But preventive medicine always seeks to remove the causes of disease. It can never rest satisfied with the universal diffusion of a mild form of disease as its final method of preventing a severe disease. Investigation must proceed until the causes of disease can be eradicated. This true aim of investigation has been reached with brilliant results in the case of typhoid fever. The most careful, persistent, and intelligent research has furnished us with the causes of typhoid; the causes can be removed with certainty; and we may confidently look forward to the disappearance of typhoid fever in all districts governed in accordance with known sanitary laws. But the method adopted in vaccination or inoculation is of a very different character. It does not teach how to remove the causes of particular diseases, but only how to mitigate their effects; and, for this reason, no experiments or practices of such a nature can be final. To inoculate and re-inoculate sheep for rot or other formidable diseases which kill our domestic animals by tens of thousands, should



only be considered as a possibly useful experiment in the present imperfect state of discovery. The effects which might be produced on the quality of thoroughly inoculated mutton as human food are still unknown. The sound instincts of people generally would certainly lead them to prefer the healthy mutton grown upon dry and breezy uplands, to that which has been inoculated with various formidable diseases in view of their prevention.

Vaccination for the prevention of small-pox being then placed in its true position as a useful temporary expedient, the practice may be justly adopted as an ordinary usage. As, however, it cannot be considered as a final preventive agent, since it does not eradicate the causes of disease, and as, moreover, injurious results are known occasionally to ensue to the subject of vaccination, it ought not to be inflicted by force on those who conscientiously object to it. The fundamental principle of natural right, the control of one's own person, sets the limit between wise social precaution and tyranny. A suitable fine to prevent the non-adoption of a useful precautionary measure, through mere carelessness, might be justly inflicted; but society has no right, by repeated fines and imprisonments, to try and crush out conscientious objection and inflict medical treatment on the body of any human being against his will.

Any attempt to eradicate the diseases which afflict men and women alike by treating, in a small number of women only, the effects, not the causes, of the diseases, is a false method of dealing with disease, and must necessarily be futile. It involves a double scientific error. But when the cause of suffering is mutual vice, such an attempt involves something far more serious than a mistaken scientific method—viz., a moral blunder. The insidious and far-reaching effects of moral error are of vital importance to the future of any nation.

Vice and disease are positive evils to be considered and

resolutely checked with a view to their final extirpation. There are right and wise ways of doing this, but such methods cannot be discussed here. It is only necessary now to point out clearly the dangerous departure from accepted principles of right, which must ensure the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts in a free and just nation,—a nation whose practical ability will also ensure the introduction of necessary, but wise and just legislation when those injurious Acts are repealed.

The several references comprised in the foregoing remarks may explain to some extent the painful doubt which certainly exists in many minds in relation to the high morality of the Medical Profession. This doubt is not justified in relation to the great body of the Profession. The dangerous tendencies of various legislative Acts have not been brought home to the careful consideration of the general Profession—the hard-working, fully-occupied practitioners of medicine. They are an honoured and trusted portion of our English nation, sharing the intelligence and the love of justice which distinguish the nation. When the attention of this great body of the Profession is fully aroused to the broad bearing of the questions at issue, then only will they become responsible for the maintenance of any injurious medical legislation. The Profession generally will certainly never allow the fundamental basis of right and wrong to be overturned, but will strongly maintain the principles of our civilisation. From the sound and independent judgment of the Profession when slowly but fully aroused, we may look with confidence to a righteous decision on the vital questions at issue.

I hope it may not appear out of place, in conclusion (as the attitude of the Profession to female students of medicine has been referred to), to offer sincere and grateful testimony to the generous aid which I have always met with in the Profession during a long and arduous pursuit of medical

knowledge. From the year 1845, when a distinguished physician accepted me as his private pupil, and placed his library and best advice freely at my disposal, such generous support has never been wanting. The college class of more than 120 young men who invited my attendance, nobly redeemed the pledge of friendly aid they forwarded to me. The class of 1850-1 at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, with whom I sat in the lecture-room, and whom I joined in the clinical visits of the hospital, displayed the same true manliness. Time would fail me to relate all the acts of generous kindness received by myself, and a few years later by my sister, from the heads of the Profession in Great Britain and in France. Less favourable experience could, of course, be furnished; but the facts I have now stated are facts, generous and encouraging, and only a part of those I would gladly record. Surely it is the truest wisdom, whilst we note errors and warn against dangers, to judge any class of human beings by their noblest actions and their highest tendencies!

ELIZABETH BLACKWELL, M.D.

With the above wise and generous article must close a discussion which, we trust, may not be without useful result. It may, perhaps, not be out of place, however, to append one or two remarks.

The contributor of the original article on the Medical Profession and its Morality (*Modern Review*, April, 1881,) complains, not, we think, altogether unjustly, of some little misrepresentation. That article contains many warnings to the reader not to run away with the idea that an indiscriminate attack is made on the whole of a Profession. Even this ruthless critic declares that we all know from

experience that "there are hundreds of medical men, in the truest sense 'gentlemen,' judged either by the most conventional or the loftiest standard;" that "there are many good men urged by none but the loftiest and purest motives" in the Profession; that "there is much real, most disinterested kindness shown by medical men to their friends and patients;" that the doctors "are industrious when poor, and often liberal when rich;" that "the ordinary English country practitioner, with his small pay, his rough work in all weathers, and his general kindness and honesty, is one of the most respectable and valuable members of the community;" and that "in times of war, or epidemics, their devotion to their chosen tasks rises, not seldom, to true heroism." These and similar saving clauses dispersed throughout what is undoubtedly a trenchant and sometimes vehement criticism, should have spared the writer from the charge of "four distinct crazes" (*Modern Review*, July, 1881, p. 533), and might, we think, have led to a calmer consideration, and, if so be, refutation, of the allegations of faults and untoward tendencies common among medical men. More care should also have been taken in exposing the alleged inaccuracies of the offending critic. For example, it is affirmed by "Two of the Profession" (p. 534) that the original writer is "wholly inaccurate" in stating that "the College of Surgeons was incorporated in the reign of Queen Victoria;" whereas no such statement is to be found (p. 296), but merely a reference to the College as already incorporated in the present reign, and, in a note, an allusion to the battle over incorporation in 1797.

Thus much in fairness to our original contributor. With regard to the larger issues raised, Dr. Blackwell has wisely declined to discuss charges of particular sins against particular individuals, preferring to point out the moral dangers to which she considers the medical student and practitioner

to be, in the nature of things, exposed. It is surely no impertinence to commend these to the grave and calm consideration alike of the thoughtful public and of high-minded and earnest members of the Profession.

Dr. Carpenter does not "claim for medical students that they are *better* than other people in this respect [making 'rows' at public meetings]"; but he challenges our contributor "to prove that they are *worse*" (p. 500). The important question, however, from the social point of view, is whether the medical student is not placed (as Dr. Blackwell maintains) in circumstances which are peculiarly apt to develop a certain class of faults, just as the divinity student's surroundings not seldom engender "priggishness," and, in the worst cases, hypocrisy. There is certainly testimony forthcoming that the constant application of the youthful mind to anatomical and physiological studies, the constant spectacles of the dissecting-room and the wards, unless balanced by parallel culture of the moral and spiritual nature, has tendencies the reverse of refining. The higher natures, indeed, will resist all degrading influences. The minute study of the human organism will elevate and enrich the mind instinct with natural reverence; but it also tends to the further debasement of the vulgar.

Dr. Blackwell has clearly pointed out the danger of accepting implicitly the opinion of the specialist in cases where a moral problem is involved. It is of extreme moment, throughout the whole realm of sociology, that this distinction should be clearly kept in mind. The specialist is of the utmost value to supply evidence and to act as advocate. The conscience of the public must be the jury. And legislation has for its only proper basis this conclusion of the lay mind. The necessity of convincing the lay mind is the only safeguard against the bias of specialists in any department of political or social ethics. This principle is recognised in our jury system and in the general structure

of our legislature. It is vital that it should be kept in mind in the discussion of such grave subjects as Vivisection and the Contagious Diseases Acts.

Finally, in the concluding paragraph of Dr. Blackwell's article, there will surely be some rebuke to that ungenerous spirit of distrust which, since she penned it, has excluded her and all of her sex from the great conference of the Physicians of Europe patronised by the Queen and hospitably entertained by the Baroness Burdett-Coutts.—ED.

## HELLENIC THOUGHT AND MODERN PROBLEMS.\*

IT is almost exclusively from two points of view that the history of Greek thought has in recent times had an interest for Englishmen. In some cases, from a mistaken conception of the true character of Hellenic influence, poets and politicians alike have dreamed that the material and external glories of Greece may be resuscitated in a moment; that the long and sad interval of her decadence may be treated as non-existent; and that even now she may be promoted to some higher rôle than that of a pawn on the chess-board of European diplomacy. Shelley, at the time of the War of Independence, hoped and half thought that "another Hellas" might "rear its mountains from waves serener far," and Byron (if, as philosophers tell us, belief is only belief when it assumes a practical form) may be said to have truly believed in the possibility of her rejuvenescence and restitution to some part of her former place in civilisation. Even now there are to be found enthusiastic statesmen who have failed to learn that Hellenic ideas are "world-deep," and not "world-wide,"—spiritual rather than external; and who wish artificially to enlarge the

\* 1. *Hellenica* : A Collection of Essays on Greek Poetry, Philosophy, and Religion. Edited by Evelyn Abbott, M.A., LL.D. London : Rivingtons. 1880.

2. *Social Life in Greece* (from Homer to Menander). By the Rev. T. P. Mahaffy, M.A. London : Macmillan and Co. 1874.

3. *Zeller's Philosophy of the Greeks*. (Translated by Alfred Goodwin and Others.) Longmans and Co.

limits of their influence, without reflecting that vitality, in nations as in individuals, is the expression and outcome of internal force, so that, when once that force has naturally subsided, no galvanism or diplomatic witchery can permanently restore it. Whatever fortune may, "in the process of the suns," be in store for Greece with regard to her material interests, or may result from political upheavals and international combinations, it is at least certain that we shall not derive much value from the study of her past, or do much good to her present, if we assume that, because by her own exertions she grew great in the past, therefore, she is to be made great in the future by the exertions of others.

Nor, on the other hand, is the other aspect in which students have been prone to contemplate her, though much commoner, any less misleading. It would appear that, to some, Greece is only interesting as having supplied "objects of curiosity to the archæologist" (in Professor Mahaffy's words) or as having fed the fancies of *dilettanti* and the unhealthy vapours of spurious æstheticism. But the men of Hellas did not live merely to build a beautiful language—though this alone were a work to be proud of—or to forge pretty conceits wherewith to while away the idle hours of the jaded nineteenth century. They were workers as well as thinkers, with problems in life to solve, as well as songs to sing, melodies to make, and theories to propound. They acted poems as well as wrote them. Even Epicurus, the outcome of a later and more languid age, demanded so much of his "Wise Man." Literary and art circles, in the sense in which we now use the terms, were unknown during the prime of Attic civilisation. We fancy that the old Greek dramatists and philosophers would rub their eyes and stare somewhat if they could return to earth and observe the quaint masquerades of our modern Agathons, who fancy that they are best doing homage to these "imperial



spirits " by caricaturing one side only of their manifold genius. In Athens even an Alcibiades could address an assembly and fight in battle, besides posing as an exquisite.

Each of the attitudes towards things Hellenic which we have described is mistaken ; the one exaggerates the practical importance of Greece at the present day, the other underrates the practical lessons to be learnt from the Greeks of a past day.

A third attitude is, however, possible. While remembering and attaching due value to the grace and beauty of the old Hellenes in their contemplative and imaginative moods, we may still recognise that all this represented only one side of their life, and that the actual difficulties which they had to face and overcome as men and citizens then, have a real significance for us too as men and citizens now. Books have been much needed to inculcate the bearing of the problems of their life on those of ours, and to show how much nearer they are to us than would be supposed from the deceptive terms, "ancient languages," "ancient history," &c., which seem to imply some impassable barrier separating the conditions of Hellenic existence from those of Europe at the present time. Works of this character, relating to different special fields of civilisation, have certainly been produced of late. The continuity in history of political and social life has been persistently and ably maintained by Mr. Freeman. No one could have treated Greek history with a more modern touch—we had almost said "party-spirit"—than Grote. The continuity of the history of Law, Language, and Religion has been expounded by Professor Max Müller, Sir Henry Maine, and many others. Yet there was wanted some work which should take the whole of Greek literature, in its extent and range, as well as in its various departments, and estimate the lessons to be learnt from it by moderns with a view to the conduct of life. In this re-

gard we especially welcome the two books (placed first in the list attached to the present article), "*Hellenica*" and "*Social Life in Greece*;" in the latter of which Professor Mahaffy has succeeded in showing how "thoroughly modern" were the so-called ancient Greeks, "more modern even than the epochs quite proximate to our own," the epochs of the Crusader, the baron, and the monk. These volumes are a very distinct contribution to our literature, and indicate a step forward in the right direction on the part of English scholars.

No subjects are more interesting to Englishmen at the present day than Education and Politics. The disquisitions on these topics in Plato and Aristotle are handled in a masterly way by Mr. Nettleship and Mr. Bradley in the two most solid essays of the collections comprising "*Hellenica*." Their peculiar merit is that they show, with more than ordinary force and clearness, how valuable are the central ideas of the two great philosophers of antiquity in relation to the practical needs and inquiries of the modern world. Especially interesting to Englishmen, with their unnatural horror of theory when opposed to custom, should be a careful consideration of the conceptions therein most at variance with their own ways of looking at things. Discussions on education and politics have too much reference with us at the present day to immediate results, and too little to first principles. When we are right in our social experiments, we appear to be so more by accident than anything else. We slide into a moderately satisfactory course of action, either by some "divine chance," or by first trying all other possible shifts and finding them failures. Hence the piecemeal additions to our constitutional law, called by many the growth of the British Constitution. Hence our tinkering legislation. If our system, or rather want of system, has worked well enough up to the present, it is because its evil effects have been counterbalanced by fine elements in the

national character ; but it by no means follows that the want of system, which we are so fond of calling "practical," is good in itself, or that, if those national qualities which have made it flourish in spite of itself should hereafter decline, it will, in the future, produce good results. It is none the less true in politics, as in everything else, that only by the light of first principles and dominating ideas can the significance of an isolated and apparently quite intelligible fact or course of action be thoroughly discerned. It may not be a bad thing, therefore, to have our proneness to defer to use and wont confronted and startled by thorough-going inquiries into the origin and rationality of institutions.

Now in such inquiries, the old Greeks are, as Mr. Abbott justly observes, "nearer to the beginning" than we are. Take a few instances. One of the Englishman's customary beliefs—at least, one of the practical premises on which he acts—is that education comes to an end at the age of twenty-four or so. We turn to our Plato, and we find that there is another point of view in regard to this question. Education, he will tell us, should be of the whole life. Philosophy we are accustomed to consider synonymous with pedantry and jargon, and think it only advantageous to learn, for purposes of social intercourse, some of the results at which its rival schools have arrived ; certainly, not necessary to go through a severe process of philosophising for ourselves. Plato informs us that "to understand it is the nearest approach to Heaven upon Earth, and to study it is true education." Politics, on the other hand, we think most assuredly should be a life's study ; but, in Plato's ideal state, only a very small portion of the lives of the ruling class are to be devoted to intermeddling in politics, and then only as tasting a sort of bitter medicine. The aim of life, in the opinion of many of us, is to get pleasure, or to become successful and con-

spicuous, by some means *esse aliquis*. Our Gospel is the Gospel of material prosperity and personal notoriety. Plato scarcely mentions the ends of the voluptuary or money-maker as being possible to any animal except a slave, a wild beast, or a tyrant. In his eyes, the life of mere pleasure is the life of a soul whose ignoble impulses are in continual war with one another, and whose inner state is a hell of discord and corruption. We may have been taught to see in justice nothing beyond conformity to the laws of a particular country at a particular time. Plato will remind us that justice, properly understood, signifies the health of the whole soul, the proper relation of its faculties to one another, their just organisation, correlation, and inter-dependence. In these days it may be thought that the object of the sciences is the advancement of material civilisation. In the Republic it will appear that they had quite another and a far higher end. The function of Art is, as French critics are never tired of telling us, to please. Plato shows in what sense it is its function to teach. Religion we may have been used to regard as necessarily antithetical to Philosophy; but in many a work of Plato we shall find Philosophy described in terms often considered applicable only to religious enthusiasm or devotional ecstasy. Let us briefly consider how some of these hard sayings may be justified, and how all of them (whether, having regard to the altered conditions of modern civilisation, justifiable or not) have a significance and legitimate interest for us even now.

Let us, first of all, compare Plato's scheme of a true and noble life with modern theory and practice. It will at once be objected that Plato was confessedly constructing an ideal, a Utopia, "the image of which is laid up in heaven," and that, being a philosopher, his ideal life was naturally that of philosophic contemplation; a life which he did not seriously expect any one to live. But there are indications

in Plato's great work that his ideal polity—in which philosophy should be the highest and most constant occupation of the rulers, and in which the investigation of truth and union with the imperishable reality of the ideas should be the goal to which all human paths are to converge—was meant by him, notwithstanding, to be something more than a fanciful "Cloud-cuckoo-land"; that though the pattern of it was laid up in heaven, yet "a man might behold it, and, beholding, order his life thereby;" and that, though difficult, it was not impossible, in the lapse of time, under the guidance of proper instructors, and after a "revolution of the soul" should have been effected in the case of each "shadow-gazer" imprisoned in the cave, to translate its central ideas into practice, and realise them in daily life.

Our notions of a "gentlemanly" life are comprised in the terms "school," "university," "learned profession," and "politics." In the intervals of professional or political life we may study art or literature; skim the surface of things generally; go abroad and see men and cities; write a book of travels, perhaps; and even, later on, when our general utility is declining, and death is drawing near, occupy ourselves with speculations on things of the other world, and dabble in philosophy. But till this period of amiable imbecility arrives, we are expected, above all things, to be "practical;" to take an active part in associations of every possible kind, where there is talking and administrative work to be done; and, generally, to bustle about, and make ourselves conspicuous. If any time remains over from these factions, a few hobbies will not be amiss, provided they are regarded purely and solely as hobbies, and not as in any sense seriously contributing to the health and serenity of the moral and mental life.

Now it is precisely against such a kind of life that Plato enters his protest; and his theory of "good living" may suggest reflections to us as to the wisdom of our persistent

glorification of the so-called "practical" man : it may lead us to ask ourselves whether the "shadow-gazer"—to use the expression in Plato's famous allegory of the Cave—is really any less one-sided and incomplete, or any more an efficient statesman, than the "star-gazer." It is not good to be governed by a Thales, perhaps, who is so intent on the heavens that he falls into a well ; but still we must remember that, down in the well, he sees "the bright potentates set in the firmament of heaven," of which we, in the broad glare of busy life, are unconscious. And it is not desirable to have for a leader a man whose horizon is bounded by his feet. Even Napoleon said : "C'est l'imagination qui domine le monde."

Education, which Plato regarded as essential to the well-being of individuals as of cities, is based by him on psychology. With us at the present day new schemes of education are continually being suggested almost at haphazard : we blindly try first this method, and then that. We know what we want, it is true : we want useful and solid things, such as the soul of Mr. Gradgrind loved, to be imparted to the youthful mind ; but we do not think it necessary to go beyond this, or to examine the nature and tone of the instrument on which we are playing, often with such distressing results. Education, in fine, is to us a machine for accumulating facts, and not a means of bringing out power. Owing to this tendency to regard the mind as a receptacle instead of an organ, we stand in the way of achieving even these "practical" objects, of the desirability of which we are so satisfied. The acquisition of anything beyond those objects is, for all the encouragement provided by our ordinary methods of training the faculties, a matter of great difficulty.

Here, then, we may learn something from Plato's tripartite division of the soul. No one of the three elements is to be crushed out or ignored, nor, on the other hand, any

one to dominate entirely, or in any absolute spirit, over the rest. This is the great object of the education of the individual soul. Each faculty is to have free play, and be allowed its proper place and functions. Without the control of the reasoning or reflective element, the two lower orders of the mental constitution would degrade the entire man. The passions, if uncontrolled by either of the two superior elements, would hold their fiendish revels without let or hindrance, to the destruction of sanity. On the other hand, the gentle and serene philosophical element would be pampered to the point of effeminacy, if not braced up for the action and bustle of life by the support of the contentious or spirited faculty. Genius lives best in calm, and talent in action, as Goethe has told us; but Plato would have no one-sided men in his State. The genius of the contemplative mind must be supported by the talents of administration, and the latter vivified by the inspiration of the former. The contrast which Goethe marks between Genius and Talent, and Plato between Reason and Spirit, we express by the terms Theory and Practice. The busy, energetic, administrative man of the present day would be the man of *θυμός* in Plato's scheme. The visionary recluse and dreamer, the man who spends his life in evolving theories out of his inner consciousness, would be, in Plato's language, the man whose reflective faculties had been developed at the expense of the others. The whole object of Plato's education was to avoid either of these extremes. The busy, professional men of the present day, with hungry eyes and fitful, restless manner, rapidly developing into machines, or rather helpless parts of one gigantic and all-absorbing machine, would have been horrible to contemplate in Plato's eyes. So would the other extreme, *dilettanti*. It was to avert this latter danger that Plato required even the philosophers of his higher Utopia to descend for a while to the concerns of

practical life, and educate their fellows. Everything was to be ordered,

So that the art and practic part of life  
Must be the mistress to the theoric.

The object, then, of all true education is the equal development of the various faculties of the soul in their proper relations to one another. What, then, are to be the means of effecting this? For the philosophic element, Music (by which, in its primitive sense, is meant cultivation and refinement, by means of speculation, discussion, literature, art, the drama, and music in our sense of the word): for the spirited element, bodily exercise or Gymnastics. It is scarcely correct, in Plato's view, to say that Music educates the mind and Gymnastics the body. In reality, the two are brought to bear on two separate powers of the soul. For the passions, of course no special educative instrument is required; their highest merit is to suppress themselves, and act in subordination to the other faculties. It is to be noted that education, in the above view, is not to be adapted, as in modern systems, to the special requirements of the particular individual in after-life; it is to develop and bring forth to maturity the faculties whereby he may render himself a complete man, and with which he may meet the difficulties of *any* life. It ceases, therefore, at the age of twenty, whereas the higher education of the philosophic class lasts, as we have seen, through life.

"Musical" influence is to be brought to bear on the child before gymnastic training begins. In regard to the proper nature of this influence, Plato is opposed both to the modes of education in vogue in his own day, and to modern views on the subject. He has much to say against art in general, still more against the drama in particular; and so satisfied is he of the paramount importance of impressing a good type of State character on the citizen, that he requires even the poet, that "holy and winged thing," to conform to



what is yet holier, the laws to be established for the education and moulding of the whole city, and to allow himself to be escorted outside the walls with hymns and felicitations, and, crowned with garlands, go his way. In matters of religious instruction he is still more rigid and unbending. Myths, stories, allegories and the like may, indeed, be used for moral purposes—he is especially fond of them himself—but he demands that nothing shall be said in them of the gods, except what is calculated to develop a noble character. Any myths imputing, or seeming to impute, injustice, cruelty, lust, or other human attributes to the gods, any that tend to bring them into “ridicule and contempt,” or invest them with that homeliness which breeds contempt, must not be admitted, however high and inspired the authority on which they rest. Artistic is to be subordinated to moral propriety.

It will at once be seen how the philosopher’s theory of divinity contradicted that of the vulgar. Professor Mahaffy, in describing the average religious sentiment and attitude, as it was in *fact*, of the Attic age, takes occasion to note the contrast between “the love of mystery in our modern religions, and its absence, or, at least, rare appearance in the religion of the Greeks” (“Social Life in Greece,” p. 344), and the humanity of the Greek gods. In the Greek world, in fact, as has been remarked, “man created gods after his own image.” Against all this Plato vehemently protests, and (so far) approaches the conceptions of modern, and leaves far behind him those of contemporary, religions.

If Plato would not tolerate the ordinary mythical teaching of the day, still less would he tolerate the drama in any shape. In the first place, the drama is imitative; and, though Plato does not object to the imitation by the young in their lives of heroic citizens, dead or living, as exemplars to guide them, he does object to their imitating more than one type of character, or to the attempt to play many parts:

in life. He has an aversion to those "polyphonous and pantomimic gentlemen" who can imitate anything and everything at a moment's notice, and change their character with their dress, who, in a very inferior sense, are all things to all men, and

To whose frail frame no second motion brings  
One mood or modulation like the last.

Such habits are calculated to emasculate the minds of youth, minds which are "wax to receive, and marble to retain," and are opposed to the severe simplicity which Plato demanded of his citizens.

The danger of being liable to give rapid and undignified expression to each passing phase of emotion, will not be considered a very serious one to Englishmen, whose fault lies quite in the opposite direction. But we may still, as Mr. Nettleship very truly points out, take to ourselves many of the remarks on the enervating character of poetry and the drama by substituting for them Fiction, and similar influences, which have an analogous place in modern culture. In our case, however, the harmful dose (if it is to be considered so), the deranging opiate, is taken in private, unlike the case of the Greeks, whose enthusiasm was born of the contagious "schwärmerei," which followed on the recitation to assembled multitudes, by the rhapsodist, of the Homer which he knew so well; or on the sad story of the Alcestis, told by Athenian captives to their masters in a strange city. To this extent our habits and condition are worse than those of the Athenian of Plato's time.

We have said that Plato not only admitted, but strenuously maintained, that the young should imitate a single type of character, and that the State type. And to the extent of commemorating the deeds of gods and heroes illustrative of this type, he would allow hymns, odes, and fables in the State education, but no further. In any case, the priest and poet were to cut their wares to order.

Whether the tales told by them were true to fact or not, did not in the least matter, provided they were true to morality and religion, provided the State *ἥθος* was upheld, and the Deity was not represented as subject to change, which to Plato was the symbol of imperfection. Better a fiction for educational purposes than "a lie on the soul" (in Platonic language), or than being in error and darkness, however involuntary, as to the most important concerns of man. Nowadays the relation here indicated of moral teaching to truth and fact, whether in history, science, or art, is completely reversed. We are now in danger of running into the other extreme, and too fond of asserting that the truth can hurt no one. It is worth considering whether we do not push too far the maxim (good in itself) that "to the pure all things are pure," and that there is no indecency in an indecent play, painting, or novel, except (as Dr. Johnson said on one occasion to Boswell) what is imported into it from the mind of the spectator or reader.

Besides these permissible kinds of poetic and religious fiction, Plato was, after all, too much of a Greek not to desire graceful forms and sculptures to be ever present to the eyes of his young citizens, so that they might live amidst "shapes more real than living man, Nurslings of immortality," and continually imbibe the wholesome atmosphere of beauty and simplicity. Music proper might also be admitted, but was chiefly to be directed to the training of the martial and contentious element in the soul. So far as it operated on the philosophic element, it should be such as to inculcate simplicity, and not encourage the softness incidental to this "mildest" of all the faculties. It should be in keeping with the other and more bracing food, in the shape of dialectic or philosophical discussion, which the "*λογιστικὸν μέρος*" most needed.

The main educator of "Spirit," however, was gymnastics. "Proper 'gymnastics' will discipline the wild impulses of

violence and pugnacity, developing the intelligent courage of the citizen-soldier, instead of the blind ferocity of the barbarian or the wild beast, while it will counteract the yielding, voluptuous, or nervous tendencies by encouraging competition, endurance, and presence of mind. On the other hand, excessive attention to it brings with it evils as great as its undue neglect. The body then gradually swallows up the mind; the whole man swells with the pride of conscious strength; by degrees his courage sinks into brutality, and his high spirit into insolence; his senses, the windows of the mind, are clogged and darkened, and his intelligence, neglected and starved, grows 'weak, deaf, and blind'" (*"Hellenica,"* pp. 89, 90). There is much in Plato's view of the proper function of gymnastics which may be taken to heart at the present day, when every form of outdoor sport tends to be carried on in such a business-like and serious fashion, so that it almost tends to lose its character of recreation entirely.

So far we have been dealing with the more distinctively Hellenic of the two Platonic types of education and social life. That this type was not very far removed from the existing practice we may see by comparing Plato's account of what he wished to institute with Professor Mahaffy's very sound and readable description of what, in fact, was customary in this department among the average Athenians of the time. \*

But there was to be another and a much higher education in the very ideal State, the Utopia of Utopias, which no man had yet beheld, and which, probably, no man would behold, still less construct, on earth. The true philosopher is, in Plato's view, "the spectator of all time and all existence;" therefore, in considering his education, abstraction must be made of all accidental conditions of space and time. It is not Athens or the Attic age that is

\* See "*Social Life in Greece*," ch. viii.—x., dealing with the subject of Attic Culture.

now to be kept in view, it is a "celestial city" without local habitation or name. In the early part of the "Republic," and while Plato is administering the first and more tentative sketch of a proper education, "the tone," as Mr. Nettleship admirably puts it, "is that of a man who certainly sees much to criticise in existing institutions, but who is, nevertheless, disposed to make the best of them, and does not despair of doing so. In the second" part "it is that of one oppressed by the sense of evil in the world, hoping for salvation only from remedies which are themselves almost hopeless, diffident and yet defiant, daringly paradoxical and yet terribly in earnest" ("Hellenica," p. 82).

Plato divides men into classes according to the predominance in them of one or other of the constitutive faculties of the soul. Those in whom the lowest or appetitive element prevails are the "lovers of lucre;" those in whom the spirited or contentious element predominates are the "lovers of honour;" those in whom the highest or rational faculty is most actively developed are the "lovers of wisdom." Philosophy, or "the love of wisdom," when put to exercise, embodies all human gifts and graces, and rests on the fullest experience of which man is capable. The philosopher, therefore, may fitly claim to rule the world; while (conversely) the noblest choice for an earthly ruler is the choice of Solomon,—the choice of Marcus Aurelius.

It is interesting here to remark the wide difference between the Greek "*φιλοσοφία*" and our "philosophy." It is owing to an unconscious identification of the two conceptions that Plato's "government by philosophy" seems to us so ridiculous. To an unphilosophical people like ourselves philosophy means little or nothing. To a cultivated Athenian it meant everything. To him it was both religion and poetry. He pursued truth, if at all, "with

the passion of a poet for beauty, and the devotion of the saint to the object of his worship" ("Hellenica" p. 85). In our time the emotional tendencies find other channels than philosophy into which to discharge themselves. Hegel, the modern "spectator of time and existence," the man who comes nearest to the *συννοητικός* which Plato required the true dialectician to be, who, like Plato, treated Thought as a whole, of which Art, Morals, Religion, Politics, Custom were but different manifestations, an encyclopædist in the highest and truest sense,—Hegel has striven, but vainly, to restore the primitive meaning, and revive the old ardour and earnestness of philosophy and philosophers. He describes with horror and humour, pathetically mingled, how low "the barren virgin consecrated to God" (in Bacon's phrase) has sunk, and what menial services she now undertakes. Scientific, political, and economical questions are all philosophy to us. "Philosophical" we often use as synonymous with "accurate." Hallam constantly talks of arriving at an historical judgment "philosophically," by which he means neither more nor less than "logically." Statistics and surgical instruments are "philosophical." But the last straw which broke the back of Hegel's resignation was the discovery in an English newspaper of an advertisement of "hair-dressing conducted on philosophical principles."

To Plato philosophy was something far more than all this. It was a disposition of soul, a passion, a yearning, a certain frame and constitution of mind—anything but a mere collection of dogmas. The love of wisdom and truth was akin to the devotion of a lover to his mistress. This latter side of the philosophic spirit is very elaborately treated by Professor Zeller in his chapter on the Philosophic Eros ("Plato and the Older Academy"), and is constantly brought before us by Plato himself, both in the "Republic" and in the "Phædrus," and other dialogues. This single

love of truth for its own sake is not common now. It is most often to be found, perhaps, among scientific men and historians; but even in their case it is not often (in Mr. Nettleship's words) "found to dominate the character and mould the life, as Plato conceived that it might do."

Mr. Nettleship's description of the central features of the Platonic theory of education is so exhaustive and sympathetic, that we may leave unsaid all that we should otherwise have been glad to say about Mr. Bradley's Essay on the Aristotelian conception of the State. Aristotle, notwithstanding his formal and sometimes captious objections to Plato's *καλλίπολις* (in its details), so closely follows his master in the main conception of his great work, and the State and Education were ideas so inseparably conjoined in the minds of all Greek thinkers of this period, that in considering Plato's system of education we have virtually been considering Aristotle's political views. Neither the one nor the other would have been able to comprehend the modern conception of personal liberty as the sacred right of the individual to do what he pleases, subject to the like liberty of every other individual. Both master and disciple regarded each individual and each class as not a separable part, but a living member, of the State to which he or it belonged, and for which alone he or it existed. Both were thoroughly impressed with the omnipotence of King Nomos to control individual preferences and tendencies; both believed in the unlimited plasticity of the citizen in the hands of the city. Both sought the end and the good of the State, not outside the State, but in the State's function and work (*ἔργον*), and held that its happiness consisted in the striving to attain that end and the exercise of that function, in self-realisation and self-development; and that when the happiness of the State was attained, if the happiness of the individual was not also attained, that was his fault, and not

the fault of legislation, which looks to the whole organism, instead of to specific class-interests. The modern tendency is, it is sufficiently obvious, to extend further and further the limits of personal freedom, and encourage the expression of individuality. But the breakdown of barriers of race and creed before the *divide et impera* of Rome's conquering legions, the influence of Imperial legislation, the successive reconstructions of the European State system, the birth of Christianity, the English Reformation, the French Revolution, and many a silent, social revolution, not the less influential because nameless and dateless—all these stand between us and the times of Hellenic civilisation; and all of them have contributed to elevate the importance of the individual, and sink that of the nation.

In the philosopher Epicurus and the historian Polybius we find representatives of a very different state of Hellenic society from that which flourished in the Platonic and Aristotelian epochs. In the times of the former, it was plain, to every one who had eyes to see, that the old Greek city-life was fast rushing to its doom. When, far later on, we reach Polybius, this city-life had long since decayed, and Hellenic life of any kind was fast decaying; and the last despairing effort to bring back some faint image of the past prime of Greece by means of Achæan and other Leagues—an effort in which Polybius himself took so noble a part—was destined to failure.

Epicurus was the exponent and mouthpiece of a universal sentiment. Like Plato's sophist, he was the child, and not the instructor, of his age; and the message which the spirit of the age repeated in fretful and weary tones to each individual ambitious to play a part in it bore this burden, "Retire, and timely, from the world if ever Thou hopest tranquil days." The individual of this epoch, whether philosopher or not, soon showed his want of confidence in the State education which formerly supplied all the wants of his



social and moral life. He found no satisfaction in his outward surroundings, and was, in consequence, thrown back upon his own resources. He looked for satisfaction within, and abandoned the attempt to prop his spirit up by such crumbling supports as the political masonry of the day could provide. He gradually detached himself from any particular city; he could no longer be considered as a "political animal,"—as a member of some "body politic," in co-operation with which alone could life have any value or meaning for him. He was now let loose upon the world; he was on a par with all other individuals wheresoever and howsoever situated, and, like them, must solve his problems for himself. Everywhere "men took refuge in the thought of the citizenship of the world, because everywhere actual citizenship had lost its worth and dignity."\*

Of this weariness of spirit, this abnegation of political and active life, Epicureanism is an exact expression. It is cosmopolitan, or rather denationalised. Like the rival theory of Stoicism, which was born of the same general upheaval and disruption of old ties and relations, it is eclectic, unsettled, and unsystematic. Like Stoicism, too, it presents rather a set of prudential maxims or rules, whereby to live as comfortably as adverse circumstances permit, rather than philosophical ideas and principles, in the strict sense of the word. How to abjure the world, and live for the self, and in the self, how to become quit of dependency on others—this was the hopeless problem which Epicureans and Stoics alike, though of course by widely different means, and from opposite starting-points, set themselves to solve. This is brought out with great force, and with a very un-Teutonic vivacity and charm of style, by Dr. Zeller in that part of his work which relates to these two schools of thought. Mr. Courtney, in his dainty little essay on Epicurus, illustrates the eclectic and some-

\* Flint's "Philosophy of History," p. 48.

what uncertain character of that philosopher's opinions, and shows how utterly non-philosophical his so-called philosophy really was. We think this essay one of the most interesting in the entire volume of "Hellenica," both because the conditions of the modern "Welt-schmerz," of the sombre presence of which Goethe and Carlyle have been continually reminding us, are in some respects analogous to those of Hellenic life in Epicurus's day,\* and also because the writer himself seems to have some of that eclectic and not over-enthusiastic temper, some of that colloquial style, which characterised the teaching of his subject, and in this respect (not to speak of others) is well qualified for the work.

Epicurus seems to us to have collected from "the best that had been thought" by his predecessors, everything that could conduce to respectable and contented living, added a few hints of his own, and called the medley a philosophy. If it be a philosophy, we can only call it the philosophy of Comfort and Dilettantism, of Moderation and Mediocrity. Epicurus was a philosopher exactly in the sense in which we now speak of a "philosophical" man—that is, a self-contained, careful, and prudent man; a man neither heroic nor brave; one who takes his pleasures soberly, and endures his pains with equanimity.

We cannot illustrate better the eclectic character of the Epicurean maxims, and the vast gap which separates Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of philosophy (as embracing thought in all its aspects, and as an organic whole) from that of Epicurus (as merely providing a *vade mecum* for easy living, and as scarcely needing logic, politics, metaphysics, or, indeed, anything except some acquaintance with natural laws, and some degree of experience of life) than by

\* The nearness of Epicurus's maxims to those inculcated by philosophers of a like type in modern times is aptly shown in Mr. Courtney's parallel of the ideal of Saint Evremond with the "Wise Man" of Epicurus. Cf. also the passage cited from Hone above.

calling attention to the manner in which the three philosophers speak of the Wise Man. How Plato conceived the lover of wisdom, the pursuer of truth, we have already seen. Aristotle we find speaking of *θεωρία*, and abstract thought or contemplation, the peculiar position of the philosopher, and of all men in their highest and best moments, in the most enthusiastic terms. It is the completest form of happiness ; " it affords wondrous pleasures in point both of purity and duration " (Eth. x. vii. 3). Philosophy is above virtue, for it is the excellence of the highest human faculty. It contains in itself its own end and satisfaction, unlike the practical and productive arts (war, politics, sculpture, and even morality), which aim at a result or object outside and beyond themselves. " The philosopher will surely be most under the protection of the gods, because honouring and cherishing that which is noblest and likeliest to God, the Reason " (Eth. x. viii. 13). It should be the proper end and object not only of the individual, but also the State. It is the condition of peace, and the crown of toil. It is the realisation of the divine in man, and most of all secures independence of the shocks of fate and chance, and " the buffets of the world."

We turn to Epicurus, as translated by Mr. Courtney (" Hellenica," p. 264), and we find his " Wise Man " to be of a very different calibre from the true philosopher of Plato and Aristotle.

The injuries which come to men either through hatred or envy or pride, the wise man will conquer by reason. He will acknowledge the power of feelings or passions, but will not thereby be hindered in his wisdom. Even though he be tortured, he is yet happy, albeit that at times in his torture he will moan and groan. It is the wise man only who can feel affection for his friends, whether present or absent. He will not punish his servants, but will be compassionate, and pardon those who are worthy. No wise man will fall in love, nor believe that Eros is heaven-sent. Nor will he be a good orator. At times a sage

will marry and beget children ; at times, if circumstances be adverse, he will not marry, and will try to dissuade others. He will neither cherish wrath in drunkenness, nor will he engage in politics, nor become a tyrant, nor yet flatter. Neither will he beg. Even though bereft of eyes, the wise man will still have a hold on life. He will feel grief, he will think about property, he will provide for the future. He will be fond of a country life, and bear a stout front against fortune. Only so far will he think of repute amongst men that he be not contemned. More than others he will feel delight at the theatre. It is only the wise man who will have a right opinion on music and poetry ; yet the sage lives poems, and does not make them. Money he will make, yet only in wisdom, if he be in want. He will court a monarch at the proper moment ; he will humour a man, in order to correct him. He will found a school, but not to gain crowds of scholars. He will give his opinion freely, and never be at a loss ; in his dream he will be true to himself. And sometimes he will die for his friend.

The reader will have noticed what a quaint medley this Epicurean ideal of wisdom is. It is composed of odds and ends from all sorts of schools—of “fragments” from many a “large banquet” of philosophy. He begins in a somewhat Platonic strain as to the subordination of passion to reason. In his recognition, however, of our common humanity (“at times in his torture he will moan and groan”), we are reminded of Aristotle’s observation that “*Πραμικαὶ τυχαί*” will mar happiness, and may overcome even philosophic serenity and resignation. But notwithstanding this passing recognition, Epicurus on the whole supports the Stoical doctrine of happiness during physical suffering. In his statement of the sage’s relations to his friends and to his slaves, he was perhaps thinking of Aristotle’s beautiful inquiry into the nature of Friendship in the Ethics, and of Slavery in the Politics. “No wise man will fall in love.” Here, again, we have an echo of Plato’s doctrine of love as a disease, as madness, as the bite of a tarantula, as anything but normal ; of the story

in the "Republic" of Sophocles' remark that in his old age he was happily delivered from "many masters" in being free from its influence; and of Socrates' amusing warning to Xenophon and Critobulus.\* "Nor will he be a good orator." So, too, Plato continually puts the sophist, the lawyer, the quack doctor, and the rhetorician into one class, ascribing to them as generic quality the aptitude and art of deception, insists on the degrading influence of the law courts "into which a man goes to get justice, because he has none of his own," and draws companion pictures (as in the "Theætetus") of the philosopher, on the one hand, "who does not even know his way to the law courts," and is totally incapable of addressing a mob; and the versatile and litigious Athenian, on the other, who is always prepared to make the worse cause appear the better, but who is absolutely incapable of philosophising, and, if required by chance to discuss some broad conception or first principle, is covered with confusion and amazement. The abstention from politics, again, which Epicurus requires, Plato also requires, except so far as political teaching is an unpleasant duty which the philosopher owes to his fellow-citizens, in order to wean them from the current modes of conducting public affairs. The exception is important. Epicurus would not recognise it for a moment. *His* wise man was to retire within himself. "Live in serenity and seclusion" ("λαθὲ βιώσας") should be his rule of life, and he was even recommended to cultivate a taste for those country pleasures, which Socrates could never understand. Plato, on the other hand, wished his philosopher, while condemning the world, at the same time to cultivate a passion for reforming it: he was to descend from the calm heights where he lived in union with God to the turbulent plain below, and help mankind up the hill as far as he could. This was quite above the

\* See Mr. Davidson's essay, "Hellenica," pp. 354, 355.

Epicurean level. In the remainder of Epicurus's sketch we rapidly come nearer to the earth, to the vulgar and commonplace. In the "thinking about property," the making money judiciously, the delight in the theatre, music, and poetry, the courting a monarch—in all this we see a direct antithesis to Plato, and the heads of the hydra of multiform passion begin to exalt themselves. But the "humouring a man, in order to correct him," is distinctly in accordance with the Socratic method, as "the founding a school, but not to gain crowds of scholars," is opposed to the Sophistic practice, if not quite consonant with that of Socrates, who desired no school at all. Epicurus seems to reach a somewhat higher standpoint when he lays down that "the sage lives poems, and does not write them." But everything depends on the nature of the poem. Carlyle is of opinion that it is better to live a poem than to write one; but his poem would be a drama or epos, Epicurus's would be some very unpretentious little idyll or romance. The expression, "in his dreams he will be true to himself," reminds us once more of the awful truth and vivid colouring of Plato's description of the state of the tyrant's soul during sleep.

"And sometimes he will die for his friend." But when? Under what circumstances? And how will dying for one's friend under any circumstances be justifiable on the Epicurean doctrine of friendship based on considerations of mutual advantage? We may, indeed, ask the same question in respect to all the nobler points above enumerated in the character of the Epicurean sage, as we may ask it in respect to all the finer precepts of the fashionable Hellenism of to-day. In either case we shall get no satisfactory answer, because the "superstructure," as Mr. Courtney says, "is too wide for the foundation." In the latter case, however, we shall find that the architects of such philosophical systems as Utilitarianism at any rate

know their business better, and make more, if not more successful, attempts to secure that of which Epicurus scarcely seems to have recognised the necessity, namely, coherency. In fact, the truth is that Epicurus had no philosophy, in the true sense of the word. He discovered what suited himself, and procured him content, and he prescribed the same to his followers and admirers. So did Sam Weller. We cannot ourselves discover any sense in which Epicurus was a philosopher and Sam Weller not, especially as Epicurus denies the necessity of culture to constitute philosophy. Mr. Courtney speaks of the resurrection of his spirit in several of the moderns. But the spirit of Jeremy Bentham, for instance, who is named among others, was very different. His doctrines hung fairly well together, if based on false premises; and, at all events, they had immediate reference to, and produced good results in, legislation. They bore their good fruit in the field wherein he chiefly desired them to be sown, and in consideration of this, we may overlook their utter incapacity to explain the moral life. But we cannot conceive that any person has been made better, or more contented, or more fitted to exercise the functions of life by assimilating the theory (if we are to call it so) of Epicurus. And if this is not the merit claimed for him by his admirers, we are ignorant what it can be. For even Mr. Courtney gives up Epicurus's claims to the rank of a philosopher. "He was not a hero," he says ("Hellenica," p. 265) "not a statesman, not even a philosopher" (this last in the tone of the French epitaph on Piron, "*pas même un académicien*"). What was he, then? "A quiet, humane, and prudent man." But, really, amiability has existed before Epicurus, as much as heroism before Agamemnon.

On the other hand, we can well conceive that many a man has been made weaker and worse by the adoption of Epicurus's rules of life, or those of the moderns on whom

his mantle has fallen. Some of his disciples—Metrodorus, for instance—travestied them, as Mr. Courtney says, but, as we should say, only followed them out to their legitimate consequences. Epicurus says, "Mingle your pleasures : do not neglect the appetites, but let a large portion of your satisfaction be derived from refined sources." "To what end?" asks the disciple. "To secure content and happiness," is the reply of the master. "Very good," says some Metrodorus whose Epicureanism takes the form of gastronomic indulgence; "I do not doubt that a judicious selection of refined pleasures, with a flavour of the grosser, secures your happiness; but exclusive attention to the grosser secures mine, and of these latter I have found those of the stomach to be, most of all, conducive to my comfort." The disciple then sits down, and, for the benefit of sub-disciples, promulgates the Johnsonian dogma—"It is in the belly that the natural reason of man finds the chief object of his care"\* ("Hellenica," p. 252). Very shocking, no doubt; and so was the irreverent and too demonstrative admiration of the whole army of cooks of the New Comedy, of whom Professor Mahaffy speaks ("Social Life in Greece," p. 343), who followed Epicurus to a man, and boasted "that he had raised their profession to the highest in life." But, if we are to call Epicurus's precepts a philosophy, each of them, as being philosophy, must depend for their validity upon some end; and if this end is still kept in view by the disciple, who improves upon the theory by varying the means suggested by the master, and substituting what are generally considered less worthy means, nobody can say that Carlyle's "philosophy of pigdom" is not a fair corollary from the tenets of Epicurus. However revolted Epicurus might have been with such a disciple as

\* Johnson's remark to Boswell was, "Depend upon it, sir, the man who does not take care of his belly will take care of nothing else." But then Johnson had known what it was to live on fourpence a-day.



a man, he could scarcely in justice be indignant at his conduct as a philosopher.

We must honestly confess that, for our own part, we think that the labour and zeal employed in unrolling the charred remains of the manuscript which was to give us this intellectual mincemeat for the impaired digestion of a restless and over-pampered age—(Mr. Courtney gives an interesting account of the process)—might very well have been put to better use. The opinions of Epicurus, like those of Zeno on the other side, are extremely interesting as reflecting the character of the age: they are the floating froth which shows us the direction of the current. But they *are* froth, after all. Neither in Epicurus's time, nor in ours (though many are even now attempting it) is "divine tranquillity" to be won by framing rules for wooing her. Content is the horizon which always seems so near, and yet is never any the nearer for being pursued.

It is a pleasure to turn from the period of decadence represented by Epicurus to the period of decadence represented by Polybius, though in other respects a yet more melancholy one. In Polybius we find a man not sitting down and folding his arms, and drawing up maxims for the attainment of a serene and secluded life, but entering boldly into the arena, and with might and main striking one last blow for Hellas in the endeavour to found leagues of cities, the then only possible means of salvation. Even when the sword failed, as it finally did, he did not court solitude and despair, but spent the rest of his life on behalf of his beloved country, in cultivating intimate relations with Rome. "Take away the sword; states can be saved without it," he said to himself, with Lytton's "*Richelieu*." He had the sagacity to perceive that Greece's day as a first-rate power (as we should now say) was done, and that a reflected greatness could only be secured for her under the protecting ægis of Roman legions, and under the equal sway of Roman law

and administration. During all this latter time he faithfully and honestly recorded the events in which he had borne so noble a part, and for the good of his countrymen told the tale of the rise and development of that great Power before whom he saw that Greece, as well as other nations, must bow. For several years he was in this way the educator of his country, and in a measure guided her destinies. In his ceaseless activity, combined with acute penetration, we see evidences of real wisdom. His life was a somewhat romantic one, especially during his stay in Rome, where his touching affection for Scipio first took root. Besides being an adroit diplomatist, he was a brave and capable soldier.\* He was something of a philosopher, as we may see from many a digression in his history. His moral judgments were generally sound (notwithstanding Mommsen's adverse criticism), and he approaches very near to the modern conception of what a historian should be. In patience of investigation, in discrimination between causes and occasions, between law and accident, in the sifting of evidence, in accuracy of detail, and in vivacity of controversial reasoning, he resembles Grote. But he unfortunately resembles Grote in another respect,—slovenliness of style. In an English writer this is no novelty, and never operates now as a fatal defect. But to a Greek then, as to a Frenchman now, it was utterly ruinous. Hence it is that one of the most interesting books of antiquity has been practically closed to all but special students of history. Mere slovenliness of style, however, is not Polybius's only failing. What he lacks in arrangement and choice of materials, and several other matters besides style, is a sense of artistic propriety. He deals with a vast variety of separate fields of investigation, but he does not work them together into an organic whole. He is several specialists rolled into one—the

\* He invented an ingenious system of military telegraphy by beacons, described by Mr. Davidson on p. 391 of "*Hellenica*."

geographer, the observant traveller, the moral philosopher, the military critic, the controversialist, the politician; but these different provinces are not judiciously blended. But notwithstanding all this, he ought to be specially interesting to us from the thoroughly modern character of his work. "No effort is required to get at his point of view. Whatever question he starts, his attitude of mind towards it is such as to appeal to the sympathy, if not to the conviction, of the average modern reader." He had the courage, rare in ancient times, to seek truth in history above all things, and to tell his countrymen in plain language their failings and dangers. He scorned to use flattery when in the service of Clio.

We have every reason, therefore, to render Mr. Davidson cordial thanks for helping to restore Polybius to his proper place. In his fresh and lucid style, he tells the story of the historian's life after a fashion which leads us to hope that we may hereafter have some more substantial work on the same subject from the same pen.

G. S. BOWER.

## *THEISM AND ATHEISM AS MORAL INFLUENCES.*

**I**T is the boast of modern Atheism in all its different forms of Positivism, Agnosticism, or Scientific Materialism that it is, at least equally favourable to human virtue, and, therefore, to the highest forms of human happiness, with belief in God, in conscience as His representative, and in the immortality of the soul; and that, to use the expression of one of its mouth-pieces, the death, burial, and oblivion of a thousand creeds founded on those beliefs, would "rid Society, not of its code, but of its imperfections; not of conscience, but its sickness."

The contention is not a new one, but it has been put forth of late years by the exponents of the schools above mentioned with so loud a note of defiance, so triumphant an assumption of victory over the beliefs that have been the dwelling-places of human faith and hope through all generations, that it is worth while to examine again the grounds on which it rests. It is no part of the purpose of this essay to discuss the truth or falsehood of special forms of religious belief or unbelief, or to enter into theories of morals and lay down tests of the relative ethical value of actions. That is a task demanding abler hands and wider space. Here Theism and Atheism will be regarded solely in the aspect of facts in human history, and compared as to their respective influence on human conduct. Such a comparison can be fairly made only by tracing their effects over numbers and through periods of time sufficiently large

to yield an average, and sufficiently cleared of foreign elements to make sure that neither side reaps the credit or discredit of results that do not belong to it. The latter is a condition especially required in the present case, for modern Atheism, born and cradled in the atmosphere of Christian faith and tradition, has had no time yet to show what its effects would be on a society entirely moulded by its influence, and these can be estimated only on general grounds of experience and knowledge of human nature and human life. It must be added that the very purity of character which distinguishes many leaders of that school, their very elevation above the grosser passions and appetites of the mass of mankind, help to deceive them as to the moral influence of their doctrines on the coarser fibre of average human creatures. It would, indeed, seem, from their theories of life and morals, as if they lived in some calm, cool atmosphere where the hot fever of passions, the fierce pangs of desire, love and hate and greed, were unknown; or if known, that the considerations of universal benevolence, or, at lowest, of regard for enlightened self-interests, could always be trusted to prevail over them. Such serene heights are beautiful to contemplate, but their rarefied air will not support the common life of man; and while our modern prophets stand on their lofty Sinai, listening with "cosmic emotion" to the voice that proclaims: "There is no God, and Humanity is all-sufficient to itself,"—the multitude below still sit down to eat and drink, and rise up to play and worship the golden calf they have set up for themselves.

The conclusions of modern Atheism concerning the inutility, or worse, as factors in human morality, of belief in a God, in conscience as His representative, and in the immortality of the soul, rest upon certain representations of the ideas involved from which, if admitted, they can be logically derived. And in this, modern Atheism resembles Roman Catholicism. Both assume their premises and

whosoever accepts those will find himself inevitably landed in their conclusions. It is, therefore, the premises we must examine rather than the arguments from them. As two of the fundamental ideas above named, God and Immortality, have no real existence for the Atheist, the representations he gives of them are borrowed, in a somewhat eclectic fashion, from the creeds he rejects, taking only those which lend themselves to his purpose, and leaving out others that would prove too stubbornly inconvenient. Of the third, Conscience, in which he does believe as a part of experience, he gives his own account as to its nature and origin as well as its history. But in this case he is apt to treat facts, those, at least, which cannot be weighed or analysed in the laboratory or dissecting-room, as in the other case he treats ideas, and, when they will not fit into his theory, to say, with the French historian: "*Tant pis pour les faits!*" We, on the contrary, will look only at the facts, and examining by their light each of the fundamental ideas above named, endeavour to ascertain which of the two theories,—that of Atheism with its corollary, necessitarianism, or that of Theism with its corollaries, moral intuitions and belief in immortality,—is most in accordance with those facts.

The first fact we have to take account of is the religious emotion in man, born of the combined action of his intellect forcing him to seek a cause for all the impressions he receives from within and from without which he can neither control nor evade, in a Power above and beyond him, and of his moral nature, impelling him to bow down before this Power in awe and worship. The history of the development of this emotion from the first blind gropings of the savage to the Monotheism of to-day is the history of the human mind in its two most important phases—philosophy and morals. For religion has ever professed on its intellectual side to give an account of causes, and on its moral side to give the law to conduct. Victor Cousin says somewhere :

"*La religion est la philosophie du peuple,*" and we find, as a matter of fact, that the fundamental lines of division between different systems of philosophy and morals rest on their assertion or denial, implicit or explicit, of religious conceptions and beliefs. Yet let me note, as an instance of the quiet overlooking of inconvenient facts alluded to above, that Professor Bain, in his work on the Emotions and the Will, actually leaves out altogether the religious emotion, whether as an original or derived feeling, so that an inhabitant of another planet, reading his work to obtain some insight into the nature of the unknown creature, man, would discover no trace in it of the most powerful factor in human history.

This factor modern Atheism proposes to eliminate from the human mind as Professor Bain eliminates it from his book, and proceeds to assert that life will suffer no change in its moral meaning and worth "though its God should die and its heaven disappear." Before this assertion can be properly met, we must consider what is comprehended under the terms "God" and "Heaven," for it is on this, the premiss of the argument, that, as already said, the conclusion depends. The conception of God always put forward by the Atheistic school as the object of attack is that of a supreme despot, ruling by arbitrary power alone and enforcing a servile obedience by the tremendous agency of rewards and punishments prolonged into eternity. All the ideal side of religion,—the conception of God as the being in whom every quality we love and revere exists in the highest conceivable degree, and supreme power is identified with supreme perfection,—is left altogether out of sight. It will be found, however, that it is just this ideal side of religious belief, bringing out in man the faculty of adoration, which exercises the most powerful influence on conduct. The standard of morals in any age or country is seen to be exactly measured on the ideal of the God or gods wor-

shipped in it. As that ideal rises so does the law of human conduct, and "the highest, holiest manhood" is ever held to be the truest reflection of the Divine. Is this to admit that "man creates his gods and teaches them how to rule him"? No. Man does not create but he discovers his God as he discovers the universe, by the like gradual progress of development and enlargement of faculty and experience. The Power he recognises in the first dawn of conscious perception, becomes, with the awakening of the moral emotions, the God he "feels after if haply he may find Him," and worships under an impulse as natural as that which prompts the dog's allegiance to the man; the God who speaks to him "at sundry times and in divers manners," through the prophets and seers of the race to whom it is given to

see and tell

Of things invisible to mortal sight;

and as veil after veil of ignorance drops away, and the rational prevails over the mere animal nature, his vision becomes clearer, and the light brightens more and more till fear gives way to love, and worship to adoration, and man surrenders his will to God, not because He is the strongest, but because He is the best.

Another fact ignored by the predominant school of modern Atheism is that the most powerful motives in human nature are not fear of pain or desire of pleasure, but love and admiration. These are human, the others are purely animal impulses, and sway the human being just in proportion as the animal elements of his nature predominate over the moral and intellectual. With the development of the higher element come the conception of the ideal, the disinterested emotions of love, of admiration; and under their sway men in all ages have been seen to sacrifice, unhesitatingly, every pleasure, even life itself, and brave every terror, even that of hopeless death. Who ever heard of any heroic deed, of



any of the great movements which lift a whole age or nation, as by the sweep of a wave of moral power, to a higher level of thought and life, having been impelled by the fear of any pain, the love of any pleasure? These are, indeed, the necessary factors in the preservation and welfare of the lower life of the body, and, therefore, we find them the main factors in animal life. But even in animals they yield to the higher ones, in proportion as the animal rises in the scale of being. The dog gives his life for his master for love, not for fear of the stick. It is a common-place of political economy that slave-labour is inferior to free-labour. Yet the slave has every inducement that the fear of pain can give, to do his best. The best can be got out of men only through the action of the best within them; and their rulers, from emperors to masters of schools and workshops, must rule over the hearts and minds of those under them and arouse their self-forgetting loyalty, if they are to get their full capacity of service from them.

It is this emotional power of the faith in a supremely adorable God which will be lost to morality when that faith dies out. So keenly did two men, so different in everything but their scepticism, as Voltaire and Auguste Comte, feel the magnitude of such a loss, that the one declared that a God would have to be invented if He did not exist, and the other tried to invent one in the shape of his *Grand Etre*, collective Humanity, together with a form of worship, to feed the ideal side of human nature, without which he felt that its highest powers must wither and die. But who can admire and love a conscious abstraction? Our hearts warm and our souls kindle at the thoughts of individual saints or heroes, but collective Humanity as an object of worship leaves us as cold as the ashes of the myriad unknown generations that make it up. And even those worthies from whose lives and thoughts we catch some flame to light us on our way, had all of them their share of human weak-

nesses, the flaws of human imperfection. We may love and revere, but cannot adore them, unless, like the Roman Catholic, we invest them with the attributes of divinity. Still less can we surrender our whole being to the abstract of them, called Humanity, in the one all-sufficing prayer, "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven."

Besides this influence of love and loyalty to the morally Perfect, the most powerful of all, there are other moral influences belonging to belief in God, which could be replaced by no other agency: fear of God, desire of His approbation, faith in His love and sympathy.

Fear is the most abject, the most brute-like of human passions. But though incapable, as we have seen, of inspiring anything great or good, it is powerful as a check and restraint on the evil-doer. The fear of God in its lowest form—the fear of suffering punishment at His hands—is necessarily a check of the strongest kind, because there can be no hope of escaping detection. The All-seeing, to whom all hearts, as well as all lives, are open, who condemns the sinful desire no less than the sinful act, and from whom the darkness cannot cover us, and the night is as light as the day, has a terror no human terror can approach. And it is a terror felt with special keenness by the lower nature, on whom higher motives would have no effect. It is not so much the distinct fear of the punishment, but the sense of that awful Eye about their path and about their bed, which becomes an actual torture, and which has impelled many a criminal rather to give himself up to the worst penalties of human law, than hide it any longer in his breast. If modern Atheism ever succeeds in killing for a time the belief in God, it will have destroyed, for that time, the best defence of society against the brute element it contains.

But there is a higher form of the fear of God, of which it may be truly said, that it is the beginning of wisdom. It is

the awe we feel at His infinite Holiness—the abasement from the sense of our own unworthiness. In the beauty of that presence we feel our own ugliness as a palpable oppression, and learn to loathe the sin that makes it. Something of that feeling we have in the presence of any beautiful human character, and it is one of the most powerful of moral influences ; but, as said before, there is always enough imperfection in any human ideals to soothe our self-love with the flattering unction that, after all, they may not be altogether so very much better than ourselves ; and thus half the value of their influence be lost.

This awe of God leads necessarily to the desire for His approbation, to faith in His sympathy with our efforts to obtain it. Now all moralists, of whatever schools, count the desire of approbation, the fear of disapproval, and the feeling of sympathy among the most powerful levers of moral action ; and those of the Atheistic school hold them strong enough to support morality without any aid from a belief in God. It is, undoubtedly, true that in the ordinary conduct of life the practical code of morals for ordinary men and women is the public opinion of their class, which—except in the *classes dangereuses*—reflects, in its broad outlines, the law and customs of the time and country, modified, however, by each class to cover certain deviations in the direction of class-interests. As the lower motives of love of pleasure and fear of pain are sufficient to preserve the life and general welfare of the animal being, so this lower morality, founded on regard for the opinion of those among whom we live, and desire for their sympathy, is sufficient to keep the framework of society together, and to maintain that predominance of the social over the anti-social impulses in human conduct, necessary to its preservation and growth in the arts of life.

But the life neither of the individual nor of society can be bounded within these narrow limits. There are times in both,—times pregnant with fateful results,—when the cus-

tomary rules of morality utterly fail for the guidance of conduct. When one of these moments comes to a man—and the finer the nature the more likely they are to occur—moments when the sense of right, the call of duty within, is at variance with his national or class standard of morality,—the latter becomes a broken reed, piercing the hand that leans upon it. If he has no other support, he must stand alone, setting his individual judgment as to what is right against all his fellows and every association of his life. And yet it is to this higher moral sense in individuals, raising a higher standard of morality than the prevailing one, that the moral progress of society is ultimately due. The great reformers of the world have been men in whom this keener moral sense amounted to genius, and made them capable of inspiring their fellow-men with the moral enthusiasm which boldly flings itself into battle against the old standards of faith and conduct, and conquers for the race a new and higher standpoint. From the tradesman resisting the petty frauds sanctioned by the customs of his trade, to the apostle of new truths, revolutionising old systems of faith and morals, the man who departs from the moral grooves of his time and class, not only loses all the landmarks by which he has been hitherto guided, but finds the moral sympathy and approbation of his fellow-men,—which, on the Atheistic hypothesis, is the only emotional power backing up his intellectual judgments of right and wrong,—arrayed in its full force against him, as the presumptuous disturber of established rules, perhaps the sacrilegious destroyer of the temples in which his fathers worshipped. The more sensitive his moral nature, the more terrible to him will be this moral isolation and the sense of reprobation which accompanies it. There may be some men so self-contained in their superiority that they can bear this awful moral solitude and not quail before its terrors, but they are the rare exceptions from which no rule for the race in

general can be drawn. To all but these, faith in God and in conscience as His voice within the heart, will make in such moments of isolation all the difference between the position of a deserter, even a betrayer, of his people and that of the leader of a forlorn hope. I use advisedly the word "faith," as indicating the emotional power wanting in belief which is simply intellectual assent. In that sense, as "the evidence of things not seen," it is the truest of truths that we are saved by faith only, for its emotional power alone can lead to belief the strength and glow of a moral force-impelling action. He who has it can appeal from the condemnation of his fellow-men to the approval of the Lord, whose soldier and servant he is, and can still say, when all have deserted him, even his own familiar friend in whom he trusted, "I am not alone, for my Father is with me." Let those who have ever tried to hold by their own sense of truth and right against the loved and honoured parent or friend, and under the obloquy and contempt of their own society, tell what that faith has done for them. It would be very difficult in the present day to judge how far even those who profess the most uncompromising Atheism are still unconsciously influenced by faith in an eternal law of right and wrong, independent of all human judgment, which is the moral atmosphere of Christianity breathed by them from their cradles; and not till Atheism has so completely replaced it as to have formed its own atmosphere of constant, unconscious influence, will it be possible to estimate fully the moral effects of each upon practical life.

There is yet one more force to be enumerated of those which faith in God brings to the aid of morality, and that is Prayer. It is the favourite assumption of the anti-theological schools that prayer is simply petition for Divine favour or deprecation of Divine wrath, and that belief in its efficacy means belief in special interpositions of Providence to control or change the order of events in accordance with

the interests of the petitioner. Taken in this sense, it is, of course, easy to show that such interpositions are contrary to all we know of the laws of the universe, and that if there were such a power in the prayers of each blind, ignorant human suppliant to change the order of nature, and introduce, at any moment, a new and incalculable force into the sequence of phenomena, not only all science, but all reliance upon ordinary experience, would be at an end, and the world relapse into chaos. The progress of science, which depends solely on the assumption that the laws it discovers are invariable—an assumption, indeed, as unproveable, *à priori*, as any theological dogma, but resting on the whole past experience of mankind,—has so moulded popular opinion in this sense that, although prayers for change of weather, for bounteous harvests, or for the prevention or cure of disease, are still put up in our churches, it may be doubted whether there is anything like real faith in their effect amongst the congregations that repeat them. And where that faith yet exists, it is still more doubtful whether it does not rather detract from than lead to a high tone of morals, by fostering the pernicious belief that temporal prosperity or adversity are signs of Divine favour or wrath towards individuals, and preventing that entire acceptance of God's will as the best, which is the very essence of an ennobling faith in Him.

But the prayer which is a true and most powerful force in human life is the prayer which is not petition to change the will of God, but for strength to do and bear it; the prayer that, in the very heat and burden of the day, can lift us out of the fret, the clash, the pricks and stings of life, the dust and jarring noises of its highway, into that larger and serener air of the unseen and eternal, breathing peace to the mind stayed upon God; prayer consciously baring the heart before Him who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, and by the very effort to see as He sees, clearing our moral vision from the beam that obstructs it; prayer

which, under the stress and strain of strong temptation,—when passion is surging as a flood, blinding and confusing the reason, overpowering the voice of conscience,—raises the cry for help, and finds it in the strong grasp of faith, keeping the soul steady to the law it can no longer see. Such prayer as this, which is the direct outcome of faith in God, and is, moreover, a natural impulse of the human heart, is an incalculable force on the side of virtue, and there is nothing to replace it in any Atheistical system, for its strength lies in its personality; it is the appeal of the human heart to a Divine heart touched with the feeling of its infirmities, and can never be made to an impersonal force or abstraction, be it the “Grand Etre” of the Positivists or any other.

Let us now consider Conscience, or the sense of right and wrong, as affected by belief or disbelief in God. But, first, I must point out, as I have done on a former occasion,\* the error regarding the nature of Conscience, which consists in attributing to it the legislative as well as the executive power over conduct—the function of pronouncing *what* is right and wrong as well as of commanding that the right be done. This view, which is unfortunately held by many Theists and moralists of the intuitive school, is the most formidable weapon in the hands of their opponents, who can point to the endless diversities of the moral code in different ages, nations, and races, and ask, triumphantly, Where is the evidence of an intuitive moral standard common to all men? In fact, however, Conscience exercises no such function, and the history of man teaches us that he discovers moral truth by the same slow and tentative processes as he advances in every other direction, though carried forward as with a bound, from time to time, by the men of moral genius—the Galileos, the Bacons, the Newtons

\* See *Theological Review*, April, 1879. “God, Duty, and Immortality: a Reply.”

of moral science—who reveal to the common herd the moral beauty and truth which, once seen, commands their allegiance, kindles their reverential love, and leads them through instinctive admiration to the loftier moral standard they could never have reasoned out. The only universal moral intuition in man, which may strictly be called a moral sense, is the sense that there is a right and a wrong in action, and that the right *ought* to be done, come what come may. This is the true expression of Conscience. The judgment whether this or that action is our duty, may be entirely erroneous; the doing of it may cost all that makes life worth having, or what is dearer than life to all but the most abject of creatures—the life, the welfare, or the love and esteem of our own best beloved and honoured ones; but never, for one instant, does the voice within falter in its command: that duty felt to be duty, must be done.

This at once seems to dispose of the argument that Conscience is only the voice of the inherited experience of self-interest. That is the voice of prudence, counting the cost of actions, and its utterance is too often diametrically opposed to that of duty bidding us act at any cost. Society is much more given to slaying than to honouring its prophets, and even if they leave any posterity to inherit their noble peculiarities, it can scarcely be averred that this variety has any advantage in the struggle for life. It is true that subsequent generations often build the sepulchres of those their fathers have slain, and adopt them for their heroes; but this is scarcely the kind of reward which will set the desires of flesh and blood flowing towards it, overcoming all nearer and more certain pains and pleasures; and if, indeed, the benefits so derived stamp themselves in human memory as worth the price they cost, it can only be because there is something stronger in human nature than flesh and blood—love and loyalty to the good *per se*.

We shall be met here by the reclamation of the opposite



school of anti-theological moralists—the Altruistic—who, far from making selfishness the *primum mobile* of human action, put in its place the very quintessence of disinterestedness, and make the enthusiasm of humanity the basis of morals. But the noble and the ignoble theory are both vitiated by the same error, the singling out of one factor from our complex human nature, and overlooking or undervaluing the rest. The Utilitarian sees this factor in self-interest, and by some metaphysical hocus-pocus makes the disinterested affections—love, generosity, and self-devotion—but transformations of selfishness. The Altruist takes the disinterested affections and eliminates from his scheme, not only selfishness, but even all desire for personal happiness. And unfortunately, his failure to construct a workable code of morals will be more absolute than that of his Utilitarian rival, in so far as its basis will be further removed from actual fact. For the bare framework of society can be, and has been, kept together by the action of self-interest, and the rewards of prudent conduct are visible to the meanest capacity; but no society can be composed of saints and heroes, willing with St. Paul to be accursed from all happiness for the sake of their brethren; and there is every reason to fear that any partial success in establishing such a superhuman standard of action would end, like similar attempts on the theological side, in a rebellion of outraged nature and a frantic return of the over-cleansed flesh to wallow in its mire again. And the difficulties of the Altruist would be so far greater than the theologian's, that by his Positivist hypothesis, the humanity from whom he demands this sublime enthusiasm and for whose sake it is to be exercised, is only a succession of ephemera, born to live one brief hour of pleasure or pain, and to die, "leaving not a wrack behind."

There is a last argument against the Atheistic claims which might logically supersede the necessity of any other,

for it shows that the materialism which is the foundation of modern Atheism, does, in fact, cut away the very root of morality in the strict sense of the word. In that sense, as the rule of right or wrong, it rests upon the assumption that man is a free agent, that he can choose between two courses of action, and that his choice is justly followed by the moral approval or disapproval of his fellows. This free agency, however, is exactly what is denied him by the predominant scientific school of the present day. It is asserted that human life is only the product of physical forces, bringing about certain integrations or disintegrations of matter, and that the human being, with all his apparent energies, emotions, intelligence, will, is but the mechanical result of these combinations, eternally reproduced by the same senseless, feelingless, purposeless concourse of atoms. If this be true, all the terms by which we designate human action are simply misnomers. There can be neither virtue nor vice, righteousness nor iniquity, in a being who is simply a machine moved by other machines. Whatsoever he does he cannot help doing, and praise or blame would be as appropriately given to him for doing it, as to the bullet for hitting or missing the mark at which it is sent. The magnificent drama of human life sinks into a puppet-show without even a showman, and its infinite play of action and passion into the mere clash of sound and motion, "signifying nothing."

This is the logical and inevitable conclusion from the theory of the materialistic school, which no sophism can evade, no fine phrases disguise. When it has mastered the popular mind through the zealous proselytism of its teachers, society may go on punishing malefactors as it hunts down noxious animals, but it will cease to have the right of inflicting moral reprobation in addition to its material penalties, and instead of criminals, it must only speak of unfortunates. The tremendous weapon of moral indig-

nation, of moral outlawry, will be taken out of its hand, and its most powerful ally within the breast of man himself, remorse, will cease to have any existence, for how can we feel remorse for that which we did automatically, or moral indignation against the automaton? It will, of course, be attempted to deny that the doctrine carries this extreme consequence, or the answer will be a *tu quoque* against the spiritualistic theory of morals which must equally take account of material conditions, and cannot abstract the man from his antecedents or his environment. But the spiritualistic theory holds these two saving principles, which Atheism denies: First, that the man brought by his antecedents and environment under the force of a special temptation, can choose whether he will yield to it,—can deliberately fix his attention on one of two motives to action and thus make the action his own for which he is justly responsible; secondly, that his life does not end here, and that the moral purpose which has been overborne on earth by the earthly conditions he could not escape from, will be worked out in another stage of existence. Nor can these principles be decried as the invention of any theological sect or school, for on the first are based the whole edifice of human legislation and education, the whole meaning of language in relation to conduct, and every code of morals of whatever age or nation; and the second rests on the unquenchable hope of the human race that the life of man is not as the life of the beasts that perish, but that he has a hereafter beyond the grave.

This brings us to the influence over conduct of the belief in Immortality. The favourite representation of the practical result of that belief by anti-theological moralists is that of other-worldliness, the prudence which regulates conduct so as to make the best of both worlds, or, at least, the virtue, if virtue it can be called, which sacrifices temporal to eternal advantages. It cannot be denied that in many

phases of religious belief such motives have been the prevalent ones, and, low as they are, they have been considered such potent forces on the side of law and order that, to preserve them, it has often been thought worth while, by the most sceptical, to preserve the superstition on which they rest. Paradoxical, however, as it may seem, I am inclined to doubt whether their influence is really so great. The fear which is a power over a certain order of minds is, as we have seen, the present fear of God's omniscience backing up the pricks of conscience. But to realise the far-off torments of hell or bliss of heaven requires more imagination than such minds generally possess, and there is, besides, a gambling spirit in man which makes him at all times ready to toss up for his chance, and to believe that something will happen to save him from the consequences of his own actions. The sinner sins in view of hell as the miner uncovers his light in view of fire-damp. Death, with all that comes after death, is uncertain; the pleasure for which he takes the risk is at hand. That is the tangible reality before which the intangible future pales and vanishes as a dream. Even at its strongest, when men's imaginations had a more vivid power of personification, and the Devil and his angels stood opposed to God and His Saints in mortal warfare, the human soul being the prize for which they contended, this fear could only act as a check upon vice. It could not inspire virtue, and the doctrine of eternal punishment by darkening the character of God and taxing His judgments with the awful injustice of an infinite doom for a finite offence has, I believe, done more to drive men into reckless unbelief than all the arguments of Atheism. The keener sense of justice, together with the tenderer humanity, developed by the progress of civilisation, tend to make the doctrine more and more revolting, until it is felt by all the nobler minds who dare to face the meaning of the creeds they repeat, that hell itself were

preferable to worshipping absolute power without justice or love.

But there is an element in the belief in Immortality, which is the quickening spirit of the highest morality. It is the belief that its highest reward is to draw nearer and nearer to the supreme perfection we can here only dimly apprehend, and beholding it "as in a glass, to be transformed by it into the same image, from glory to glory,"—that its direst penalty is to feel the great gulf that divides us from it. Again, the belief in immortality appeals to the most powerful, because most constant factor in human nature, to Hope, that "springs eternal in the human breast;" Hope, pure and simple, apart from all special views concerning the future life, as the background of infinite possibilities, stretching out above and beyond the poorest, meanest, most miserable of human lives, and making all the difference between living in a mine without an outlet, and under the open vault of heaven. Hope, the one blessing which clings to us when all else is gone, this it is of which Atheism would rob us. Some faint idea of what human morality would become if it should succeed in the attempt, may be gathered from the records of the behaviour of men under the influence of despair, and its expression is ready-written for us: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." And it is on the lives of the masses—the toiling, suffering millions of mankind—that this loss of hope will mainly tell. It will, indeed, cast a shadow over the sunshine of the happiest, make satiety more sickening, and give to cynicism a bitterer flavour; but the full magnitude of its import will be felt only by the disinherited of the earth, and they, when they realise that there is no other inheritance to hope for, will turn with brute force on the privileged few who have monopolised it here, and strive to wrench it from their hands through blood and ashes.

Yet Atheism boasts that human life will retain its worth

undiminished; that it will lose none of its dignity, its higher aspirations, its beauty or its poetry, when recognised to be wholly of the earth earthy. Let us hear a word on this subject from one who will assuredly not be suspected of sickly idealism or sickly sentimentalism of any kind—Prince Bismarck. "It is incomprehensible to me," he says, in a letter to his wife, "how any human being, who thinks about himself at all, and who is ignorant, or chooses to remain ignorant, of God, can live under his load of self-contempt and *ennui*. . . . If I had to live now as I did then . . . I really do not know why I should not throw off this life like a dirty shirt." \* And this was written by him in the prime of life, with every affection gratified, with the magnificent career he has since run opening unclouded before him; and he specially begs his wife, to whom the letter is addressed, not to suppose it is written in a particularly dark mood, but that, on the contrary, his health and spirits are good. And in a letter written ten years later, speaking of the shortness of life even in the happiest case, and when prolonged to its fullest span, he says: "It would not be worth while to dress and undress if it were over with that" (p. 163). If the promise of this life only was not worth living for in the estimation of one to whom its richest fulfilment was assured, what must it be to the mass of mortals, for whom it means only a shorter or longer treadmill round, with certain pains and uncertain pleasures, the lower and the higher cravings of our nature equally unsatisfied, and the noble and the base equally suffering from a sense of the injustice of fate, which made them to desire and forbids them to enjoy? What poetry, what art, what morality will long survive under the belief that man is only an earthworm of more differentiated protoplasm; his love and faith but atomic currents of the brain, or may be—as the French philosopher asserted—of the smaller

\* Prince Bismarck's Letters. Translated by T. Maxse. 2nd ed., p. 86.

intestines ; and the power ruling all, not a God and Father, but a millwheel of perpetual motion, lower than himself in that it has not even a brain? With what face can the Atheistic moralist ask of such a being to sacrifice his one little earthly morsel of joy of which alone he can make sure, that other earthworms like himself—not even his own kith and kin, but unknown and unborn—should have larger morsels when he himself has returned to his original dust? If any proof were needed of the extent to which the old spiritual faith and hopes of mankind still govern the minds that believe themselves entirely rid of them, it would be found in these lofty theories of self-forgetting morals and an ideal humanity, so sublimely inconsistent with their other theory of the universe, as a self-acting machine, with no law but that of mechanical force.

It will be asked—sadly enough by some, more or less scoffingly by others—why, if religious belief has the influence on morality here attributed to it, it has not raised the condition of the believing masses of mankind above what we now see it. Why, in the nineteenth century of Christianity—the purest form of religion ever known—impurity and selfishness, with all their brood of meanness, vice, and crime, are still rampant in every Christian country, and society honeycombed by the corruption they engender? To answer this question would be to answer the question of all time, Why does evil exist? Why have man and the conditions of his earthly existence been constituted as they are, to pass through an infinite series of imperfections towards a perfection unattained, invisible as yet, and why is life a battle which slays its thousands for the triumph of a few? The believer in

One God, one law, one element,  
And one far-off divine event  
To which the whole creation moves;

who trusts that every life lost here shall be found again

hereafter, and Death be swallowed up in victory, can wait in patient hope for the lifting up of the veil. But to the unbeliever, the existence of evil, the contemplation of "the whole creation groaning and travailing together in pain until now," to produce nothing better than a little more comfort and pleasure for each passing generation during its brief span of life, till life itself is swallowed up in death, must, one would suppose, bring the very blackness of despair. But no; modern Atheism accepts the conclusion with even truculent exultation, and preaches from the only text in the Bible it believes in, "Dust thou art, and to dust thou shalt return," as if it were, indeed, the "Good tidings of great joy, which shall be unto all people."

Some, indeed, there are among its followers who do acknowledge the dreariness of the outlook, but say: It is best to know and make known the truth, be it ever so bitter. Why? If there be a God, and Truth is His word to man, then, indeed, it is best—it is vital to our souls to know it. But if there be no God and we have no souls, then only the truth which concerns the life of our bodies can be of any value; and the ignorant impatience of such gritty food, exhibited by the subtler form of matter called by some spirit, might be harmlessly soothed, as Comte recommends, with poetic fictions about the Unseen and Eternal, for which it craves with a persistence so unbecoming its character as matter.

One thing there is abundant evidence to prove: that, however lamentably religion may have failed to raise human conduct to its ideal standard of morality, the absence of religion, where it has been general in any society, has been accompanied by a fearful increase of immorality. Witness the morals of the later Roman Empire; of Italy, under the first pagan influence of the Renaissance; of France, during the last half of the eighteenth century. Witness also the doctrines of the Nihilists and of all the extreme Socialist,



or, as they should rather be called, anti-socialist, sects of whatever nationality, who would abolish the family, property, and social organisation, together with God, and with unconscious logic call for absolute lawlessness as the only complete expression of Atheistic liberty. Religion, in fact, is, in its essence, faith in a supreme and adorable Law over human life. Called by a thousand names, worshipped under a thousand forms, expressed through a thousand symbols, interpreted in a thousand ways, it still—even when most ignobly travestied—rescues man from the lawlessness of the brutes. His wisdom lies in reading it aright; his happiness in loving it; his highest dignity in obeying it voluntarily, finding in its service his perfect freedom.

MARIA G. GREY.

## DEAN STANLEY.

**T**HREE foremost names already stand inscribed on the English death-roll of 1881. Three men of influence more diverse on English thought, sentiment, and action than Thomas Carlyle, Benjamin Disraeli, and Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, it would indeed be difficult to name.

The mark which Dean Stanley leaves on the mind of England is individual and unique; yet seldom are the influences of early association and training more clearly traceable in a man's mature and permanent work than in his case. The home at Alderley, the school-days at Rugby, the parents' example, the tutor's counsels, recur to the mind continually as it contemplates the character and the career unfolded successively at Oxford and at Westminster.

It is to the reverent affection of the son and pupil himself that we owe the vivid impression called up in our minds by the names of Edward Stanley, of Catherine Stanley, of Thomas Arnold.

Edward Stanley became Rector of Alderley ten years before the birth of Arthur, his second son. When he left his rectory for the Bishop's palace at Norwich, Arthur was already running his brilliant career at Oxford. Mr. Stanley's predecessor in the Cheshire parish "used to boast that he had never set foot in a sick person's cottage;" and during his incumbency, "the clerk used to go to the church-yard-stile to see whether there were any more coming to church, for there were seldom enough to make a congregation." Mr. Stanley was a clergyman *malgré lui*: his

passion was for a sea-faring life. But the thirty years of his pastoral charge were spent in unremitting and affectionate intercourse with his people, which won for him their unmeasured love and veneration. The good rector was a man of much simplicity, no great scholar, but of a sincerity, a directness, a conscientiousness, and a kindliness, that did much more for the elevation of his parishioners and the training of his children than would have been achieved by more brilliant parts with less sterling character. From his example his sons imbibed an honesty and a warmth of heart which won for two of them high regard in the antipodes, and for one the respect and affection of the English people. Even Miss Martineau, though she introduces him as "the nervous, good-natured, indiscreet rattle," and most inaptly pronounces him "timid as a hare,"\* found him "admirable in his way," and declares that "in the function of benevolence to the poor and afflicted, he was exemplary." But doubtless the rarer graces of mind and character which marked the late Dean of Westminster, descended to him rather from his mother than his father. The latter was the brave and conscientious presbyter and prelate, who officered his church, as he would have officered a ship, with conspicuous loyalty and self-devotion; the former was a woman of singular refinement of intellectual and spiritual culture. At once the brightness and the consecration of the home over which she presided, she infused into her child that exquisite sensibility which coloured alike his intercourse with men, his literary temperament, and his personal religion. In his manliness and his sincerity the son drew from the paternal stores; in the finely strung chords of his religious nature his mother's gentle spirit lived again.

But it is the strong, shaping hand of Arnold that is most clearly to be seen as mind and soul unfold to their maturity. Dean Stanley often rebuked the tone of the nominally

\* Harriet Martineau's *Autobiography*, I., p. 339.

religious press. His gentle form, no longer tenanted by the gifted soul, still lay unburied in the precincts of the mighty Abbey, when the *Church Times* permitted itself to speak of "the romantic biography wherein and whereby he created the Arnold myth, and elevated a man who, with much force of personal character, had a very poor, narrow, and ragged quality of intellect, into a hero and demi-god, in the very teeth of the rebutting evidence abundantly supplied by that noxious product of forty-five years ago, the average 'Rugby prig.'" We are not concerned to deny the existence of the "priggish" element in some of the Arnold school; but the Arnold of the biography was not a myth, but a fact full of beneficent results in the England of the mid-century, full of fruit even now in the English Press, the English Senate, and the English Church. And by none has the influence of Arnold been more effectually transmitted than by Arthur Stanley. The fervid, constructive, political radicalism of Arnold has been chiefly continued indeed by a distinguished pupil who has never taken orders. Dean Stanley probably never felt any temptation to found, edit, write, and pay for a weekly *Register*, to instruct working men in the higher principles of politics. But Stanley's theory of the English Church was taken bodily, and his attitude towards Nonconformists was directly developed, from that of Arnold. His leading principle, the union of the secular and the sacred, though differently applied, was in itself the animating principle of Arnold also. The suggestion of the treatment of sacred history as a development, and of its heroes as men of like flesh and blood to our own, came to him from Arnold's enthusiastic acceptance of Niebuhr; and the whole strain of his writings as an historian is coloured by the enthusiasm with which he recalls the great day when Arnold delivered his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford.\* "If,"

\* Life of Dr. Arnold. Fourth Ed., II., p. 292.

says Dr. Stanley, in the preface to his first important theological work, "there are fewer references than might naturally have been expected to the name of one to whom, though not living, this, as well as any similar work which I may be called to undertake, must in great measure be due, it is because I trust that I may be allowed to take this opportunity of vindicating, once for all, for the scholars of Arnold, the privilege and pleasure of using his words and adopting his thoughts without the necessity of specifying in every instance the source from which they have been derived."\* Yet again and again, in sermon, in essay, in history, does the name of that beloved master recur, linked by the fond reverence of the pupil with those of the most famous English Churchmen—Hooker, Butler, Chillingworth,—with those of the most illustrious Christian apostles—Athanasius, Augustine, Luther.

In tracing the chief personal influences which went to the making of the remarkable man whom we have lost, it is necessary, after parting with the parents and the school-master, to pass over some thirty years of life, more or less recluse, to meet Dr. Stanley again with that companion by his side who completed the full orb of his perfect manhood. The first volume of his *Lectures on the Jewish Church*, published six months after his widowed mother died, is dedicated "to the dear memory of her, by whose firm faith, calm wisdom, and tender sympathy these and all other labours have for years been sustained and cheered." The third volume was the offering of the widowed husband at the grave of "the inseparable partner in every joy and every struggle of twelve eventful years." To her that volume, "the solicitude and solace of her latest days," is dedicated "with the humble prayer that its aim may not be altogether unworthy of her sustaining love, her inspiring courage, and her never-failing faith in the enlargement of the Church

\* *Sermons and Essays on the Apostolical Age*. Second Edition, p. iii.

and the triumph of all truth." Of what his noble wife was to the Dean of Westminster those may have some glimmering conception who, finding him in his last years companioned in his spacious yet homely study, by the marble bust that stood, not on any lofty shelf or remote pedestal, but on the table littered with his books and papers, have seen his eye wander to the chiselled features as he said, "Ah, if she were here, she would tell me what I ought to do."

But the personal influences which moulded the mind and character of the great Churchman who has passed out from among us have been drawn with so charming a pencil by one most highly qualified for the grateful task,\* that we hasten to our more proper business, the estimate of the man as a factor in the life and thought of his country and his age. We pass by the distinguished career at Oxford, during which the sustained communion with Arnold proved ample protection from that far more brilliant Churchman, whose subtle, mighty power was penetrating the heart of the youthful talent and enthusiasm of the University. The spell of Newman's genius was vain against the triple armour of the young Rugbeian's loyalty. We pass over the period of waxing reputation in the canonry at Canterbury, when first the young clergyman's delight in welding together the great events of history and the spots of earth on which they befell found adequate and congenial vent. We pass over the second group of years spent at Oxford, this time in the very fulness of manhood, and with accredited honour as Canon of Christ Church and Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History. We pass over the years, all too few, of established and finally cosmopolitan fame, spent in communion with the very spirit of the venerable Church of the Confessor and Henry III.—a

\* Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, by A. J. C. Hare. *Macmillan's Magazine*, September, 1881.

communion so full and deep that no man could hear the name of the Dean, but the cloistered glory of the Abbey rose up in his mind, and seemed to speak with the voices of centuries of the royal and gifted dead whom the magician's potent wand had called back to life; and no man could hear the name of the Abbey, but the short, slight figure, and the grey, quick eye, and refined and speaking features of the Dean were conjured up before him. We pass over the varied travel with which the conversation and the writings of the Dean were so luminously enriched,—the boy's trip to the Pyrenees and his ecstatic cry, "What shall I do? What shall I do?" as the Pic du Midi glowed roseate upon his vision; the young man's wanderings through Italy and Greece; the later journeys through lands consecrated by the footsteps of Patriarchs, Prophets, and the chief Son of Man; that visit to the frozen court of the North, where he saw the consummation of a Prince's happiness, while the relentless climate, attacking his own wife, prepared his own abiding grief; the voyage to the great Western land, where for the first time he saw an English people without a Westminster, without a Canterbury, without an Oxford, without an Establishment, and learnt how well they fared.

The qualities of mind and heart which were revealed in the countenance and conversation of Dean Stanley, as testified by all who have had the least acquaintance with him, shine also in his writings. Seldom have any man's books been so perfect a mirror of himself. To say this is to say that his character was permeated with sincerity. He could write only what he thought and felt. To affect or to suppress an opinion or an emotion was impossible to his face or to his pen. His eyes, his tongue, his books always spoke the truth—or what was truth to him; and they always spoke the truth in love. This love, so easy to talk about, to preach about, so rarely maintained as the ruling spring

of life, was by him so maintained. This is proved by the love which he awoke in others. There are many ecclesiastics who are respected far and wide; many who are loved by those within the immediate circle of their influence: we know of none in our generation except Dean Stanley who have been heartily and unreservedly loved by men of every Church, by their fierce opponents no less than their warm allies. Of all Churchmen, Dean Stanley most effectually combated the spirit of Dissent; yet the Non-conformists who took part as pall-bearers when the Dean was laid in his beloved Abbey were representatives, in that last act of affectionate service, of myriads of Dissenters and Liberationists. At no other ecclesiastical group in Christendom had he shot such shafts of railery as at the Ritualists and their friends. Against a motion seconded by Archdeacon Denison he had delivered the most fiery and sarcastic speech to be found in his works.\* Yet it is the hot-headed Archdeacon who, when the first wave of sorrow broke over the land, delivered of all others the most touching testimony of tender friendship.† The scoff of his

\* Speech on the South African Controversy. Essays chiefly on Questions of Church and State, from 1850 to 1870, pp. 296-331.

† We cannot forbear to preserve the simple words pronounced by Archdeacon Denison, in the Lower House of Convocation, on the morning of the great bereavement. He said:—

“My words shall be very few. Words at such a time are poor things. What I have to say refers to the last time I ever spoke with our dear friend who is gone. It was in his own house, when I was coming away from the last of those hospitable receptions at which it was manifestly a great pleasure to receive members of this House. I was leaving the room with him, and, thinking that he was looking far from well, I said to him, ‘Dear Dean, let me say one word to you.’ We went a little aside, and I said—‘I have been on the point of writing to you many times just lately, but I never like writing to a man about his sermons, and I held my hand; but now I have the opportunity, let me say that few things have touched and moved me more nearly than your sermon on the death of my dear old friend John Thynne, and I cannot help saying so to you.’ His face lighted up, he took hold of both of my hands, and said, ‘I am very glad indeed that you have told me this.’ So we parted. The light on his face and the hearty kindness of his words will never leave my memory. It is one out of a thousand instances of the same character. It is not only the great intellectual qualities of the late Dean of Westminster, and it is not many men who have qualities so great; but it is the heart of the Dean of Westminster—



enemies, that he was "honorary member of all the denominations," derived its point from the truth that his heart was of no denomination. His sympathy was so strong and so finely strung that it vibrated to chords in every devout spirit. It extended not only to the Arnolds and Stanleys of other Churches and other lands, Philaret, the gentle Archbishop of Moscow, and Kolomna, Chunder Sen, the ardent reformer of Bengal, but (what is so much rarer) to the most vehement opponents of his own principles and policy in his own land and his own Church. Psychologically, this moral trait had one source with the extraordinary power of realisation of the person of another which gives such vivacity and life to his historical sketches. Socially, it gave that magic charm to his manner by which the humblest individual, casually thrown into contact with him, was set at once at ease, and felt that he was with one who intuitively understood all the best part of his nature. Religiously, it lay at the very heart of his Christianity, which was that simple sentiment of brotherhood to all men in sonship to the Father, which was the inspiration and power of Jesus Christ.

It will be convenient to consider Dean Stanley's position as an Ecclesiastic, as a Theologian, as an Historian.

I. As an Ecclesiastic he was emphatically a Church of England man. No Presbyterian or Bishop has ever served that Church with a more profound devotion. He declared himself—and unquestionably he was—"an Erastian of the Erastians" \*; but he was so because he conceived that the Erastian position best served both State and Church. The Church of England was to him an institution of such bene-

his affections, his sympathy, his loving-kindness which will long survive with us all the recollection of differences of judgment, however wide. No man has differed more with him than I have. No man has had more occasion and more reason than I have to carry with me to the end all that I feel now."—*Guardian*, July 20, 1881.

\* Lectures on the Church of Scotland. Second Edition, p. 19.

ficent and far-reaching capability, that he felt her ministry to be the most sacred office which any man could hold. "To serve," said he, "a great institution, and by serving it to endeavour to promote within it a vitality which shall secure it as the shelter for such as will have to continue the same struggle after they are gone, is an object for which much may be and ought to be endured which otherwise would be intolerable."\*

But it was as an Establishment that he especially valued the English Church. The essence of Establishment he found, not in endowments, nor in any secular offices held by the clergy, nor in the constant interference of the State, but in the recognition and ultimate control of the clergy by the State. In this recognition and control he saw the best guarantee for the comprehensiveness and the elasticity of the Church. Impressed with this view, he deprecated disestablishment whether in England or in Scotland. To his mind the movement for disestablishment in Scotland arose from "narrow and retrograde principles," from "illiberal prejudice;" and observing its growing attractions for liberal statesmen, "it is to be hoped," he cried,

"That this eclipse of the more generous and enlightened principles which marked the liberal statesmanship of former days is not permanent, and that this generation will not live to deplore the reckless sacrifice of great opportunities in the future to the party watchwords of modern sacerdotalism in the fleeting controversies of the present moment." To destroy the Established Church of Scotland would be, he averred, "to destroy not merely an ancient institution, with endowments which would be taken from it only to be uselessly squandered, and with opportunities for Christian beneficence which no wise man would willingly take away in an age where material progress is so disproportionately active—it would be to destroy, as far as human efforts can destroy, the special ideas of freedom, of growth, of comprehension which are avowedly repugnant to the very

\* *Essays Chiefly on Questions of Church and State, from 1850 to 1870,* p. xxx.

purpose of the seceding Churches, but which are inherent in the very existence of a National Church." \*

"We cannot afford," says he, "to lose the testimonies furnished by an institution like the Church of Scotland in behalf of free inquiry, of the sacredness of individual conscience, of the superiority of the spirit over the letter, and of the moral and intellectual over the material forms of religion." †

It was doubtless an astonishment to many visitors from the manses that line the Firth of Forth to the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh to hear themselves thus applauded for virtues which they craved not, by the Southern prelatie minister. But the sincerity and fervour of Stanley's faith in the principle of a State Church ring out in his praise of his own noble Minister.

"Whilst Westminster Abbey stands the Church of England stands. So long as its stones are not sold to the first chance purchaser—so long as it remains the sanctuary, not of any private sect, but of the English people—so long as the great Council of the nation which assisted at its first dedication recognises its religious purpose; so long the separation between the English State and the English Church will not have been accomplished." ‡

However largely this view of the inherent comprehensive-ness of an Establishment may seem due to enthusiasm, there is no doubt that Arthur Stanley himself did all that in him lay to stamp with such a character the Church in which he served. Arnold had been convinced "that the founders of our present constitution in Church and State did 'truly consider them to be identical, the Christian nation of England to be the Church of England, the head of that nation to be for that very reason the head of the Church,'" and had "asked with an indignant sorrow 'whether it were indeed indifference or latitudinarianism, to

\* Lectures on the Church of Scotland. Second Edition, pp. xi., 172.

† Church of Scotland, p. 190.

‡ Historical Memorials of Westminster Abbey. Fourth Edition, p. 523

wish most devoutly that this noble, this divine theory, might be fully and for ever realised ; ' ' \* and his pupil and biographer perceived that this co-extension of Church and Nation, this identification of churchmanship and citizenship, could only be approached in the measure in which the Church expanded to receive religious men of every shade of theological opinion. Accordingly, he pushed his desire for comprehension so far as to urge again and again that which he even dared in a limited degree to practise, the interchange of pulpits between the ordained clergyman of the Establishment and the Dissenter who had never subscribed the Articles.†

The supreme test of his love of comprehension lay in his vigorous protest against every attempt to thrust the Tractarians and the Ritualists from the Church. These "Nonconformists within the Church of England," this "sect within its bosom," ‡ worked against every opinion and every sentiment which to him were dear, magnified everything which he deemed insignificant. To him their sacerdotalism was as abominable as to any Quaker, their estimate of the Eucharist was replete with mischief, their cherished vestments were "the shreds and patches of the clothes worn by Roman nobles and labourers." § Their pretensions to the exclusive government of the Establishment were to him in the last degree offensive. It is against them, and them almost alone, that he ever falls into harsh and vehement language. To their good works, and theirs alone, he appears incapable of according the credit due. Yet history is on his side when he rebukes Cardinal Newman for alleging in

\* Arnold's Church Reform, Postscript, p. 24, quoted in Life of Dr. Arnold, 4th Ed., I., p. 233.

† The admission of Scotch Churchmen and English Nonconformists to the pulpits of the English Establishment is recommended with unabated enthusiasm in Dean Stanley's Introduction to "Church and Chapel" (p. xliv.) posthumously published.

‡ Church and Chapel, p. xxvii.

§ Christian Institutions, p. 157.

justification of those "fierce thoughts against the Liberal school" to which he owns and of which he boasts, that the Liberals were the men who drove him from the Anglican Church.\* Stanley undoubtedly reflected Arnold's opinion, that "any mind that could turn towards the books and the system of the Newmanites with anything less than aversion appears to be already diseased;" † but as a young man he stood beside Tait and Maurice and Donkin and Hull to protest against any official censure of Tract XC., and in the maturity of his influence he bade his fellow clergy to extend an unrestricted toleration even to the supreme follies of so-called Ritualists, and to "let them add, if so be," to cope and chasuble "the peacocks' feathers which the Pope borrowed from the Kings of Persia, or the scarlet shoes which he took from the Roman Emperors." ‡

It was in pursuance of this same policy of utmost comprehension that Dean Stanley from first to last took so deep an interest in the question of Subscription. Arnold himself, as is well known, had experienced serious scruples in early life; though his later difficulties with regard to the Articles were confined to doubts about the proper canonicity of the Epistle to the Hebrews.§ It appears that Stanley also passed under a dark "cloud" of trial ere his conscience could yield to the representations of Arnold and permit him to take orders. But the vehemence and pertinacity of his pleadings for an enlargement of the terms of Subscription were dictated by the desire to remove a stumbling-block from the path of others, that the threshold of the Church might be clear for the footsteps of the most scrupulous. In 1840, Archbishop Whately, "trembling from head to foot," presented a petition to the House of Lords, originating with Canon Wodehouse and

\* *Macmillan's Magazine*, Jan. 1881, p. 210.

† *Life of Arnold*, 4th Ed., II., p. 7.

‡ *Christian Institutions*, p. 174.

§ *Life of Arnold*, 4th Ed., II., p. 138.

signed by sixty Churchmen, praying for a modification of Subscription. Young Stanley sat a silent spectator of the scene and heard the courageous words in which his father alone of all the Episcopal Bench dared to support the prayer of the petition; heard also the hiss of the "burning shell" thrown by Bishop Blomfield, which with its "concentrated fire" abruptly closed the debate and postponed all relief for a quarter of a century.\* In 1863, Arthur Stanley addressed to a far more enlightened Bishop of London a Letter on "the state of Subscription," which did as much to precipitate reform as Bishop Blomfield's speech had done to retard it; and two years later, almost without debate in either House, was enacted the measure of modification unanimously recommended by a Royal Commission.

Dean Stanley, to the last day of his life, and in spite of its extraordinarily insignificant practical effect, regarded this relaxation of Subscription as a momentous and radical triumph of liberal and enlightened statesmanship.†

It was a source of surprise to him that scruples about

\* *Essays on Church and State*, p. 217.

† It seems well worth while to requote from the Dean's own pages the remarkable speech in which Mr. Buxton, one of the Commissioners, expounded in the House of Commons the scope which the Commissioners themselves ascribed to the measure which they recommended. He said:—

"It was of the greatest importance to observe that all those phrases which indicated that the subscriber declared his acceptance of every dogma of the Church had been swept away; and this had been done expressly and of forethought. As regarded the Thirty-nine Articles, the Commission had agreed to sweep away the words 'each and every of them;' implying, therefore, that the subscriber was only to take them as a whole, even though he might disagree with them here and there. As regarded the Prayer-Book, the change was even still more marked; for instead of declaring his assent and consent to all and everything it contained, he only declared his assent to the Book of Prayer—that is to say, to the Book as a whole; and his belief that the doctrine of the Church as therein set forth was agreeable to the Word of God. Observe that he would not declare that the doctrines, in the plural number, or that each and all of the doctrines, were agreeable to the Word of God, but only the doctrine of the Church in the singular number. It was expressly and unanimously agreed by the Commission that the word 'doctrine' should be used in the singular number in order that it might be understood that it was the general teaching and not every part and parcel of the teaching to which assent was given."—*Essays on Church and State*, p. 218.

Subscription were not banished by an enactment so expressly framed for their removal. He could not understand that robust consciences should find no great difference between subscribing a set of propositions and subscribing "each and every" of those propositions; that men should be unable to assent to a book "as a whole" when they dissented from many of its particular parts, and from its underlying assumptions; that they should scruple to allege that the doctrine of that Book was agreeable to the Word of God, when they believed many of the "doctrines" making up the "doctrine" to be alien to the truth. He seems never to have realised that the "general teaching" of the Prayer-Book could only be arrived at by a synthesis of its particular parts. He himself once quoted with great effect the saying of the counsel who defended Laud, that "a hundred white rabbits could never make one black horse." He contended that a dozen doctrines of Colenso's which were not separately grounds for his deposition could not make one doctrine which would justify that measure. But he never saw that a score of doctrines from which a man dissents cannot go to the making of a whole doctrine to which he can honestly assent.

He failed no less to perceive the true difficulty which would still withhold so many from conformity, were Subscription entirely swept away, so long as the Liturgy remained the compulsory form of public worship. To him, as to every educated Englishman, the Liturgy was of interest as embodying in itself the record of the struggles of a Puritan and a sacerdotal theology. It was as delightful to him to trace the historic sentiments and emotions built into its structure, as to view the monuments in his Abbey which told the changing tale of a score of generations. He could not understand—or, at any rate, he did not share—the Puritanic earnestness which could not go to public worship as to an antiquarian museum, but demanded that

every phrase of prayer should express the desire of the very soul there worshipping towards God. His vivid historic sense was foremost even in the sanctuary, and it delighted him to utter now a prayer as from the mind of Cranmer, and now a thanksgiving as from the heart of Laud. He felt no sympathy with that naked truthfulness which requires in the holy presence that prayer and thanksgiving should be shaped by the thought and yearning of the living worshippers without reference to any other.

And so it was that to Stanley one word was beautiful and honourable which to men of other mould is altogether the reverse. That word is "Compromise." He made it the praise of his Church, of her Articles, of her Prayer-Book, of her creeds, that they were founded and confirmed in Compromise; and the spirit of ready Compromise he lauded beyond all others in politics ecclesiastical. He saw that it favoured gentleness, mutual consideration, peace. He believed the refusal of Compromise to spring from narrowness of mind and heart. He failed to see that Compromise, in all matters which are not solely personal, has for its opposite Principle.\*

II. When we attempt to fix Stanley's position as a Theologian, we are assured alike by those to whom his liberalism was an abomination and by those in whose eyes it was an ornament, that in this capacity he was not great. In one sense, however, he was a great theologian. No man ever had a firmer grasp of the principle that statements concerning God and divine things are to be judged by the vital force with which they energise the soul, not by the nicety with which they can be fitted into a metaphysical construction. He demanded moral significance of a theological statement ere he could accept it as the embodiment of

\* See his pleasure in recording, from Baillie's Letters, the "give-and-take" policy which had so considerable a share in shaping the Westminster Confession of Faith. *Macmillan's Magazine*, August, 1881, pp. 289, &c.



living truth. "When Bishop Pearson in his work on the Creed vindicates the Divinity of Christ without the slightest mention of any of those moral qualities by which He has bowed down the world before Him, his grasp on the doctrine is far feebler than that of Rousseau or Mill, who have seized the very attributes which constitute the marrow and essence of His nature."\* This is a bold saying; and seeing the deadly mischief that has been wrought on theology by confining its investigations to the metaphysical or scholastic sphere, without the indispensable reference of proffered solutions to the veto or approval of the ethical and spiritual elements of our nature, we cannot afford to put any man out of court as a theologian, who has pertinaciously insisted on testing the theological asseverations hammered out in intellectual debate, by the touch of the conscience and the spirit.

Yet, it must be conceded that on the intellectual side Dean Stanley's theology was strangely defective. No other could tell as he could the outward story of the crucial theological controversies of Christendom, or expose with equal art the passionate or devout emotions that swayed the partisans. Yet he was singularly incapable of entering into the metaphysical conceptions and distinctions with which those emotions were bound up. He was deficient in scientific accuracy of thought; nor was he himself wholly unaware of the defect. To one who had presided, when he lectured in a provincial town on Shakespeare, Calvin, and Galileo—contemporary representatives of letters, of theology, of science—and had turned an injudicious compliment by ascribing to him a culture covering the three departments, he said afterwards, with a smile, "I have not a grain of science in my composition." And it was true that in power of strict scientific thought, whether in the physical sphere or in that of "the queen of

\* *Christian Institutions*, p. 39.

the sciences," his mental constitution was comparatively defective. His thinking was not up to his own admirable dictum, "Breadth without accuracy, accuracy without breadth, are almost equal evils."\* Therefore, it seemed to him that Rutherford's saying, "Truth is in an indivisible line that hath no latitude," reversed "every principle of all sound theology."† Truth was to him a subjective method rather than an objective fact. In his essay on "The Theology of the Nineteenth Century," what he describes is not a system of doctrine but a method of dealing with doctrine, a temper of mind towards doctrinal questions. So is he able to say that "this theology"—his own—has come to us "through Clement of Alexandria; through Origen; in part, through Athanasius, and Jerome, and Chrysostom; through Scotus Erigena and Anslem; through the genius of Luther; even through the stern precision of Calvin; through Erasmus and Grotius; through the English Latitudinarians and Platonists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."‡ If any one will try to draw up, in precise philosophical terms, any theological proposition, to which all this happy family will subscribe, he will find it a refreshing intellectual puzzle; but that they are related by a certain likeness of theological method need not be denied.

We cannot better illustrate Stanley's failure to grasp what theologians have meant by the terms they have used, than by citing, from his posthumous article on the Westminster Confession of Faith, his commentary on the proposition, "Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, or saved, but the elect alone."

Looking at this statement calmly, . . . it is hardly possible to conceive that the doctrine which it contains, however scholastically and crudely expressed, could be objected to by any

\* Lectures on the Eastern Church, 5th Edition, p. lxiv.

† Lectures on the Church of Scotland. Second Edition, p. 77. Cf. Addresses delivered at St. Andrew's, p. 79.

‡ Essays on Church and State, p. 479.

human being. What is it? It is that the effects of Christ's redemption, by which must be meant whatever effects Christianity has produced in the world, are only applicable to those chosen souls whom God has caused to walk faithfully, uprightly, and justly in the way of His commandments. This is the only election which Christians can recognise, and this is the election of which alone the Westminster Confession need be understood to speak. . . . Universalism may or may not be true; but, if it be true, it must be understood to mean that all mankind are saved, not from the punishment, but from sin itself. *In other words, the effect of Christ's death, as of all other benefits of Christianity, is limited to those who by their moral conduct are worthy of receiving them.\**

That any man who had studied the history of theology as Stanley had, who knew, as few know, the twists and turns of debate from which the Westminster Confession was evolved, should be capable of thus whittling away every vestige of meaning from one of its most vital propositions, and interpreting it into sentiments so profoundly opposed to the dearest convictions of its framers, is enough to raise a doubt whether it is possible to enshrine any opinion whatever in words which shall not be read off into its contradictory.

A more entertaining instance of the totally unwarranted largeness of meaning which Stanley would breathe into historic theological and ecclesiastical terms occurs in the Lectures on the Scottish Church. Citing Burns's fine theistic passage beginning—

“Wha made the heart, 'tis He alone  
Decidedly can try us,”

he claims on the strength of it, for the heretical ploughman, a place among Evangelical preachers.†

When, however, we attempt, in spite of Stanley's repugnance to exact theological statement, to arrive at some sort of notion of the opinions he actually held on the leading themes

\* *Macmillan's Magazine*, August, 1881, p. 287.

† P. 163.

of theological thought, the haziness and unscientific looseness of his language and his mind are more bewildering than ever. We seem to be pursuing a phantom which ever eludes our grasp as we fancy we are about to lay hold of it. The views of Arnold concerning Jesus Christ were of such a nature that he was unwilling to open the doors of the ancient Universities to Unitarians.\* His pupil's love to Christ was, perhaps, not less fervent; but that name had to him a much vaguer connotation than to his master. He freely spoke, indeed, of Christ's Divinity, and described the study of him as the highest function of the theologian.† But in his later life, at any rate, he would hardly have used Arnold's blank and unfaltering language: ‡ "Our God" is "Jesus Christ our Lord." He rather rebuked all scholastic statement on the Deity of Christ,§ and dwelt on his function as an exemplar for human conduct and an object for the affectionate loyalty which we give to a human benefactor.|| Nay, even the distinct human personality of Jesus sometimes receded from the forefront of his mind; and he spoke as though he contemplated an ideal Christ personified wherever good deeds shine. Christ is the "external conscience," and "wheresoever in history the same likeness is or has been in any degree reproduced in human character, there and in that proportion is the same effect produced. There and in that proportion is the Word which speaks through every word of human wisdom, and the Light which lightens with its own radiance every human act of righteousness and of goodness."¶ Indeed, "the love of Christ was long ago described by Sophocles."\*\* The highly charac-

\* Life, 4th Edition, Vol. II., p. 387. Cf. Vol. I., pp. 33, 257, 283, 356-8; Vol. II., pp. 81, 159, 399.

† Essays on Church and State, p. 476.

‡ Sermons, Vol. V., p. 222, quoted Life I., p. 33.

§ *Macmillan's Magazine*, Aug., 1881, p. 289.

|| Christian Institutions, p. 125.

¶ *Ibid.*, 2nd Edition, p. 271.

\*\* *Ibid.*, 2nd Edition, p. 124.

teristic Essay on "The Creed of the Early Christians," republished in "Christian Institutions," with its reduction of the Three Persons of the Trinity to the expressions of Natural, of Historical, and of Spiritual Religion, strikingly illustrates the good Dean's method of dissolving in the alembic of his vague and generous liberalism the historical theology of his Church. From that Essay the reader rises with complete agreement. Undoubtedly, divine influences may be contemplated under these three aspects. But if these are the three Persons of the Trinity, why stop short of five, or ten, or a score? \*

III. But far wider and more shining than Stanley's reputation as a theologian is his fame as an historian. History to him was literature, and literature was history. He wrote essays; but they were historical essays. He delivered speeches; but they were historical speeches. He threw himself into debate; but his arguments, his illustrations, his thrust and parry, were historical. He preached sermons; but lesson and incentive were drawn from the vast stores of his historical knowledge. He published a commentary on certain Epistles of St. Paul; but he selected for the purpose what he deemed the most "eminently historical" Epistles. Like Lawrence Charteris, "he had gone through the chief parts of learning, but was most conversant in history as the innocentest sort of study, that did not fill the mind with subtlety, but helped to make a man wiser and better." †

That a man who illustrated everything from history should again and again repeat himself, was inevitable. That one who "was always writing something," and always publishing, should turn many a slipshod sentence, and leave it standing, even that his proofs should be but hastily cor-

\* For an English clergyman's estimate of the value of the theology of the school of which Dean Stanley was the most conspicuous ornament, we may be allowed to refer to the succeeding article.

† Burnet's Own Times, I., 216; Stanley, Church of Scotland, p. 114.

rected, was not to be avoided. But the style of the author of "Sinai and Palestine," "The Jewish Church," and, above all, "The Lectures on the Eastern Church," the style of the tender essayist on Milman and on Philaret, the almost perfect biographer of Thomas Arnold, will never lose its freshness or its charm while rich and vivid pictorial presentation gives delight to Englishmen. Reading "Sinai and Palestine," we seem to be restfully enjoying a gallery of beautiful water-colour sketches; in "The Eastern Church," canvas after canvas stretches before the eye rich with the flashing tints of the ancient Orient, crowded with the living forms of the mighty few, and the eager, passionate faces of the multitude; the "Memorials of Westminster Abbey" is a museum of miniatures ranging through the history of our people; the great Biography of Arnold is a noble portrait; the soul of the painter is penetrated by the soul of his subject. If you read that book with the view of making acquaintance with the Stanley of 1844, you find yourself continually forgetting Stanley, getting *no* impression of him, impressed only, and more and more, by Arnold.

We have said that literature to Stanley was history: history was to him biography. He held that even the history of doctrines and opinions "gains immensely in liveliness, in power, in the capacity of being understood and appreciated, if we view them through the medium of the lives, characters, and circumstances of those who received and taught them." \* And his own power of seizing on the personality of the heroes of the dead past, breathing the breath of life into the dry bones, and exhibiting living, moving, battling human beings was unsurpassed. Not that it was always the real historical person that he re-created. Probably he often went far astray. But the characters which he conjured from the tomb were always beings

\* Eastern Church, 5th Edition, p. xlvii.

informed with a full and genuine manhood, moving to the play of actual emotions, not mere anatomical reconstructions. And these subjects of his story he saw before him; he conversed with them, strove with them, wept with them, laughed with them. For him Thomas Beket was there in the Cathedral of Canterbury moving quietly towards the altar of St. Bennet, and Stanley heard the brave words, "Here am I, no traitor, but a priest of God;" heard the swing of the sword of Fitzurse, heard the quick, fell blows that followed, stood by as the great prelate breathed out the last breath of life. From the scattered indications of Julian, of Gregory Nazianzen, of the *Acta Sanctorum*, Stanley figures forth in lively presence that "small insignificant young man, of hardly twenty-five years of age, of lively manners and speech, and of bright serene countenance," who was so profoundly to stamp Christendom with the luminous power of his teaching. He sees him at Nicæa, "riveting the attention of the assembly by the vehemence of his arguments," "taking the words out of the Bishop's mouth." \* That is Athanasius, and henceforth the reader knows him as he knows any public man whom he has heard in the senate or the pulpit of his own land and time. From Epiphanius and Gelasius, he "puts together" that famous description of Arius, which called up from the dishonoured tomb of 1,500 years the Presbyter of Baucalis, and set him before modern Oxford, the living, vehement champion of a doomed cause.

In appearance he is the very opposite of Athanasius. He is sixty years of age, very tall and thin, and apparently unable to support his stature; he has an odd way of contorting and twisting himself, which his enemies compare to the wriggings of a snake. He would be handsome but for the emaciation and deadly pallor of his face, and a downcast look, imparted by a weakness of eyesight. At times his veins throb and swell, and his limbs tremble, as if suffering from some violent internal com-

\* *Eastern Church*, 5th Edition, p. 99. Cf. p. 223.

plaint—the same, perhaps, that will terminate one day in his sudden and dreadful death. There is a wild look about him, which at first sight is startling. His dress and demeanour are those of a rigid ascetic. He wears a long coat with short sleeves, and a scarf of only half size, such as was the mark of an austere life; and his hair hangs in a tangled mass over his head. He is usually silent, but at times breaks out into fierce excitement, such as will give the impression of madness. Yet, with all this, there is a sweetness in his voice, and a winning, earnest manner, which fascinates those who come across him. . . . This strange, captivating, moon-struck giant is the heretic Arius, or, as his adversaries called him, the madman of Ares or Mars.\*

But this extraordinary dramatic power is a faculty as dangerous as it is charming in an historian, especially an historian who deals mainly with times and lands remote, and is called on to weave his narrative from documents and traditions demanding the revision of a laborious criticism ere they are fit for the loom. Stanley's mind was, as we have seen, vividly pictorial; it was not logical, not critical. It was so little logical that that of which he could form a lively conception seemed to him *ipso facto* truth. It was so little critical that that event of which the drama rose up clearly in his imagination, seemed to him fact; that that character of which he clearly discerned the play, seemed to him the reality; and that portraiture of which the lines were distinct and the tints were fresh, seemed to him the true image of the man. He believed because he saw: and so he was content.

The critical element, therefore, is not so much feeble as absent throughout his writings. It is not with reluctance, but with undisturbed content, that in his sermon on the Epistle to the Hebrews he acquiesces with Origen that "the real author is known to God alone." † In the one nominally critical work which he gave to the world, the Commentary on the Epistles to the Corinthians, there is a

\* Eastern Church. Fifth Edition, p. 100.

† Sermons on the Apostolical Age, 2nd Edition, p. 349.



brilliant sketch of Isthmian Corinth, a vivid picture of the Apostle's perturbation, much narrative, much exposition, but of criticism proper scarcely any. The tradition of the hill-side, the legend of the isles, suffices him. The peasants of Iona showed him the hill they call Cnoc Angel, the Knoll of the Angels. It was enough for him. He saw Columba standing on that height in rapt converse with the heavenly visitants, saw him with the eyes of the disciple who gazed on the master from the neighbouring rock. Stanley never harbours the thought that the name may have originated the legend, not the event the name.\* It does not matter that the knoll is called also the Hill of the Fairies. "The natural features and the Celtic names still preserved in Iona give us the complete framework of the earliest authentic history of Scottish Christianity."† So, again, he almost sees the footsteps of St. Margaret on the beach of the Frith of Forth, as she flees from the Norman conquerors. Her romantic meeting with Malcolm takes fast hold of his imagination: the stone on which the fierce chieftain "found her seated may still be seen on that same road." ‡

We may smile at a simplicity which, accepting without scepticism the local legends of that Scottish land and people which the Dean loved so well, lends so romantic a charm to the opening chapter of one of his most delightful books. But when we meet the Regius Professor in his theatre and find him treating of the most momentous history in the annals of our race, we cannot so complacently dispense with the critical discipline and temper which should there find their place.

In a remarkable paragraph in his celebrated speech on the South African controversy, Dean Stanley announces the

\* It is not, of course, implied that Stanley actually believed in the celestial visitation.

† Lectures on the Church of Scotland, pp. 26, 29.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

principles on which his biblical works have been constructed :—

Bishop Colenso's peculiar style of criticism is not such as commends itself to me, nor is his mode of approaching the Sacred Volume that which is consonant to my tastes and feelings. . . . My endeavour has been, in the first instance, to get whatever there is of good, whatever there is of elevation, whatever there is of religious instruction, whatever there is of experience, whatever there is of the counsel of God, whatever there is of knowledge of the heart of man, whatever there is of the grace of poetry, whatever there is of historical truth, whatever there is that is true, honest, just, lovely, of good report, of virtue, and of praise in the highest degree, in the Sacred Scriptures. That, I think, is the best way of approaching the Bible; and to the utmost of my humble capacity I have employed my labours in that direction. I have always lamented whenever any one has approached these subjects from what may be called a negative point of view.\*

The manner of approaching the national literature of Israel here described is admirable when edification is the only object of pursuit. But although the temper of reverent appreciation should never be discarded, it is not alone adequate to the duties of the responsible historian. To him there should be no negative and no positive point of view. He should approach his documents neither as their panegyrist nor as their assailant. Such historical views put forward by them as will bear the test of dispassionate criticism he should not, indeed, deny; it is in every way a gain if, not distorting them, he can suffuse them with the glow of a loving eloquence. But such historical views advanced by them as dissolve under the test of passionless criticism he is bound to deny. At all costs he is peremptorily pledged to apply such criticism to every document that passes through his hands. If he refuse the burden of this duty, he may be a dramatist, an expositor, a preacher, but he is no true historian. The pupil of the enthusiastic disciple of Niebuhr

\* *Essays on Church and State*, p. 311.

should not have failed in this. Stanley, in many fields, enlarged to great and fruitful issues the principles which Arnold had more narrowly applied. He should have seen that if Niebuhr resolutely carried the canons of the new-born criticism to the annals of regal Rome, he himself was bound to carry them to his own chosen field, the book of Genesis. He should have seen that if Roman history became more luminous, not less, under this rigorous treatment, so also would Israelitish history. The measure which his master had applauded when meted out to Romulus and Numa, he himself should not have shrunk from meting out to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob. It was Arnold himself who had written, without indeed knowing the full force of his words, "What Wolf and Niebuhr have done for Greece and Rome seems sadly wanted for Judæa."

The strange thing, however, is that Dr. Stanley entertained the profoundest, the most enthusiastic reverence for Ewald; spoke of "his noble work on the History of the People of Israel—as powerful in its general conception, as it is saturated with learning down to its minutest details;" \* habitually named him not only among the greatest historical, but among the greatest religious expositors; declared that "to listen to him after the harsh and dry instructions of ordinary teachers was like passing from the dust and turmoil of the street into the depth and grandeur of an ancient cathedral." †

Dean Stanley's own repugnance to critical investigation explains his curious description of Kuenen's epoch-making volumes as "dry;" but he formally recognised his labours also in the field of Jewish history. His plea, however, is that these works and the like "exempt any later author from the duty of undertaking afresh a labour which they have accomplished once for all;" ‡ and so he calmly goes on his

\* Lectures on the Jewish Church, Vol. I., 8th Edition, p. xiii.

*Ibid*, Vol. III., 3rd ed., p. x.

‡ *Ibid*, Vol. III., 3rd Ed., p. viii.

way, satisfied that the new path has been cut through the jungle and hewn through the rock by other pioneers, but contentedly journeying himself and conducting his myriad readers along the well-worn track hardened by the traffic of the multitude.

For of Ewald's most important teachings there is but little trace in Stanley's Lectures; of Kuenen's none at all. Those who are familiar with Ewald's treatment of the Patriarchs will be amazed, after Stanley's plea for exemption from the discussion of problems already disposed of by the great German, to find him complacently narrating Abraham's daily itinerary, and meekly following the Pentateuchal narrative without any discrimination of sources whatever.

Stanley's treatment of miracle is highly unsatisfactory; indeed, he does not treat it at all. He never faces the problem. This seemed to him outside the historian's duty.\*

It is said that there is a river in America which, owing to the peculiar conformation of the country through which it flows, frequently and suddenly swerves from its course and shifts its channel. A traveller, coming one evening to its bank, hesitated whether to attempt the passage that night or to take his rest first and cross the stream in the morning. As the sun had already sunk, he elected the latter course, and pitched his tent a few yards from the water. Waking at early dawn, he rose to go on his way; but, looking forth from beneath his canvas, the grey light showed him in front the dry stones over which, but a few hours since, the stream had slid along, behind him the flowing waters. He had not crossed the river—it *had crossed him*, while he slumbered.

This story is irresistibly brought to mind when we turn to Dean Stanley's account of the passage of the Red Sea.

\* His conception of the difficulties involved in separating the miraculous from the historical elements in a narrative seem<sup>e</sup> to have been but faint. See Lectures on Church of Scotland, 2nd Editio<sup>n</sup>, p. 84.

Ewald, Kuenen, and every other historian have discussed it. But, because they have done so, Stanley holds himself "exempted" from the task.

The Israelites were encamped on the western shore of the Red Sea, when suddenly a cry of alarm ran through the vast multitude. Over the ridges of the desert hills were seen the well-known horses, the terrible chariots of the Egyptian host: "Pharaoh pursued after the children of Israel, and they were sore afraid."

"They were sore afraid;" and in that terror and perplexity the sun went down behind the huge mountain-range, which rose on their rear, and cut off their return to Egypt; and the dark night fell over the waters of the sea, which rolled before them, and cut off their advance into the desert. So closed in upon them that evening. Where were they when the morning broke over the hills of Arabia? Where were they, and where were their enemies?

They stood in safety on the further shore; and the chariots, and the horsemen, and the host of Pharaoh had vanished in the waters.\*

And that is all!

But we must hasten to a close. In his tender, loving essay on the great rival Dean—rival in his *Histories* of the Jews and of the early Christian Church, rival in his veneration for, and his affectionate *Memorials* of, his own mighty cathedral; more than rival in the gorgeousness, though less than rival in the purity, of his style; rival in the breadth and charity of his Churchmanship—Stanley gives utterance to the apprehension that in Milman may be closed the long line of what he deemed the best and wisest that the Church of England can produce, the line on which stand Chillingworth, Cudworth, Tillotson, Butler, Berkeley, Heber, Arnold. On this illustrious bead-roll, strong, where it is strong, through an ample learning and a noble piety, weak, where it is weak, in political, philosophical, or ethical judg-

\* *Lectures on Jewish Church*, Vol. I., 8th Edition, p. 108.

ment, not the more precious graces of the Christian, must now be written the loved name of Arthur Penrhyn Stanley. It has been our duty to dwell on what we have deemed the inconsistencies in his position, the defects in his labours. We cannot hide from ourselves that elements of weakness were present in his character, as in that of every human being. To us he has seemed sometimes too much of the courtier; but even the courtier was merged in the wise and loyal friend.\* And the streams of pure, sound manhood that flowed through him were many and unmistakable. His humour, by all testimony, sparkled in his conversation. It appeared occasionally on the printed page; note, for instance, the contents-table of the address on Ecclesiastical Vestments:—

- I. Antiquarian import.
- II. Dress of the ancient world.
  - 1. The shirt.
  - 2. The shawl.
  - 3. The overcoat.
- III. Their secular origin, &c.
  - Importance of maintaining their indifference.
  - Attention to matters of real importance.

What chance had the unhappy ritualist in the debate at Sion College, however well primed with the Anglican view of vestments, after the wicked Dean had led off in this vein? His courage, his chivalry, again, were indomitable. We have only to remember the challenge to excommunicate *him*, instead of Colenso, flung like a bomb-shell into the Lower House of Convocation, with the sudden, blank avowal of naked heresies which, on every other occasion, were dressed up in the seductive garbs he could weave so well. What-

\* To persons remote from the influence of Courts, it is startling to find the Prince Consort and the Prince of Wales written of with those marks of reverence—a capital letter in “He,” “Him,” “One”—which are usually reserved for reference to God or Christ alone. (Sermons in the East, Dedication.) But Dean Stanley’s affection for the Royal Family was unquestionable, and his interest in its younger members was simple and paternal.

ever our own view may be of the ethics of Subscription and Conformity in the case of one who has travelled far afield from the professed theology of his Church—and we have not disguised it—it is impossible to question Stanley's transparent sincerity, or his honest conviction of the soundness, nay, the sacredness, of his own position. A mass of bright, loving, generous inconsistency, he gave his life to the increase of Christian kindness. While we deplore his death, we find our consolation in the rich streams of Christian charity which the shock of that event has liberated in every communion and set flowing through the Churches. It is the Christians of England who feel the loss; and by their common sorrow and affection they are drawn perceptibly nearer to each other. So he, being dead, yet speaketh.

THE EDITOR.

## CHURCH AND CHAPEL.\*

THE work before us will no doubt attract attention from the mournful interest which attaches to its most important contributions, the "Introduction" and the Sermon on the Church of England by the late Dean Stanley. These are indeed a most careful and finished expression of their author's riper thought, and on this ground alone the volume has a peculiar value. But apart from this, the book is perhaps deserving of remark as a representative volume of Broad Church sermons. This, indeed, would not be noteworthy in itself, if it were not that it is in sermons only that the current phases of Anglican liberalism find expression. The present sermons, then, are perhaps as good an example as we could have of the prevailing tone of liberal thought—we cannot, to be accurate, say liberal theology—in the Church. For their very interest lies in the fact that they exhibit, in spite of their theological subjects, the peculiarly untheological method and character of what is styled Broad Church teaching. We find here, if we except a general denunciation of Calvinism, no antagonism to any special dogma, but rather a general ignoring of theology as a factor in Christian life and thought. The late Dean's words (p. 84) on the function of the Church of England, as contrasted with theological Churches, strike the keynote, not of this volume only, but of the Broad Church theory generally.

\* *Church and Chapel: Sermons on the Church of England and Dissent: Preached at St. Botolph's, Bishopsgate. With Introduction by the Very Rev. Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., Dean of Westminster.* London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1881.



"The Church of England," he says, "was founded and continues simply for the sake of doing good, after its measure, to the people of England."

The Introduction to "Church and Chapel"—in itself a witness to the irreparable loss which the Church of England has sustained in Dean Stanley's death—is a singularly clear exposition of the relation of the Church to Nonconforming bodies as understood by liberal Churchmen. "The true policy with regard to the Nonconforming elements outside the pale is not either repression, which indeed belongs altogether to the past, nor even absorption into the Church itself, but a full recognition of the value, the excellence, in some instances the almost indispensable necessity, of such forms of ecclesiastical government, of religious doctrine, of practical organisation, as the Nonconformist communities supply" (p. 30). But it need not be pointed out that such a latitudinarian view is perfectly compatible with an absence of predilection for any special dogmatic position. And this is, in effect, the peculiar phenomenon of the English liberal theology as it exists in the Church. It is not too much to say that many of its leaders despise theology, are ignorant of its scope, and could not define their attitude towards half-a-dozen articles of the Creed. Their advice to the younger generation is, "Let theology alone:" "You have difficulties?—put them on the shelf." Such a position, of course, is consistent with a thoroughly real and spiritual faith. But it is a faith that has no very definite contents—a faith which is hardly a propagandist faith.

We are not saying whether this is to be deprecated or not; but certainly it is a phenomenon that deserves attention. The influence of the Broad Church school is wide, and in our present social conditions any force that makes for the vital unity of faith and progress is to be welcomed without reserves. Interests of party and of sect must yield before the common end of all liberal theologians—the reconcilia-

tion of faith and knowledge in the work of realising the "Day of the Lord." But it is a fair question whether such a non-theological position can attain lasting results. At present, Broad Church theology is purely negative: it has abandoned the orthodox lines, but it has no positive opinions. It has no opinion on criticism; no opinion on the value of the Pauline conception of Christian faith; no clear opinion on the Resurrection, on the Atonement, on miracles, on comparative religion, on inspiration, on church authority. There is a half-perceived idea amongst its supporters, that if they must define their opinions they could only satisfy themselves with the orthodox formulas; and yet that the contents of these formulas, when drawn out, would prove to be heterodox. They avoid difficult subjects, they shrink from any reference to themselves for guidance in interpretation. Their work, as Dean Stanley succinctly puts it for them, is to do good after their measure to their parishioners.

Dr. Pfeiderer, in one of his most interesting contributions to the problem of liberal theology, speaks of the interest with which he watches Protestant Christendom essaying the task of restating Christian truth. In America, in Holland, in Scotland, and in Switzerland he already sees signs of the growing zeal for vitalising the faith. Amongst other countries, he gives a foremost place to England, where he hears of projects in our Universities for the free study of theology as a means of spreading abroad a more profound knowledge of the subject, and of raising the ideals of our national culture. But so far as regards the Church of England, we see no signs of any such movement. Where, for instance, can we see the men capable of producing a volume in the least degree comparable to the "Scotch Sermons" lately issued? Or where have we the clergyman in Oxford or Cambridge who could give, and would think of giving, such a course of Lectures as Prin-

cipal Caird's on the Philosophy of Religion? These two works suggest at once the enormous gulf which separates Scotch theological progress from English Broad Churchism. Where, again, have we the preacher who could or dare address his congregation as Heinrich Lang, the Zürich Pfarrer? Or the Professor of Theology equal to producing Pfleiderer's "*Religions-philosophie*," or Lipsius' "*Dogmatik*"? And yet these books, and a dozen like them, are the product of but part of a decade.

Let us take two of those great representative names which Anglican liberalism honours with its most conspicuous reverence. Frederick Maurice is undoubtedly the highest type of the liberal theologian of the Church. In him a fervid piety and faith, the widest charity, the sweetest humility were combined with a masterly reforming instinct, and a moral energy not unworthy of it. Rightly was he called the "Prophet." He had that true mark of prophecy, that his words and principles contained the germs of truths of which he had himself no inkling. Leaving aside his great influence with a generation grappling with social problems of the first order, no Churchman of the century has done more to raise men's thoughts of God, and to bring home to us the Divine as a moral Ideal. That was Maurice's work, to proclaim to a faithless world, and a terror-stricken Church, the one dogma, that God must be at least as good as man, a dogma that was itself the death of such a belief as eternal hell, and of the fearful theories of the atonement still struggling for life. But great as he was on the moral and ideal side of religion, Maurice left absolutely untouched the vast field of criticism. From the results of Strauss and Colenso he shrank hardly less markedly than Dr. Newman or the House of Convocation. Indeed, it is curious to note that the younger school which more especially accepts him as their leader is with no uncertain steps developing a rigid finalism, with a distinct sacerdotal savour.

The late Dean of Westminster, again, though of a critical, because literary, mind, can hardly be said to have left us any positive results in theology, profound and all-enduring as has been his practical influence in the ecclesiastical region. One service indeed he has rendered to theology: by his treatment of the subject of Christian Institutions he has shown us that only in a very subordinate way can the questions of the Ministry, the Sacraments, the Church—ecclesiastical in their contents—be regarded as the subject-matter of theology at all. But, to a broad constructive theology he has contributed at best but indirectly. It is true that his critical spirit has not died with him, and that a school of original and thoroughly sound biblical and ecclesiastical criticism is rising up amongst us; but it must be confessed that we have to strain our eyes to see in our Universities the marks of that movement which rejoiced Dr. Pfleiderer.

In answer to the questions, What are the causes of this phenomenon? what hope is there of a brighter prospect for the coming years? we can only in this place suggest one or two of the more obvious influences at work within and without the Church of England, which bear some relation to the facts we see. First, perhaps, we may note the prevailing philosophic tendencies of the day—the materialist and agnostic atmosphere in which we live. The English public is frightened by agnosticism; it sounds so tolerant, it seems so simple, and, as it stands in a few pages of Mr. Spencer's "First Principles," so easily proved. The clergy feel that this is the peculiar form of scientific thought now in vogue; and a hazy, indistinct belief seems more in harmony with the *Zeitgeist* than any possible form of definite theology. The clergy and laity alike are in England utterly ignorant of philosophy, and, without knowing it, crouch before the monthly Reviews. As a rule, the clergy have never read any philosophy for themselves, and only pick up a shallow, empirical, third-hand conception of

scientific thought which unconsciously influences their faith, and with which they think it their duty to reconcile their own teaching. Obviously such a bastard creation can neither form the basis of, nor even admit of, a constructive theology. As for the laity, even less given than the clergy to spiritual analysis, their ignorance of the problems of consciousness and of the universe is still more profound. Our modern system of Reviews, which has developed so remarkably during the past decade, fosters this ignorance, and along with it a pretence of knowledge that is fatal to thought. One need hardly say how different is the case in Scotland or in Germany. There it is understood that philosophy is the only basis for theology; that theology, a fearless, definite, constructive theology, is the natural crown of philosophy.

When we say that the Universities are partly to blame, we open the door to a whole flood of complaints, of hopes disappointed, of remedies fallen vain. Here, however, let this only be noted. The close theological professorships are an insurmountable barrier to a real theology. Oxford theology is simply "ecclesiastics" of the narrowest type. Can we imagine a Baur, or a Rothe, or a Robertson Smith lecturing at Christ Church? Well-wishers of liberal churchmanship may well despair of the future when they think of the terrible disadvantages under which theology is taught, and must be taught, at its chief places of education. Professor Bryce's resolution on this subject is a tardy effort in the right direction, and we suppose it is useless, in the present state of public affairs, to urge him to extend his principle to all the theological chairs in his University. The Anglican Theological Colleges, so-called, need only be mentioned to indicate the value placed upon free theological study by those who are responsible for the direction of strictly clerical education.

A third influence may be mentioned, not less important,

though widely differing from the others: the parochial system under which the Church clergy work. If we look at the titles of the Bishopsgate sermons, we find that each of the preachers—three of them well-known Broad Church parish clergy—spend their lives in poor and crowded London districts. Mr. Lambert (who worked many years in Whitechapel), Mr. Barnett, and Dr. Ross are all so placed that their contact with the laity is chiefly contact with the very poorest—with whom the *Kampf um Dasein* is the beginning and the end of life. Now, apart from the fact that such surroundings are not conducive to high thinking, there is always an unconscious reference of intellectual conclusions to the point of view of those for whose welfare the clergyman, in theory, exists. And this acts as a hindrance to a criticism for which such hearers are wholly unfit. There is an ever-present dread lest by trying to save one, living in ease and culture, from a headlong materialism, a hundred of the poor in spirit, the lowly, and the uneducated might be cut adrift from the one stay of faith which has kept them above the deeps of crime and despair. No one who has daily before him the terrible problems which our crowded centres present, who remembers, perhaps self-reproachfully, the work of One whom the "common people" heard gladly, can help feeling that truth absolute and truth relative do at this day come into conflict with a shock that stirs all our moral fibres.

Perhaps, indeed, if they look a little below the surface, our readers may find in the Sermon and Introduction of Dean Stanley traces of a principle, not yet fully formed and never by him explicitly declared, which may determine a new departure in the liberal tendencies of the Church. If ever the liberal theology of the Church attains a definite constructive basis, it will, perhaps, be found that its fundamental idea is foreshadowed here; and that idea may take shape in the dogma that all our beliefs in God, in Christ, in

heaven, in eternity, are but shadows, forms, of a reality,—the expressions of an æon, fading with the advance of the ages into ever wider expressions of which none has any validity beyond what it receives from the consciousness, not of the individual only, but of the community. Hence, all finite attempts to convey the knowledge of the infinite are local, temporary; not only as they are expressed in forms, ceremonies, organisations, but in the ultimate verities of the Christian faith. This is, unconsciously, the basis on which the Broad Churchman even now rests his teaching: *his* higher faith is only an approximation, a little nearer, perhaps, than that of his hearers, but none the less finite, none the less but a dim reflection of the eternal truth itself. Hence a tenderness, which some outside the Church find it so hard to understand, towards grosser, less spiritual expressions of faith: the readiness to speak to others in their own language a message for which the needs of the teacher himself demand a loftier strain. Yes, he maintains, by all means adapt eternal truth to temporary modes of thought; but not for the benefit of higher culture alone, but for the lower: not only for the morally and intellectually elect, but for the halt and blind who cannot grasp the abstract and demand a visible—shall we say, human—personality and life, whereto to cling in the tumult of the world.

For all that, this basis, this new dogma, which I have tried to express above, is not yet formulated: it is unconsciously held; it is still in solution, but slowly crystallising into explicit faith. And if there is felt a chafing of the spirit of truth against the form in which it is compelled to find its normal expression, the Broad Church principle, as Dean Stanley's Sermon was intended to bring out, is not individual only, but the principle of the community. The very fusing of opinion, the crossing and recrossing of the various reflected lights of truth, tend always towards purer, higher knowledge. Individuality produces narrow-

ness ; it substitutes for the old, fresh dogmas derived from the consciousness of one. Whereas the light of the Divine must be, however varying in power and brilliancy, for all ; and the individual conception of the light corrected and modified by the needs and experiences of the fellowship.

This position is very ably drawn out by Mr. Lambert in his Sermon on the Baptists—perhaps, next to the Dean's, the most noteworthy of the series. There is much subtlety in his development of the idea of the Church, as the company of all who strive to attain a measure of spiritual knowledge as the basis of a spiritual life. The abstract "individual" is fast disappearing from moral and political science, and Mr. Lambert refuses to recognise him in the religious sphere. Only he is careful to add that the Church, in his sense of the word, is not the Church of England nor yet another, but the congregation of all faithful people. The Sermon on the Presbyterians is interesting from the bold claim made by Dr. Ross on behalf of modern Scotland—the product of Presbyterianism—as a leading factor in regenerating English theology. The remaining Sermons, on the "Friends," the "Independents," and the "Methodists," do not call for notice. But why, in spite of the Dean's programme in the Introduction, is no place allotted to the Unitarians ? It is a conspicuous defect, in a volume which professes to exhibit the chief phases of Nonconformist thought, that the pioneers of free inquiry are passed over unnoticed. But on reflection the omission is seen to be characteristic. It is one more instance of the unwillingness of liberal Churchmen to meddle with the vital questions of speculative theology and criticism.

W. H. WOODWARD.



## NOTES AND NOTICES.

IN Dr. Martineau's latest pamphlet\* lie some of the weightiest words which our generation has heard. We trust that Dr. Martineau may yet at intervals, for many years of his honoured old age, address us, by voice or pen; but there can be no doubt that in this solemn discourse to his former students and his old congregation, he intended to give the result of the studies and reflections of his life. The conclusions which he desired to be understood to have reached, concern the great problems wherein his mind has laboured from his youth. It was, as those who clustered around him so eagerly to hear it, would not fail to recognise, a supreme utterance, which the speaker would contentedly leave, should he open his lips no more, as his last intellectual and spiritual testament.

We shall make no attempt to measure James Martineau's altitude, or to estimate his rank among the thinkers of past and present times. To us, when we compare him to those few of his contemporaries who could be supposed to stand on the same level, and of whom the world has spoken more loudly, there would seem ivory in the proposal to place their conclusions on religion in the same category with his; even as there would be in one to estimate, as of equal value, the judgment of a picture by a blind man or by a man of sight. The very organ by which spiritual things alone can be discerned, was well-nigh extirpated in one of the best of these philosophers in his childhood, and began to grow only at the close of his life; while if it exist in the most notable of the others, the prophets of agnosticism, it is scarcely more perceptible to observers than the eye of the Proteus Anguinus, in the cavern-river or Adelsberg. Dr. Martineau brought to the study of religion, first and before all things, a nature rich in religious sentiment; secondly, he brought (a gift which we equally miss among his rivals) a poet's temperament, alive to the sublime, the pathetic, the holy, and able to understand, through sympathy, the religious history of mankind, and cast an eagle glance over the wide generalisations wherewith theology—the science of sciences—is concerned; thirdly, he brought a critical faculty

\* *Loss and Gain in Recent Theology.* An Address delivered on Thursday evening, June 23, 1881, in Little Portland Street Chapel, to former students, in Manchester New College, by James Martineau, LL.D., D.D. London: Williams, Norgate. 1881.

so fine that to watch him patiently disentangling the threads of true and false traditions, and weaving them into an harmonious tapestry, has often made the spectator think that so perfect a critic could be only a critic, and nothing else; and, finally, all these noble instruments for sounding the heavens have worked upon a firm basis of solid learning—broad and deep. No faculty or acquirement which should equip a great theologian has been missing, and from early youth to advanced age, each and all have been devoted directly and immediately to the search for truth—a search for once not disturbed (as in the case of almost every layman) by worldly duties, and not trammelled (as in the case of the great bulk of the clergy) by pledges to foregone conclusions. Free, learned, able, gifted, pious, a man with a man's natural experience, husband, father, teacher, friend; yet, possessed almost of the leisure of a monkish recluse, James Martineau has through half a century moved steadily onward, never hasting in youth, never standing still in the wonted immobility of age. If the conclusions of any human being on the problems of religion are deserving of our attention, it is surely those which such a man announces at last, as the result of his life's Divine pursuit. What, then, are Dr. Martineau's final verdicts on the chief questions mooted amongst us? We may sum them up briefly.

1. External authority of Bible or Church ritual can no longer be recognised. "What was once a Divine text-book has become a human literature." "The time is past when a doctrine could save itself from criticism by taking refuge under an apostle's word, or a futurity authenticate itself by a prophet's forecast, or a habit become obligatory by evangelical example."

2. The entire "*Messianic mythology* has disappeared from our faith." "From the person of Jesus everything *official* has fallen." He is "simply the Divine flower of humanity, blossoming after ages of spiritual growth, the realised possibility of life in God."

3. These apparent losses are real gains. "The power of things invisible is not destroyed when they can no longer be treated as if visible."  
 . . . . "What is Divine in the world and in ourselves is precisely what lives behind and within all appearances; and the assurance of it becomes intense in proportion as outward conditions dissolve like shadows before us, and leave us alone at the inner focus of reality."  
 . . . . "None the less solemnly does conscience make us sure that our sin will find us out, because we have no vision of the hour and the scene of our inevitable shame. And when Death snatches from our side the attendant angels of our life, are we not as certain that they were made for more than these fragmentary years, as if the landscape were before us of the everlasting hills?"

It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of these conclusions, reached through a lifetime of inquiry, by such a man. But there is another result, not stated so plainly, yet indicated beyond mistake in this self-revealing Address, which goes yet deeper into the heart of things, and is more precious than any opinion on theology, however weighty. It

is the testimony to the experience of a soul which has sounded the depths in every conceivable direction, that throughout that awful quest the inner heart of the religious man may continue to beat out its music unsilenced, to end at last in the triumphant chant of perfect melody. In the outer court of the intellect, Faith has fought a life-long battle with Doubts that pressed through every door, swarmed over the walls, burst up from hidden mines beneath. But all the while in the holy place, the place of prayer and sacrifice, there has been stillness and peace.

To hundreds of us, if I mistake not, in these dark days, the inward history dimly shadowed in the words I shall now quote is infinitely more encouraging than a thousand serried arguments demonstrating the theoretical truth of pure religion. It is the proof of the living power of that religion to break through all the clouds which surround us now, and be to us, as to the saints of old, the Light of Life, shining more and more unto the perfect day. Here, then, is the history of the soul which half a century ago was occupied with the "Rationale of Religious Inquiry" and the "Endeavours after the Christian Life," and which now sums up at last its own and the world's "Loss and Gain in Theology":—

Who can ever forget the intense and lofty years when first the real communion of the living God—the same God, who received the cries of Gethsemane and Calvary—and the sanctity of the inward law, and the sublime contents of life on both sides of death, broke in a flood of glory on his mind, and spread the world before him, stripped of its surface illusions, and with its diviner essence cleared? The restless intellect of mid-life may toss these things about in speculation, may add to them, or take from them, or weave them into the artificial texture of a system. But in old age, as the end draws near, we repose again on these simple truths and trusts, only *with a fuller inward witness and a more spiritual calm*. And so the evening light is as the morning's, and sheds once more the tenderest beauty on the world. (P. 19.)

Where is the heart amongst us which does not pray that for him also  
"at evening-tide there may be light"? F. P. COBBE.

IT is now more than forty years since M. Chastel first published some of the results of his studies in the History of Christianity, in the shape of a little volume issued in 1839, containing six lectures on the Church of the first three centuries. The inquiries thus begun were continued in an ever-widening range. Two important essays, successively crowned by the French Academy, proved the author's talent for special investigation as well as for broad and rapid summaries. The first of these, published in 1850, on the History of the Destruction of Paganism in the Eastern Empire, took its place beside the well-known treatise of M. Beugnot on the fall of Paganism in the West, and offered a picture of the religious transition from popular polytheism to the faith and worship of the Church. The second (1853) consisted of a series of studies on the Influence of Clarity during the first six centuries, and was well adapted to exhibit one phase of the immense moral changes effected under Christian influence. Still at work at the laborious tasks which he had

laid out for himself, M. Chastel put forth in 1859 a small volume, gathering up his views on Christianity and the Church in the Middle Ages. "If I live long enough for a more extended publication," said the writer in his preface, "the materials for which are for the most part in my hands, it will be found to contain the details in support of the results which I now only announce, and I trust that my readers will do me the justice to acknowledge that I have not been precipitate or rash in my generalisations. But life is short; the years pass rapidly away; and, doubtful whether I shall be permitted to trace as a whole so vast a picture, I desire at least, if it may be, to complete the sketch." Every one will be glad that the veteran Professor—now, we believe, upwards of eighty years of age—should realise the desire thus pathetically expressed, and every one will admire the splendid energy which can undertake, at a time when most men long for rest, to reduce the results of half a century's labour into a permanent shape, and commit them, in five volumes, to the press. The first of these volumes has now appeared,\* and it is to be hoped that the writer's great plan, now on the eve of accomplishment, will proceed without hindrance to its appointed end. The author points, with just emphasis, in his preface, to the importance of the study of the general history of Christianity, as the necessary complement of all higher teaching, refers to the causes which have prevented French Protestantism from contributing as much as might have been expected to the almost boundless literature of the subject, and offers his work to supply a gap which there is, at present, no other similar treatise in the French language to fill. It is written on the model rather of the German than of the English histories. The first volume is divided into six chapters. A brief introduction on Judaism before Jesus Christ prepares the way for a rapid sketch of the origin of Christianity, whose founder is presented, on the basis chiefly of the first three Gospels, as the Spiritual Messiah, labouring for the regeneration of his people, and done to death by the violence of his enemies, and the cowardice of the Roman Governor. The picture of the Apostolic Church is mainly traced upon the basis of the book of Acts; and the writer then takes up the story of the position of Christianity, when launched into the Gentile world by the apostle Paul, and follows its fortunes under the Imperial Government, through successive periods of persecution and calm, until the "Peace of the Church," under Constantine. The next chapter deals with the development of Ecclesiastical government. The characteristic moderation and scrupulous impartiality of the author are seen in the caution with which he pronounces in favour of the original equality of the bishops and presbyters; and his clearness of arrangement, his orderly method, in the skill with which he passes from the organisation of individual churches to trace the connections gradually established between them, and the growth of authority on the part of the higher orders of the clergy. This

\* *Histoire du Christianisme depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours. Par Etienne Chastel, Professeur de Théologie Historique à l'Université de Genève. Tome I. Le Christianisme avant Constantin. Paris. 1881.*

leads the way to the history of worship, its forms, places, and seasons. The discussion of the Christian cultus is followed by a very brief account of the morals and discipline of the new community, to which succeeds a survey of the principal writers of the different Christian schools. The last chapter, occupying one-third of the book, exhibits the gradual elaboration of Christian doctrine, and the chief types of variation among heretical sects.

A glance at this programme will show its superiority over the treatises of our English historians, who, too often, are so occupied with the Church that they leave out the Christianity. Yet it has its drawbacks also. The reader is carried rapidly through three centuries to the age of Constantine, but he can hardly account for the victory of the new religion over the old, for he has heard nothing of its spread, its numbers, or, above all, the character, development, and organisation of its moral and spiritual forces, not having yet been made acquainted with them. He is really unable to tell precisely what it was that Christianity conquered, or what it was in Christianity which conquered. We know that a historian who proposes to traverse eighteen centuries must prescribe to himself strict limits of space. But the problems which the first three centuries suggest are so intricate and so interesting that we cannot help regretting that M. Chastel could not devote to them a larger share of his work. This is particularly the case with the chapter on Christian morals. Our author has sketched some of the philosophical objections to Christianity; but he has not, we think, given any adequate idea of the character of the popular polytheism against which the believer lived in continual protest, nor has he allowed himself to elaborate the marvellous contrasts presented by the Christian ideal (however far short ecclesiastical practice may have been) with the degradation of common morals. It is assuredly from no want of familiarity with his theme, for his earlier essays prove his close acquaintance with every necessary detail. It is due, perhaps, to the preference given by the venerable teacher to the theological over the moral elements in the development of Christianity. We are inclined to believe that it was the latter rather than the former which appealed to the heart of the world: it was before the elevation of a new life rather than the proclamation of a new God, that the deities of the people and the philosophies of the educated sank away and disappeared. It is through the incorruptibility of its central character that Christianity won its way and maintained its place through every struggle, and is even now renewing its vitality in an age which is weary of theological divisions. Of course, Christianity had its own answer to the question whence its immense moral impulse was derived. And that answer, dealing with transcendent spiritual realities, could not help taking a theological form. But beneath its solutions of the problems of the universe and human destiny, which have varied from age to age with the variations of contemporary knowledge and sympathy, there has thrilled the absolute conviction that Christianity means under all circumstances the warfare with sin, and that the Church is the instrument for securing in all hearts over the whole earth the supremacy of righteousness. Every one has

his own theory of the essential significance, the secret power, of the complex sum of forces known in history under the general term Christianity; but we cannot help believing that the transformations of the moral ideal effected under its influence, even if not its highest work, deserve a greater share of attention than we find here accorded to them.

Though M. Chastel, however, takes what may be called the theological view of Christianity rather than the moral, he is theological without prejudice. He has no hidden purpose to serve. His sketch of the chief phases of Christian doctrine, is admirable for its lucid simplicity and freedom from any concealed suggestion. He desires to present the facts, and let them tell their own tale. Some of his readers, indeed, may desire a little more aid in forming some kind of synthesis of the ecclesiastical development. He exercises throughout his whole work a remarkable reserve, amounting almost to self-effacement. He is not tempted into brilliant but shallow disquisition; he guards himself severely from the seductions of the picturesque. His citations are always admirably chosen, but he does not employ them for artistic, only for practical, purposes. A grave earnestness marks his advance, as of one who feels that his task is mighty, and his time is short. He cannot turn aside into the by-paths which open constantly on either hand. He is deeply read in the immense literature of his subject, but a word or a phrase must suffice to indicate a view or to dismiss a theory. Thus the reconstruction of the history of the apostolic and postapostolic periods by the Tübingen school is gently but decisively put aside, first of all by the quiet acceptance of the book of Acts as a satisfactory historical record, and then in a note (p. 127) on Baur's interpretation of the tradition ascribing the foundation of the Church at Rome to the two Apostles, Peter and Paul. Other subjects have been thrust out by the inexorable necessities of space. Yet surely it might be pleaded that the influences which led to the formation of the New Testament Canon, for example (to say nothing of the origins of Christian literature), deserved some analysis, while the writings of the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists are treated at considerable length. Why does the authorship of the Ignatian Epistles deserve five precious pages, while the question of the fourth Gospel never comes fairly to the front? In this matter of selection, however, a historian and his critics can hardly ever expect to be in accord. Each reader has his own private views as to what might have been left out: each writer his convictions of the absolute indispensableness of what—possibly after many excisions, compressings, and final planings down—is finally left in. And the dignified brevity of M. Chastel's style is a guarantee of a solid control over his material, and of a restraint of imagination deserving of the student's high admiration. We shall look for his successive volumes with genuine and increasing interest, and we earnestly trust that nothing may interfere with the fitting completion of his life-long labours. Such a spectacle of unintermitting devotion to the cause of truth is indeed even more worthy of respect, and may be more fruitful to the younger generation who can feel its nobility, than the work itself which it achieves.

J. E. C.

THE illustrative commentary on the Gospel according to Matthew, promised by Mr. Nicholson, in the preface to his work on the Gospel according to the Hebrews, is now before us,\* and we are glad to see that it is only the first volume of a new commentary on the historical books of the New Testament. The work, it may be presumed, was nearly through the press before the appearance of the Revised Version, otherwise Mr. Nicholson would, perhaps, have given us that instead of the authorised translation, and, as it is, it seems a pity that he had not introduced his corrections into the text, instead of reserving them for the notes. Many of these will be found to have been adopted by the Revisers, though this book naturally has the advantage of showing the grounds on which the alterations are made. As a point of special interest just now, attention may be called to a note on chapter v. 22, which, after a reference to the "ravine of Hinnom," adds, "The Jews used its name as a synonym for hell." If this be true—and no doubt it is—the objections that have been made to the retention of the word "hell" fall to the ground. Mr. Nicholson has taken great pains in collecting illustrations from Jewish sources of various points of interest in the Gospel, parallels to the sayings of Jesus from the Talmud, references to Jewish customs, and so on; and, indeed, this will be found to be one of the distinctive features of his work. In regard to the mutual relations of Pharisaism and Christianity, he has no theory to support, but frankly puts before his readers the rabbinical sayings allied to those in the Gospel, with the date of each teacher, and leaves us to draw our own conclusion. He does, indeed, avow his belief that "the sayings of Jesus must have been largely perpetuated in Jewish tradition," which, of course, is not impossible, though it seems more likely that, where the resemblance is more than accidental, the sayings were the common property of the rabbis, of whom Jesus, though not fully authorised, seems to have been regarded as one. This might be the case even with sayings ascribed to particular rabbis—if we may suppose that repetition would sometimes end in appropriation—such as Rabbi Eliezer the Great, who said, "Whoso hath still bread in his basket, and yet saith, *What shall I eat to-morrow?* belongeth only to them of little faith." Whether this is necessarily an echo of Matt. vi. 80, the reader must judge for himself; but in this case, at least, there are reasons for thinking the saying may have been borrowed from a Christian source, one of which is that Eliezer is said in the Talmud to have been charged (though wrongly) with Christian leanings. Mr. Nicholson might have found a few more tolerably apt parallels in M. Hippolyte Rodrigue's "*Origines du Sermon de la Montagne*," and he has overlooked, or, at any rate, not noticed, a Talmudic passage, given in Deutsch's famous essay, which has a strong *general* resemblance to the parable of the marriage feast. It runs as follows: "There was a King who bade all his servants to a great repast, but did not indicate the hour;

\* A New Commentary on the Historical Books of the New Testament, by Edward Byron Nicholson, M.A. Vol. I. "The Gospel according to Matthew." London: C. Kegan Paul. 1881.

some went home and put on their best garments, and stood at the door of the palace; others said, 'There is ample time, the King will let us know beforehand.' But the King summoned them of a sudden, and those that came in their best garments were well received; but the foolish ones, who came in their slovenliness, were turned away in disgrace. Repent to-day, lest to-morrow ye might be summoned."

Mr. Nicholson's commentary is preceded by a Preface, in which he explains the principle, scope, and method of his work, by an account of the chief authorities for the text, and an Introduction which, however, is very brief, and makes no attempt at discussing, in any adequate sense, the question of authorship. Mr. Nicholson, indeed, says in his preface that he sees "no reason to disbelieve the very general evidence that Matthew did write a work relating to Jesus, or to disbelieve that part, or all, of that work is contained in this Gospel, attributed to Matthew from the latter half of the second century downwards," and adds "whether or not there is good ground to suppose that other early hands had supplemented the original work of Matthew, by adding 'the synoptic tradition,' or other matter, is a question on which I have implied no opinion in the past, and imply none now." Yet this is a question which should hardly be ignored. Let it be hoped that Mr. Nicholson is reserving it for a general Introduction to all the Gospels. We will only add another word. Those who are acquainted with Mr. Nicholson's work on the Gospel according to the Hebrews, are aware that he has his own ideas about English diction and orthography. In this volume we have "trouble not for the morrow," which is surely very colloquial English for "trouble not yourselves," and "stumble," in a transitive sense, proposed as a substitute for "cause to offend," which is scarcely English at all. It is pleasant to observe, however, that we have a "preface" instead of "forewords," and, perhaps, by-and-by, the author may condescend to spell "therefore" and "foreigner" in the right (or, if he prefers it, in the wrong, but customary) way. In the meantime he has produced a work which must be regarded as a very valuable contribution to New Testament exegesis, and one which is obviously the result of much care and labour.

The English translation of Keim's great work, "The History of Jesus of Nazara,"\* does not advance rapidly; but it is satisfactory to know that it is likely to be completed early next year. The present volume describes the Messianic progress to Jerusalem, the cleansing of the Temple, the encounters with the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Herodians, the anointing at Bethany, and the Last Supper; and discusses, with the author's accustomed vigour and incisiveness, the various critical and historical questions that present themselves on the way. According to Keim, Jesus went to Jerusalem by the least frequented route, through Peræa, thus avoiding all risk of collision with the Samaritans. Arrived

\* The History of Jesus of Nazara. By Dr. Theodor Keim. Translated by Arthur Ransom. Vol. V. London: Williams and Norgate. 1881.



at Jericho, he is met by the Pharisees, and, by their questions concerning divorce, led for the first time into conscious antagonism with Moses. From Jericho he proceeds direct to Jerusalem, and amid the fresh enthusiasm excited by his entrance, asserts his Messianic authority by the expulsion of the money-changers from the Temple. The next few days are occupied with the encounters with his assailants, until, on the evening of the 12th of April, Jesus withdraws for the last time to the quiet of Bethany, where he remains till the 14th, the day of the Pass-over. Keim rejects, as altogether unhistorical, the narrative of Luke and the Samaritan mission reported by that Evangelist. He will have nothing to say to Zacchæus, but is inclined to accept the healing of the blind man at Jericho, though without calling in the aid of absolute miracle. "In the enthusiastic elevation of the minds of the people, a confidence might be created which, according to the distinct confession of Jesus himself ('Thy faith hath saved thee!') might, by its stormy impulse, distinctly increase even the bodily, vital, and nervous forces, and for a time, or for ever, restore the disused or lost power of the eye." The Johannine Christ's visit to Bethany, and the raising of Lazarus, are subjected to the most searching criticism, and pronounced absolutely unvarious. The writer indicates the various elements of doubt which connect themselves with the Messianic entry on the ass, and seems half inclined to question the story, but finally decides not to reject an incident testified by all the Evangelists. The discourses of this period, it need not be said, are also handled with great power, freedom, and insight. Keim accepts as undoubtedly genuine Matthew's parable of the two sons, and also that of the wicked husbandmen, with its frank anticipation of the murderous intentions of the Pharisees. That of the wedding-feast, on the other hand, he regards as an ill-placed interpolation of Matthew's Gentile-favouring editor, violently disturbing the true order of things. Other speeches must be looked upon but as the vehicles in which "the apostolic or postapostolic time expressed their sighs, their longings, their hopes." Such are the Matthew-parable of the ten virgins, and the Luke-parable of the unjust judge. The vigorous denunciation of the Pharisees is genuine in the main; but in the description of the Last Judgment, "the creative, or at least the formative, hand of a later generation, is unmistakably to be detected." Nevertheless, Keim does not doubt, on the contrary, he affirms it as "a fact above all objection, that Jesus, in thoroughly genuine words, held out a prospect of His return to the then living generation, and to then living disciples; and that Peter and Paul, and the community, lived for decades and centuries upon this belief." In this respect, of course, Jesus was mistaken,—“He thought of himself, not too grandly but too meanly—too humbly, when he found a second advent necessary;”—and not less so, according to Keim, in attaching a vicarious efficacy to his death, as he did, if his words at the institution of the Last Supper have been correctly reported. On the whole, this great work will be found to increase in interest as the climax of the history is approached; and it is to be hoped that the con-

cluding volume will not be longer delayed than the time specified in the preface.

It is not easy to know what class of readers are likely to benefit by a translation of the Apocalypse,\* in which the attempt is made to reproduce in English each word of the original, with an entire disregard of the idiomatic differences between the two languages; but that the effect is peculiar a very short specimen will suffice to show. Here are three verses (9, 10, 11) from chap. vi. :—

“And when He opened the fifth seal, I saw beneath the altar the souls of the ones having-been-slain on-account-of the Word of the God and on-account-of the witnessing which they-were-having. (10) And they cried with a loud voice, saying, until when, O Master, the holy and truthful, art-Thou not-judging and exacting-justice-for our blood from-out-of the *ones* dwelling upon the land? (11) And there-was-given to them a white robe, and it-was-spoken to them, in-order-that they-shall-refresh-themselves (take-rest) yet a time, until also their fellow-bondmen shall-have-fulfilled (? *their witness*), and their brethren the *ones* being-about-to-be about-to-kill-themselves (to bring about their own death), as also themselves (have done).”

The Commentary which accompanies the translation is apparently the work of an earnest man, who thoroughly believes that the visions of the Apocalypse have been fulfilled in the events of modern history, and who is not much accustomed to literary expression. In the Beast, it is hardly necessary to say, he sees the type of the Papal power, and for the number of his name he has recourse to the old but erroneous solution of Irenæus. If he knows anything of what rational criticism has done to clear up the mysteries of this singular book, he has carefully concealed that knowledge.

R. B. DRUMMOND.

#### SOME RECENT SERMONS.

WE cannot pay a higher compliment to the author of “Spirit and Form” † than by saying that his discourses remind us of the non-theological sermons of the late Canon Mozley. The volume exhibits a peculiar power of keen analysis, combined with accurate observation, and a special insight into the religious and moral temper of the wide middle-class, to whom the sermons were addressed. Mr. Hawkins has been careful to avoid a professional treatment of his subjects. One of the most noteworthy discourses before us dwells strongly on the “growing conviction that we all have an ordination at the hands of God.” In a sermon on “Christianity and Civilisation,” the “spirit” of the Christian future hope is admirably drawn out, and distinguished from its local and temporary “form.” “The consciousness of invisible realities” is our “modern equivalent for the phrase and idea of ‘the Lord is at hand.’”

\* John's Apocalypse, Literally Translated, and Spiritually Interpreted. By H. Browne, M.A., Glas.; M.D., Lond.; Consulting Physician to the Manchester Royal Infirmary. Manchester: Tubbs, Brook, and Chrystal; London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1881.

† Spirit and Form. Sermons Preached in the Parish Church of Leatherhead. By E. C. Hawkins, M.A. London: C. Kegan Paul. 1881.

The belief in immortality has been the secret of material progress. No one can say that in our day this is a needless Gospel. On the "idolatry of the text of Scripture," Mr. Hawkins speaks of the indolent habit of regarding religion merely as an "objective historical system," and not as primarily a "permanent state of mind and feeling" towards the Invisible. On the "uncertainty of criticism," we are warned that the New Testament has nothing in praise of such certainty; certainty implies rules, but the religion of Christ is based on principles. Beneath all imperfections and all criticism, the Bible contains for ever the "power of an endless life." We may call attention to sermons on the "World," the spirit of which, contends the author, is best exhibited now, as in our Lord's day, in much of conventional religion; on "Religious Excitement" and "Social Pressure," which reveal a fresh and genuine insight into certain regions of human nature. Lastly, we can recommend, for earnest perusal, what Mr. Hawkins has to say on "True Almsgiving," in some ways the most apposite sermon in the volume. Paul's life is the ideal of true almsgiving. His power of "making many rich" lay in his wealth of spiritual strength, courage, and hope. Being great, Paul could make others great. Our almsgiving is the reverse of this. "In helping the poor, we are lavish of our money, but niggardly of time, trouble, companionship." The spirit of true charity is lost in the form. This sermon alone should make the book a success. It is a book to read carefully, and to keep.

Of Mr. Geldart's sermons\* "two were originally preached to Church of England congregations; the rest were written for the pulpit of Hope Street Church, Liverpool." The volume exhibits a distinct earlier and later manner; and we confess that the later, and less polemical, shows their author to better advantage. We feel indeed the fire and unflinching manliness of such sermons as those on "Our Calling and Election" and "Not Ashamed of the Gospel," but it is not altogether the fire that warms. We welcome the repose and quiet confidence of "Holy Ground" and "Christmas Day" with which the volume closes. The book is the work of a man of culture and of real conviction. It is conspicuously Christian. To know Christ and Him crucified is the ideal of religion. We can commend especially the sermons headed "Good Friday" and "Will ye also go away?" as Mr. Geldart's answer to the question, "What think ye of Christ?" Though surrendering his belief in the Divinity of Christ, he preaches boldly the power of His name. Critical research has resulted for Mr. Geldart in a deeper sense of God in man and the Universe. The sermons are printed as they were delivered, which may excuse the defect of a too exuberant style occasionally noticeable.

Mr. Voysey's addresses† on the Lord's Prayer are opportune. The best

\* Faith and Freedom. Sermons by E. M. Geldart, M.A., late scholar of Balliol College, minister of Croydon Free Christian Church. Trübner. 1881.

† The Sling and the Stone. Vol. viii. On the Lord's Prayer. By Rev. Charles Voysey. Williams and Norgate. 1881.

of them is the first, on the "Fatherhood of God," wherein the conception of God, which all creeds alike are fast recognising as the keystone of religion, is set forth with its author's peculiar devoutness. Mr. Voysey's anti-Christian position appears as strongly defined as ever; and when he says that "the star of Jesus must set to rise no more," we feel that he is casting from him the one religious power of civilisation. The religion of the future will, we venture to think, be more and more Christian, whatever the special view that is taken of the nature of the Master. On the petition for "Our Daily Bread," Mr. Voysey has some simple and excellent remarks on prayer for physical welfare, as the outcome of the "child-like" relation to God, and as necessary to our present stage of religious apprehension. The whole question of prayer is treated with a piety and humility which render Mr. Voysey's conclusions valuable to all sections of believers. Temptation as essential to the very idea of morality is the subject of a whole address, which, like the rest, the author does not hesitate to illustrate from his own inner experience.

W. H. WOODWARD.

IT is now thirty-eight years since the second edition of the "Essence of Christianity" was published in Germany, and twenty-seven years since it was translated into English by Marian Evans—the late "George Eliot." A second edition of this translation is now issued as the fifteenth volume of "the English and Foreign Philosophical Library."\* It is not a very readable book, except to those who share Milton's enthusiasm—

"How charming is divine philosophy!  
Not harsh and crabbed as dull fools suppose;  
But musical as is Apollo's lute,  
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets,  
Where no crude surfeit reigns."

Such may find a certain intellectual charm in the book, but "dull fools" who cannot rise much above a demand for common-sense and ethical consistency, and who like to take words in their plain meanings, will peedily experience a "surfeit" and lay it down. The volume is, nevertheless, learned, clever, suggestive, and—disappointing. Its author claims to give "a faithful, correct translation of the Christian religion out of the Oriental language of imagery into plain speech"—"a close translation, or, to speak literally, an empirical or historico-philosophical analysis, a solution of the enigma of the Christian religion." This is supposed to be done by dealing solely with facts. No materials are recognised but such as can be appreciated through the senses. The process of reasoning is that of "natural philosophy in the domain of mind," and has for its principle, not some abstract idea, but man, and man alone. The author eschews speculation utterly—speculating, however, from beginning to end—proposing to "let religion itself speak, and thus to show that atheism, in the sense of this work, is the secret of religion itself, which

\* The *Essence of Christianity*. By Ludwig Feuerbach. Translated from the Second German Edition by Marian Evans, translator of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*. Second Edition. London: Trübner and Co. 1881.

in its essence believes in nothing else than the truth and divinity of human nature." "The true sense of Theology is Anthropology, and there is no distinction between the predicates of the divine and human nature, no distinction between the divine and human subject—any attempt to make such ends in absurdity." Consequently the definitions which religion gives of God only make objective the true nature of man. This does not make God, religion, &c., mere illusions, because man, into which they are resolved as true object and substance, is essentially real, so that in reducing Theology to Anthropology, Anthropology is exalted into Theology. "Religion is the dream of the human mind, but even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm of reality. We only see real things in the entrancing splendour of imagination and caprice, instead of in the simple daylight of reality and necessity." What Feuerbach—not with excess of modesty—says he does, "is nothing more to religion, and to speculative philosophy and theology also, than to open its eyes, or, rather, to turn its gaze from the internal towards the external, *i.e.*, to change the object as it is in the imagination, into the object as it is in the reality." This aim of the book is followed out into detail in an Introduction dealing with "the essential nature of man" and "the essence of religion," and through twenty-eight chapters, and a large body of notes in an Appendix, applying Anthropology, pure and simple, as a test and solution to all the objects, doctrines, and difficulties of religious faith, a discussion into which comparatively few will follow our author, for, as he says, "the very form which the purpose of the book imposes upon it makes it unsuitable for popular reading." This is a true testimony, and we cannot have it upon better authority. It will be a very small minority of those who begin to read the volume who will be able to subscribe to the statement of S. Baring-Gould which the publishers have put upon the fly-leaf, in which that clever, but erratic writer, says, "I confess that to Feuerbach I owe a debt of inestimable gratitude. Feeling about in uncertainty for the ground, and finding everywhere shifting sands, Feuerbach cast a sudden blaze into the darkness, and disclosed to me the way."

The book is vitiated by a confusion together of Christianity and religion, as if they were necessarily the same thing, and by a similar confusion of historical Christianity and the essential teachings of Jesus; but its great weakness, which is radical, persistent, and permeates every page, is that Feuerbach—for all his boasted first principle—does *not* take facts as they are. He takes them, and gives them new predicates, new definitions, new relations, and new applications, and then proceeds to apply his philosophy, and interpret them accordingly. His conclusions are not the consequent and necessary deduction from facts; they are simply his interpretation of facts, which he has manipulated by his philosophy, having first assumed that it is the only true one. He gets out of his facts only what he has first put into them. He does not come, in the true spirit of science, to question facts by experiment, analysis, and synthesis, but brings his ready-made formula, and, by one way or other, makes it express everything. So far as the book has any evidence,

it proves a great deal too much ; but its stronghold is its superb dogmatic assertiveness, more or less disguised under forms of argument. The great reason why things are so, and why certain theories and interpretations are true, is that Feuerbach says they are so, and that must suffice. He does not realise at all that there are many things in the nature of man, in the development of religious thought and feeling, and in the suggestive aspects of natural facts, which cannot be dealt with by his method ; and if the appeal is to be to facts, and to facts only—to which we say, by all means!—it surely is not irrelevant to ask, Whence come the facts themselves ? What makes them what they are ? How arises that wonderful, mysterious order, which gives them continuity and beauty ? A philosophy of Anthropology might seem to cover the case if man alone were concerned ; but it is no key to the universe, and reveals no essential unity, which is the central life and law alike of worlds and souls. It is difficult to see why this book should have been republished. It speaks to no need of to-day. Whatever interest it may have had is now passed, or remains only for the student as one possible phase of thought. It is probable that the recent death of George Eliot may awaken some attention to one of her earlier pieces of literary work ; but her admirers who come to it will find little to move them except to a curious wonder what the inward thought and life of a young lady must have been who gave herself to such a work. Perhaps when her biography appears, it may throw some light upon the subject.

T. W. F.

IF Professor Adamson's treatise \* on Fichte proves a commercial success, this will probably be rather due to the attractive features which the personal history of this philosopher presents than to the able introduction to Fichte's philosophical system, which forms the concluding half of the volume. The interest which noted philosophers excite centres naturally rather in their writings than in their biography. Fichte's case, however, is exceptional ; for the ethical grandeur of his personality, and his noble efforts to awaken a higher moral life in his countrymen, appeal to a far wider class of admirers than his philosophy can hope to attract. To quote Mr. Adamson's words :—"There exists not now, there never did exist to any extent, a school of followers of Fichte ; it may well be doubted if there are at present half-a-dozen students of his works. As a patriot, as representative of what seems noblest and loftiest in the German character, he lives, and will doubtless continue to live, in the grateful remembrance of his countrymen. As a metaphysician, he lives not at all beyond the learned pages of the historians of philosophy." The last clause is, perhaps, too unqualified. Fichte's teachings have exerted, and probably will continue to exert, a living influence on theological thought ; and even in this country Dr. William Smith's translations of the more popular treatises have not been without effect in this

\* Fichte. By Robert Adamson, M.A., Professor of Logic in the Owens College. London: W. Blackwood and Sons. 1881.

direction. Still it is no doubt true that what is most original and precious in Fichte's ideas has, in the main, been taken up by Hegel, and incorporated in his more imposing and self-consistent philosophical system.

Professor Adamson's graphic sketch of Fichte's life and surroundings is drawn from richer materials than were accessible when Dr. William Smith compiled his excellent life of this philosopher; and if, as we fear will be the case, most readers will close the book after having adventured a short way into the exposition of Fichte's philosophy, this will not be owing to any fault on Mr. Adamson's part. He has performed his very difficult task with conscientious care, and with conspicuous ability; but our country has not yet passed to that stage of intellectual culture when such reflections as those of Fichte can be widely understood and appreciated. We can manage somehow to follow Mr. Bain or Mr. Spencer in those generalisations of physical and psychological phenomena which they mis-name philosophy; but our national training has not yet brought home to us the truth that all this knowledge of the objective and subjective facts of experience is only suggestive of fundamental speculative questions as to what are the prior conditions which render this experience possible. Thought investigates physical and psychological experience, but the physical and psychological sciences are of themselves utterly incompetent to give any account of the origin and conditions of that thinking faculty to whose activity they owe their being.

Fichte, taking up the criticism of the *a priori* conditions of experience as given by Kant, rejected that philosopher's doctrine of the existence of "the thing in itself," and sought in self-consciousness alone the true and sole source both of the subjective and of the objective world. Professor Adamson combats the general impression that Fichte's later philosophy is inconsistent with his earlier view, and he maintains that at no period of his philosophical development did Fichte hold the doctrine of subjective idealism. According to Professor Adamson, the self-consciousness in which Fichte in his earlier writings found the ground of all reality is not the individual consciousness, but that universal element in all individuals which partakes of infinitude, and which, while it is essentially ever one and the same, is yet the creative source of all the variety of finite spirits. Fichte holds that unless we see that *God is involved in our self-consciousness*, his existence must be for us for ever contingent and unnecessary. In this doctrine of the absolute inseparability of God and the soul, Fichte is probably simply expressing as a philosopher the same fact which Jesus, speaking from the stand-point of religious experience, expresses when he refers all that is divine in his words and deeds, not so much to his own activity as to that of the Father within him. This mysterious blending of man's higher life with the life of God is constantly being suggested by the thoughtful study of either the intellectual, the ethical, or the religious aspects of human nature; and here it is, as it seems to us, that Fichte's theology has the advantage over that of Berkeley. Berkeley, at least in his earlier writings, regarded God as a being of infinite wisdom and love,

existing substantially apart from our finite spirits, and impressing upon our minds from without those sensations and ideas which we interpret as an objective world. According to Fichte, on the other hand, the presence of God is an integral part of our own self-consciousness, and to attempt to think of ourselves as existing apart from Him involves us in hopeless contradictions. It must be admitted, however, that Fichte's view is very apt to oscillate between two errors; to pass, on the one hand, into Subjective Idealism, and on the other into Idealistic Pantheism. It is because Fichte at times seems to slip decidedly into this latter position that his system has been sometimes called "Spinozism inverted."

There is one part of Mr. Adamson's exposition in which we should have liked to have a fuller and more explicit utterance. What was Fichte's position in regard to the question of man's Moral Freedom? We are told of Fichte's vehement defence of man's free will and consequent responsibility; but the language which Professor Adamson uses in describing the individual personality as one of the *manifestations* of the universal Ego or God, seems to imply a doctrine of determinism as unqualified as that of Spinoza or Hegel. So far as we can understand Fichte's attitude, as interpreted by Mr. Adamson, there is nothing in his view of the relations between man and God which would justify us in saying to a wilful wrong-doer, "You are to blame, for your conduct might have been other than it actually has been." Fichte seems really to have held a similar view to that of Leibnitz, who said that a man was to blame not because he could have acted otherwise, but because he felt that he had *himself* done the evil act in the absence of all foreign compulsion. It is evident, however, that this doctrine does away with that uncaused causation in the matter of *free choice*, which is absolutely essential as a metaphysical ground for true responsibility and blame; and how Fichte, with his intense ethical vitality, could have been content with this pseudo-freedom and pseudo-responsibility is to us a most perplexing problem, on which we had expected and hoped that Professor Adamson's careful first-hand study of Fichte's writings would have thrown some light.

On the whole, Fichte's doctrine that God is involved in self-consciousness, and is the moral order of the universe, does not in his hands seem to us to yield the adequate philosophical satisfaction for man's religious needs. The causality of man, in his view, seems to be merged in the all-pervading causality of God, and hence no foundation is left for human merit or demerit. Nor can the soul find, we think, in this view of God, as "the moral order of the universe," a sufficient metaphysical basis for that reciprocal relation of affection between the spirit and the in-dwelling Father, which is an essential element in religious experience. Still, it cannot be denied that, whether with or without consistency with his formal system, Fichte does at times speak of the soul's relation to God and Heaven in terms which seem to express the warmest personal relation between the soul and God.

It may be noted, in conclusion, that it is rather to be regretted that the



present volume of these "Philosophical Classics" was not preceded by the volumes on Spinoza and Kant, as some acquaintance with those philosophers is essential to the full understanding of Mr. Adamson's able exposition of Fichte's system.

C. B. U.

WE have received from Messrs. Trübner and Co. a copy of the "Cambridge Edition" (excellent as to type, paper, and binding) of the Dramatic Works of Mr. Bayard Taylor.\* There is nothing in the volume which was not published in the author's lifetime, except the notes, in which an interesting account is given of the circumstances under which the poems were written, and certain passages are explained or illustrated. Although, however, this new edition of works already known to no inconsiderable number of readers on this side of the Atlantic, does not now call for any detailed description or criticism, we willingly avail ourselves of the opportunity of saying a word of high appreciation of these latest and most mature productions of a poet whose gifts of artistic skill and intellectual culture were intimately connected with a broad and loving faith and deep spiritual earnestness. The three poems which the volume contains—"The Prophet," "The Masque of the Gods," and "Prince Deukalion"—were written after the author had completed his well-known translation of Goethe's "Faust;" and no doubt we see in them some of the fruits of the labour and study which were bestowed on the great German master-piece. But it was the American poet's own talent that was so cultivated, and, both in subject and treatment, Mr. Bayard Taylor showed a true originality; and he marked these, his latest works, most distinctly with the stamp of his own peculiar genius. The hero of "The Prophet" is a youth of dreamy and enthusiastic temperament who becomes the founder of a new sect and takes his followers across the prairies to found a city of the faithful. His faith is based on a narrow literalism which leads him to apply to his own personal history the Scriptural promises of miraculous gifts, and makes him look for special revelations and departures from the order of the divine government. The comparatively innocent self-delusions with which his career begins become complicated with more dangerous influences both from within and from without, and his course tends ever towards a tragic issue in guilt and disaster. In the great moral crises in the plot we might look, perhaps, for more intense dramatic expression than the author has given; but, as he himself has remarked, "the tragic element in the poem is placed chiefly in its moral and spiritual aspects, not in its action." The poem is full of interest and power, and the author's skill in clear, expressive verse seldom, if ever, fails him. The same may be said of "Prince Deukalion," and of its prelude, "The Masque of the Gods." These, however, are purely imaginative and idealistic poems, the *dramatis personæ* being those familiar mythological

\* The Dramatic Works of Bayard Taylor. With Notes by Marie Hansen-Taylor. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co. London: Trübner and Co. 1880.

beings who are made to do duty in modern poetry for so many artistic or moral purposes. The author's main design is to bring out some of the leading ideas which were embodied in the religions of the past, and to show how the outworn creeds and dim visions had given place to the higher conceptions for which they had been in some degree a preparation; and he carries us forward in imagination and hope into the full divine light of that day, the dawn of which he saw already brightening around him. If the exact significance of each character be not always self-evident, it is easy to grasp the general idea of the poem; and we can enjoy its fine literary quality, while we yield to the charm of that spirit of pure moral earnestness and sympathy with all that is highest and best in life which pervades it. Mrs. Hansen-Taylor remarks that in his dramas the author "ceased to sing to his old audiences; he now sang to himself, and to the few who were able to understand him." Certainly some of that smaller sympathetic audience ought to be found among our readers.

R. C. J.

THE winds of heaven are mighty and manifold in their might. From East and West, from North and South they blow, but not more contrary in direction than in character. They quicken the flowers of spring, and rend the full-grown tree up from its roots; they fan the child's face, hot with its play, and enrage the sea with their fierce beat. They bring us rain, and drive the clouds afar. We live in them and of them. But there is no boast of the spirits of the air which the spirit of man may not rightly usurp; no epithet of the wind but is more properly its own; no work of the wind but it can perform in higher fashion. It can be keen and bitter, and gentle and playful, and strong. It can raise the storm in "Lear," and whistle and laugh aloud with Falstaff. Its great sea waves are in the Iliad, its terror in the Inferno. It has, too, its cardinal points, a spiritual four—Lyric and Epic, Satiric and Dramatic—and the varieties and combinations, and permutations of these are all the Inspirations, storm or zephyr breathings, of man's spirit.

Such is the idea of the great work of the greatest of living—may we say of nineteenth century?—poets, which has just appeared.\*

The first book is devoted to satire. The hymn universal which rises ever to God, singing, "with all the flowers and all the stars, proud, bright, triumphant," changes to hooting, to a hiss, as passes Satan.

"L'être immonde qui cherche à tout prostituer,"

and yet its hiss is praise, its hoot a psalm.

This part consists of forty-four fragments of various high merit. Pity and contempt and wrath find utterance abundant, and subjects of universal often—sometimes of too personal interest. One can hardly help regretting that poor blind Mgr. Ségur was not spared so savage an attack. "No quarter" must necessarily be the word on the orthodox side; but cannot Liberals afford to be generous, and nobly proud above insult?

"Le Livre Lyrique" is likewise fragmentary, as its very name, indeed,

\* Les Quatre Vents de l'Esprit. Par Victor Hugo. Paris. 1881.

implies; and it is impossible to render count of it briefly. And the drama we must pass over, too, to reach what seems to us far to outweigh the three other quarters of the book—the epic of the Revolution. It is hazardous to venture an outline of the argument, lest an unskilful pen render ridiculous what the poet recounts in style which never descends from the terrible and sublime. Suffice it to say how one night of wind and clouds, from his pedestal in the darkness, above the rushing waters of the Seine, the bronze statue of Henri Quatre, armed and mounted, descends into the still streets of Paris, and obedient to an unknown voice, borne upon the winds, goes to see how fares the marble statue of his son. They, together, the black horseman and the white, seek the third King's bronze statue, and, it joining them, the three—father, son, and grandson—go in further quest of the fourth, the grandson's grandson, successor and heir, Louis the Fifteenth. Cold, deaf, silent, they make their way in the deep, sad night till they reach the place where should stand the statue. But it is the site only of the guillotine, rising tall, black, ominous, against the gloom, and in the darkness passes a head pale and bleeding.

"The horsemen shuddered, and the forefather of bronze spoke: 'What is thy crime! Oh, dread head, which goest by, paler than Christ upon crucifix of ebony?' 'I am the grandson of thy grandson!' 'And whence comest thou?' 'From the throne. Oh, Kings, the dawn is terrible!' 'Spectre, what is that scaffold there so horrible?' 'It is the end,' said the head, with sad, soft regard. 'And who, then, constructed it?' 'Oh, my fathers, even you.'"

CHARLES HARGROVE.

THAT Madame de Sévigné\* should be accorded a pedestal in Mrs. Oliphant's temple beside Dante, Goethe, Molière, and Cervantes, is at the first moment matter of surprise. But a second thought fully justifies the admission of *la belle Parisienne*. Lesser lights than those world-names—Pascal, Saint Simon, La Fontaine—have been adjudged places in this palace of fame; and with them Madame de Sévigné may fairly claim the rights of literary comradeship. No printer's devil ever knocked at Madame de Sévigné's door; her works lay folded in the desk of Bussy or the dressing-case of Madame de Grignan. Letters only; and yet literature in the truest sense. For these famous letters were the transparent revelation of a life, the mirror of a mind and heart. Indeed, they were more: they were the faithful picture by the pencil of genius of that exquisitely refined, yet outrageously coarse, that gay, miserable, brilliant, wicked society that gathered round the court of *le grand monarque*,—a picture hiding nothing, yet throwing the purity of the consummate artist's touch over the profligacy of that corrupt humanity. Madame de Sévigné kept her own name free from the breath of scorn, in an atmosphere wherein scandal was in all men's mouths; and the genius of native self-respect which helped her to do this, taught her also to touch with a marvellous delicacy the follies and sins around her.

\* Madame de Sévigné. By Miss Thackeray (Mrs. Richmond Ritchie). Foreign Classics for English Readers. London: Blackwood and Sons. 1881.

"It is impossible to speak of women," says Sainte Beuve, "without first putting one's self into good humour by the thought of Madame de Sévigné. With us moderns, this process takes the place of one of those invocations or libations which the ancients were used to offer up to the pure source of grace." One is inclined to say that it is impossible to think of the literary women of our own day without first putting one's self into good humour by the thought of Miss Thackeray. No more charming friend could introduce us to *l'incomparable Marquise*, nor any with a more delicate sensibility to the subtle fragrance of the beautiful French-woman's thought and style.

The reader, however, lays down the little book—as he must all books dealing faithfully with seventeenth century France—with an oppressive sense of the cruel, hateful selfishness of the high-born and the powerful in the *grand siècle*. Even Madame de Sévigné's gentle heart is only moderately disturbed by the frightful wrongs and woes of the Breton peasantry; and her idolised daughter is the petted, flattered incarnation of indifference to the great world's sorrows. The France of to-day has yet its grave problems to solve, and may err and go astray. But, thank God, the France of Madame de Sévigné is for ever more impossible. Even fanaticism, blood, and terror were not too high a price for that deliverance.

THE name of Sir Colin Campbell is indissolubly connected in the minds of Englishmen with those of Sir Henry Havelock and Sir James Outram. Lucknow and the Mutiny have made these three for ever famous. All that is noblest in the British soldier, all that most fires the enthusiasm of a martial patriotism, each of the illustrious trio displayed in those terrible months, when the penalty of the forefathers' lust of conquest and lust of gold was visited on the children in the third and fourth generations. Each name will ever be pronounced with gratitude and honour by English lips. But while Outram, by the daring and adventure of his youth, and the strenuous individuality of his manhood, and Havelock, by the evangelic fervour of his faith, showed themselves something more than soldiers, and have for us a personal fascination outside their professional careers, the courageous, prudent, devoted, forethoughtful commander-in-chief of the armies of India was a soldier pure and simple, and exhibits as unmixed a type of high soldiery as can be found in the pages of military history. The man of letters or of affairs who desires to read and realise in its purest essence the life and consciousness of the man of arms, could go to no better book for his purpose than General Shadwell's ponderous—but not too ponderous—*Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde*.\*

Colin Campbell, or rather Colin Macliver—for such was the great commander's real name—entered the army at the early age of sixteen years, and saw active service in the Peninsula under Sir John Moore and Wellington.

\* *The Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde, Illustrated by Extracts from his Diary and Correspondence.* By Lieut.-General Shadwell, C.B. In two Volumes. London: Blackwood and Sons. 1881.